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126cdaf47a
Our uses of gss_display_status() and gss_display_name() assumed that the gss_buffer_desc strings returned by those functions are null-terminated. It appears that they generally are, given the lack of field complaints up to now. However, the available documentation does not promise this, and some man pages for gss_display_status() show examples that rely on the gss_buffer_desc.length field instead of expecting null termination. Also, we now have a report that on some implementations, clang's address sanitizer is of the opinion that the byte after the specified length is undefined. Hence, change the code to rely on the length field instead. This might well be cosmetic rather than fixing any real bug, but it's hard to be sure, so back-patch to all supported branches. While here, also back-patch the v12 changes that made pg_GSS_error deal honestly with multiple messages available from gss_display_status. Per report from Sudheer H R. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/5372B6D4-8276-42C0-B8FB-BD0918826FC3@tekenlight.com |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| auth-scram.c | ||
| auth.c | ||
| be-fsstubs.c | ||
| be-gssapi-common.c | ||
| be-secure-common.c | ||
| be-secure-gssapi.c | ||
| be-secure-openssl.c | ||
| be-secure.c | ||
| crypt.c | ||
| hba.c | ||
| ifaddr.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pg_hba.conf.sample | ||
| pg_ident.conf.sample | ||
| pqcomm.c | ||
| pqformat.c | ||
| pqmq.c | ||
| pqsignal.c | ||
| README.SSL | ||
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
|
(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
|
Send 'S'
|
|
Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
|
|
Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
|
|
Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
|
|
Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
|
Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).