The NFC recomposition incorrectly included TBASE as a valid T syllable,
which is incorrect based on the Unicode specification (TBASE is one
below the start of the range, range beginning at U+11A8).
This would cause the TBASE to be silently swallowed in the
normalization, leading to an incorrect result.
A couple of regression tests are added to check more patterns with
Hangul recomposition and decomposition, on top of a test to check the
problem with TBASE. Diego has submitted the code fix, and I have
written the tests.
Author: Diego Frias <mail@dzfrias.dev>
Co-authored-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/B92ED640-7D4A-4505-B09F-3548F58CBB16@dzfrias.dev
Backpatch-through: 14
Define MaxAllocSize in src/include/common/fe_memutils.h rather
than having several copies of it in different src/common/*.c files.
This also provides an opportunity to document it better.
Back-patch of commit 11b7de4a7, needed now because assorted security
fixes are adding additional references to MaxAllocSize in frontend
code.
Backpatch-through: 14-17
Security: CVE-2026-6473
Some UTF8 characters decompose to more than a dozen codepoints.
It is possible for an input string that fits into well under
1GB to produce more than 4G decomposed codepoints, causing
unicode_normalize()'s decomp_size variable to wrap around to a
small positive value. This results in a small output buffer
allocation and subsequent buffer overrun.
To fix, test after each addition to see if we've overrun MaxAllocSize,
and break out of the loop early if so. In frontend code we want to
just return NULL for this failure (treating it like OOM). In the
backend, we can rely on the following palloc() call to throw error.
I also tightened things up in the calling functions in varlena.c,
using size_t rather than int and allocating the input workspace
with palloc_array(). These changes are probably unnecessary
given the knowledge that the original input and the normalized
output_chars array must fit into 1GB, but it's a lot easier to
believe the code is safe with these changes.
Reported-by: Xint Code
Reported-by: Bruce Dang <bruce@calif.io>
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Co-authored-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-6473
Sufficiently large "count" arguments could result in undetected
overflow, causing the allocated memory chunk to be much smaller
than what the caller will subsequently write into it. This is
unlikely to be a hazard with 64-bit size_t but can sometimes
happen on 32-bit builds, primarily where a function allocates
workspace that's significantly larger than its input data.
Rather than trying to patch the at-risk callers piecemeal,
let's just redefine these macros so that they always check.
To do that, move the longstanding add_size() and mul_size() functions
into palloc.h and mcxt.c, and adjust them to not be specific to
shared-memory allocation. Then invent palloc_mul(), palloc0_mul(),
palloc_mul_extended() to use these functions. Actually, the latter
use inlined copies to save one function call. repalloc_array() gets
similar treatment. I didn't bother trying to inline the calls for
repalloc0_array() though.
In v14 and v15, this also adds repalloc_extended(), which previously
was only available in v16 and up.
We need copies of all this in fe_memutils.[hc] as well, since that
module also provides palloc_array() etc.
Reported-by: Xint Code
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Reviewed-by: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-6473
After a recent macOS update, building Postgres produces warnings
that look like this:
ranlib: warning: 'libpgport_shlib.a(pg_cpu_x86.c.o)' has no symbols
ranlib: warning: 'libpgport_shlib.a(pg_popcount_x86.c.o)' has no symbols
To fix, add a dummy symbol to files that may otherwise have none.
Per project policy, this is a candidate for back-patching into
out-of-support branches: it suppresses annoying compiler warnings
but changes no behavior.
Reported-by: Zhang Mingli <zmlpostgres@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: John Naylor <johncnaylorls@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/229aaaf3-f529-44ed-8e50-00cb6909af21%40Spark
Backpatch-through: 13
* JOHAB: replace the incorrect "simplified Chinese" description with
a correct one that identifies it as the Korean combining (Johab)
encoding standardized in KS X 1001 annex 3.
* EUC_KR: drop a stray space before the comma in the existing
comment, and note that the encoding covers the KS X 1001
precomposed (Wansung) form.
* UHC: spell out "Unified Hangul Code", clarify that it is
Microsoft Windows CodePage 949, and describe its relationship to
EUC-KR (superset covering all 11,172 precomposed Hangul syllables).
Backpatch-through: 14
Author: Henson Choi <assam258@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAAAe_zAFz1v-3b7Je4L%2B%3DwZM3UGAczXV47YVZfZi9wbJxspxeA%40mail.gmail.com
When decoding a match tag, pglz_decompress() reads 2 bytes (or 3
for extended-length matches) from the source buffer before checking
whether enough data remains. The existing bounds check (sp > srcend)
occurs after the reads, so truncated compressed data that ends
mid-tag causes a read past the allocated buffer.
Fix by validating that sufficient source bytes are available before
reading each part of the match tag. The post-read sp > srcend
check is no longer needed and is removed.
Found by fuzz testing with libFuzzer and AddressSanitizer.
Backpatch-through: 14
When converting multibyte to pg_wchar, the UTF-8 implementation would
silently ignore an incomplete final character, while the other
implementations would cast a single byte to pg_wchar, and then repeat
for the remaining byte sequence. While it didn't overrun the buffer, it
was surely garbage output.
Make all encodings behave like the UTF-8 implementation. A later change
for master only will convert this to an error, but we choose not to
back-patch that behavior change on the off-chance that someone is
relying on the existing UTF-8 behavior.
Security: CVE-2026-2006
Backpatch-through: 14
Author: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
While EUC_CN supports only 1- and 2-byte sequences (CS0, CS1), the
mb<->wchar conversion functions allow 3-byte sequences beginning SS2,
SS3.
Change pg_encoding_max_length() to return 3, not 2, to close a
hypothesized buffer overrun if a corrupted string is converted to wchar
and back again in a newly allocated buffer. We might reconsider that in
master (ie harmonizing in a different direction), but this change seems
better for the back-branches.
Also change pg_euccn_mblen() to report SS2 and SS3 characters as having
length 3 (following the example of EUC_KR). Even though such characters
would not pass verification, it's remotely possible that invalid bytes
could be used to compute a buffer size for use in wchar conversion.
Security: CVE-2026-2006
Backpatch-through: 14
Author: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
(This is a cherry-pick of 390b3cbbb, which I hadn't realized wasn't
backpatched. It was originally reported to security@ and determined not
to be a vulnerability; thanks to Stanislav Osipov for noticing the
omission in the back branches.)
In case of torn UTF8 in the input data we might end up going
past the end of the string since we don't account for length.
While validation won't be performed on a sequence with a NULL
byte it's better to avoid going past the end to beging with.
Fix by taking the length into consideration.
Reported-by: Stanislav Osipov <stasos24@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAOYmi+mTnmM172g=_+Yvc47hzzeAsYPy2C4UBY3HK9p-AXNV0g@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 14
With GB18030 as source encoding, applications could crash the server via
SQL functions convert() or convert_from(). Applications themselves
could crash after passing unterminated GB18030 input to libpq functions
PQescapeLiteral(), PQescapeIdentifier(), PQescapeStringConn(), or
PQescapeString(). Extension code could crash by passing unterminated
GB18030 input to jsonapi.h functions. All those functions have been
intended to handle untrusted, unterminated input safely.
A crash required allocating the input such that the last byte of the
allocation was the last byte of a virtual memory page. Some malloc()
implementations take measures against that, making the SIGSEGV hard to
reach. Back-patch to v13 (all supported versions).
Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Author: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Reviewed-by: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>
Backpatch-through: 13
Security: CVE-2025-4207
There are cases where we cannot / do not want to error out for invalidly
encoded input. In such cases it can be useful to replace e.g. an incomplete
multi-byte characters with bytes that will trigger an error when getting
validated as part of a larger string.
Unfortunately, until now, for some encoding no such sequence existed. For
those encodings this commit removes one previously accepted input combination
- we consider that to be ok, as the chosen bytes are outside of the valid
ranges for the encodings, we just previously failed to detect that.
As we cannot add a new field to pg_wchar_table without breaking ABI, this is
implemented "in-line" in the newly added function.
Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Backpatch-through: 13
Security: CVE-2025-1094
Now that lstat() reports junction points with S_IFLNK/S_ISLINK(), and
unlink() can unlink them, there is no need for conditional code for
Windows in a few places. That was expressed by testing for WIN32 or
S_ISLNK, which we can now constant-fold.
The coding around pgwin32_is_junction() was a bit suspect anyway, as we
never checked for errors, and we also know that errors can be spuriously
reported because of transient sharing violations on this OS. The
lstat()-based code has handling for that.
This also reverts 4fc6b6ee on master only. That was done because
lstat() didn't previously work for symlinks (junction points), but now
it does.
Tested-by: Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA%2BhUKGLfOOeyZpm5ByVcAt7x5Pn-%3DxGRNCvgiUPVVzjFLtnY0w%40mail.gmail.com
(cherry picked from commit 5fc88c5d53)
Author: Thomas Munro <tmunro@postgresql.org>
Author: Alexandra Wang <alexandra.wang.oss@gmail.com>
Coverity complained that pg_saslprep() could suffer integer overflow,
leading to under-allocation of the output buffer, if the input string
exceeds SIZE_MAX/4. This hazard seems largely hypothetical, but it's
easy enough to defend against, so let's do so.
This patch creates a third place in src/common/ where we are locally
defining MaxAllocSize so that we can test against that in the same way
in backend and frontend compiles. That seems like about two places
too many, so the next patch will move that into common/fe_memutils.h.
I'm hesitant to do that in back branches however.
Back-patch to v14. The code looks similar in older branches, but
before commit 67a472d71 there was a separate test on the input string
length that prevented this hazard.
Per Coverity report.
Replace a static scratch buffer with a local variable, because a
static buffer makes the function not thread-safe. This function is
used in client-code in libpq, so it needs to be thread-safe. It was
until commit b67b57a966, which replaced the implementation with the
one from pgcrypto.
Backpatch to v14, where we switched to the new implementation.
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/dfa2015d-ad21-4802-a4cc-3850fc5fff3f@iki.fi
json_lex_string() relies on pg_encoding_mblen_bounded() to point to the
end of a JSON string when generating an error message, and the input it
uses is not guaranteed to be null-terminated.
It was possible to walk off the end of the input buffer by a few bytes
when the last bytes consist of an incomplete multi-byte sequence, as
token_terminator would point to a location defined by
pg_encoding_mblen_bounded() rather than the end of the input. This
commit switches token_terminator so as the error uses data up to the
end of the JSON input.
More work should be done so as this code could rely on an equivalent of
report_invalid_encoding() so as incorrect byte sequences can show in
error messages in a readable form. This requires work for at least two
cases in the JSON parsing API: an incomplete token and an invalid escape
sequence. A more complete solution may be too invasive for a backpatch,
so this is left as a future improvement, taking care of the overread
first.
A test is added on HEAD as test_json_parser makes this issue
straight-forward to check.
Note that pg_encoding_mblen_bounded() no longer has any callers. This
will be removed on HEAD with a separate commit, as this is proving to
encourage unsafe coding.
Author: Jacob Champion
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAOYmi+ncM7pwLS3AnKCSmoqqtpjvA8wmCdoBtKA3ZrB2hZG6zA@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 13
When processing a match tag, check to see if the claimed "off"
is more than the distance back to the output buffer start.
If it is, then the data is corrupt, and what's more we would
fetch from outside the buffer boundaries and potentially incur
a SIGSEGV. (Although the odds of that seem relatively low, given
that "off" can't be more than 4K.)
Back-patch to v13; before that, this function wasn't really
trying to protect against bad data.
Report and fix by Flavien Guedez.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/01fc0593-e31e-463d-902c-dd43174acee2@oopacity.net
Some of our src/bin tools read the control file without any kind of
interlocking against concurrent writes from the server. At least ext4
and ntfs can expose partially modified contents when you do that.
For now, we'll try to tolerate this by retrying up to 10 times if the
checksum doesn't match, until we get two reads in a row with the same
bad checksum. This is not guaranteed to reach the right conclusion, but
it seems very likely to. Thanks to Tom Lane for this suggestion.
Various ideas for interlocking or atomicity were considered too
complicated, unportable or expensive given the lack of field reports,
but remain open for future reconsideration.
Back-patch as far as 12. It doesn't seem like a good idea to put a
heuristic change for a very rare problem into the final release of 11.
Reviewed-by: Anton A. Melnikov <aamelnikov@inbox.ru>
Reviewed-by: David Steele <david@pgmasters.net>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20221123014224.xisi44byq3cf5psi%40awork3.anarazel.de
The majority of error exit cases in json_lex_string() failed to
set lex->token_terminator, causing problems for the error context
reporting code: it would see token_terminator less than token_start
and do something more or less nuts. In v14 and up the end result
could be as bad as a crash in report_json_context(). Older
versions accidentally avoided that fate; but all versions produce
error context lines that are far less useful than intended,
because they'd stop at the end of the prior token instead of
continuing to where the actually-bad input is.
To fix, invent some macros that make it less notationally painful
to do the right thing. Also add documentation about what the
function is actually required to do; and in >= v14, add an assertion
in report_json_context about token_terminator being sufficiently
far advanced.
Per report from Nikolay Shaplov. Back-patch to all supported
versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/7332649.x5DLKWyVIX@thinkpad-pgpro
Try to disable ASLR when building in EXEC_BACKEND mode, to avoid random
memory mapping failures while testing. For developer use only, no
effect on regular builds.
This has been originally applied as of f3e7806 for v15~, but
recently-added buildfarm member gokiburi tests this configuration on
older branches as well, causing it to fail randomly as ASLR would be
enabled.
Suggested-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Tested-by: Bossart, Nathan <bossartn@amazon.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20210806032944.m4tz7j2w47mant26%40alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch-through: 12
This prevents marking the argument string for translation for gettext,
and it also prevents the given string (which is already translated) from
being translated at runtime.
Also, mark the strings used as arguments to check_rolespec_name for
translation.
Backpatch all the way back as appropriate. None of this is caught by
any tests (necessarily so), so I verified it manually.
On Windows with MSVC, get_dirent_type() was recently made to return
DT_LNK for junction points by commit 9d3444dc, which fixed some
defective dirent.c code.
On Windows with Cygwin, get_dirent_type() already worked for symlinks,
as it does on POSIX systems, because Cygwin has its own fake symlinks
that behave like POSIX (on closer inspection, Cygwin's dirent has the
BSD d_type extension but it's probably always DT_UNKNOWN, so we fall
back to lstat(), which understands Cygwin symlinks with S_ISLNK()).
On Windows with MinGW/MSYS, we need extra code, because the MinGW
runtime has its own readdir() without d_type, and the lstat()-based
fallback has no knowledge of our convention for treating junctions as
symlinks.
Back-patch to 14, where get_dirent_type() landed.
Reported-by: Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/b9ddf605-6b36-f90d-7c30-7b3e95c46276%40dunslane.net
For some reason by default the mingw C Runtime takes it upon itself to
expand program arguments that look like shell globbing characters. That
has caused much scratching of heads and mis-attribution of the causes of
some TAP test failures, so stop doing that.
This removes an inconsistency with Windows binaries built with MSVC,
which have no such behaviour.
Per suggestion from Noah Misch.
Backpatch to all live branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220423025927.GA1274057@rfd.leadboat.com
This reverts commits ab27df2, af8d530 and 3a0cced, that introduced
pg_cryptohash_error(). In order to make the core code able to pass down
the new error types that this introduced, some of the MD5-related
routines had to be reworked, causing an ABI breakage, but we found that
some external extensions rely on them. Maintaining compatibility
outweights the error report benefits, so just revert the change in v14.
Reported-by: Laurenz Albe
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9f0c0a96d28cf14fc87296bbe67061c14eb53ae8.camel@cybertec.at
The existing cryptohash facility was causing problems in some code paths
related to MD5 (frontend and backend) that relied on the fact that the
only type of error that could happen would be an OOM, as the MD5
implementation used in PostgreSQL ~13 (the in-core implementation is
used when compiling with or without OpenSSL in those older versions),
could fail only under this circumstance.
The new cryptohash facilities can fail for reasons other than OOMs, like
attempting MD5 when FIPS is enabled (upstream OpenSSL allows that up to
1.0.2, Fedora and Photon patch OpenSSL 1.1.1 to allow that), so this
would cause incorrect reports to show up.
This commit extends the cryptohash APIs so as callers of those routines
can fetch more context when an error happens, by using a new routine
called pg_cryptohash_error(). The error states are stored within each
implementation's internal context data, so as it is possible to extend
the logic depending on what's suited for an implementation. The default
implementation requires few error states, but OpenSSL could report
various issues depending on its internal state so more is needed in
cryptohash_openssl.c, and the code is shaped so as we are always able to
grab the necessary information.
The core code is changed to adapt to the new error routine, painting
more "const" across the call stack where the static errors are stored,
particularly in authentication code paths on variables that provide
log details. This way, any future changes would warn if attempting to
free these strings. The MD5 authentication code was also a bit blurry
about the handling of "logdetail" (LOG sent to the postmaster), so
improve the comments related that, while on it.
The origin of the problem is 87ae969, that introduced the centralized
cryptohash facility. Extra changes are done for pgcrypto in v14 for the
non-OpenSSL code path to cope with the improvements done by this
commit.
Reported-by: Michael Mühlbeyer
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/89B7F072-5BBE-4C92-903E-D83E865D9367@trivadis.com
Backpatch-through: 14
PostgreSQL 13 and newer versions are directly impacted by that through
the SQL function normalize(), which would cause a call of this function
to write one byte past its allocation if using in input an empty
string after recomposing the string with NFC and NFKC. Older versions
(v10~v12) are not directly affected by this problem as the only code
path using normalization is SASLprep in SCRAM authentication that
forbids the case of an empty string, but let's make the code more robust
anyway there so as any out-of-core callers of this function are covered.
The solution chosen to fix this issue is simple, with the addition of a
fast-exit path if the decomposed string is found as empty. This would
only happen for an empty string as at its lowest level a codepoint would
be decomposed as itself if it has no entry in the decomposition table or
if it has a decomposition size of 0.
Some tests are added to cover this issue in v13~. Note that an empty
string has always been considered as normalized (grammar "IS NF[K]{C,D}
NORMALIZED", through the SQL function is_normalized()) for all the
operations allowed (NFC, NFD, NFKC and NFKD) since this feature has been
introduced as of 2991ac5. This behavior is unchanged but some tests are
added in v13~ to check after that.
I have also checked "make normalization-check" in src/common/unicode/,
while on it (works in 13~, and breaks in older stable branches
independently of this commit).
The release notes should just mention this commit for v13~.
Reported-by: Matthijs van der Vleuten
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17277-0c527a373794e802@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 10
The intermittent h buffer was not freed, causing it to leak. Backpatch
through 14 where HMAC was refactored to the current API.
Author: Sergey Shinderuk <s.shinderuk@postgrespro.ru>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/af07e620-7e28-a742-4637-2bc44aa7c2be@postgrespro.ru
Backpatch-through: 14
This is a combined revert of the following commits:
- c3826f8, a refactoring piece that moved the hex decoding code to
src/common/. This code was cleaned up by aef8948, as it originally
included no overflow checks in the same way as the base64 routines in
src/common/ used by SCRAM, making it unsafe for its purpose.
- aef8948, a more advanced refactoring of the hex encoding/decoding code
to src/common/ that added sanity checks on the result buffer for hex
decoding and encoding. As reported by Hans Buschmann, those overflow
checks are expensive, and it is possible to see a performance drop in
the decoding/encoding of bytea or LOs the longer they are. Simple SQLs
working on large bytea values show a clear difference in perf profile.
- ccf4e27, a cleanup made possible by aef8948.
The reverts of all those commits bring back the performance of hex
decoding and encoding back to what it was in ~13. Fow now and
post-beta3, this is the simplest option.
Reported-by: Hans Buschmann
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1629039545467.80333@nidsa.net
Backpatch-through: 14
An incorrectly-encoded multibyte character near the end of a string
could cause various processing loops to run past the string's
terminating NUL, with results ranging from no detectable issue to
a program crash, depending on what happens to be in the following
memory.
This isn't an issue in the server, because we take care to verify
the encoding of strings before doing any interesting processing
on them. However, that lack of care leaked into client-side code
which shouldn't assume that anyone has validated the encoding of
its input.
Although this is certainly a bug worth fixing, the PG security team
elected not to regard it as a security issue, primarily because
any untrusted text should be sanitized by PQescapeLiteral or
the like before being incorporated into a SQL or psql command.
(If an app fails to do so, the same technique can be used to
cause SQL injection, with probably much more dire consequences
than a mere client-program crash.) Those functions were already
made proof against this class of problem, cf CVE-2006-2313.
To fix, invent PQmblenBounded() which is like PQmblen() except it
won't return more than the number of bytes remaining in the string.
In HEAD we can make this a new libpq function, as PQmblen() is.
It seems imprudent to change libpq's API in stable branches though,
so in the back branches define PQmblenBounded as a macro in the files
that need it. (Note that just changing PQmblen's behavior would not
be a good idea; notably, it would completely break the escaping
functions' defense against this exact problem. So we just want a
version for those callers that don't have any better way of handling
this issue.)
Per private report from houjingyi. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Instead, put them in via a format placeholder. This reduces the
number of distinct translatable messages and also reduces the chances
of typos during translation. We already did this for the system call
arguments in a number of cases, so this is just the same thing taken a
bit further.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/92d6f545-5102-65d8-3c87-489f71ea0a37%40enterprisedb.com
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
This expands the binary validation in pg_upgrade with a version
check per binary to ensure that the target cluster installation
only contains binaries from the target version.
In order to reduce duplication, validate_exec is exported from
port.h and the local copy in pg_upgrade is removed.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/9328.1552952117@sss.pgh.pa.us
Point to the specific line where the error was detected; the
previous code tended to include several preceding lines as well.
Avoid re-scanning the entire input to recompute which line that
was. Simplify the logic a bit. Add test cases.
Simon Riggs and Hamid Akhtar, reviewed by Daniel Gustafsson and myself
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANbhV-EPBnXm3MF_TTWBwwqgn1a1Ghmep9VHfqmNBQ8BT0f+_g@mail.gmail.com
With its current design, a careless use of pg_cryptohash_final() could
would result in an out-of-bound write in memory as the size of the
destination buffer to store the result digest is not known to the
cryptohash internals, without the caller knowing about that. This
commit adds a new argument to pg_cryptohash_final() to allow such sanity
checks, and implements such defenses.
The internals of SCRAM for HMAC could be tightened a bit more, but as
everything is based on SCRAM_KEY_LEN with uses particular to this code
there is no need to complicate its interface more than necessary, and
this comes back to the refactoring of HMAC in core. Except that, this
minimizes the uses of the existing DIGEST_LENGTH variables, relying
instead on sizeof() for the result sizes. In ossp-uuid, this also makes
the code more defensive, as it already relied on dce_uuid_t being at
least the size of a MD5 digest.
This is in philosophy similar to cfc40d3 for base64.c and aef8948 for
hex.c.
Reported-by: Ranier Vilela
Author: Michael Paquier, Ranier Vilela
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEudQAoqEGmcff3J4sTSV-R_16Monuz-UpJFbf_dnVH=APr02Q@mail.gmail.com
This is a replacement for the existing --with-openssl, extending the
logic to make easier the addition of new SSL libraries. The grammar is
chosen to be similar to --with-uuid, where multiple values can be
chosen, with "openssl" as the only supported value for now.
The original switch, --with-openssl, is kept for compatibility.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson, Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/FAB21FC8-0F62-434F-AA78-6BD9336D630A@yesql.se
This makes pg_verify_mbstr() function faster, by allowing more efficient
encoding-specific implementations. All the implementations included in
this commit are pretty naive, they just call the same encoding-specific
verifychar functions that were used previously, but that already gives a
performance boost because the tight character-at-a-time loop is simpler.
Reviewed-by: John Naylor
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/e7861509-3960-538a-9025-b75a61188e01@iki.fi
With this commit, SHA1 goes through the implementation provided by
OpenSSL via EVP when building the backend with it, and uses as fallback
implementation KAME which was located in pgcrypto and already shaped for
an integration with a set of init, update and final routines.
Structures and routines have been renamed to make things consistent with
the fallback implementations of MD5 and SHA2.
uuid-ossp has used for ages a shortcut with pgcrypto to fetch a copy of
SHA1 if needed. This was built depending on the build options within
./configure, so this cleans up some code and removes the build
dependency between pgcrypto and uuid-ossp.
Note that this will help with the refactoring of HMAC, as pgcrypto
offers the option to use MD5, SHA1 or SHA2, so only the second option
was missing to make that possible.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9HXKTgrvJvYO7Oh@paquier.xyz
This commit addresses some issues with c3826f83 that moved the hex
decoding routine to src/common/:
- The decoding function lacked overflow checks, so when used for
security-related features it was an open door to out-of-bound writes if
not carefully used that could remain undetected. Like the base64
routines already in src/common/ used by SCRAM, this routine is reworked
to check for overflows by having the size of the destination buffer
passed as argument, with overflows checked before doing any writes.
- The encoding routine was missing. This is moved to src/common/ and
it gains the same overflow checks as the decoding part.
On failure, the hex routines of src/common/ issue an error as per the
discussion done to make them usable by frontend tools, but not by shared
libraries. Note that this is why ECPG is left out of this commit, and
it still includes a duplicated logic doing hex encoding and decoding.
While on it, this commit uses better variable names for the source and
destination buffers in the existing escape and base64 routines in
encode.c and it makes them more robust to overflow detection. The
previous core code issued a FATAL after doing out-of-bound writes if
going through the SQL functions, which would be enough to detect
problems when working on changes that impacted this area of the
code. Instead, an error is issued before doing an out-of-bound write.
The hex routines were being directly called for bytea conversions and
backup manifests without such sanity checks. The current calls happen
to not have any problems, but careless uses of such APIs could easily
lead to CVE-class bugs.
Author: Bruce Momjian, Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Sehrope Sarkuni
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201231003557.GB22199@momjian.us
This commit addresses two issues:
- In pgcrypto, MD5 computation called pg_cryptohash_{init,update,final}
without checking for the result status.
- Simplify pg_checksum_raw_context to use only one variable for all the
SHA2 options available in checksum manifests.
Reported-by: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f62f26bb-47a5-8411-46e5-4350823e06a5@iki.fi
The allocation of the cryptohash context data when building with OpenSSL
was happening in the memory context of the caller of
pg_cryptohash_create(), which could lead to issues with resowner cleanup
if cascading resources are cleaned up on an error. Like other
facilities using resowners, move the base allocation to TopMemoryContext
to ensure a correct cleanup on failure.
The resulting code gets simpler with this commit as the context data is
now hold by a unique opaque pointer, so as there is only one single
allocation done in TopMemoryContext.
After discussion, also change the cryptohash subroutines to return an
error if the caller provides NULL for the context data to ease error
detection on OOM.
Author: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9xbuEoiU3dlImfa@paquier.xyz
Since at least 2001 we've used putenv() and avoided setenv(), on the
grounds that the latter was unportable and not in POSIX. However,
POSIX added it that same year, and by now the situation has reversed:
setenv() is probably more portable than putenv(), since POSIX now
treats the latter as not being a core function. And setenv() has
cleaner semantics too. So, let's reverse that old policy.
This commit adds a simple src/port/ implementation of setenv() for
any stragglers (we have one in the buildfarm, but I'd not be surprised
if that code is never used in the field). More importantly, extend
win32env.c to also support setenv(). Then, replace usages of putenv()
with setenv(), and get rid of some ad-hoc implementations of setenv()
wannabees.
Also, adjust our src/port/ implementation of unsetenv() to follow the
POSIX spec that it returns an error indicator, rather than returning
void as per the ancient BSD convention. I don't feel a need to make
all the call sites check for errors, but the portability stub ought
to match real-world practice.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2065122.1609212051@sss.pgh.pa.us
The patch needs test cases, reorganization, and cfbot testing.
Technically reverts commits 5c31afc49d..e35b2bad1a (exclusive/inclusive)
and 08db7c63f3..ccbe34139b.
Reported-by: Tom Lane, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1ktAAG-0002V2-VB@gemulon.postgresql.org
