as per my recent proposal. release.sgml itself is now just a stub that should
change rarely; ideally, only once per major release to add a new include line.
Most editing work will occur in the release-N.N.sgml files. To update a back
branch for a minor release, just copy the appropriate release-N.N.sgml
file(s) into the back branch.
This commit doesn't change the end-product documentation at all, only the
source layout. However, it makes it easy to start omitting ancient information
from newer branches' documentation, should we ever decide to do that.
recursion when we are unable to convert a localized error message to the
client's encoding. We've been over this ground before, but as reported by
Ibrar Ahmed, it still didn't work in the case of conversion failures for
the conversion-failure message itself :-(. Fix by installing a "circuit
breaker" that disables attempts to localize this message once we get into
recursion trouble.
Patch all supported branches, because it is in fact broken in all of them;
though I had to add some missing translations to the older branches in
order to expose the failure in the particular test case I was using.
require SELECT privilege as well, since you normally need to read existing
column values within such commands. This behavior is according to spec,
but we'd never documented it before. Per gripe from Volkan Yazici.
version ones, to make it clear to users just browsing the notes
that there are a lot more changes available from whatever version
they are at than what's in the minor version release notes.
we need to be able to swallow NOTICE messages, and potentially also
ParameterStatus messages (although the latter would be a bit weird),
without exiting COPY OUT state. Fix it, and adjust the protocol documentation
to emphasize the need for this. Per off-list report from Alexander Galler.
and CLUSTER) execute as the table owner rather than the calling user, using
the same privilege-switching mechanism already used for SECURITY DEFINER
functions. The purpose of this change is to ensure that user-defined
functions used in index definitions cannot acquire the privileges of a
superuser account that is performing routine maintenance. While a function
used in an index is supposed to be IMMUTABLE and thus not able to do anything
very interesting, there are several easy ways around that restriction; and
even if we could plug them all, there would remain a risk of reading sensitive
information and broadcasting it through a covert channel such as CPU usage.
To prevent bypassing this security measure, execution of SET SESSION
AUTHORIZATION and SET ROLE is now forbidden within a SECURITY DEFINER context.
Thanks to Itagaki Takahiro for reporting this vulnerability.
Security: CVE-2007-6600
recovery stop time was used. This avoids a corner-case risk of trying to
overwrite an existing archived copy of the last WAL segment, and seems
simpler and cleaner all around than the original definition. Per example
from Jon Colverson and subsequent analysis by Simon.
This is needed to allow a security-definer function to set a truly secure
value of search_path. Without it, a malicious user can use temporary objects
to execute code with the privileges of the security-definer function. Even
pushing the temp schema to the back of the search path is not quite good
enough, because a function or operator at the back of the path might still
capture control from one nearer the front due to having a more exact datatype
match. Hence, disable searching the temp schema altogether for functions and
operators.
Security: CVE-2007-2138
