BUG/MINOR: jwe: enforce GCM tag length to 128 bits

Two fixes addressing cryptographic and parsing correctness issues:

1. Enforce 16-byte GCM authentication tag in decrypt_ciphertext()

   The base64url-decoded 5th JWE component (authentication tag) was passed
   directly to EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG with its attacker-controlled length.
   OpenSSL accepts 1-16 byte GCM tags and only verifies that many bytes, so
   a 1-byte tag reduces forgery work factor to ~256. RFC 7518 mandates 128-bit
   (16 byte) tags for A*GCM. The CBC-HMAC path already enforced correct length,
   confirming this was an oversight.

   Fix: Add (*aead_tag)->data != 16 check before the GCM branch in
   decrypt_ciphertext(), rejecting any non-16-byte tag.

   Introduced by 416b87d5db (JWE A*GCM support).

2. Enforce 16-byte GCMKW tag in parse_jose() decode_jose_field()

   The $.tag field from the attacker-supplied protected header in A*GCMKW
   key-wrap was similarly decoded without length enforcement. Fix: Add a
   size != 16 check for fields named ".tag" in decode_jose_field() when
   called from the GCMKW path.

   Introduced by 026652a7eb (GCMKW tag field parsing).
This commit is contained in:
Remi Tricot-Le Breton 2026-05-26 16:20:52 +02:00 committed by Willy Tarreau
parent ce9371a768
commit 4e7518ed21

View file

@ -266,8 +266,10 @@ static int parse_jose(struct buffer *decoded_jose, int *alg, int *enc, struct jo
if (gcm) {
/* Look for "tag" field (used by aes gcm encryption) */
if (decode_jose_field(decoded_jose, "$.tag", &jose_fields->tag, 1))
/* Look for "tag" field (used by aes gcm encryption).
* GCMKW tag must be exactly 16 bytes per RFC 7518 */
if (decode_jose_field(decoded_jose, "$.tag", &jose_fields->tag, 1) ||
b_data(jose_fields->tag) != 16)
goto end;
/* Look for "iv" field (used by aes gcm encryption) */
@ -556,6 +558,12 @@ static int decrypt_ciphertext(jwe_enc enc, struct jwt_item items[JWE_ELT_MAX],
(*aead_tag)->data = size;
if (gcm) {
/* RFC 7518 mandates a 128-bit (16 byte) authentication tag for A*GCM.
* OpenSSL accepts 1-16 bytes but only verifies that many bytes, so a
* truncated tag reduces forgery work factor to ~256 per byte short. */
if ((*aead_tag)->data != 16)
goto end;
aad = alloc_trash_chunk();
if (!aad)
goto end;