From 4e7518ed21adc7d42c5459deea3a18e51fb9c997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Remi Tricot-Le Breton Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 16:20:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MINOR: jwe: enforce GCM tag length to 128 bits Two fixes addressing cryptographic and parsing correctness issues: 1. Enforce 16-byte GCM authentication tag in decrypt_ciphertext() The base64url-decoded 5th JWE component (authentication tag) was passed directly to EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG with its attacker-controlled length. OpenSSL accepts 1-16 byte GCM tags and only verifies that many bytes, so a 1-byte tag reduces forgery work factor to ~256. RFC 7518 mandates 128-bit (16 byte) tags for A*GCM. The CBC-HMAC path already enforced correct length, confirming this was an oversight. Fix: Add (*aead_tag)->data != 16 check before the GCM branch in decrypt_ciphertext(), rejecting any non-16-byte tag. Introduced by 416b87d5db (JWE A*GCM support). 2. Enforce 16-byte GCMKW tag in parse_jose() decode_jose_field() The $.tag field from the attacker-supplied protected header in A*GCMKW key-wrap was similarly decoded without length enforcement. Fix: Add a size != 16 check for fields named ".tag" in decode_jose_field() when called from the GCMKW path. Introduced by 026652a7eb (GCMKW tag field parsing). --- src/jwe.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/jwe.c b/src/jwe.c index 27762c8d3..0471fb804 100644 --- a/src/jwe.c +++ b/src/jwe.c @@ -266,8 +266,10 @@ static int parse_jose(struct buffer *decoded_jose, int *alg, int *enc, struct jo if (gcm) { - /* Look for "tag" field (used by aes gcm encryption) */ - if (decode_jose_field(decoded_jose, "$.tag", &jose_fields->tag, 1)) + /* Look for "tag" field (used by aes gcm encryption). + * GCMKW tag must be exactly 16 bytes per RFC 7518 */ + if (decode_jose_field(decoded_jose, "$.tag", &jose_fields->tag, 1) || + b_data(jose_fields->tag) != 16) goto end; /* Look for "iv" field (used by aes gcm encryption) */ @@ -556,6 +558,12 @@ static int decrypt_ciphertext(jwe_enc enc, struct jwt_item items[JWE_ELT_MAX], (*aead_tag)->data = size; if (gcm) { + /* RFC 7518 mandates a 128-bit (16 byte) authentication tag for A*GCM. + * OpenSSL accepts 1-16 bytes but only verifies that many bytes, so a + * truncated tag reduces forgery work factor to ~256 per byte short. */ + if ((*aead_tag)->data != 16) + goto end; + aad = alloc_trash_chunk(); if (!aad) goto end;