The two new call sites added by the CLASS-validation work passed NULL
as the reason, but ns_client_dumpmessage() bails out early on a NULL
reason — so the message dump never happened. The intent was to dump
the message and let the follow-up ns_client_log() carry the reason
text, so pass "" to suppress the prefix without short-circuiting the
dump.
After the send callback completes, the UV request is freed but
the HTTP/2 socket's write buffer still points to the freed memory.
If nghttp2 subsequently needs to send frames (e.g. SETTINGS ACK),
the server_read_callback reads from the dangling buffer.
Clear the write buffer before freeing the UV request.
Replace the hysteretic hi_water/lo_water switch with a stochastic
check: always false below lo_water, always true at or above hi_water,
linearly ramped probability in between. This spreads cache cleaning
across many inserts instead of triggering a thundering herd once the
hi_water mark is crossed (which causes every addrdataset to enter the
LRU purge path simultaneously and serializes lookups behind the node
write locks).
The is_overmem atomic and its stores are no longer needed and are
removed. The existing tests that asserted specific hysteretic state
transitions are simplified to check only the deterministic boundaries.
Ensure that we don't attempt an ACL match for answer addresses
when handling a class-CHAOS zone. This is an additional line of
defense for YWH-PGM40640-74.
NOTIFY and UPDATE messages must specify a data class in the
QUESTION/ZONE section. NONE and ANY are meta-classes and not
appropriate here. Return FORMERR if either is used.
Rejecting messages with a query class of NONE addresses YWH-PGM40640-72,
YWH-PGM40640-82, and YWH-PGM40640-83. Rejecting messages with a query
class of ANY addresses YWH-PGM40640-87, YWH-PGM40640-88, and
YWH-PGM40640-117.
Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5778Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5782Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5783Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5797Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5798Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5853
Reject requests with unsupported or misused CLASS values before
further processing. Only IN, CH, HS, RESERVED0 (for DNS Cookies),
ANY (for TKEY negotiation), and NONE (for DNS UPDATE) are accepted;
all other classes return NOTIMP. Misuse of NONE or ANY outside
their allowed contexts returns FORMERR.
This adds further protection against bugs of the same general class
as YWH-PGM40640-70 and YWH-PGM40640-73.
Return NOTIMP for UPDATE and NOTIFY requests received for views with a
class other than IN. Only QUERY is now supported for non-IN views such
as CHAOS.
When running dns dns_rdata_tostruct() with types that are only defined
for class IN, ensure that the class is correct before proceeding.
Add an assertion that any zone being updated is of class IN. (Note
that previously, a DLZ zone could have its class value set incorrectly
to NONE; this has been fixed.)
This addresses YWH-PGM40640-70 and YWH-PGM40640-73 (as well as any
similar problems that might have occurred in the future) by minimizing
the code paths that can be reached by rdata classes other than IN, so it
is safe for the implementation to assume that rdatatypes that are only
defined for class IN, such as SVCB or WKS, have been parsed and
validated, and not accepted as unknown/opaque data.
Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5777Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5779
Force recursion off, and set allow-recursion/allow-recursion-on ACLs
to none, for views with a class other than IN. Log a configuration
warning if recursion is explicitly enabled for a non-IN view.
This addresses YWH-PGM40640-74 and YWH-PGM40640-75 by preventing any
attempt at recursive processing in a class-CHAOS view, ensuring that
server addresses used for recursive queries and received in recursive
responses are of the expected format.
Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5780Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#5781
RFC 3645 Section 3.1.1 mandates that the client MUST abandon the
algorithm if replay_det_state is FALSE after GSS_Init_sec_context
completes. The previous commit checked MUTUAL and INTEG but missed
REPLAY, even though it was already requested in the input flags.
Add GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG to the ret_flags bitmask check so all three
required properties (replay detection, mutual authentication, and
integrity) are verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After gss_accept_sec_context() completes, verify that the INTEG flag
is set in ret_flags. Without integrity protection, GSS-TSIG message
authentication cannot function correctly.
The server side was previously passing NULL for ret_flags, meaning it
never verified the negotiated security properties. The client side
was fixed in the previous commit; this fixes the server side.
After gss_init_sec_context() completes, verify that both MUTUAL and
INTEG flags are set in ret_flags. RFC 3645 Section 3.1.1 requires
the client to abandon the algorithm if either flag is missing, as
the security context would not provide mutual authentication or
message integrity.
Also fix uninitialized gss_name_t variable in dst_gssapi_initctx()
that could cause undefined behavior if gss_import_name() fails and
the cleanup path calls gss_release_name() on the uninitialized
value.
In dst_gssapi_acceptctx(), rename outtoken to outtokenp (matching BIND
convention for output pointer parameters) and free the allocated output
token buffer on error in the cleanup path.
In process_gsstkey(), route the empty-principal error path through
cleanup via CLEANUP() instead of returning early, so that the output
token, GSS context, and TSIG key are all freed consistently by the
existing cleanup block.
Reject multi-round GSS-API negotiation (GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) in
dst_gssapi_acceptctx(). Each call to gss_accept_sec_context()
allocates a context inside the GSS library; without this fix, the
context handle was passed back to process_gsstkey() which did not
store it persistently, leaking it on every incomplete negotiation.
An unauthenticated attacker could exhaust server memory by sending
repeated TKEY queries with GSSAPI tokens, each leaking one GSS
context. The leaked memory is allocated by the GSS library via
malloc(), bypassing BIND's memory accounting.
In practice, Kerberos/SPNEGO (the only mechanism used with BIND)
completes in a single round, so rejecting continuation does not
affect real-world deployments. See RFC 3645 Section 4.1.3.
When a SIG(0)-signed response triggers async ECDSA verification via
dns_message_checksig_async(), the respctx_t holds a raw pointer to
the resquery_t. If the fetch context is shut down while verification
is in flight (e.g. due to recursive-clients quota exhaustion), the
query is destroyed and the callback dereferences a dangling pointer.
Take a reference on the resquery_t when initializing the respctx_t,
and release it in both cleanup paths. The query's own reference to
the fetch context keeps the fctx alive transitively.
The SLIST (essentially `fctx->finds`, forwarders and dual-stack
alternatives aside) can have duplicate server addresses when multiple
in-domain nameservers share the same IP addresses:
sub.example. NS ns1.sub.example.
sub.example. NS ns2.sub.example.
ns1.sub.example. A 1.2.3.4
ns1.sub.example. A 5.6.7.8
ns2.sub.example. A 1.2.3.4
ns2.sub.example. A 5.6.7.8
If both 1.2.3.4 and 5.6.7.8 fail to return a valid answer, the resolver
would query each address twice.
The problem is fixed by replacing the two-phase server selection (sort
each find list by SRTT, sort finds by head SRTT) with a single linear
scan in nextaddress() that finds the lowest-SRTT unmarked, non-duplicate
address across all find lists.
The old approach had a correctness bug: after sorting, the resolver
picked the next address from the "current" find list rather than
globally. For example, with find lists [1, 15, 26] and [3, 4, 5], the
second pick would be SRTT 15 instead of the correct SRTT 3.
The new approach is both simpler and correct: each call to nextaddress()
walks all addresses, skips marked and duplicate entries, and returns the
one with the lowest SRTT. While this walk is repeated for each server
attempt, it operates on a small bounded list and is negligible compared
to the network I/O of querying the server.
The number of `dns_adbaddrfind_t` (NS address with metadata like SRTT)
returned from an ADB NS name lookup is now limited by the caller. The
default value (outside the resolver) uses `max-delegation-servers`, and
the resolver, for a given fetch, start with `max-delegation-servers` and
decrement it at each ADB fetch. This ensures that, for a given
delegation, no more than 13 nameservers will be contacted.
This is the same mechanism used when looking up `dns_adbaddrfind_t` from
a list of glues (addresses).
When an upstream server answers BADCOOKIE, no matter the transport used,
the resolver eventually resends the query using TCP. However, if the
upstream server responds with BADCOOKIE again over TCP, the resolver
would keep resending until the maximum query count is reached.
This is now fixed by stopping resending once the query has already been
sent over TCP.
Calls to `rctx_resend()` are done internally within the resolver, in
flow which are not supposed to happens more than once. For instance,
if some query fails, and a specific flag "F" wasn't set, then set the
flag and try again. This wouldn't occur more than once because if the
query fails the next attempt, the flag "F" would be set already, so the
resolver would move to the next server (or give up).
However, a subtle bug missing checking a flag, for instance, could lead
to an unbounded loop re-trying to query the same server. This is now
impossible as `rctx_resend()` also increment the query counters (so if
such case occurs, it would stop once the maximum limit is reached).
The dns_resstatscounter_retry are also only incremented if the
`fctx_query()` succeeds, similar to as is done in `fctx_try()`.
When a validator is being shut down, the associated name
`val->name` is set to NULL. This could cause a crash if a worker
thread subsequently added an EDE code to the response containing
val->name in the extra text.
`validator_addede()` now checks whether the name is NULL before
trying to add it to the extra text.
The allow-transfer/allow-query catalog zone custom properties support
only APL RRtypes. All other types are correctly rejected by the
catz_process_apl() function. However, when an APL RRtype is processed
by that function, and another (non-APL) RRtype is then attempted to be
processed, there is an assertion failure happening in the prologue
of the function because `*aclbp != NULL` (i.e. an APL has been already
processed). Move the code to do type checking before the affected
REQUIRE assertion.
The DNS64 state information stored in client->query.dns64_aaaaok
could cause an assertion failure in query_respond() if the server
was configured in such a way as to trigger a new recursion before
the query had been reset - for example, by using the filter-aaaa
plugin, which may need to recurse to find out whether an A record
exists.
This has been addressed by clearing DNS64 state information
immediately after the call to query_filter64().
In previous_closest_nsec(), a new qpreader was opened to search the NSEC
tree. It was possible for that to be used to update a QP iterator object
owned by the caller, and then be destroyed when the function returned.
This qpreader object isn't necessary anymore; since namespaces were
added to the QP trie in commit 15653c54a0, we can now just reuse the
existing reader for the main tree.
Each dns__nta_t now references its parent ntatable in nta_create() and
releases it in dns__nta_destroy(). This avoids a use-after-free in
fetch_done() and other callbacks that dereference nta->ntatable: the
ntatable could otherwise be released by view destruction while an
in-flight resolver fetch still holds a reference to the NTA.
makeslab(), makevec(), dns_rdatavec_merge() and dns_rdatavec_subtract()
summed per-record storage into an unsigned int with no upper-bound
check. An RRset whose total encoded size exceeds DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH
cannot fit in a DNS message and is unservable; building its in-memory
representation only burns memory on data that will fail at response
time, and at the upper bound the running sum could in theory wrap.
Cap the running total at DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH and return ISC_R_NOSPACE
when exceeded. Update the qpdb cache memory-purge test to use a
record size that fits within the new limit.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
RFC 3445 also eliminated the DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH, DNS_KEYTYPE_NOCONF,
and DNS_KEYOWNER_ENTITY flags. With NOAUTH and NOCONF gone, the
concept of NOKEY can no longer be expressed in KEY records.
DNS_KEYOWNER_ENTITY was already unused as of 22d688f656 but still
defined; that is now also removed.
The DNS_KEYFLAG_EXTENDED flag was only legitimate for type KEY
and was eliminated by RFC 3445. Dropping the extended-flags
handling in pub_compare() also fixes a possible crash when
signing a zone whose journal contains a crafted DNSKEY: a
6-byte record with the EXTENDED bit set produced a memmove()
length that underflowed and ran off a stack buffer.
The previous hash_key() was a deterministic, unkeyed (<<1) + add over the
key words. An off-path attacker could invert it offline and submit
queries whose source /24, qname hash, and qtype map to a single bucket;
under chaining this turns every lookup into an O(N) walk under
rrl->lock and starves legitimate query processing on the very feature
deployed to mitigate DoS.
Replace it with isc_hash32(), which is HalfSipHash-2-4 keyed by a
per-process random seed, so collision sets cannot be precomputed.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Once the walk reaches the root, splitting one more label off would
trip an internal assertion and abort named. Stop cleanly with
ISC_R_NOTFOUND so the dispatcher cancels the fetch. Only reachable
through misconfiguration (root configured as a primary with parental
agents, or a parent zone that NODATAs its own NS).
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
The dns_adbfind_t lifetime model has no reference counting; storage
liveness is held together by find->lock and the FIND_EVENT_SENT
idempotency flag, plus an unwritten cross-module rule that all
non-trivial operations on a find run on find->loop. If a caller
violates that rule, the unlock-relock window in dns_adb_cancelfind
(and similar paths) becomes a use-after-free and we crash later
inside libpthread on a corrupted mutex.
Add REQUIREs at dns_adb_cancelfind, dns_adb_destroyfind and
find_sendevent so a violation aborts at the offending call site
rather than silently freeing storage another loop is still touching.
Also poison find->magic with ~DNS_ADBFIND_MAGIC in free_adbfind so
DNS_ADBFIND_VALID catches reuse-after-free at the next public entry
point instead of letting the dangling pointer reach the mutex code.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
The wire-format RSA DNSKEY parser used the residual rdata length after
the exponent as the modulus length, with no positive lower bound. A
crafted DNSKEY whose declared exponent length consumed the whole buffer
produced n = 0; the BN_bin2bn(_, 0, _) returned a non-NULL BIGNUM, the
NULL-check passed, and dnssec-importkey -f wrote out a "valid" key with
no key material. RSASHA1 also bypassed the algorithm-specific lower
bound in opensslrsa_createctx (which only checks an upper bound for the
SHA1 algorithms), so the degenerate key reached the verify path with
whatever behaviour the linked OpenSSL exhibits for n = 0.
Add OPENSSLRSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS = 512 (the lowest legitimate modulus
across the RSA DNSSEC algorithms per RFC 5702) and reject smaller
moduli at parse time in opensslrsa_fromdns, opensslrsa_parse, and
opensslrsa_fromlabel — the same three load paths where the existing
exponent upper-bound check lives.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
The wire-format RSA DNSKEY parser was the only key path with no upper
bound on the public exponent — opensslrsa_parse and opensslrsa_fromlabel
already cap at RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS. An attacker-controlled DNSKEY could
therefore force a validator to compute s^e mod n with e up to ~|n| bits,
amplifying every verify by ~120x for typical 2048-bit moduli (OpenSSL
itself only caps the exponent for moduli above 3072 bits). Apply the
same bit-count cap to wire-format keys.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
isc__ratelimiter_tick() and isc_ratelimiter_shutdown() each pulled
events out of rl->pending into a function-local list, dropped the
mutex, and then iterated. ISC_LIST_APPEND leaves the link in the
LINKED state, so a concurrent isc_ratelimiter_dequeue() saw an
event as still queued, called ISC_LIST_UNLINK against rl->pending —
which patched the prev/next of the local list — and freed the
event before dispatch finished, producing either an INSIST in the
unlink macro or a use-after-free in the dispatch loop.
isc_async_run() is a non-blocking wfcq enqueue, so there is no
benefit to dropping the mutex around it. Unlink each event and
hand it to isc_async_run() while still holding rl->lock; the
existing ISC_LINK_LINKED check in dequeue then correctly
distinguishes "still queued and cancellable" from "already taken".
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
For a query whose qname is the root, the labels==1 branch in
redirect2() called dns_name_copy(redirectname, view->redirectzone)
with arguments reversed, overwriting the view-global
nxdomain-redirect target with the empty redirectname rather than
copying the configured target into the per-query lookup name. After
the corruption, view->redirectzone names the root, so
dns_name_issubdomain() makes redirect2() short-circuit for every
subsequent query and the nxdomain-redirect feature stops working
until named is restarted.
Triggering this needs the resolver to receive an NXDOMAIN for the
root from upstream, which does not happen in normal DNS operation.
Swap the arguments to match the dns_name_copy(source, dest)
signature. Add a system test that issues a root query through the
nxdomain-redirect resolver and verifies the redirect feature still
works for a normal NXDOMAIN-producing query afterwards.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
hmac_generate() declared its on-stack nonce buffer as
unsigned char data[ISC_MAX_MD_SIZE], i.e. 64 bytes. That is the maximum
digest size, but the buffer is filled up to the algorithm's HMAC block
size, which is 128 bytes for SHA-384 and SHA-512. Asking rndc-confgen
for an HMAC-SHA-384 or HMAC-SHA-512 key with -b > 512 (the documented
range allows up to 1024) wrote past the end of the stack buffer; on
hardened builds this aborted with a stack-smash detector firing
instead of producing a key.
Use the existing ISC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE (128) for the buffer so the full
1..1024 range advertised by -A hmac-sha{384,512} works as documented.
The matching key_rawsecret[64] in confgen's generate_key() is enlarged
the same way so the generated key fits when dumped to the buffer.
Add a system test that exercises rndc-confgen across the previously
overflowing keysizes; with -Db_sanitize=address it caught the abort
before the fix.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
The function existence-checked the target with stat() and then opened
the same path without O_NOFOLLOW, so a symlink at the target path
passed the regular-file test against the link's destination and the
open() that followed truncated and wrote through the link.
rndc-confgen -a is typically run as root and writes the keyfile under
a directory that service accounts may have write access to, so a stray
symlink there would silently redirect the truncate, fchown, and
overwrite to whatever file the link pointed at.
Switch the existence check to lstat() and use S_ISREG() so a symlink's
S_IFLNK mode is detected directly (a plain bitmask of S_IFREG matches
both, since S_IFLNK shares its high bit). Add O_NOFOLLOW to both
open() flag sets to close the lstat/open TOCTOU window. Hardening
against unexpected symlinks on intermediate path components is out of
scope.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
DNS_MASTER_NOINCLUDE was defined to suppress $INCLUDE processing, but
no caller ever set it, so the guarded code path was dead and the flag
gave the false impression that named-checkzone could be hardened
against untrusted input. The zone-file parser cannot safely read text
from a less-trusted source than the user running the tool: $INCLUDE
opens any local file readable by that user, and fragments of its
contents leak through tokenizer error messages.
Rather than wire up an opt-in flag that suggests this is a supported
mode, remove the dead flag and the dead guard, and document in the
named-checkzone and named-compilezone manual pages that these tools
must not be run on zone text from an untrusted source.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
When processing a referral, the `cache_delegns()` function was accepting
glues from a different parent. For instance:
```
AUTHORITY
test.example. NS ns.test.example.
test.example. NS ns.foo.example.
test.example. NS ns.bar.
ADDITIONAL
ns.bar. A 1.2.3.4
ns.foo.example. A 5.6.7.8
ns.test.example. A 9.8.7.6
```
In such situation, only the glues for `ns.foo.example.` and
`ns.test.example.` should be used, and the glue from `ns.bar.` should be
ignored as this is not either a sub-domain or a sibling domain, the
parent is different (`bar.` instead of `example.`). This is now fixed.
Sibling glue and cyclic sibling glues are defined in RFC 9471 section
2.2 and section 2.3.
OPENSSL_cleanup() in OpenSSL 4 doesn't free the memory, and that is
not compatible with BIND 9's memory leak detection code. Don't use
custom allocation/deallocation functions for OpenSSL's internal memory
management in the ossl3.c module.
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29721
Compute qpzone_get_lock(elem->node) into a local variable while the
heap lock is still held, rather than dereferencing the stale elem
pointer after releasing the lock. A concurrent thread running
setsigningtime() (e.g. via IXFR apply on a worker thread) could free
the top-of-heap element between the heap lock release and the
dereference, causing a use-after-free.
In the dns_zonefetch mechanism, some option flags for
dns_resolver_createfetch() were used for all fetches, but
were actually only needed by the DNSKEY refresh fetches.
(Specifially, these options were DNS_FETCHOPT_UNSHARED
and DNS_FETCHOPT_NOCACHED, which were used along with
DNS_FETCHOPT_NOVALIDATE to ensure we get a new copy of
the DNSKEY as it is currently published by the authority,
without prior validation. Those conditions are needed
for RFC 5011 trust anchor maintenace, but not when looking
up parent-NS or DSYNC RRsets.)
Instrument the delegation cache (introduced to back both NS-based and
DELEG-based delegations) with 11 USDT probes in the libdns provider so
that hit rate, eviction pressure, and lookup latency can be measured
without recompiling or enabling logging.
The probes are:
- delegdb_lookup_start / delegdb_lookup_done wrap dns_delegdb_lookup()
and pass the query name plus the result code.
- delegdb_insert_start / delegdb_insert_done wrap dns_delegset_insert().
The early SHUTTINGDOWN return is funneled through the cleanup label
so the done probe fires on every path.
- delegdb_cleanup_start / delegdb_cleanup_done bracket the SIEVE-based
eviction triggered when the cache goes overmem, reporting the number
of bytes requested and actually reclaimed. An additional per-node
delegdb_evict probe (guarded by _ENABLED() because it fires inside
the loop) exposes which zones are being evicted.
- delegdb_create, delegdb_reuse, and delegdb_shutdown trace the per-view
lifecycle across server reloads.
- delegdb_delete traces rndc flush-delegation paths, reporting whether
a subtree or single name was removed.
Name arguments are stringified with dns_name_format() behind
LIBDNS_*_ENABLED() guards so that the hot lookup and insert paths remain
zero-cost when no consumer is attached.
SIG (24) and NXT (30) are obsolete DNSSEC record types, superseded by
RRSIG and NSEC in RFC 3755. Allowing them through dynamic update
exposes two distinct bugs that the surrounding GL#5818 work already
fixes as defense-in-depth:
- dns__db_findrdataset() used to REQUIRE that (covers == 0 ||
type == RRSIG), which aborts named when a SIG update reaches the
prescan foreach_rr() call. Fixed to accept dns_rdatatype_issig().
- diff.c rdata_covers() used to test only RRSIG, dropping the
covered-type field for SIG rdatas; the zone DB then filed every
SIG rdataset under typepair (SIG, 0) instead of
(SIG, covered_type) and follow-up adds collided at that bucket.
Fixed to use dns_rdatatype_issig().
Both underlying bugs are still reachable via inbound zone transfer
(diff.c rdata_covers() runs from both dns_diff_apply on the IXFR path
and dns_diff_load on the AXFR path), so the type-helper fixes above
remain necessary. For the dynamic-update path, the simplest and
safest posture is to refuse SIG and NXT outright at the front door in
ns/update.c, alongside the existing NSEC/NSEC3/non-apex-RRSIG
refusals. KEY remains permitted because it is still used to carry
public keys for SIG(0) transaction authentication.
The existing tcp-self SIG regression test is repointed to assert
REFUSED on the SIG add, a symmetric NXT test is added, and the
SIG-via-dyn-update covers-bucket test is removed because it is no
longer reachable through this entry point; AXFR-based coverage of
diff.c rdata_covers() follows in a separate commit.
rdata_covers() in lib/dns/diff.c discriminated only on
dns_rdatatype_rrsig (46) and returned 0 for the legacy SIG (24), so
the covered-type field was silently discarded on the dynamic-update
and IXFR paths. Every SIG rdataset was then filed in the zone DB
under typepair (SIG, 0) instead of (SIG, covered_type); a second SIG
add with a different covers but a different TTL collided at that
bucket, tripped DNS_DBADD_EXACTTTL in qpzone, returned
DNS_R_NOTEXACT, and came back to the client as SERVFAIL.
Use dns_rdatatype_issig() here so both SIG and RRSIG carry their
covers through the diff, matching the helper pattern already used in
lib/dns/master.c, lib/ns/xfrout.c, lib/dns/qpcache.c, and the
dns__db_findrdataset() REQUIRE that the surrounding merge request
just relaxed.
dns__db_findrdataset() had a REQUIRE() that only accepted
dns_rdatatype_rrsig when the covers parameter was set. A dynamic
update containing a SIG record (type 24) would trigger this
assertion, crashing named. Use dns_rdatatype_issig() to accept
both SIG and RRSIG.
resign_sooner_values() only checked whether rhs was SOA-typed when
resign times were equal, but did not check lhs. When both entries were
SOA-typed with equal resign times, the comparison returned true in both
directions, violating irreflexivity and corrupting heap invariants.
Add lhs_typepair parameter and require lhs to be non-SOA for the
tie-breaking logic to apply.
