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Add information about the cert renewal enhancements to the upgrade guide
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@ -34,3 +34,26 @@ flexibly determine whether to tidy up from the revocation list, the general
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certificate storage, or both. In addition, you can specify a safety buffer
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(defaulting to 72 hours) to ensure that any time discrepancies between your
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hosts is accounted for.
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## Cert Authentication Backend Performs Client Checking During Renewals
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The `cert` backend now performs a variant of channel binding at renewal time
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for increased security. In order to not overly burden clients, a notion of
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identity is used, as follows:
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* At both login and renewal time, the validity of the presented client
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certificate is checked
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* At login time, the key ID of both the client certificate and its issuing
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certificate are stored
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* At renewal time, the key ID of both the client certificate and its issuing
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certificate must match those stored at login time
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Matching on the key ID rather than the serial number allows tokens to be
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renewed even if the CA or the client certificate used are rotated; so long as
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the same key was used to generate the certificate (via a CSR) and sign the
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certificate, renewal is allowed. As Vault encourages short-lived secrets,
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including client certificates (for instance, those issued by the `pki`
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backend), this is a useful approach compared to strict issuer/serial number
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checking.
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You can use the new `cert/config` endpoint to disable this behavior.
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@ -36,3 +36,26 @@ flexibly determine whether to tidy up from the revocation list, the general
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certificate storage, or both. In addition, you can specify a safety buffer
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(defaulting to 72 hours) to ensure that any time discrepancies between your
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hosts is accounted for.
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## Cert Authentication Backend Performs Client Checking During Renewals
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The `cert` backend now performs a variant of channel binding at renewal time
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for increased security. In order to not overly burden clients, a notion of
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identity is used, as follows:
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* At both login and renewal time, the validity of the presented client
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certificate is checked
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* At login time, the key ID of both the client certificate and its issuing
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certificate are stored
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* At renewal time, the key ID of both the client certificate and its issuing
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certificate must match those stored at login time
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Matching on the key ID rather than the serial number allows tokens to be
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renewed even if the CA or the client certificate used are rotated; so long as
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the same key was used to generate the certificate (via a CSR) and sign the
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certificate, renewal is allowed. As Vault encourages short-lived secrets,
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including client certificates (for instance, those issued by the `pki`
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backend), this is a useful approach compared to strict issuer/serial number
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checking.
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You can use the new `cert/config` endpoint to disable this behavior.
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