dnssec lameness detection improved to disable detection when not sure.

git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@715 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9

doc/Changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+23 October 2007: Wouter
+	- fixup (grand-)parent problem for dnssec-lameness detection.
+	- fixup tests to do additional section processing for lame replies,
+	  since the detection needs that.
+	- no longer trust in query section in reply during dnssec lame detect.
+
 22 October 2007: Wouter
 	- added donotquerylocalhost config option. Can be turned off for
 	  out test cases.

doc/requirements.txt

@@ -140,3 +140,22 @@ o The method by which dnssec-lameness is detected is not secure. DNSSEC lame
   Also for zones for which no chain of trust exists, but a DS is given by the
   parent, dnssec-lameness detection enables. This delivers dnnsec to our 
   clients when possible (for client validators).
+
+  The following issue needs to be resolved:
+	a server that serves both a parent and child zone, where
+	parent is signed, but child is not. The server must not be marked 
+	lame for the parent zone, because the child answer is not signed. 
+  Instead of a false positive, we want false negatives; failure to 
+  detect dnssec-lameness is less of a problem than marking honest 
+  servers lame. dnssec-lameness is a config error and deserves the trouble.
+  So, only messages that identify the zone are used to mark the zone
+  lame. The zone is identified by SOA or NS RRsets in the answer/auth.
+  That includes almost all negative responses and also A, AAAA qtypes.
+  That would be most responses from servers.
+  For referrals, delegations that add a single label can be checked to be
+  from their zone, this covers most delegation-centric zones.
+
+  So possibly, for complicated setups, with multiple (parent-child) zones 
+  on a server, dnssec-lameness detection does not work - no dnssec-lameness 
+  is detected. Instead the zone that is dnssec-lame becomes bogus.
+

iterator/iter_utils.c

@@ -371,18 +371,18 @@ iter_dp_is_useless(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct delegpt* dp)
 
 int 
 iter_indicates_dnssec(struct module_env* env, struct delegpt* dp,
-        struct dns_msg* msg)
+        struct dns_msg* msg, uint16_t dclass)
 {
 	/* information not available, !env->anchors can be common */
 	if(!env || !env->anchors || !dp || !dp->name || !msg || !msg->rep)
 		return 0;
 	/* a trust anchor exists with this name, RRSIGs expected */
 	if(anchor_find(env->anchors, dp->name, dp->namelabs, dp->namelen,
-		msg->qinfo.qclass))
+		dclass))
 		return 1;
 	/* see if DS rrset was given, in AUTH section */
 	if(reply_find_rrset_section_ns(msg->rep, dp->name, dp->namelen,
-		LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, msg->qinfo.qclass))
+		LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, dclass))
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -402,3 +402,45 @@ iter_msg_has_dnssec(struct dns_msg* msg)
 	 * not empty (NSEC) */
 	return 0;
 }
+
+int iter_msg_from_zone(struct dns_msg* msg, struct delegpt* dp,
+        enum response_type type, uint16_t dclass)
+{
+	if(!msg || !dp || !msg->rep || !dp->name)
+		return 0;
+	/* SOA RRset - always from reply zone */
+	if(reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, dp->name, dp->namelen,
+		LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA, dclass) ||
+	   reply_find_rrset_section_ns(msg->rep, dp->name, dp->namelen,
+		LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA, dclass))
+		return 1;
+	if(type == RESPONSE_TYPE_REFERRAL) {
+		size_t i;
+		/* if it adds a single label, i.e. we expect .com,
+		 * and referral to example.com. NS ... , then origin zone
+		 * is .com. For a referral to sub.example.com. NS ... then
+		 * we do not know, since example.com. may be in between. */
+		for(i=0; i<msg->rep->an_numrrsets+msg->rep->ns_numrrsets; 
+			i++) {
+			struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s = msg->rep->rrsets[i];
+			if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
+				ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class) == dclass) {
+				int l = dname_count_labels(s->rk.dname);
+				if(l == dp->namelabs + 1 &&
+					dname_strict_subdomain(s->rk.dname,
+					l, dp->name, dp->namelabs))
+					return 1;
+			}
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	log_assert(type==RESPONSE_TYPE_ANSWER || type==RESPONSE_TYPE_CNAME);
+	/* not a referral, and not lame delegation (upwards), so, 
+	 * any NS rrset must be from the zone itself */
+	if(reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, dp->name, dp->namelen,
+		LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS, dclass) ||
+	   reply_find_rrset_section_ns(msg->rep, dp->name, dp->namelen,
+		LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS, dclass))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}

iterator/iter_utils.h

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 
 #ifndef ITERATOR_ITER_UTILS_H
 #define ITERATOR_ITER_UTILS_H
+#include "iterator/iter_resptype.h"
 struct iter_env;
 struct config_file;
 struct module_env;
@@ -143,10 +144,11 @@ int iter_dp_is_useless(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct delegpt* dp);
  * @param env: module env with trust anchors.
  * @param dp: delegation point.
  * @param msg: delegation message, with DS if a secure referral.
+ * @param dclass: class of query.
  * @return 1 if dnssec is expected, 0 if not.
  */
 int iter_indicates_dnssec(struct module_env* env, struct delegpt* dp,
-	struct dns_msg* msg);
+	struct dns_msg* msg, uint16_t dclass);
 
 /**
  * See if a message contains DNSSEC.
@@ -158,4 +160,19 @@ int iter_indicates_dnssec(struct module_env* env, struct delegpt* dp,
  */
 int iter_msg_has_dnssec(struct dns_msg* msg);
 
+/**
+ * See if a message is known to be from a certain zone.
+ * This looks for SOA or NS rrsets, for answers.
+ * For referrals, when one label is delegated, the zone is detected.
+ * Does not look at signatures.
+ * @param msg: the message to inspect.
+ * @param dp: delegation point with zone name to look for.
+ * @param type: type of message.
+ * @param dclass: class of query.
+ * @return true if message is certain to be from zone in dp->name.
+ *	false if not sure (empty msg), or not from the zone.
+ */
+int iter_msg_from_zone(struct dns_msg* msg, struct delegpt* dp, 
+	enum response_type type, uint16_t dclass);
+
 #endif /* ITERATOR_ITER_UTILS_H */

iterator/iterator.c

@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ processInitRequest(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct iter_qstate* iq,
 	/* if the cache reply dp equals a validation anchor or msg has DS,
 	 * then DNSSEC RRSIGs are expected in the reply */
 	iq->dnssec_expected = iter_indicates_dnssec(qstate->env, iq->dp, 
-		iq->deleg_msg);
+		iq->deleg_msg, iq->qchase.qclass);
 
 	/* Reset the RD flag. If this is a query restart, then the RD 
 	 * will have been turned off. */
@@ -1192,12 +1192,18 @@ processQueryResponse(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct iter_qstate* iq,
 		 * differently. No queries should be sent elsewhere */
 		type = RESPONSE_TYPE_ANSWER;
 	}
-	if(!(iq->chase_flags&BIT_RD) && type != RESPONSE_TYPE_LAME && 
-		type != RESPONSE_TYPE_THROWAWAY && 
-		type != RESPONSE_TYPE_UNTYPED && iq->dnssec_expected) {
+	if(iq->dnssec_expected && !(iq->chase_flags&BIT_RD) 
+		&& type != RESPONSE_TYPE_LAME 
+		&& type != RESPONSE_TYPE_THROWAWAY 
+		&& type != RESPONSE_TYPE_UNTYPED) {
 		/* a possible answer, see if it is missing DNSSEC */
 		/* but not when forwarding, so we dont mark fwder lame */
-		if(!iter_msg_has_dnssec(iq->response))
+		/* also make sure the answer is from the zone we expected,
+		 * otherwise, (due to parent,child on same server), we
+		 * might mark the server,zone lame inappropriately */
+		if(!iter_msg_has_dnssec(iq->response) &&
+			iter_msg_from_zone(iq->response, iq->dp, type,
+				iq->qchase.qclass))
 			type = RESPONSE_TYPE_LAME;
 	}
 
@@ -1242,7 +1248,7 @@ processQueryResponse(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct iter_qstate* iq,
 		/* see if the next dp is a trust anchor, or a DS was sent
 		 * along, indicating dnssec is expected for next zone */
 		iq->dnssec_expected = iter_indicates_dnssec(qstate->env, 
-			iq->dp, iq->response);
+			iq->dp, iq->response, iq->qchase.qclass);
 
 		/* stop current outstanding queries. 
 		 * FIXME: should the outstanding queries be waited for and

testdata/iter_dnsseclame_ds.rpl

@@ -270,12 +270,15 @@ www.sub.example.com. IN A
 SECTION ANSWER
 www.sub.example.com. IN A       11.11.11.11
 SECTION AUTHORITY
+; dnssec-lameness detection depends on this information
+sub.example.com. IN     NS ns.sub.example.com.
+sub.example.com. IN     NS ns.example.net.
 SECTION ADDITIONAL
+ns.sub.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.6
 ENTRY_END
 RANGE_END
 
 
-
 STEP 1 QUERY
 ENTRY_BEGIN
 REPLY RD DO

testdata/iter_dnsseclame_ta.rpl

@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ www.example.com. IN A
 SECTION ANSWER
 ; the wrong answer.
 www.example.com. IN A	10.20.30.40
+SECTION AUTHORITY
+; dnssec-lameness detection depends on this information
+example.com.	IN NS	ns.example.com.
+example.com.	IN NS	ns.example.net.
+SECTION ADDITIONAL
+ns.example.com. IN A	1.2.3.55
 ENTRY_END
 RANGE_END