Documentation nicer.

Stronger crypto by default for unbound-control.


git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1950 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
This commit is contained in:
Wouter Wijngaards 2010-01-06 14:48:44 +00:00
parent 8e447003fd
commit d11d56b0b3
4 changed files with 18 additions and 11 deletions

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@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
- iana portlist updated.
- bug#291: DNS wireformat max is 255. dname_valid allowed 256 length.
- verbose output includes parent-side-address notion for lameness.
- documented val-log-level: 2 setting in example.conf and man page.
- change unbound-control-setup from 1024(sha1) to 1536(sha256).
1 January 2010: Wouter
- iana portlist updated.

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@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ server:
# val-permissive-mode: no
# Have the validator log failed validations for your diagnosis.
# 0: off. 1: A line per failed user query.
# 0: off. 1: A line per failed user query. 2: With reason and bad IP.
# val-log-level: 0
# It is possible to configure NSEC3 maximum iteration counts per

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@ -596,11 +596,13 @@ to protect the users that rely on this validator for authentication from
protentially bad data in the additional section.
.TP
.B val\-log\-level: \fI<number>
Have the validator print validation failures to the log. Regardless of the
verbosity setting. Default is 0, off. At 1, for every user query that fails
a line is printed to the logs. This way you can monitor what happens with
validation. Use a diagnosis tool, such as dig or drill, to find out why
validation is failing for these queries.
Have the validator print validation failures to the log. Regardless of
the verbosity setting. Default is 0, off. At 1, for every user query
that fails a line is printed to the logs. This way you can monitor what
happens with validation. Use a diagnosis tool, such as dig or drill,
to find out why validation is failing for these queries. At 2, not only
the query that failed is printed but also the reason why unbound thought
it was wrong and which server sent the faulty data.
.TP
.B val\-permissive\-mode: \fI<yes or no>
Instruct the validator to mark bogus messages as indeterminate. The security

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@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ CLIENTNAME=unbound-control
DAYS=7200
# size of keys in bits
BITS=1024
BITS=1536
# hash algorithm
HASH=sha256
# base name for unbound server keys
SVR_BASE=unbound_server
@ -84,7 +87,7 @@ done
# go!:
echo "setup in directory $DESTDIR"
cd "$DESTDIR" || error "could not cd"
cd "$DESTDIR" || error "could not cd to $DESTDIR"
# create certificate keys; do not recreate if they already exist.
if test -f $SVR_BASE.key; then
@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ fi
cat >request.cfg <<EOF
[req]
default_bits=$BITS
default_md=sha1
default_md=$HASH
prompt=no
distinguished_name=req_distinguished_name
@ -122,7 +125,7 @@ openssl x509 -in $SVR_BASE.pem -addtrust serverAuth -out $SVR_BASE"_trust.pem"
cat >request.cfg <<EOF
[req]
default_bits=$BITS
default_md=sha1
default_md=$HASH
prompt=no
distinguished_name=req_distinguished_name
@ -132,7 +135,7 @@ EOF
test -f request.cfg || error "could not create request.cfg"
echo "create $CTL_BASE.pem (signed client certificate)"
openssl req -key $CTL_BASE.key -config request.cfg -new | openssl x509 -req -days $DAYS -CA $SVR_BASE"_trust.pem" -CAkey $SVR_BASE.key -CAcreateserial -out $CTL_BASE.pem
openssl req -key $CTL_BASE.key -config request.cfg -new | openssl x509 -req -days $DAYS -CA $SVR_BASE"_trust.pem" -CAkey $SVR_BASE.key -CAcreateserial -$HASH -out $CTL_BASE.pem
test -f $CTL_BASE.pem || error "could not create $CTL_BASE.pem"
# create trusted usage pem
# openssl x509 -in $CTL_BASE.pem -addtrust clientAuth -out $CTL_BASE"_trust.pem"