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And review fixup recommit.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1647 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
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3 changed files with 29 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
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before chrooting. This makes permissions on remote-control key
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files easier to set up. Fixes bug #251.
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- flush_type and flush_name remove msg cache entries.
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- codereview - dp copy bogus setting fix.
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8 June 2009: Wouter
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- Removed RFC5011 REVOKE flag support. Partial 5011 support may cause
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27
doc/TODO
27
doc/TODO
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@ -62,6 +62,33 @@ o infra and lame cache: easier size config (in Mb), show usage in graphs.
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- check where queries go - otherwise reduce TTL on NS.
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- also make DS NSEC bogus. Also DS msg cache entry.
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- check BIT_DS in DS NSEC and do not take from cache if set.
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- mark bogus under stringent conditions
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- if DS at parent and validly signed. Then DNSKEY must exist.
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- Also for trust anchor points themselves. DNSKEY must exist.
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- so if then DNSKEY keyprime fails
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- then it is not simply a server that only answers qtype A.
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- then parent is agreeing (somewhat) with the DS record
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- but it could still be a lame domain, these exist
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The objective is to keep tries for genuinely lame domains to a
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minimum, while detecting forgeries quickly. exponential backoff.
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- for unbound we can check if we got something to verify while
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building that chain of trust. If so - not lame, agressive retry.
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- but security-lame zones also exist and should not pose
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too high a burden. Exponential backoff again.
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(fe. badly signed or dnskey reply too large fails).
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- the delegation NS for the domain is bogus.
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The referral retried, with exponential backoff.
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This exponential backoff should go towards values which are close
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to the TTLs that are used now (on lame delegations for example).
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so that the extra traffic is manageable.
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- for unbound, reset the TTL on the NS rrset. Let it timeout.
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Set NS rrset bogus - no more queries to the domain are done.
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Also set DNSKEY and DS (rrset, NSEC, msg) bogus and ttl like that.
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(to the same absolute value, so a clean retry is done).
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TTL of NS is (rounddown) timeout in seconds.
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Until the NS times out and referral is done again.
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Make sure multiple validations for chains of trust do not result
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in a flood of queries or backoff too quickly.
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- bogus exponential backoff cache. hash(name,t,c), size(1M, 5%).
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TTL of 24h. Backoff from 200msec to 24h.
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x2 on bogus(18 tries), x8 backoff on lameness(6 tries),
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@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct delegpt* delegpt_copy(struct delegpt* dp, struct regional* region)
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return NULL;
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if(!delegpt_set_name(copy, region, dp->name))
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return NULL;
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copy->bogus = dp->bogus;
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for(ns = dp->nslist; ns; ns = ns->next) {
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if(!delegpt_add_ns(copy, region, ns->name))
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return NULL;
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