And review fixup recommit.

git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1647 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
This commit is contained in:
Wouter Wijngaards 2009-06-11 10:52:28 +00:00
parent 2c56564e4e
commit add0079981
3 changed files with 29 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
before chrooting. This makes permissions on remote-control key
files easier to set up. Fixes bug #251.
- flush_type and flush_name remove msg cache entries.
- codereview - dp copy bogus setting fix.
8 June 2009: Wouter
- Removed RFC5011 REVOKE flag support. Partial 5011 support may cause

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@ -62,6 +62,33 @@ o infra and lame cache: easier size config (in Mb), show usage in graphs.
- check where queries go - otherwise reduce TTL on NS.
- also make DS NSEC bogus. Also DS msg cache entry.
- check BIT_DS in DS NSEC and do not take from cache if set.
- mark bogus under stringent conditions
- if DS at parent and validly signed. Then DNSKEY must exist.
- Also for trust anchor points themselves. DNSKEY must exist.
- so if then DNSKEY keyprime fails
- then it is not simply a server that only answers qtype A.
- then parent is agreeing (somewhat) with the DS record
- but it could still be a lame domain, these exist
The objective is to keep tries for genuinely lame domains to a
minimum, while detecting forgeries quickly. exponential backoff.
- for unbound we can check if we got something to verify while
building that chain of trust. If so - not lame, agressive retry.
- but security-lame zones also exist and should not pose
too high a burden. Exponential backoff again.
(fe. badly signed or dnskey reply too large fails).
- the delegation NS for the domain is bogus.
The referral retried, with exponential backoff.
This exponential backoff should go towards values which are close
to the TTLs that are used now (on lame delegations for example).
so that the extra traffic is manageable.
- for unbound, reset the TTL on the NS rrset. Let it timeout.
Set NS rrset bogus - no more queries to the domain are done.
Also set DNSKEY and DS (rrset, NSEC, msg) bogus and ttl like that.
(to the same absolute value, so a clean retry is done).
TTL of NS is (rounddown) timeout in seconds.
Until the NS times out and referral is done again.
Make sure multiple validations for chains of trust do not result
in a flood of queries or backoff too quickly.
- bogus exponential backoff cache. hash(name,t,c), size(1M, 5%).
TTL of 24h. Backoff from 200msec to 24h.
x2 on bogus(18 tries), x8 backoff on lameness(6 tries),

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@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct delegpt* delegpt_copy(struct delegpt* dp, struct regional* region)
return NULL;
if(!delegpt_set_name(copy, region, dp->name))
return NULL;
copy->bogus = dp->bogus;
for(ns = dp->nslist; ns; ns = ns->next) {
if(!delegpt_add_ns(copy, region, ns->name))
return NULL;