Further fix for CVE-2020-28935, so the chown is omitted when the pidfile

fails due to a symlink.
This commit is contained in:
W.C.A. Wijngaards 2020-11-23 13:48:04 +01:00
parent ad38783297
commit 19f8f4d9f9

View file

@ -337,8 +337,9 @@ readpid (const char* file)
/** write pid to file.
* @param pidfile: file name of pid file.
* @param pid: pid to write to file.
* @return false on failure
*/
static void
static int
writepid (const char* pidfile, pid_t pid)
{
int fd;
@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ writepid (const char* pidfile, pid_t pid)
, 0644)) == -1) {
log_err("cannot open pidfile %s: %s",
pidfile, strerror(errno));
return;
return 0;
}
while(count < strlen(pidbuf)) {
ssize_t r = write(fd, pidbuf+count, strlen(pidbuf)-count);
@ -362,11 +363,13 @@ writepid (const char* pidfile, pid_t pid)
continue;
log_err("cannot write to pidfile %s: %s",
pidfile, strerror(errno));
break;
close(fd);
return 0;
}
count += r;
}
close(fd);
return 1;
}
/**
@ -520,16 +523,17 @@ perform_setup(struct daemon* daemon, struct config_file* cfg, int debug_mode,
/* write new pidfile (while still root, so can be outside chroot) */
#ifdef HAVE_KILL
if(cfg->pidfile && cfg->pidfile[0] && need_pidfile) {
writepid(daemon->pidfile, getpid());
if(cfg->username && cfg->username[0] && cfg_uid != (uid_t)-1 &&
pidinchroot) {
if(writepid(daemon->pidfile, getpid())) {
if(cfg->username && cfg->username[0] && cfg_uid != (uid_t)-1 &&
pidinchroot) {
# ifdef HAVE_CHOWN
if(chown(daemon->pidfile, cfg_uid, cfg_gid) == -1) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "cannot chown %u.%u %s: %s",
(unsigned)cfg_uid, (unsigned)cfg_gid,
daemon->pidfile, strerror(errno));
}
if(chown(daemon->pidfile, cfg_uid, cfg_gid) == -1) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "cannot chown %u.%u %s: %s",
(unsigned)cfg_uid, (unsigned)cfg_gid,
daemon->pidfile, strerror(errno));
}
# endif /* HAVE_CHOWN */
}
}
}
#else