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- autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well.

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git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@2100 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
This commit is contained in:
Wouter Wijngaards 2010-04-27 13:00:48 +00:00
parent 339d94b643
commit 12e20eb5f4
3 changed files with 241 additions and 9 deletions
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1
doc/Changelog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
27 April 2010: Wouter
- unbound-control get_option domain-insecure shows config file items.
- fix retry sequence if prime hints are recursion-lame.
- autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well.
26 April 2010: Wouter
- Compile fix using Sun Studio 12 compiler on Solaris 5.9, use

180
testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
; config options
server:
target-fetch-policy: "0 0 0 0 0"
log-time-ascii: yes
stub-zone:
name: "."
stub-addr: 193.0.14.129 # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
; initial content (say from dig example.com DNSKEY > example.com.key)
AUTOTRUST_FILE example.com
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (zsk), size = 512b}
AUTOTRUST_END
CONFIG_END
SCENARIO_BEGIN Test autotrust with initial trust anchor ZSK
; K-ROOT
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qname qtype
ADJUST copy_id copy_query
REPLY QR AA
SECTION QUESTION
. IN NS
SECTION ANSWER
. IN NS k.root-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
k.root-servers.net IN A 193.0.14.129
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode subdomain
ADJUST copy_id copy_query
REPLY QR
SECTION QUESTION
com. IN NS
SECTION AUTHORITY
com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; a.gtld-servers.net.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 192.5.6.30
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode subdomain
ADJUST copy_id copy_query
REPLY QR
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN NS
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; ns.example.com.
RANGE_BEGIN 0 100
ADDRESS 1.2.3.4
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qname qtype
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION ANSWER
www.example.com. 3600 IN A 10.20.30.40
www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899}
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.com.
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899}
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. 3600 IN A 1.2.3.4
ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899}
ENTRY_END
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH opcode qname qtype
ADJUST copy_id
REPLY QR AA
SECTION QUESTION
example.com. IN DNSKEY
SECTION ANSWER
; KSK 1
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b}
; ZSK 1
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (ksk), size = 512b}
; signatures
example.com. 10800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. b/HK231jIQLX8IhlZfup3r0yhpXaasbPE6LzxoEVVvWaTZWcLmeV8jDIcn0qO7Yvs7bIJN20lwVAV0GcHH3hWQ== ;{id = 30899}
example.com. 10800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 55582 example.com. PCHme1QLoULxqjhg5tMlpR0qJlBfstEUVq18TtNoKQe9le1YhJ9caheXcTWoK+boLhXxg9u6Yyvq8FboQh0OjA== ;{id = 55582}
ENTRY_END
RANGE_END
; set date/time to Aug 24 09:46:40 (2009).
STEP 5 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 1251100000
STEP 6 ASSIGN t0 = ${time}
; get probe time and check it. 4800 is about 10% less than 5400. And more than
; the 3600 that a failure timeout would have.
STEP 7 ASSIGN probe = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400}
; the auto probing should have been done now.
STEP 8 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
FILE_BEGIN
; autotrust trust anchor file
;;id: example.com. 1
;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe}
;;query_failed: 0
;;query_interval: 5400
;;retry_time: 3600
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
FILE_END
STEP 10 QUERY
ENTRY_BEGIN
REPLY RD DO
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
ENTRY_END
STEP 20 CHECK_ANSWER
ENTRY_BEGIN
MATCH all
REPLY QR RD RA AD NOERROR
SECTION QUESTION
www.example.com. IN A
SECTION ANSWER
www.example.com. 3600 IN A 10.20.30.40
www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899}
SECTION AUTHORITY
example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.com.
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899}
SECTION ADDITIONAL
ns.example.com. 3600 IN A 1.2.3.4
ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899}
ENTRY_END
; The autotrust anchor was probed due to the query.
STEP 30 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
FILE_BEGIN
; autotrust trust anchor file
;;id: example.com. 1
;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe}
;;query_failed: 0
;;query_interval: 5400
;;retry_time: 3600
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
FILE_END
; wait and see if autotrust probes (the unchanged) domain again.
STEP 40 TIME_PASSES EVAL ${$probe}
STEP 50 TRAFFIC
STEP 65 ASSIGN probe2 = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400}
STEP 70 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com
FILE_BEGIN
; autotrust trust anchor file
;;id: example.com. 1
;;last_queried: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}}
;;last_success: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}}
;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe + $probe2} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe + $probe2}
;;query_failed: 0
;;query_interval: 5400
;;retry_time: 3600
example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009
FILE_END
SCENARIO_END

69
validator/autotrust.c
View file

@ -941,8 +941,8 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp)
continue;
if(ta->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED)
continue;
/* only store SEP keys */
if(!rr_is_dnskey_sep(ta->rr))
/* only store keys */
if(ldns_rr_get_type(ta->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY)
continue;
str = ldns_rr2str(ta->rr);
if(!str || !str[0]) {
@ -1578,6 +1578,37 @@ anchor_state_update(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* anchor, int* c)
}
}
/** if ZSK init then trust KSKs */
static int
init_zsk_to_ksk(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, int* changed)
{
/* search for VALID ZSKs */
struct autr_ta* anchor;
int validzsk = 0;
int validksk = 0;
for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
/* last_change test makes sure it was manually configured */
if (ldns_rr_get_type(anchor->rr) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY &&
anchor->last_change == 0 &&
!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) &&
anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID)
validzsk++;
}
if(validzsk == 0)
return 0;
for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
if (rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) &&
anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_ADDPEND) {
verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "trust KSK from "
"ZSK(config)");
set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed,
AUTR_STATE_VALID);
validksk++;
}
}
return validksk;
}
/** Remove missing trustanchors so the list does not grow forever */
static void
remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
@ -1586,8 +1617,6 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
struct autr_ta* anchor;
int exceeded;
int valid = 0;
if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0)
return; /* keep forever */
/* see if we have anchors that are valid */
for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
/* Only do KSKs */
@ -1596,16 +1625,38 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
if (anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID)
valid++;
}
if(valid == 0)
return;
/* if there are no SEP Valid anchors, see if we started out with
* a ZSK (last-change=0) anchor, which is VALID and there are KSKs
* now that can be made valid. Do this immediately because there
* is no guarantee that the ZSKs get announced long enough. Usually
* this is immediately after init with a ZSK trusted, unless the domain
* was not advertising any KSKs at all. In which case we perfectly
* track the zero number of KSKs. */
if(valid == 0) {
valid = init_zsk_to_ksk(env, tp, changed);
if(valid == 0)
return;
}
for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) {
/* Only do KSKs */
if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr))
/* ignore ZSKs if newly added */
if(anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_START)
continue;
/* remove ZSKs if a KSK is present */
if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr)) {
if(valid > 0) {
verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "remove ZSK "
"[%d key(s) VALID]", valid);
set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed,
AUTR_STATE_REMOVED);
}
continue;
}
/* Only do MISSING keys */
if (anchor->s != AUTR_STATE_MISSING)
continue;
if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0)
continue; /* keep forever */
exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->keep_missing);
/* If keep_missing has exceeded and we still have more than
@ -1657,7 +1708,7 @@ autr_cleanup_keys(struct trust_anchor* tp)
while(p) {
/* do we want to remove this key? */
if(p->s == AUTR_STATE_START || p->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED ||
!rr_is_dnskey_sep(p->rr)) {
ldns_rr_get_type(p->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
struct autr_ta* np = p->next;
/* remove */
ldns_rr_free(p->rr);