opnsense-src/crypto/openssh/platform.c
Ed Maste ff2fd01609 openssh: Update to 9.8p1
Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below.  Some security
and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided.
See the upstream release notes for full details
(https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html).

---

Future deprecation notice
=========================

OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
early 2025.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
   repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
   completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
   discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
   Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
   servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
   proxies may need to consider these settings.

 * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
   and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
   smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
   protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
   separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
   disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
   separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
   planned for the future.

 * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
   log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
   named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".

 * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
   containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
   This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
   "-q" flag to silence them altogether.

 * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
   as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
   directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
   defaults to "sshd". bz2101

New features
------------

 * sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various
   reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is
   controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is
   on by default.

 * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the
   implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys.

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules
   unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when
   particular authentication methods were in use.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY
   environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11
   DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479

---

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914

(cherry picked from commit 0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e)
(cherry picked from commit b4bb480ae9294d7e4b375f0ead9ae57517c79ef3)
(cherry picked from commit e95979047aec384852102cf8bb1d55278ea77eeb)
(cherry picked from commit dcb4ae528d357f34e4a4b4882c2757c67c98e395)

Approved by:	re (accelerated MFC)
2025-02-20 12:50:11 -05:00

205 lines
5.1 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "platform.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
int
platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
return 1;
#else
return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
#endif
}
/*
* This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
* not running as root.
*/
void
platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/* Cache selinux status for later use */
(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
/*
* If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless
* we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the
* PAM stack.
*/
if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0))
solaris_set_default_project(pw);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
setpgid(0, 0);
# endif
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
/*
* If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
* before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
*/
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred();
}
}
# endif /* USE_PAM */
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
/* Sets login uid for accounting */
if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
}
/*
* This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
* called if sshd is running as root.
*/
void
platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
/*
* PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
* These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
* Reestablish them here.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred();
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
irix_setusercontext(pw);
#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
#ifdef _AIX
aix_usrinfo(pw);
#endif /* _AIX */
#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
/*
* If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
* uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a
* chroot directory, we don't override anything.
*/
{
char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
{ "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
creds = chroot_creds;
if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
#endif
}
char *
platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
{
#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
/* returns 1 if account is locked */
int
platform_locked_account(struct passwd *pw)
{
int locked = 0;
char *passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
char *iaf_passwd = NULL;
#endif
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 1;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
if (spw != NULL)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
iaf_passwd = passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
if (passwd && *passwd) {
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
if (iaf_passwd != NULL)
freezero(iaf_passwd, strlen(iaf_passwd));
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
return locked;
}