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Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below. Some security and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided. See the upstream release notes for full details (https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html). --- Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever completing authentication or that crash the server. See the discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or proxies may need to consider these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8), and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is planned for the future. * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd". * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error. This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new "-q" flag to silence them altogether. * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0] as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5) directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This defaults to "sshd". bz2101 New features ------------ * sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default. * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when particular authentication methods were in use. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11 DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479 --- Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914 (cherry picked from commit 0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e) (cherry picked from commit b4bb480ae9294d7e4b375f0ead9ae57517c79ef3) (cherry picked from commit e95979047aec384852102cf8bb1d55278ea77eeb) (cherry picked from commit dcb4ae528d357f34e4a4b4882c2757c67c98e395) Approved by: re (accelerated MFC)
332 lines
9.2 KiB
C
332 lines
9.2 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.36 2024/05/17 04:42:13 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "ssh2.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "dispatch.h"
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#include "sshbuf.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "kex.h"
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#include "ssh-gss.h"
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#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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#define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS 2048
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extern ServerOptions options;
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extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
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static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
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static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
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static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
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static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
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/*
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* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
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* how to check local user kuserok and the like)
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*/
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static int
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userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
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Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
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int r, present;
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u_int mechs;
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OM_uint32 ms;
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size_t len;
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u_char *doid = NULL;
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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if (mechs == 0) {
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logit_f("mechanism negotiation is not supported");
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return (0);
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} else if (mechs > SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS) {
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logit_f("too many mechanisms requested %u > %u", mechs,
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SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS);
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return (0);
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}
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do {
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mechs--;
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free(doid);
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present = 0;
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse oid");
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if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
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doid[1] == len - 2) {
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goid.elements = doid + 2;
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goid.length = len - 2;
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ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
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} else {
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logit_f("badly formed OID received");
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}
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} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
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if (!present) {
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free(doid);
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authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
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return (0);
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}
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if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
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debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
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free(doid);
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return (0);
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}
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if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid))) {
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if (ctxt != NULL)
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ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
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free(doid);
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authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
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return (0);
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}
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authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
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/* Return the OID that we received */
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if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
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free(doid);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
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authctxt->postponed = 1;
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return (0);
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}
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static int
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input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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Gssctxt *gssctxt;
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gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
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gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
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OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
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u_char *p;
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size_t len;
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int r;
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if (authctxt == NULL)
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fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
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gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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recv_tok.value = p;
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recv_tok.length = len;
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maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
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&send_tok, &flags);
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free(p);
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if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
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if (send_tok.length != 0) {
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if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
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SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
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send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
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}
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authctxt->postponed = 0;
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
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} else {
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if (send_tok.length != 0) {
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if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
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SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
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send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
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}
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if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
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&input_gssapi_mic);
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else
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
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SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
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&input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
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}
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}
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gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
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return 0;
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}
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static int
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input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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Gssctxt *gssctxt;
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gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
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gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
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OM_uint32 maj_status;
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int r;
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u_char *p;
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size_t len;
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if (authctxt == NULL)
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fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
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gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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recv_tok.value = p;
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recv_tok.length = len;
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/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
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maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
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&send_tok, NULL);
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free(recv_tok.value);
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/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
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/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
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gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
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* It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
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* which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
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*/
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static int
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input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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int r, authenticated;
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if (authctxt == NULL)
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fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
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/*
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* We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
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* the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
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*/
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
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authctxt->postponed = 0;
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
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userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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static int
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input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
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Gssctxt *gssctxt;
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int r, authenticated = 0;
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struct sshbuf *b;
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gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
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u_char *p;
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size_t len;
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if (authctxt == NULL)
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fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
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gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
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if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0)
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fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
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if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
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fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
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mic.value = p;
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mic.length = len;
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ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
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"gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
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if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
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fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
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gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
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if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
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authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
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else
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logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
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sshbuf_free(b);
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free(mic.value);
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authctxt->postponed = 0;
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
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ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
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userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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Authmethod method_gssapi = {
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&methodcfg_gssapi,
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userauth_gssapi,
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};
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#endif /* GSSAPI */
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