mirror of
https://github.com/opnsense/src.git
synced 2026-03-18 16:52:21 -04:00
At a basic level, remove assumptions about the underlying algorithm (such as output block size and reseeding requirements) from the algorithm-independent logic in randomdev.c. Chacha20 does not have many of the restrictions that AES-ICM does as a PRF (Pseudo-Random Function), because it has a cipher block size of 512 bits. The motivation is that by generalizing the API, Chacha is not penalized by the limitations of AES. In READ_RANDOM_UIO, first attempt to NOWAIT allocate a large enough buffer for the entire user request, or the maximal input we'll accept between signal checking, whichever is smaller. The idea is that the implementation of any randomdev algorithm is then free to divide up large requests in whatever fashion it sees fit. As part of this, two responsibilities from the "algorithm-generic" randomdev code are pushed down into the Fortuna ra_read implementation (and any other future or out-of-tree ra_read implementations): 1. If an algorithm needs to rekey every N bytes, it is responsible for handling that in ra_read(). (I.e., Fortuna's 1MB rekey interval for AES block generation.) 2. If an algorithm uses a block cipher that doesn't tolerate partial-block requests (again, e.g., AES), it is also responsible for handling that in ra_read(). Several APIs are changed from u_int buffer length to the more canonical size_t. Several APIs are changed from taking a blockcount to a bytecount, to permit PRFs like Chacha20 to directly generate quantities of output that are not multiples of RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE (AES block size). The Fortuna algorithm is changed to NOT rekey every 1MiB when in Chacha20 mode (kern.random.use_chacha20_cipher="1"). This is explicitly supported by the math in FS&K §9.4 (Ferguson, Schneier, and Kohno; "Cryptography Engineering"), as well as by their conclusion: "If we had a block cipher with a 256-bit [or greater] block size, then the collisions would not have been an issue at all." For now, continue to break up reads into PAGE_SIZE chunks, as they were before. So, no functional change, mostly. Reviewed by: markm Approved by: secteam(delphij) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20312
247 lines
7.1 KiB
C
247 lines
7.1 KiB
C
/*-
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Mark R V Murray
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
|
|
* in this position and unchanged.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
|
|
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
|
|
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
|
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
|
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
|
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
|
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/random.h>
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
#else /* !_KERNEL */
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
#include <inttypes.h>
|
|
#include <signal.h>
|
|
#include <stdbool.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <threads.h>
|
|
#define KASSERT(x, y) assert(x)
|
|
#define CTASSERT(x) _Static_assert(x, "CTASSERT " #x)
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
#define CHACHA_EMBED
|
|
#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
|
|
#define CHACHA_NONCE0_CTR128
|
|
#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.c>
|
|
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
|
|
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* This code presumes that RANDOM_KEYSIZE is twice as large as RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE */
|
|
CTASSERT(RANDOM_KEYSIZE == 2*RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
|
|
|
|
/* Validate that full Chacha IV is as large as the 128-bit counter */
|
|
_Static_assert(CHACHA_STATELEN == RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE, "");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Experimental Chacha20-based PRF for Fortuna keystream primitive. For now,
|
|
* disabled by default. But we may enable it in the future.
|
|
*
|
|
* Benefits include somewhat faster keystream generation compared with
|
|
* unaccelerated AES-ICM.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool random_chachamode = false;
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, use_chacha20_cipher, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
|
|
&random_chachamode, 0,
|
|
"If non-zero, use the ChaCha20 cipher for randomdev PRF. "
|
|
"If zero, use AES-ICM cipher for randomdev PRF (default).");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise the hash */
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_hash_init(struct randomdev_hash *context)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Init(&context->sha);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Iterate the hash */
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_hash_iterate(struct randomdev_hash *context, const void *data, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Update(&context->sha, data, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Conclude by returning the hash in the supplied <*buf> which must be
|
|
* RANDOM_KEYSIZE bytes long.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_hash_finish(struct randomdev_hash *context, void *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Final(buf, &context->sha);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise the encryption routine by setting up the key schedule
|
|
* from the supplied <*data> which must be RANDOM_KEYSIZE bytes of binary
|
|
* data.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_encrypt_init(union randomdev_key *context, const void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (random_chachamode) {
|
|
chacha_keysetup(&context->chacha, data, RANDOM_KEYSIZE * 8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rijndael_cipherInit(&context->cipher, MODE_ECB, NULL);
|
|
rijndael_makeKey(&context->key, DIR_ENCRYPT, RANDOM_KEYSIZE*8, data);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a psuedorandom output stream of 'bytecount' bytes using a CTR-mode
|
|
* cipher or similar. The 128-bit counter is supplied in the in-out parmeter
|
|
* 'ctr.' The output stream goes to 'd_out.'
|
|
*
|
|
* If AES is used, 'bytecount' is guaranteed to be a multiple of
|
|
* RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_keystream(union randomdev_key *context, uint128_t *ctr,
|
|
void *d_out, size_t bytecount)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i, blockcount, read_chunk;
|
|
|
|
if (random_chachamode) {
|
|
uint128_t lectr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Chacha always encodes and increments the counter little
|
|
* endian. So on BE machines, we must provide a swapped
|
|
* counter to chacha, and swap the output too.
|
|
*/
|
|
le128enc(&lectr, *ctr);
|
|
|
|
chacha_ivsetup(&context->chacha, NULL, (const void *)&lectr);
|
|
while (bytecount > 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are limited by the chacha_encrypt_bytes API to
|
|
* u32 bytes per chunk.
|
|
*/
|
|
read_chunk = MIN(bytecount,
|
|
rounddown((size_t)UINT32_MAX, CHACHA_BLOCKLEN));
|
|
|
|
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&context->chacha, NULL, d_out,
|
|
read_chunk);
|
|
|
|
d_out = (char *)d_out + read_chunk;
|
|
bytecount -= read_chunk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Decode Chacha-updated LE counter to native endian and store
|
|
* it back in the caller's in-out parameter.
|
|
*/
|
|
chacha_ctrsave(&context->chacha, (void *)&lectr);
|
|
*ctr = le128dec(&lectr);
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(&lectr, sizeof(lectr));
|
|
} else {
|
|
KASSERT(bytecount % RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE == 0,
|
|
("%s: AES mode invalid bytecount, not a multiple of native "
|
|
"block size", __func__));
|
|
|
|
blockcount = bytecount / RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < blockcount; i++) {
|
|
/*-
|
|
* FS&K - r = r|E(K,C)
|
|
* - C = C + 1
|
|
*/
|
|
rijndael_blockEncrypt(&context->cipher, &context->key,
|
|
(void *)ctr, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE * 8, d_out);
|
|
d_out = (char *)d_out + RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE;
|
|
uint128_increment(ctr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch a pointer to the relevant key material and its size.
|
|
*
|
|
* This API is expected to only be used only for reseeding, where the
|
|
* endianness does not matter; the goal is to simply incorporate the key
|
|
* material into the hash iterator that will produce key'.
|
|
*
|
|
* Do not expect the buffer pointed to by this API to match the exact
|
|
* endianness, etc, as the key material that was supplied to
|
|
* randomdev_encrypt_init().
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
randomdev_getkey(union randomdev_key *context, const void **keyp, size_t *szp)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!random_chachamode) {
|
|
*keyp = &context->key.keyMaterial;
|
|
*szp = context->key.keyLen / 8;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Chacha20 mode */
|
|
*keyp = (const void *)&context->chacha.input[4];
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check keysize */
|
|
if (context->chacha.input[0] == U8TO32_LITTLE(sigma) &&
|
|
context->chacha.input[1] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[4]) &&
|
|
context->chacha.input[2] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[8]) &&
|
|
context->chacha.input[3] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&sigma[12])) {
|
|
*szp = 32;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/*
|
|
* Included for the sake of completeness; as-implemented, Fortuna
|
|
* doesn't need or use 128-bit Chacha20.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (context->chacha->input[0] == U8TO32_LITTLE(tau) &&
|
|
context->chacha->input[1] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[4]) &&
|
|
context->chacha->input[2] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[8]) &&
|
|
context->chacha->input[3] == U8TO32_LITTLE(&tau[12])) {
|
|
*szp = 16;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
panic("%s: Invalid chacha20 keysize: %16D\n", __func__,
|
|
(void *)context->chacha.input, " ");
|
|
#else
|
|
raise(SIGKILL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|