opnsense-src/sys/dev/random/fortuna.c
Conrad Meyer e8e1f0b420 Fortuna: Fix false negatives in is_random_seeded()
(1) We may have had sufficient entropy to consider Fortuna seeded, but the
random_fortuna_seeded() function would produce a false negative if
fs_counter was still zero.  This condition could arise after
random_harvestq_prime() processed the /boot/entropy file and before any
read-type operation invoked "pre_read()."  Fortuna's fs_counter variable is
only incremented (if certain conditions are met) by reseeding, which is
invoked by random_fortuna_pre_read().

is_random_seeded(9) was introduced in r346282, but the function was unused
prior to r346358, which introduced this regression.  The regression broke
initial seeding of arc4random(9) and broke periodic reseeding[A], until something
other than arc4random(9) invoked read_random(9) or read_random_uio(9) directly.
(Such as userspace getrandom(2) or read(2) of /dev/random.  By default,
/etc/rc.d/random does this during multiuser start-up.)

(2) The conditions under which Fortuna will reseed (including initial seeding)
are: (a) sufficient "entropy" (by sheer byte count; default 64) is collected
in the zeroth pool (of 32 pools), and (b) it has been at least 100ms since
the last reseed (to prevent trivial DoS; part of FS&K design).  Prior to
this revision, initial seeding might have been prevented if the reseed
function was invoked during the first 100ms of boot.

This revision addresses both of these issues.  If random_fortuna_seeded()
observes a zero fs_counter, it invokes random_fortuna_pre_read() and checks
again.  This addresses the problem where entropy actually was sufficient,
but nothing had attempted a read -> pre_read yet.

The second change is to disable the 100ms reseed guard when Fortuna has
never been seeded yet (fs_lasttime == 0).  The guard is intended to prevent
gratuitous subsequent reseeds, not initial seeding!

Machines running CURRENT between r346358 and this revision are encouraged to
refresh when possible.  Keys generated by userspace with /dev/random or
getrandom(9) during this timeframe are safe, but any long-term session keys
generated by kernel arc4random consumers are potentially suspect.

[A]: Broken in the sense that is_random_seeded(9) false negatives would cause
arc4random(9) to (re-)seed with weak entropy (SHA256(cyclecount ||
FreeBSD_version)).

PR:		237869
Reported by:	delphij, dim
Reviewed by:	delphij
Approved by:	secteam(delphij)
X-MFC-With:	r346282, r346358 (if ever)
Security:	yes
Sponsored by:	Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20239
2019-05-13 19:35:35 +00:00

493 lines
15 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2017 W. Dean Freeman
* Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Mark R V Murray
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
/*
* This implementation of Fortuna is based on the descriptions found in
* ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" by Ferguson, Schneier
* and Kohno ("FS&K").
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/fail.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <machine/cpu.h>
#else /* !_KERNEL */
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <threads.h>
#include "unit_test.h"
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <dev/random/random_harvestq.h>
#endif
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
#include <dev/random/fortuna.h>
/* Defined in FS&K */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS 32 /* The number of accumulation pools */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE 64 /* The default pool size/length for a (re)seed */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ (1 << 20) /* Max bytes in a single read */
/*
* The allowable range of RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE. The default value is above.
* Making RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE too large will mean a long time between reseeds,
* and too small may compromise initial security but get faster reseeds.
*/
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE 16
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE INT_MAX
CTASSERT(RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE <= RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE);
CTASSERT(RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE <= RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE);
/* This algorithm (and code) presumes that RANDOM_KEYSIZE is twice as large as RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE */
CTASSERT(RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE == sizeof(uint128_t));
CTASSERT(RANDOM_KEYSIZE == 2*RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
/* Probes for dtrace(1) */
#ifdef _KERNEL
SDT_PROVIDER_DECLARE(random);
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(random);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(random, fortuna, event_processor, debug, "u_int", "struct fs_pool *");
#endif /* _KERNEL */
/*
* This is the beastie that needs protecting. It contains all of the
* state that we are excited about. Exactly one is instantiated.
*/
static struct fortuna_state {
struct fs_pool { /* P_i */
u_int fsp_length; /* Only the first one is used by Fortuna */
struct randomdev_hash fsp_hash;
} fs_pool[RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS];
u_int fs_reseedcount; /* ReseedCnt */
uint128_t fs_counter; /* C */
union randomdev_key fs_key; /* K */
u_int fs_minpoolsize; /* Extras */
/* Extras for the OS */
#ifdef _KERNEL
/* For use when 'pacing' the reseeds */
sbintime_t fs_lasttime;
#endif
/* Reseed lock */
mtx_t fs_mtx;
} fortuna_state;
#ifdef _KERNEL
static struct sysctl_ctx_list random_clist;
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(fs_minpoolsize, RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE, RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE);
#else
static uint8_t zero_region[RANDOM_ZERO_BLOCKSIZE];
#endif
static void random_fortuna_pre_read(void);
static void random_fortuna_read(uint8_t *, u_int);
static bool random_fortuna_seeded(void);
static bool random_fortuna_seeded_internal(void);
static void random_fortuna_process_event(struct harvest_event *);
static void random_fortuna_init_alg(void *);
static void random_fortuna_deinit_alg(void *);
static void random_fortuna_reseed_internal(uint32_t *entropy_data, u_int blockcount);
struct random_algorithm random_alg_context = {
.ra_ident = "Fortuna",
.ra_init_alg = random_fortuna_init_alg,
.ra_deinit_alg = random_fortuna_deinit_alg,
.ra_pre_read = random_fortuna_pre_read,
.ra_read = random_fortuna_read,
.ra_seeded = random_fortuna_seeded,
.ra_event_processor = random_fortuna_process_event,
.ra_poolcount = RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS,
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_fortuna_init_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
int i;
#ifdef _KERNEL
struct sysctl_oid *random_fortuna_o;
#endif
RANDOM_RESEED_INIT_LOCK();
/*
* Fortuna parameters. Do not adjust these unless you have
* have a very good clue about what they do!
*/
fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize = RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE;
#ifdef _KERNEL
fortuna_state.fs_lasttime = 0;
random_fortuna_o = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_random),
OID_AUTO, "fortuna", CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Fortuna Parameters");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_fortuna_o), OID_AUTO,
"minpoolsize", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize, RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE,
random_check_uint_fs_minpoolsize, "IU",
"Minimum pool size necessary to cause a reseed");
KASSERT(fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize > 0, ("random: Fortuna threshold must be > 0 at startup"));
#endif
/*-
* FS&K - InitializePRNG()
* - P_i = \epsilon
* - ReseedCNT = 0
*/
for (i = 0; i < RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS; i++) {
randomdev_hash_init(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash);
fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_length = 0;
}
fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount = 0;
/*-
* FS&K - InitializeGenerator()
* - C = 0
* - K = 0
*/
fortuna_state.fs_counter = UINT128_ZERO;
explicit_bzero(&fortuna_state.fs_key, sizeof(fortuna_state.fs_key));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_fortuna_deinit_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
RANDOM_RESEED_DEINIT_LOCK();
explicit_bzero(&fortuna_state, sizeof(fortuna_state));
#ifdef _KERNEL
sysctl_ctx_free(&random_clist);
#endif
}
/*-
* FS&K - AddRandomEvent()
* Process a single stochastic event off the harvest queue
*/
static void
random_fortuna_process_event(struct harvest_event *event)
{
u_int pl;
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
/*-
* FS&K - P_i = P_i|<harvested stuff>
* Accumulate the event into the appropriate pool
* where each event carries the destination information.
*
* The hash_init() and hash_finish() calls are done in
* random_fortuna_pre_read().
*
* We must be locked against pool state modification which can happen
* during accumulation/reseeding and reading/regating.
*/
pl = event->he_destination % RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS;
/*
* We ignore low entropy static/counter fields towards the end of the
* he_event structure in order to increase measurable entropy when
* conducting SP800-90B entropy analysis measurements of seed material
* fed into PRNG.
* -- wdf
*/
KASSERT(event->he_size <= sizeof(event->he_entropy),
("%s: event->he_size: %hhu > sizeof(event->he_entropy): %zu\n",
__func__, event->he_size, sizeof(event->he_entropy)));
randomdev_hash_iterate(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_hash,
&event->he_somecounter, sizeof(event->he_somecounter));
randomdev_hash_iterate(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_hash,
event->he_entropy, event->he_size);
/*-
* Don't wrap the length. This is a "saturating" add.
* XXX: FIX!!: We don't actually need lengths for anything but fs_pool[0],
* but it's been useful debugging to see them all.
*/
fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_length = MIN(RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE,
fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_length +
sizeof(event->he_somecounter) + event->he_size);
explicit_bzero(event, sizeof(*event));
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
/*-
* FS&K - Reseed()
* This introduces new key material into the output generator.
* Additionally it increments the output generator's counter
* variable C. When C > 0, the output generator is seeded and
* will deliver output.
* The entropy_data buffer passed is a very specific size; the
* product of RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS and RANDOM_KEYSIZE.
*/
static void
random_fortuna_reseed_internal(uint32_t *entropy_data, u_int blockcount)
{
struct randomdev_hash context;
uint8_t hash[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
const void *keymaterial;
size_t keysz;
bool seeded;
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
seeded = random_fortuna_seeded_internal();
if (seeded) {
randomdev_getkey(&fortuna_state.fs_key, &keymaterial, &keysz);
KASSERT(keysz == RANDOM_KEYSIZE, ("%s: key size %zu not %u",
__func__, keysz, (unsigned)RANDOM_KEYSIZE));
}
/*-
* FS&K - K = Hd(K|s) where Hd(m) is H(H(0^512|m))
* - C = C + 1
*/
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, zero_region, RANDOM_ZERO_BLOCKSIZE);
if (seeded)
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, keymaterial, keysz);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, entropy_data, RANDOM_KEYSIZE*blockcount);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, hash);
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, hash, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, hash);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&fortuna_state.fs_key, hash);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
/* Unblock the device if this is the first time we are reseeding. */
if (uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter))
randomdev_unblock();
uint128_increment(&fortuna_state.fs_counter);
}
/*-
* FS&K - GenerateBlocks()
* Generate a number of complete blocks of random output.
*/
static __inline void
random_fortuna_genblocks(uint8_t *buf, u_int blockcount)
{
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
KASSERT(!uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter), ("FS&K: C != 0"));
/*
* Fills buf with RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE * blockcount bytes of keystream.
* Increments fs_counter as it goes.
*/
randomdev_keystream(&fortuna_state.fs_key, &fortuna_state.fs_counter,
buf, blockcount);
}
/*-
* FS&K - PseudoRandomData()
* This generates no more than 2^20 bytes of data, and cleans up its
* internal state when finished. It is assumed that a whole number of
* blocks are available for writing; any excess generated will be
* ignored.
*/
static __inline void
random_fortuna_genrandom(uint8_t *buf, u_int bytecount)
{
uint8_t temp[RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE * RANDOM_KEYS_PER_BLOCK];
u_int blockcount;
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
/*-
* FS&K - assert(n < 2^20 (== 1 MB)
* - r = first-n-bytes(GenerateBlocks(ceil(n/16)))
* - K = GenerateBlocks(2)
*/
KASSERT((bytecount <= RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ), ("invalid single read request to Fortuna of %d bytes", bytecount));
blockcount = howmany(bytecount, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
random_fortuna_genblocks(buf, blockcount);
random_fortuna_genblocks(temp, RANDOM_KEYS_PER_BLOCK);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&fortuna_state.fs_key, temp);
explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
}
/*-
* FS&K - RandomData() (Part 1)
* Used to return processed entropy from the PRNG. There is a pre_read
* required to be present (but it can be a stub) in order to allow
* specific actions at the begin of the read.
*/
void
random_fortuna_pre_read(void)
{
#ifdef _KERNEL
sbintime_t now;
#endif
struct randomdev_hash context;
uint32_t s[RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS*RANDOM_KEYSIZE_WORDS];
uint8_t temp[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
u_int i;
KASSERT(fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize > 0, ("random: Fortuna threshold must be > 0"));
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
#ifdef _KERNEL
/* FS&K - Use 'getsbinuptime()' to prevent reseed-spamming. */
now = getsbinuptime();
#endif
if (fortuna_state.fs_pool[0].fsp_length < fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize
#ifdef _KERNEL
/*
* FS&K - Use 'getsbinuptime()' to prevent reseed-spamming, but do
* not block initial seeding (fs_lasttime == 0).
*/
|| (__predict_true(fortuna_state.fs_lasttime != 0) &&
now - fortuna_state.fs_lasttime <= SBT_1S/10)
#endif
) {
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
return;
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
/*
* When set, pretend we do not have enough entropy to reseed yet.
*/
KFAIL_POINT_CODE(DEBUG_FP, random_fortuna_pre_read, {
if (RETURN_VALUE != 0) {
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
return;
}
});
#endif
#ifdef _KERNEL
fortuna_state.fs_lasttime = now;
#endif
/* FS&K - ReseedCNT = ReseedCNT + 1 */
fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount++;
/* s = \epsilon at start */
for (i = 0; i < RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS; i++) {
/* FS&K - if Divides(ReseedCnt, 2^i) ... */
if ((fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount % (1 << i)) == 0) {
/*-
* FS&K - temp = (P_i)
* - P_i = \epsilon
* - s = s|H(temp)
*/
randomdev_hash_finish(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash, temp);
randomdev_hash_init(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash);
fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_length = 0;
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, temp, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, s + i*RANDOM_KEYSIZE_WORDS);
} else
break;
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
SDT_PROBE2(random, fortuna, event_processor, debug, fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount, fortuna_state.fs_pool);
#endif
/* FS&K */
random_fortuna_reseed_internal(s, i);
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
/* Clean up and secure */
explicit_bzero(s, sizeof(s));
explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
}
/*-
* FS&K - RandomData() (Part 2)
* Main read from Fortuna, continued. May be called multiple times after
* the random_fortuna_pre_read() above.
* The supplied buf MUST be a multiple of RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE in size.
* Lots of code presumes this for efficiency, both here and in other
* routines. You are NOT allowed to break this!
*/
void
random_fortuna_read(uint8_t *buf, u_int bytecount)
{
KASSERT((bytecount % RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE) == 0, ("%s(): bytecount (= %d) must be a multiple of %d", __func__, bytecount, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE ));
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
random_fortuna_genrandom(buf, bytecount);
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
static bool block_seeded_status = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, block_seeded_status, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&block_seeded_status, 0,
"If non-zero, pretend Fortuna is in an unseeded state. By setting "
"this as a tunable, boot can be tested as if the random device is "
"unavailable.");
#endif
static bool
random_fortuna_seeded_internal(void)
{
return (!uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter));
}
static bool
random_fortuna_seeded(void)
{
#ifdef _KERNEL
if (block_seeded_status)
return (false);
#endif
if (__predict_true(random_fortuna_seeded_internal()))
return (true);
/*
* Maybe we have enough entropy in the zeroth pool but just haven't
* kicked the initial seed step. Do so now.
*/
random_fortuna_pre_read();
return (random_fortuna_seeded_internal());
}