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opnsense-src/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
John Baldwin c034143269 Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). 
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
  initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
  crypto_session_params.  This session includes a new mode to define
  how the other fields should be interpreted.  Available modes
  include:

  - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
  - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
  - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
  - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
  - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)

  Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
  support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
  for that.  TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)

  The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
  before.  However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
  switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
  encryption key.  The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
  keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher.  (Compression
  algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)

- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms.  This
  doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
  support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
  for ETA).  Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
  added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers.  This
  method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
  device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
  the "best" driver.  There are three constants for hardware
  (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
  (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order.  One effect of this
  is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
  you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
  Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
  crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.

  Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.

- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
  structure.  The linked list of descriptors has been removed.

  A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
  in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
  more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
  zero-copy).  It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
  input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).

  Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
    member of the operation structure.  If this flag is not set, the
    IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
    and stored into the data buffer.  This cannot be used with
    CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
  can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
  the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
  CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
  crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
  Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
  but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
  (and they had to be adjacent).

  crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
  the plaintext/ciphertext.  Modes that only do a single operation
  (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
  AAD region empty.

  If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
  location is marked by crp_digest_start.

  Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
  of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
  operation to perform.  For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
  mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
  request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
  digest.  GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
  requires this for decryption.  The new ETA mode now also requires
  this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
  authentication verification.  Simple DIGEST operations can also do
  this, though there are no in-tree consumers.

  To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
  cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
  set crp_sesssion directly.

- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
  crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq().  This permits the
  crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
  driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.

- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
  crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
  first parameter instead of individual members.  This makes it easier
  to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
  separate input and output buffers.  It's also simpler for driver
  writers to use.

- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
  This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
  use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.

- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
  and OPAD.  This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.

- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
  device drivers.  However, session key buffers provided when a session
  is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
  session.

- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
  key.  The redundant auth information is not needed or used.

- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
  callback now invokes a function pointer in the session.  This
  function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
  simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
  'process'.

  It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
  is some duplication.

- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
  as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.

- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
  mode.  The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
  This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
  the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
  flag.

- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
  sessions.  I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
  as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
  all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.

- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
  of which many are written from scratch.

- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
  that they compile, but I have not tested all of them.  I have tested
  the following drivers:

  - cryptosoft
  - aesni (AES only)
  - blake2
  - ccr

  and the following consumers:

  - cryptodev
  - IPsec
  - ktls_ocf
  - GELI (lightly)

  I have not tested the following:

  - ccp
  - aesni with sha
  - hifn
  - kgssapi_krb5
  - ubsec
  - padlock
  - safe
  - armv8_crypto (aarch64)
  - glxsb (i386)
  - sec (ppc)
  - cesa (armv7)
  - cryptocteon (mips64)
  - nlmsec (mips64)

Discussed with:	cem
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00

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/* $OpenBSD: cryptosoft.c,v 1.35 2002/04/26 08:43:50 deraadt Exp $ */
/*-
* The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu)
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting
*
* This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in
* February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly
* supported the development of this code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis
* Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney
* under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
* Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
*
* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
* all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
* modification of this software.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <crypto/blowfish/blowfish.h>
#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <opencrypto/rmd160.h>
#include <opencrypto/cast.h>
#include <opencrypto/skipjack.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/bus.h>
#include "cryptodev_if.h"
struct swcr_auth {
void *sw_ictx;
void *sw_octx;
struct auth_hash *sw_axf;
uint16_t sw_mlen;
uint16_t sw_octx_len;
};
struct swcr_encdec {
uint8_t *sw_kschedule;
struct enc_xform *sw_exf;
};
struct swcr_compdec {
struct comp_algo *sw_cxf;
};
struct swcr_session {
struct mtx swcr_lock;
int (*swcr_process)(struct swcr_session *, struct cryptop *);
struct swcr_auth swcr_auth;
struct swcr_encdec swcr_encdec;
struct swcr_compdec swcr_compdec;
};
static int32_t swcr_id;
static void swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses);
/* Used for CRYPTO_NULL_CBC. */
static int
swcr_null(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm.
*/
static int
swcr_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
unsigned char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN], blk[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
unsigned char *ivp, *nivp, iv2[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_encdec *sw;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int i, j, k, blks, ind, count, ivlen;
struct uio *uio, uiolcl;
struct iovec iovlcl[4];
struct iovec *iov;
int iovcnt, iovalloc;
int error;
bool encrypting;
error = 0;
sw = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = sw->sw_exf;
blks = exf->blocksize;
ivlen = exf->ivsize;
/* Check for non-padded data */
if ((crp->crp_payload_length % blks) != 0)
return EINVAL;
if (exf == &enc_xform_aes_icm &&
(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* IV explicitly provided ? */
if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE)
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
else if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE) {
arc4rand(iv, ivlen, 0);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_iv_start, ivlen, iv);
} else
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_iv_start, ivlen, iv);
if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) {
if (sw->sw_kschedule)
exf->zerokey(&(sw->sw_kschedule));
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
error = exf->setkey(&sw->sw_kschedule,
crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
iov = iovlcl;
iovcnt = nitems(iovlcl);
iovalloc = 0;
uio = &uiolcl;
switch (crp->crp_buf_type) {
case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF:
error = crypto_mbuftoiov(crp->crp_mbuf, &iov, &iovcnt,
&iovalloc);
if (error)
return (error);
uio->uio_iov = iov;
uio->uio_iovcnt = iovcnt;
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO:
uio = crp->crp_uio;
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_CONTIG:
iov[0].iov_base = crp->crp_buf;
iov[0].iov_len = crp->crp_ilen;
uio->uio_iov = iov;
uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
break;
}
ivp = iv;
if (exf->reinit) {
/*
* xforms that provide a reinit method perform all IV
* handling themselves.
*/
exf->reinit(sw->sw_kschedule, iv);
}
count = crp->crp_payload_start;
ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
if (ind == -1) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i = crp->crp_payload_length;
encrypting = CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op);
while (i > 0) {
/*
* If there's insufficient data at the end of
* an iovec, we have to do some copying.
*/
if (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len < k + blks &&
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len != k) {
cuio_copydata(uio, count, blks, blk);
/* Actual encryption/decryption */
if (exf->reinit) {
if (encrypting) {
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
blk);
} else {
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
blk);
}
} else if (encrypting) {
/* XOR with previous block */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
blk[j] ^= ivp[j];
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk);
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
bcopy(blk, iv, blks);
ivp = iv;
} else { /* decrypt */
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv;
bcopy(blk, nivp, blks);
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk);
/* XOR with previous block */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
blk[j] ^= ivp[j];
ivp = nivp;
}
/* Copy back decrypted block */
cuio_copyback(uio, count, blks, blk);
count += blks;
/* Advance pointer */
ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
if (ind == -1) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i -= blks;
/* Could be done... */
if (i == 0)
break;
}
while (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len >= k + blks && i > 0) {
uint8_t *idat;
size_t nb, rem;
nb = blks;
rem = MIN((size_t)i,
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len - (size_t)k);
idat = (uint8_t *)uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_base + k;
if (exf->reinit) {
if (encrypting && exf->encrypt_multi == NULL)
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat);
else if (encrypting) {
nb = rounddown(rem, blks);
exf->encrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat, nb);
} else if (exf->decrypt_multi == NULL)
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat);
else {
nb = rounddown(rem, blks);
exf->decrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat, nb);
}
} else if (encrypting) {
/* XOR with previous block/IV */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
idat[j] ^= ivp[j];
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat);
ivp = idat;
} else { /* decrypt */
/*
* Keep encrypted block to be used
* in next block's processing.
*/
nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv;
bcopy(idat, nivp, blks);
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat);
/* XOR with previous block/IV */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
idat[j] ^= ivp[j];
ivp = nivp;
}
count += nb;
k += nb;
i -= nb;
}
/*
* Advance to the next iov if the end of the current iov
* is aligned with the end of a cipher block.
* Note that the code is equivalent to calling:
* ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
*/
if (i > 0 && k == uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) {
k = 0;
ind++;
if (ind >= uio->uio_iovcnt) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
}
out:
if (iovalloc)
free(iov, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return (error);
}
static void
swcr_authprepare(struct auth_hash *axf, struct swcr_auth *sw,
const uint8_t *key, int klen)
{
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
hmac_init_ipad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_ictx);
hmac_init_opad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_octx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
{
/*
* We need a buffer that can hold an md5 and a sha1 result
* just to throw it away.
* What we do here is the initial part of:
* ALGO( key, keyfill, .. )
* adding the key to sw_ictx and abusing Final() to get the
* "keyfill" padding.
* In addition we abuse the sw_octx to save the key to have
* it to be able to append it at the end in swcr_authcompute().
*/
u_char buf[SHA1_RESULTLEN];
bcopy(key, sw->sw_octx, klen);
axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx);
axf->Update(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Final(buf, sw->sw_ictx);
break;
}
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
axf->Setkey(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx);
break;
default:
panic("%s: algorithm %d doesn't use keys", __func__, axf->type);
}
}
/*
* Compute or verify hash.
*/
static int
swcr_authcompute(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_char aalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
u_char uaalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_auth *sw;
struct auth_hash *axf;
union authctx ctx;
int err;
sw = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = sw->sw_axf;
if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) {
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
swcr_authprepare(axf, sw, crp->crp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
bcopy(sw->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length,
(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
if (sw->sw_octx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
bcopy(sw->sw_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
axf->Update(&ctx, aalg, axf->hashsize);
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
/* If we have no key saved, return error. */
if (sw->sw_octx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Add the trailing copy of the key (see comment in
* swcr_authprepare()) after the data:
* ALGO( .., key, algofill )
* and let Final() do the proper, natural "algofill"
* padding.
*/
axf->Update(&ctx, sw->sw_octx, sw->sw_octx_len);
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
}
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, sw->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (1ll<<39) - 256); /* GCM: plain text < 2^39-256 */
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (uint64_t)-1); /* GCM: associated data <= 2^64-1 */
static int
swcr_gmac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE)
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
else
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_iv_start, ivlen, iv);
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
/* length block */
bzero(blk, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption with MAC */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
} else {
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
}
}
/* length block */
bzero(blk, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 3;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen);
if (r != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE)
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
else
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_iv_start, ivlen, iv);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = 0;
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
} else {
/*
* One of the problems with CCM+CBC is that
* the authentication is done on the
* unecncrypted data. As a result, we have to
* decrypt the data twice: once to generate
* the tag and a second time after the tag is
* verified.
*/
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
}
}
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen);
if (r != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
aalg);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply a cipher and a digest to perform EtA.
*/
static int
swcr_eta(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
int error;
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
} else {
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Apply a compression/decompression algorithm
*/
static int
swcr_compdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t *data, *out;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int adj;
u_int32_t result;
cxf = ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf;
/* We must handle the whole buffer of data in one time
* then if there is not all the data in the mbuf, we must
* copy in a buffer.
*/
data = malloc(crp->crp_payload_length, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (data == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
data);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op))
result = cxf->compress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
else
result = cxf->decompress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
free(data, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
if (result == 0)
return (EINVAL);
crp->crp_olen = result;
/* Check the compressed size when doing compression */
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op)) {
if (result >= crp->crp_payload_length) {
/* Compression was useless, we lost time */
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return (0);
}
}
/* Copy back the (de)compressed data. m_copyback is
* extending the mbuf as necessary.
*/
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, result, out);
if (result < crp->crp_payload_length) {
switch (crp->crp_buf_type) {
case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF:
adj = result - crp->crp_payload_length;
m_adj(crp->crp_mbuf, adj);
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: {
struct uio *uio = crp->crp_uio;
int ind;
adj = crp->crp_payload_length - result;
ind = uio->uio_iovcnt - 1;
while (adj > 0 && ind >= 0) {
if (adj < uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) {
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len -= adj;
break;
}
adj -= uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len;
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len = 0;
ind--;
uio->uio_iovcnt--;
}
}
break;
}
}
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return 0;
}
static int
swcr_setup_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct enc_xform *txf;
int error;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
MPASS(txf->ivsize == csp->csp_ivlen);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_auth(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
swa->sw_octx_len = axf->ctxsize;
swa->sw_octx = malloc(swa->sw_octx_len, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_octx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
swa->sw_octx_len = csp->csp_auth_klen;
swa->sw_octx = malloc(swa->sw_octx_len, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_octx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
/* Store the key so we can "append" it to the payload */
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
#ifdef notdef
case CRYPTO_MD5:
#endif
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gmac;
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
/*
* Blake2b and Blake2s support an optional key but do
* not require one.
*/
if (csp->csp_auth_klen == 0 || csp->csp_auth_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm_cbc_mac;
break;
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = &enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm;
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = &enc_xform_ccm;
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static bool
swcr_auth_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct auth_hash *axf;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
if (axf == NULL)
return (false);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
if (csp->csp_auth_klen != POLY1305_KEY_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
}
return (true);
}
static bool
swcr_cipher_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct enc_xform *txf;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
if (txf == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_NULL_CBC &&
txf->ivsize != csp->csp_ivlen)
return (false);
return (true);
}
static int
swcr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
if (csp->csp_flags != 0)
return (EINVAL);
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
default:
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
if (!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
/* AEAD algorithms cannot be used for EtA. */
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
return (EINVAL);
}
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp) ||
!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
return (CRYPTODEV_PROBE_SOFTWARE);
}
/*
* Generate a new software session.
*/
static int
swcr_newsession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int error;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_init(&ses->swcr_lock, "swcr session lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
error = 0;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
cxf = &comp_algo_deflate;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad compression algo");
#endif
}
ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf = cxf;
ses->swcr_process = swcr_compdec;
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
ses->swcr_process = swcr_null;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad cipher algo");
#endif
default:
error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_encdec;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_gcm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gcm;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_ccm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad aead algo");
#endif
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
#ifdef INVARIANTS
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad eta cipher algo");
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
panic("bad eta auth algo");
}
#endif
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
if (error)
break;
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_NULL_CBC) {
/* Effectively degrade to digest mode. */
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
}
error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_eta;
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
}
if (error)
swcr_freesession(dev, cses);
return (error);
}
static void
swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_destroy(&ses->swcr_lock);
txf = ses->swcr_encdec.sw_exf;
if (txf != NULL) {
if (ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule != NULL)
txf->zerokey(&(ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule));
}
axf = ses->swcr_auth.sw_axf;
if (axf != NULL) {
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
if (swa->sw_ictx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_ictx, axf->ctxsize);
free(swa->sw_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
if (swa->sw_octx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_octx, swa->sw_octx_len);
free(swa->sw_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
}
}
/*
* Process a software request.
*/
static int
swcr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session);
mtx_lock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crp->crp_etype = ses->swcr_process(ses, crp);
mtx_unlock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crypto_done(crp);
return (0);
}
static void
swcr_identify(driver_t *drv, device_t parent)
{
/* NB: order 10 is so we get attached after h/w devices */
if (device_find_child(parent, "cryptosoft", -1) == NULL &&
BUS_ADD_CHILD(parent, 10, "cryptosoft", 0) == 0)
panic("cryptosoft: could not attach");
}
static int
swcr_probe(device_t dev)
{
device_set_desc(dev, "software crypto");
return (BUS_PROBE_NOWILDCARD);
}
static int
swcr_attach(device_t dev)
{
swcr_id = crypto_get_driverid(dev, sizeof(struct swcr_session),
CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC);
if (swcr_id < 0) {
device_printf(dev, "cannot initialize!");
return (ENXIO);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_detach(device_t dev)
{
crypto_unregister_all(swcr_id);
return 0;
}
static device_method_t swcr_methods[] = {
DEVMETHOD(device_identify, swcr_identify),
DEVMETHOD(device_probe, swcr_probe),
DEVMETHOD(device_attach, swcr_attach),
DEVMETHOD(device_detach, swcr_detach),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_probesession, swcr_probesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, swcr_newsession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession,swcr_freesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, swcr_process),
{0, 0},
};
static driver_t swcr_driver = {
"cryptosoft",
swcr_methods,
0, /* NB: no softc */
};
static devclass_t swcr_devclass;
/*
* NB: We explicitly reference the crypto module so we
* get the necessary ordering when built as a loadable
* module. This is required because we bundle the crypto
* module code together with the cryptosoft driver (otherwise
* normal module dependencies would handle things).
*/
extern int crypto_modevent(struct module *, int, void *);
/* XXX where to attach */
DRIVER_MODULE(cryptosoft, nexus, swcr_driver, swcr_devclass, crypto_modevent,0);
MODULE_VERSION(cryptosoft, 1);
MODULE_DEPEND(cryptosoft, crypto, 1, 1, 1);
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