opnsense-src/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
Olivier Certner adc6f56e81
MAC/do: Fix a too stringent debug assertion for a target of 'uid=*'
MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE only concerns groups, not users, and is thus not
set in the latter case.

This change only has an effect on INVARIANTS builds.

PR:             287057
MFC after:      10 minutes
Sponsored by:   The FreeBSD Foundation

(cherry picked from commit b5c9889e369a801ce7c1115f2535ddacbd69800d)
(cherry picked from commit 30f092c40ad4eb592861839f4ffa9e9891abf1d3)

Approved by:    re (cperciva)
2025-05-27 23:01:54 +02:00

2131 lines
55 KiB
C

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
*
* Copyright(c) 2024 Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
* Copyright (c) 2024 The FreeBSD Foundation
*
* Portions of this software were developed by Olivier Certner
* <olce.freebsd@certner.fr> at Kumacom SARL under sponsorship from the FreeBSD
* Foundation.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ctype.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/refcount.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, do,
CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, "mac_do policy controls");
static int do_enabled = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&do_enabled, 0, "Enforce do policy");
static int print_parse_error = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, print_parse_error, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&print_parse_error, 0, "Print parse errors on setting rules "
"(via sysctl(8)).");
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_DO, "do_rule", "Rules for mac_do");
#define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024
static unsigned osd_jail_slot;
static unsigned osd_thread_slot;
#define IT_INVALID 0 /* Must stay 0. */
#define IT_UID 1
#define IT_GID 2
#define IT_ANY 3
#define IT_LAST IT_ANY
static const char *id_type_to_str[] = {
[IT_INVALID] = "invalid",
[IT_UID] = "uid",
[IT_GID] = "gid",
/* See also parse_id_type(). */
[IT_ANY] = "*",
};
#define PARSE_ERROR_SIZE 256
struct parse_error {
size_t pos;
char msg[PARSE_ERROR_SIZE];
};
/*
* We assume that 'uid_t' and 'gid_t' are aliases to 'u_int' in conversions
* required for parsing rules specification strings.
*/
_Static_assert(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(u_int) && (uid_t)-1 >= 0 &&
sizeof(gid_t) == sizeof(u_int) && (gid_t)-1 >= 0,
"mac_do(4) assumes that 'uid_t' and 'gid_t' are aliases to 'u_int'");
/*
* Internal flags.
*
* They either apply as per-type (t) or per-ID (i) but are conflated because all
* per-ID flags are also valid as per-type ones to qualify the "current" (".")
* per-type flag. Also, some of them are in fact exclusive, but we use one-hot
* encoding for simplicity.
*
* There is currently room for "only" 16 bits. As these flags are purely
* internal, they can be renumbered and/or their type changed as needed.
*
* See also the check_*() functions below.
*/
typedef uint16_t flags_t;
/* (i,gid) Specification concerns primary groups. */
#define MDF_PRIMARY (1u << 0)
/* (i,gid) Specification concerns supplementary groups. */
#define MDF_SUPP_ALLOW (1u << 1)
/* (i,gid) Group must appear as a supplementary group. */
#define MDF_SUPP_MUST (1u << 2)
/* (i,gid) Group must not appear as a supplementary group. */
#define MDF_SUPP_DONT (1u << 3)
#define MDF_SUPP_MASK (MDF_SUPP_ALLOW | MDF_SUPP_MUST | MDF_SUPP_DONT)
#define MDF_ID_MASK (MDF_PRIMARY | MDF_SUPP_MASK)
/*
* (t) All IDs allowed.
*
* For GIDs, MDF_ANY only concerns primary groups. The MDF_PRIMARY and
* MDF_SUPP_* flags never apply to MDF_ANY, but can be present if MDF_CURRENT is
* present also, as usual.
*/
#define MDF_ANY (1u << 8)
/* (t) Current IDs allowed. */
#define MDF_CURRENT (1u << 9)
#define MDF_TYPE_COMMON_MASK (MDF_ANY | MDF_CURRENT)
/* (t,gid) All IDs allowed as supplementary groups. */
#define MDF_ANY_SUPP (1u << 10)
/* (t,gid) Some ID or MDF_CURRENT has MDF_SUPP_MUST or MDF_SUPP_DONT. */
#define MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP (1u << 11)
/* (t,gid) Some explicit ID (not MDF_CURRENT) has MDF_SUPP_MUST. */
#define MDF_EXPLICIT_SUPP_MUST (1u << 12)
/* (t,gid) Whether any target clause is about primary groups. Used during
* parsing only. */
#define MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE (1u << 13)
/* (t,gid) Whether any target clause is about supplementary groups. Used during
* parsing only. */
#define MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE (1u << 14)
#define MDF_TYPE_GID_MASK (MDF_ANY_SUPP | MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP | \
MDF_EXPLICIT_SUPP_MUST | MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE | MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE)
#define MDF_TYPE_MASK (MDF_TYPE_COMMON_MASK | MDF_TYPE_GID_MASK)
/*
* Persistent structures.
*/
struct id_spec {
u_int id;
flags_t flags; /* See MDF_* above. */
};
/*
* This limits the number of target clauses per type to 65535. With the current
* value of MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN (1024), this is way more than enough anyway.
*/
typedef uint16_t id_nb_t;
/* We only have a few IT_* types. */
typedef uint16_t id_type_t;
struct rule {
STAILQ_ENTRY(rule) r_entries;
id_type_t from_type;
u_int from_id;
flags_t uid_flags; /* See MDF_* above. */
id_nb_t uids_nb;
flags_t gid_flags; /* See MDF_* above. */
id_nb_t gids_nb;
struct id_spec *uids;
struct id_spec *gids;
};
STAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule);
struct rules {
char string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
struct rulehead head;
volatile u_int use_count __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
};
/*
* Temporary structures used to build a 'struct rule' above.
*/
struct id_elem {
STAILQ_ENTRY(id_elem) ie_entries;
struct id_spec spec;
};
STAILQ_HEAD(id_list, id_elem);
#ifdef INVARIANTS
static void
check_type(const id_type_t type)
{
if (type > IT_LAST)
panic("Invalid type number %u", type);
}
static void
panic_for_unexpected_flags(const id_type_t type, const flags_t flags,
const char *const str)
{
panic("ID type %s: Unexpected flags %u (%s), ", id_type_to_str[type],
flags, str);
}
static void
check_type_and_id_flags(const id_type_t type, const flags_t flags)
{
const char *str;
check_type(type);
switch (type) {
case IT_UID:
if (flags != 0) {
str = "only 0 allowed";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
break;
case IT_GID:
if ((flags & ~MDF_ID_MASK) != 0) {
str = "only bits in MDF_ID_MASK allowed";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
if (!powerof2(flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK)) {
str = "only a single flag in MDF_SUPP_MASK allowed";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
break;
default:
__assert_unreachable();
}
return;
unexpected_flags:
panic_for_unexpected_flags(type, flags, str);
}
static void
check_type_and_id_spec(const id_type_t type, const struct id_spec *const is)
{
check_type_and_id_flags(type, is->flags);
}
static void
check_type_and_type_flags(const id_type_t type, const flags_t flags)
{
const char *str;
check_type_and_id_flags(type, flags & MDF_ID_MASK);
if ((flags & ~MDF_ID_MASK & ~MDF_TYPE_MASK) != 0) {
str = "only MDF_ID_MASK | MDF_TYPE_MASK bits allowed";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
if ((flags & MDF_ANY) != 0 && (flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
(type == IT_UID || (flags & MDF_PRIMARY) != 0)) {
str = "MDF_ANY and MDF_CURRENT are exclusive for UIDs "
"or primary group GIDs";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
if ((flags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0 && (flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
(flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0) {
str = "MDF_SUPP_ANY and MDF_CURRENT with supplementary "
"groups specification are exclusive";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
if (type == IT_GID &&
((flags & MDF_PRIMARY) != 0 || (flags & MDF_ANY) != 0) &&
(flags & MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE) == 0) {
str = "Presence of folded primary clause not reflected "
"by presence of MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
if (((flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0 || (flags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0) &&
(flags & MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE) == 0) {
str = "Presence of folded supplementary clause not reflected "
"by presence of MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE";
goto unexpected_flags;
}
return;
unexpected_flags:
panic_for_unexpected_flags(type, flags, str);
}
#else /* !INVARIANTS */
#define check_type_and_id_flags(...)
#define check_type_and_id_spec(...)
#define check_type_and_type_flags(...)
#endif /* INVARIANTS */
/*
* Returns EALREADY if both flags have some overlap, or EINVAL if flags are
* incompatible, else 0 with flags successfully merged into 'dest'.
*/
static int
coalesce_id_flags(const flags_t src, flags_t *const dest)
{
flags_t res;
if ((src & *dest) != 0)
return (EALREADY);
res = src | *dest;
/* Check for compatibility of supplementary flags, and coalesce. */
if ((res & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0) {
/* MDF_SUPP_DONT incompatible with the rest. */
if ((res & MDF_SUPP_DONT) != 0 && (res & MDF_SUPP_MASK &
~MDF_SUPP_DONT) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Coalesce MDF_SUPP_ALLOW and MDF_SUPP_MUST into MDF_SUPP_MUST.
*/
if ((res & MDF_SUPP_ALLOW) != 0 && (res & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0)
res &= ~MDF_SUPP_ALLOW;
}
*dest = res;
return (0);
}
static void
toast_rules(struct rules *const rules)
{
struct rulehead *const head = &rules->head;
struct rule *rule, *rule_next;
STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rule, head, r_entries, rule_next) {
free(rule->uids, M_DO);
free(rule->gids, M_DO);
free(rule, M_DO);
}
free(rules, M_DO);
}
static struct rules *
alloc_rules(void)
{
struct rules *const rules = malloc(sizeof(*rules), M_DO, M_WAITOK);
_Static_assert(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN > 0, "MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN <= 0!");
rules->string[0] = 0;
STAILQ_INIT(&rules->head);
rules->use_count = 0;
return (rules);
}
static bool
is_null_or_empty(const char *s)
{
return (s == NULL || s[0] == '\0');
}
/*
* String to unsigned int.
*
* Contrary to the "standard" strtou*() family of functions, do not tolerate
* spaces at start nor an empty string, and returns a status code, the 'u_int'
* result being returned through a passed pointer (if no error).
*
* We detour through 'quad_t' because in-kernel strto*() functions cannot set
* 'errno' and thus can't distinguish a true maximum value from one returned
* because of overflow. We use 'quad_t' instead of 'u_quad_t' to support
* negative specifications (e.g., such as "-1" for UINT_MAX).
*/
static int
strtoui_strict(const char *const restrict s, const char **const restrict endptr,
int base, u_int *result)
{
char *ep;
quad_t q;
/* Rule out spaces and empty specifications. */
if (s[0] == '\0' || isspace(s[0])) {
if (endptr != NULL)
*endptr = s;
return (EINVAL);
}
q = strtoq(s, &ep, base);
if (endptr != NULL)
*endptr = ep;
if (q < 0) {
/* We allow specifying a negative number. */
if (q < -(quad_t)UINT_MAX - 1 || q == QUAD_MIN)
return (EOVERFLOW);
} else {
if (q > UINT_MAX || q == UQUAD_MAX)
return (EOVERFLOW);
}
*result = (u_int)q;
return (0);
}
/*
* strsep() variant skipping spaces and tabs.
*
* Skips spaces and tabs at beginning and end of the token before one of the
* 'delim' characters, i.e., at start of string and just before one of the
* delimiter characters (so it doesn't prevent tokens containing spaces and tabs
* in the middle).
*/
static char *
strsep_noblanks(char **const stringp, const char *delim)
{
char *p = *stringp;
char *ret, *wsp;
size_t idx;
if (p == NULL)
return (NULL);
idx = strspn(p, " \t");
p += idx;
ret = strsep(&p, delim);
/* Rewind spaces/tabs at the end. */
if (p == NULL)
wsp = ret + strlen(ret);
else
wsp = p - 1;
for (; wsp != ret; --wsp) {
switch (wsp[-1]) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
continue;
}
break;
}
*wsp = '\0';
*stringp = p;
return (ret);
}
static void
make_parse_error(struct parse_error **const parse_error, const size_t pos,
const char *const fmt, ...)
{
struct parse_error *const err = malloc(sizeof(*err), M_DO, M_WAITOK);
va_list ap;
err->pos = pos;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vsnprintf(err->msg, PARSE_ERROR_SIZE, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
MPASS(*parse_error == NULL);
*parse_error = err;
}
static void
free_parse_error(struct parse_error *const parse_error)
{
free(parse_error, M_DO);
}
static int
parse_id_type(const char *const string, id_type_t *const type,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
/*
* Special case for "any", as the canonical form for IT_ANY in
* id_type_to_str[] is "*".
*/
if (strcmp(string, "any") == 0) {
*type = IT_ANY;
return (0);
}
/* Start at 1 to avoid parsing "invalid". */
for (size_t i = 1; i <= IT_LAST; ++i) {
if (strcmp(string, id_type_to_str[i]) == 0) {
*type = i;
return (0);
}
}
*type = IT_INVALID;
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0, "No valid type found.");
return (EINVAL);
}
static size_t
parse_gid_flags(const char *const string, flags_t *const flags,
flags_t *const gid_flags)
{
switch (string[0]) {
case '+':
*flags |= MDF_SUPP_ALLOW;
goto has_supp_clause;
case '!':
*flags |= MDF_SUPP_MUST;
*gid_flags |= MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP;
goto has_supp_clause;
case '-':
*flags |= MDF_SUPP_DONT;
*gid_flags |= MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP;
goto has_supp_clause;
has_supp_clause:
*gid_flags |= MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE;
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
static bool
parse_any(const char *const string)
{
return (strcmp(string, "*") == 0 || strcmp(string, "any") == 0);
}
static bool
has_clauses(const id_nb_t nb, const flags_t type_flags)
{
return ((type_flags & MDF_TYPE_MASK) != 0 || nb != 0);
}
static int
parse_target_clause(char *to, struct rule *const rule,
struct id_list *const uid_list, struct id_list *const gid_list,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
const char *const start = to;
char *to_type, *to_id;
const char *p;
struct id_list *list;
id_nb_t *nb;
flags_t *tflags;
struct id_elem *ie;
struct id_spec is = {.flags = 0};
flags_t gid_flags = 0;
id_type_t type;
int error;
MPASS(*parse_error == NULL);
MPASS(to != NULL);
to_type = strsep_noblanks(&to, "=");
MPASS(to_type != NULL);
to_type += parse_gid_flags(to_type, &is.flags, &gid_flags);
error = parse_id_type(to_type, &type, parse_error);
if (error != 0)
goto einval;
if (type != IT_GID && is.flags != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_type - start,
"Expected type 'gid' after flags, not '%s'.",
to_type);
goto einval;
}
to_id = strsep_noblanks(&to, "");
switch (type) {
case IT_GID:
if (to_id == NULL) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_type - start,
"No '=' and ID specification after type '%s'.",
to_type);
goto einval;
}
if (is.flags == 0) {
/* No flags: Dealing with a primary group. */
is.flags |= MDF_PRIMARY;
gid_flags |= MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE;
}
list = gid_list;
nb = &rule->gids_nb;
tflags = &rule->gid_flags;
/* "*" or "any"? */
if (parse_any(to_id)) {
/*
* We check that we have not seen any other clause of
* the same category (i.e., concerning primary or
* supplementary groups).
*/
if ((is.flags & MDF_PRIMARY) != 0) {
if ((*tflags & MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE) != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error,
to_id - start,
"'any' specified after another "
"(primary) GID.");
goto einval;
}
*tflags |= gid_flags | MDF_ANY;
} else {
/*
* If a supplementary group flag was present, it
* must be MDF_SUPP_ALLOW ("+").
*/
if ((is.flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != MDF_SUPP_ALLOW) {
make_parse_error(parse_error,
to_id - start,
"'any' specified with another "
"flag than '+'.");
goto einval;
}
if ((*tflags & MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE) != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error,
to_id - start,
"'any' with flag '+' specified after "
"another (supplementary) GID.");
goto einval;
}
*tflags |= gid_flags | MDF_ANY_SUPP;
}
goto check_type_and_finish;
} else {
/*
* Check that we haven't already seen "any" for the same
* category.
*/
if ((is.flags & MDF_PRIMARY) != 0) {
if ((*tflags & MDF_ANY) != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error,
to_id - start,
"Some (primary) GID specified after "
"'any'.");
goto einval;
}
} else if ((*tflags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0 &&
(is.flags & MDF_SUPP_ALLOW) != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error,
to_id - start,
"Some (supplementary) GID specified after "
"'any' with flag '+'.");
goto einval;
}
*tflags |= gid_flags;
}
break;
case IT_UID:
if (to_id == NULL) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_type - start,
"No '=' and ID specification after type '%s'.",
to_type);
goto einval;
}
list = uid_list;
nb = &rule->uids_nb;
tflags = &rule->uid_flags;
/* "*" or "any"? */
if (parse_any(to_id)) {
/* There must not be any other clause. */
if (has_clauses(*nb, *tflags)) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_id - start,
"'any' specified after another UID.");
goto einval;
}
*tflags |= MDF_ANY;
goto check_type_and_finish;
} else {
/*
* Check that we haven't already seen "any" for the same
* category.
*/
if ((*tflags & MDF_ANY) != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_id - start,
"Some UID specified after 'any'.");
goto einval;
}
}
break;
case IT_ANY:
/* No ID allowed. */
if (to_id != NULL) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_type - start,
"No '=' and ID allowed after type '%s'.", to_type);
goto einval;
}
/*
* We can't have IT_ANY after any other IT_*, it must be the
* only one.
*/
if (has_clauses(rule->uids_nb, rule->uid_flags) ||
has_clauses(rule->gids_nb, rule->gid_flags)) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_type - start,
"Target clause of type '%s' coming after another "
"clause (must be alone).", to_type);
goto einval;
}
rule->uid_flags |= MDF_ANY;
rule->gid_flags |= MDF_ANY | MDF_ANY_SUPP |
MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE | MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE;
goto finish;
default:
/* parse_id_type() returns no other types currently. */
__assert_unreachable();
}
/* Rule out cases that have been treated above. */
MPASS((type == IT_UID || type == IT_GID) && !parse_any(to_id));
/* "."? */
if (strcmp(to_id, ".") == 0) {
if ((*tflags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0) {
/* Duplicate "." <id>. Try to coalesce. */
error = coalesce_id_flags(is.flags, tflags);
if (error != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_id - start,
"Incompatible flags with prior clause "
"with same target.");
goto einval;
}
} else
*tflags |= MDF_CURRENT | is.flags;
goto check_type_and_finish;
}
/* Parse an ID. */
error = strtoui_strict(to_id, &p, 10, &is.id);
if (error != 0 || *p != '\0') {
make_parse_error(parse_error, to_id - start,
"Cannot parse a numerical ID (base 10).");
goto einval;
}
/* Explicit ID flags. */
if (type == IT_GID && (is.flags & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0)
*tflags |= MDF_EXPLICIT_SUPP_MUST;
/*
* We check for duplicate IDs and coalesce their 'struct id_spec' only
* at end of parse_single_rule() because it is much more performant then
* (using sorted arrays).
*/
++*nb;
if (*nb == 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
"Too many target clauses of type '%s'.", to_type);
return (EOVERFLOW);
}
ie = malloc(sizeof(*ie), M_DO, M_WAITOK);
ie->spec = is;
STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(list, ie, ie_entries);
check_type_and_id_spec(type, &is);
check_type_and_finish:
check_type_and_type_flags(type, *tflags);
finish:
return (0);
einval:
/* We must have built a parse error on error. */
MPASS(*parse_error != NULL);
return (EINVAL);
}
static int
u_int_cmp(const u_int i1, const u_int i2)
{
return ((i1 > i2) - (i1 < i2));
}
static int
id_spec_cmp(const void *const p1, const void *const p2)
{
const struct id_spec *const is1 = p1;
const struct id_spec *const is2 = p2;
return (u_int_cmp(is1->id, is2->id));
}
/*
* Transfer content of 'list' into 'array', freeing and emptying list.
*
* 'nb' must be 'list''s length and not be greater than 'array''s size. The
* destination array is sorted by ID. Structures 'struct id_spec' with same IDs
* are coalesced if that makes sense (not including duplicate clauses), else
* EINVAL is returned. On success, 'nb' is updated (lowered) to account for
* coalesced specifications. The parameter 'type' is only for testing purposes
* (INVARIANTS).
*/
static int
pour_list_into_rule(const id_type_t type, struct id_list *const list,
struct id_spec *const array, id_nb_t *const nb,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
struct id_elem *ie, *ie_next;
size_t idx = 0;
/* Fill the array. */
STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(ie, list, ie_entries, ie_next) {
MPASS(idx < *nb);
array[idx] = ie->spec;
free(ie, M_DO);
++idx;
}
MPASS(idx == *nb);
STAILQ_INIT(list);
/* Sort it (by ID). */
qsort(array, *nb, sizeof(*array), id_spec_cmp);
/* Coalesce same IDs. */
if (*nb != 0) {
size_t ref_idx = 0;
for (idx = 1; idx < *nb; ++idx) {
const u_int id = array[idx].id;
if (id != array[ref_idx].id) {
++ref_idx;
if (ref_idx != idx)
array[ref_idx] = array[idx];
continue;
}
switch (type) {
int error;
case IT_GID:
error = coalesce_id_flags(array[idx].flags,
&array[ref_idx].flags);
if (error != 0) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
"Incompatible flags or duplicate "
"GID %u.", id);
return (EINVAL);
}
check_type_and_id_flags(type,
array[ref_idx].flags);
break;
case IT_UID:
/*
* No flags in this case. Multiple appearances
* of the same UID is an exact redundancy, so
* error out.
*/
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
"Duplicate UID %u.", id);
return (EINVAL);
default:
__assert_unreachable();
}
}
*nb = ref_idx + 1;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* See also the herald comment for parse_rules() below.
*
* The second part of a rule, called <target> (or <to>), is a comma-separated
* (',') list of '<flags><type>=<id>' clauses similar to that of the <from>
* part, with the extensions that <id> may also be "*" or "any" or ".", and that
* <flags> may contain at most one of the '+', '-' and '!' characters when
* <type> is "gid" (no flags are allowed for "uid"). No two clauses in a single
* <to> list may list the same <id>. "*" and "any" both designate any ID for
* the <type>, and are aliases to each other. In front of "any" (or "*"), only
* the '+' flag is allowed (in the "gid" case). "." designates the process'
* current IDs for the <type>. The precise meaning of flags and "." is
* explained in functions checking privileges below.
*/
static int
parse_single_rule(char *rule, struct rules *const rules,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
const char *const start = rule;
const char *from_type, *from_id, *p;
char *to_list;
struct id_list uid_list, gid_list;
struct id_elem *ie, *ie_next;
struct rule *new;
int error;
MPASS(*parse_error == NULL);
STAILQ_INIT(&uid_list);
STAILQ_INIT(&gid_list);
/* Freed when the 'struct rules' container is freed. */
new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_DO, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
from_type = strsep_noblanks(&rule, "=");
MPASS(from_type != NULL); /* Because 'rule' was not NULL. */
error = parse_id_type(from_type, &new->from_type, parse_error);
if (error != 0)
goto einval;
switch (new->from_type) {
case IT_UID:
case IT_GID:
break;
default:
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0, "Type '%s' not allowed in "
"the \"from\" part of rules.");
goto einval;
}
from_id = strsep_noblanks(&rule, ":>");
if (is_null_or_empty(from_id)) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0, "No ID specified.");
goto einval;
}
error = strtoui_strict(from_id, &p, 10, &new->from_id);
if (error != 0 || *p != '\0') {
make_parse_error(parse_error, from_id - start,
"Cannot parse a numerical ID (base 10).");
goto einval;
}
/*
* We will now parse the "to" list.
*
* In order to ease parsing, we will begin by building lists of target
* UIDs and GIDs in local variables 'uid_list' and 'gid_list'. The
* number of each type of IDs will be filled directly in 'new'. At end
* of parse, we will allocate both arrays of IDs to be placed into the
* 'uids' and 'gids' members, sort them, and discard the tail queues
* used to build them. This conversion to sorted arrays at end of parse
* allows to minimize memory allocations and enables searching IDs in
* O(log(n)) instead of linearly.
*/
to_list = strsep_noblanks(&rule, ",");
if (to_list == NULL) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0, "No target list.");
goto einval;
}
do {
error = parse_target_clause(to_list, new, &uid_list, &gid_list,
parse_error);
if (error != 0) {
(*parse_error)->pos += to_list - start;
goto einval;
}
to_list = strsep_noblanks(&rule, ",");
} while (to_list != NULL);
if (new->uids_nb != 0) {
new->uids = malloc(sizeof(*new->uids) * new->uids_nb, M_DO,
M_WAITOK);
error = pour_list_into_rule(IT_UID, &uid_list, new->uids,
&new->uids_nb, parse_error);
if (error != 0)
goto einval;
}
MPASS(STAILQ_EMPTY(&uid_list));
if (!has_clauses(new->uids_nb, new->uid_flags)) {
/* No UID specified, default is "uid=.". */
MPASS(new->uid_flags == 0);
new->uid_flags = MDF_CURRENT;
check_type_and_type_flags(IT_UID, new->uid_flags);
}
if (new->gids_nb != 0) {
new->gids = malloc(sizeof(*new->gids) * new->gids_nb, M_DO,
M_WAITOK);
error = pour_list_into_rule(IT_GID, &gid_list, new->gids,
&new->gids_nb, parse_error);
if (error != 0)
goto einval;
}
MPASS(STAILQ_EMPTY(&gid_list));
if (!has_clauses(new->gids_nb, new->gid_flags)) {
/* No GID specified, default is "gid=.,!gid=.". */
MPASS(new->gid_flags == 0);
new->gid_flags = MDF_CURRENT | MDF_PRIMARY | MDF_SUPP_MUST |
MDF_HAS_PRIMARY_CLAUSE | MDF_HAS_SUPP_CLAUSE;
check_type_and_type_flags(IT_GID, new->gid_flags);
}
STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&rules->head, new, r_entries);
return (0);
einval:
free(new->gids, M_DO);
free(new->uids, M_DO);
free(new, M_DO);
STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(ie, &gid_list, ie_entries, ie_next)
free(ie, M_DO);
STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(ie, &uid_list, ie_entries, ie_next)
free(ie, M_DO);
MPASS(*parse_error != NULL);
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* Parse rules specification and produce rule structures out of it.
*
* Returns 0 on success, with '*rulesp' made to point to a 'struct rule'
* representing the rules. On error, the returned value is non-zero and
* '*rulesp' is unchanged. If 'string' has length greater or equal to
* MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, ENAMETOOLONG is returned. If it is not in the expected
* format, EINVAL is returned. If an error is returned, '*parse_error' is set
* to point to a 'struct parse_error' giving an error message for the problem,
* else '*parse_error' is set to NULL.
*
* Expected format: A >-colon-separated list of rules of the form
* "<from>><target>" (for backwards compatibility, a semi-colon ":" is accepted
* in place of '>'). The <from> part is of the form "<type>=<id>" where <type>
* is "uid" or "gid", <id> an UID or GID (depending on <type>) and <target> is
* "*", "any" or a comma-separated list of '<flags><type>=<id>' clauses (see the
* comment for parse_single_rule() for more details). For convenience, empty
* rules are allowed (and do nothing), and spaces and tabs are allowed (and
* removed) around each token (tokens are natural ones, except that
* '<flags><type>' as a whole is considered a single token, so no blanks are
* allowed between '<flags>' and '<type>').
*
* Examples:
* - "uid=1001>uid=1010,gid=1010;uid=1002>any"
* - "gid=1010>gid=1011,gid=1012,gid=1013"
*/
static int
parse_rules(const char *const string, struct rules **const rulesp,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
const size_t len = strlen(string);
char *copy, *p, *rule;
struct rules *rules;
int error = 0;
*parse_error = NULL;
if (len >= MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN) {
make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
"Rule specification string is too long (%zu, max %zu)",
len, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN - 1);
return (ENAMETOOLONG);
}
rules = alloc_rules();
bcopy(string, rules->string, len + 1);
MPASS(rules->string[len] == '\0'); /* Catch some races. */
copy = malloc(len + 1, M_DO, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(string, copy, len + 1);
MPASS(copy[len] == '\0'); /* Catch some races. */
p = copy;
while ((rule = strsep_noblanks(&p, ";")) != NULL) {
if (rule[0] == '\0')
continue;
error = parse_single_rule(rule, rules, parse_error);
if (error != 0) {
(*parse_error)->pos += rule - copy;
toast_rules(rules);
goto out;
}
}
*rulesp = rules;
out:
free(copy, M_DO);
return (error);
}
/*
* Find rules applicable to the passed prison.
*
* Returns the applicable rules (and never NULL). 'pr' must be unlocked.
* 'aprp' is set to the (ancestor) prison holding these, and it must be unlocked
* once the caller is done accessing the rules. '*aprp' is equal to 'pr' if and
* only if the current jail has its own set of rules.
*/
static struct rules *
find_rules(struct prison *const pr, struct prison **const aprp)
{
struct prison *cpr, *ppr;
struct rules *rules;
cpr = pr;
for (;;) {
prison_lock(cpr);
rules = osd_jail_get(cpr, osd_jail_slot);
if (rules != NULL)
break;
prison_unlock(cpr);
ppr = cpr->pr_parent;
MPASS(ppr != NULL); /* prison0 always has rules. */
cpr = ppr;
}
*aprp = cpr;
return (rules);
}
static void
hold_rules(struct rules *const rules)
{
refcount_acquire(&rules->use_count);
}
static void
drop_rules(struct rules *const rules)
{
if (refcount_release(&rules->use_count))
toast_rules(rules);
}
#ifdef INVARIANTS
static void
check_rules_use_count(const struct rules *const rules, u_int expected)
{
const u_int use_count = refcount_load(&rules->use_count);
if (use_count != expected)
panic("MAC/do: Rules at %p: Use count is %u, expected %u",
rules, use_count, expected);
}
#else
#define check_rules_use_count(...)
#endif /* INVARIANTS */
/*
* OSD destructor for slot 'osd_jail_slot'.
*
* Called with 'value' not NULL. We have arranged that it is only ever called
* when the corresponding jail goes down or at module unload.
*/
static void
dealloc_jail_osd(void *const value)
{
struct rules *const rules = value;
/*
* If called because the "holding" jail goes down, no one should be
* using the rules but us at this point because no threads of that jail
* (or its sub-jails) should currently be executing (in particular,
* currently executing setcred()). The case of module unload is more
* complex. Although the MAC framework takes care that no hook is
* called while a module is unloading, the unload could happen between
* two calls to MAC hooks in the course of, e.g., executing setcred(),
* where the rules' reference count has been bumped to keep them alive
* even if the rules on the "holding" jail has been concurrently
* changed. These other references are held in our thread OSD slot, so
* we ensure that all thread's slots are freed first in mac_do_destroy()
* to be able to check that only one reference remains.
*/
check_rules_use_count(rules, 1);
toast_rules(rules);
}
/*
* Remove the rules specifically associated to a prison.
*
* In practice, this means that the rules become inherited (from the closest
* ascendant that has some).
*
* Destroys the 'osd_jail_slot' slot of the passed jail.
*/
static void
remove_rules(struct prison *const pr)
{
struct rules *old_rules;
int error __unused;
prison_lock(pr);
/*
* We go to the burden of extracting rules first instead of just letting
* osd_jail_del() calling dealloc_jail_osd() as we want to decrement
* their use count, and possibly free them, outside of the prison lock.
*/
old_rules = osd_jail_get(pr, osd_jail_slot);
error = osd_jail_set(pr, osd_jail_slot, NULL);
/* osd_set() never fails nor allocate memory when 'value' is NULL. */
MPASS(error == 0);
/*
* This completely frees the OSD slot, but doesn't call the destructor
* since we've just put NULL in the slot.
*/
osd_jail_del(pr, osd_jail_slot);
prison_unlock(pr);
if (old_rules != NULL)
drop_rules(old_rules);
}
/*
* Assign already built rules to a jail.
*/
static void
set_rules(struct prison *const pr, struct rules *const rules)
{
struct rules *old_rules;
void **rsv;
check_rules_use_count(rules, 0);
hold_rules(rules);
rsv = osd_reserve(osd_jail_slot);
prison_lock(pr);
old_rules = osd_jail_get(pr, osd_jail_slot);
osd_jail_set_reserved(pr, osd_jail_slot, rsv, rules);
prison_unlock(pr);
if (old_rules != NULL)
drop_rules(old_rules);
}
/*
* Assigns empty rules to a jail.
*/
static void
set_empty_rules(struct prison *const pr)
{
struct rules *const rules = alloc_rules();
set_rules(pr, rules);
}
/*
* Parse a rules specification and assign them to a jail.
*
* Returns the same error code as parse_rules() (which see).
*/
static int
parse_and_set_rules(struct prison *const pr, const char *rules_string,
struct parse_error **const parse_error)
{
struct rules *rules;
int error;
error = parse_rules(rules_string, &rules, parse_error);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
set_rules(pr, rules);
return (0);
}
static int
mac_do_sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
char *const buf = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_DO, M_WAITOK);
struct prison *const td_pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
struct prison *pr;
struct rules *rules;
struct parse_error *parse_error;
int error;
rules = find_rules(td_pr, &pr);
strlcpy(buf, rules->string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
prison_unlock(pr);
error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, buf, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
goto out;
/* Set our prison's rules, not that of the jail we inherited from. */
error = parse_and_set_rules(td_pr, buf, &parse_error);
if (error != 0) {
if (print_parse_error)
printf("MAC/do: Parse error at index %zu: %s\n",
parse_error->pos, parse_error->msg);
free_parse_error(parse_error);
}
out:
free(buf, M_DO);
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, rules,
CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_PRISON|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
0, 0, mac_do_sysctl_rules, "A",
"Rules");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_SUBNODE(mac, do, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail MAC/do parameters");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mac_do, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN,
"Jail MAC/do rules");
static int
mac_do_jail_create(void *obj, void *data __unused)
{
struct prison *const pr = obj;
set_empty_rules(pr);
return (0);
}
static int
mac_do_jail_get(void *obj, void *data)
{
struct prison *ppr, *const pr = obj;
struct vfsoptlist *const opts = data;
struct rules *rules;
int jsys, error;
rules = find_rules(pr, &ppr);
jsys = pr == ppr ?
(STAILQ_EMPTY(&rules->head) ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE : JAIL_SYS_NEW) :
JAIL_SYS_INHERIT;
error = vfs_setopt(opts, "mac.do", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done;
error = vfs_setopts(opts, "mac.do.rules", rules->string);
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
goto done;
error = 0;
done:
prison_unlock(ppr);
return (error);
}
/*
* -1 is used as a sentinel in mac_do_jail_check() and mac_do_jail_set() below.
*/
_Static_assert(-1 != JAIL_SYS_DISABLE && -1 != JAIL_SYS_NEW &&
-1 != JAIL_SYS_INHERIT,
"mac_do(4) uses -1 as a sentinel for uninitialized 'jsys'.");
/*
* We perform only cheap checks here, i.e., we do not really parse the rules
* specification string, if any.
*/
static int
mac_do_jail_check(void *obj, void *data)
{
struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
char *rules_string;
int error, jsys, size;
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "mac.do", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
if (error == ENOENT)
jsys = -1;
else {
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if (jsys != JAIL_SYS_DISABLE && jsys != JAIL_SYS_NEW &&
jsys != JAIL_SYS_INHERIT)
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* We use vfs_getopt() here instead of vfs_getopts() to get the length.
* We perform the additional checks done by the latter here, even if
* jail_set() calls vfs_getopts() itself later (they becoming
* inconsistent wouldn't cause any security problem).
*/
error = vfs_getopt(opts, "mac.do.rules", (void**)&rules_string, &size);
if (error == ENOENT) {
/*
* Default (in absence of "mac.do.rules") is to disable (and, in
* particular, not inherit).
*/
if (jsys == -1)
jsys = JAIL_SYS_DISABLE;
if (jsys == JAIL_SYS_NEW) {
vfs_opterror(opts, "'mac.do.rules' must be specified "
"given 'mac.do''s value");
return (EINVAL);
}
/* Absence of "mac.do.rules" at this point is OK. */
error = 0;
} else {
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* Not a proper string. */
if (size == 0 || rules_string[size - 1] != '\0') {
vfs_opterror(opts, "'mac.do.rules' not a proper string");
return (EINVAL);
}
if (size > MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN) {
vfs_opterror(opts, "'mdo.rules' too long");
return (ENAMETOOLONG);
}
if (jsys == -1)
/* Default (if "mac.do.rules" is present). */
jsys = rules_string[0] == '\0' ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE :
JAIL_SYS_NEW;
/*
* Be liberal and accept JAIL_SYS_DISABLE and JAIL_SYS_INHERIT
* with an explicit empty rules specification.
*/
switch (jsys) {
case JAIL_SYS_DISABLE:
case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT:
if (rules_string[0] != '\0') {
vfs_opterror(opts, "'mac.do.rules' specified "
"but should not given 'mac.do''s value");
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
}
}
return (error);
}
static int
mac_do_jail_set(void *obj, void *data)
{
struct prison *pr = obj;
struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
char *rules_string;
struct parse_error *parse_error;
int error, jsys;
/*
* The invariants checks used below correspond to what has already been
* checked in jail_check() above.
*/
error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "mac.do", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
MPASS(error == 0 || error == ENOENT);
if (error != 0)
jsys = -1; /* Mark unfilled. */
rules_string = vfs_getopts(opts, "mac.do.rules", &error);
MPASS(error == 0 || error == ENOENT);
if (error == 0) {
MPASS(strlen(rules_string) < MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
if (jsys == -1)
/* Default (if "mac.do.rules" is present). */
jsys = rules_string[0] == '\0' ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE :
JAIL_SYS_NEW;
else
MPASS(jsys == JAIL_SYS_NEW ||
((jsys == JAIL_SYS_DISABLE ||
jsys == JAIL_SYS_INHERIT) &&
rules_string[0] == '\0'));
} else {
MPASS(jsys != JAIL_SYS_NEW);
if (jsys == -1)
/*
* Default (in absence of "mac.do.rules") is to disable
* (and, in particular, not inherit).
*/
jsys = JAIL_SYS_DISABLE;
/* If disabled, we'll store an empty rule specification. */
if (jsys == JAIL_SYS_DISABLE)
rules_string = "";
}
switch (jsys) {
case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT:
remove_rules(pr);
error = 0;
break;
case JAIL_SYS_DISABLE:
case JAIL_SYS_NEW:
error = parse_and_set_rules(pr, rules_string, &parse_error);
if (error != 0) {
vfs_opterror(opts,
"MAC/do: Parse error at index %zu: %s\n",
parse_error->pos, parse_error->msg);
free_parse_error(parse_error);
}
break;
default:
__assert_unreachable();
}
return (error);
}
/*
* OSD jail methods.
*
* There is no PR_METHOD_REMOVE, as OSD storage is destroyed by the common jail
* code (see prison_cleanup()), which triggers a run of our dealloc_jail_osd()
* destructor.
*/
static const osd_method_t osd_methods[PR_MAXMETHOD] = {
[PR_METHOD_CREATE] = mac_do_jail_create,
[PR_METHOD_GET] = mac_do_jail_get,
[PR_METHOD_CHECK] = mac_do_jail_check,
[PR_METHOD_SET] = mac_do_jail_set,
};
/*
* Common header structure.
*
* Each structure that is used to pass information between some MAC check
* function and priv_grant() must start with this header.
*/
struct mac_do_data_header {
/* Size of the allocated buffer holding the containing structure. */
size_t allocated_size;
/* Full size of the containing structure. */
size_t size;
/*
* For convenience, we use privilege numbers as an identifier for the
* containing structure's type, since there is one distinct privilege
* for each privilege changing function we are supporting. 0 in 'priv'
* indicates this header is uninitialized.
*/
int priv;
/* Rules to apply. */
struct rules *rules;
};
/*
* The case of unusable or absent per-thread data can actually happen as nothing
* prevents, e.g., priv_check*() with privilege 'priv' to be called standalone,
* as it is currently by, e.g., the Linux emulator for PRIV_CRED_SETUID. We
* interpret such calls to priv_check*() as full, unrestricted requests for
* 'priv', contrary to what we're doing here for selected operations, and
* consequently will not grant the requested privilege.
*
* Also, we protect ourselves from a concurrent change of 'do_enabled' while
* a call to setcred() is in progress by storing the rules per-thread
* which is then consulted by each successive hook so that they all have
* a coherent view of the specifications, and we empty the slot (actually, mark
* it as empty) when MAC/do is disabled.
*/
static int
check_data_usable(const void *const data, const size_t size, const int priv)
{
const struct mac_do_data_header *const hdr = data;
if (hdr == NULL || hdr->priv == 0)
return (ENOENT);
/*
* Impacting changes in the protocols we are based on... Don't crash in
* production.
*/
if (hdr->priv != priv) {
MPASS(hdr->priv == priv);
return (EBUSY);
}
MPASS(hdr->size == size);
MPASS(hdr->size <= hdr->allocated_size);
return (0);
}
static void
clear_data(void *const data)
{
struct mac_do_data_header *const hdr = data;
if (hdr != NULL) {
drop_rules(hdr->rules);
/* We don't deallocate so as to save time on next access. */
hdr->priv = 0;
}
}
static void *
fetch_data(void)
{
return (osd_thread_get_unlocked(curthread, osd_thread_slot));
}
static bool
is_data_reusable(const void *const data, const size_t size)
{
const struct mac_do_data_header *const hdr = data;
return (hdr != NULL && size <= hdr->allocated_size);
}
static void
set_data_header(void *const data, const size_t size, const int priv,
struct rules *const rules)
{
struct mac_do_data_header *const hdr = data;
MPASS(hdr->priv == 0);
MPASS(priv != 0);
MPASS(size <= hdr->allocated_size);
hdr->size = size;
hdr->priv = priv;
hdr->rules = rules;
}
/* The proc lock (and any other non-sleepable lock) must not be held. */
static void *
alloc_data(void *const data, const size_t size)
{
struct mac_do_data_header *const hdr = realloc(data, size, M_DO,
M_WAITOK);
MPASS(size >= sizeof(struct mac_do_data_header));
hdr->allocated_size = size;
hdr->priv = 0;
if (hdr != data) {
/*
* This call either reuses the existing memory allocated for the
* slot or tries to allocate some without blocking.
*/
int error = osd_thread_set(curthread, osd_thread_slot, hdr);
if (error != 0) {
/* Going to make a M_WAITOK allocation. */
void **const rsv = osd_reserve(osd_thread_slot);
error = osd_thread_set_reserved(curthread,
osd_thread_slot, rsv, hdr);
MPASS(error == 0);
}
}
return (hdr);
}
/* Destructor for 'osd_thread_slot'. */
static void
dealloc_thread_osd(void *const value)
{
free(value, M_DO);
}
/*
* Whether to grant access to some primary group according to flags.
*
* The passed 'flags' must be those of a rule's matching GID, or the IT_GID type
* flags when MDF_CURRENT has been matched.
*
* Return values:
* - 0: Access granted.
* - EJUSTRETURN: Flags are agnostic.
*/
static int
grant_primary_group_from_flags(const flags_t flags)
{
return ((flags & MDF_PRIMARY) != 0 ? 0 : EJUSTRETURN);
}
/*
* Same as grant_primary_group_from_flags(), but for supplementary groups.
*
* Return values:
* - 0: Access granted.
* - EJUSTRETURN: Flags are agnostic.
* - EPERM: Access denied.
*/
static int __unused
grant_supplementary_group_from_flags(const flags_t flags)
{
if ((flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0)
return ((flags & MDF_SUPP_DONT) != 0 ? EPERM : 0);
return (EJUSTRETURN);
}
static int
rule_grant_supplementary_groups(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const struct ucred *const new_cred)
{
const gid_t *const old_groups = old_cred->cr_groups;
const gid_t *const new_groups = new_cred->cr_groups;
const int old_ngroups = old_cred->cr_ngroups;
const int new_ngroups = new_cred->cr_ngroups;
const flags_t gid_flags = rule->gid_flags;
const bool current_has_supp = (gid_flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
(gid_flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0;
id_nb_t rule_idx = 0;
int old_idx = 1, new_idx = 1;
if ((gid_flags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0 &&
(gid_flags & MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP) == 0)
/*
* Any set of supplementary groups is accepted, no need to loop
* over them.
*/
return (0);
for (; new_idx < new_ngroups; ++new_idx) {
const gid_t gid = new_groups[new_idx];
bool may_accept = false;
if ((gid_flags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0)
may_accept = true;
/* Do we have to check for the current supplementary groups? */
if (current_has_supp) {
/*
* Linear search, as both supplementary groups arrays
* are sorted. Advancing 'old_idx' with a binary search
* on absence of MDF_SUPP_MUST doesn't seem worth it in
* practice.
*/
for (; old_idx < old_ngroups; ++old_idx) {
const gid_t old_gid = old_groups[old_idx];
if (old_gid < gid) {
/* Mandatory but absent. */
if ((gid_flags & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0)
return (EPERM);
} else if (old_gid == gid) {
switch (gid_flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) {
case MDF_SUPP_DONT:
/* Present but forbidden. */
return (EPERM);
case MDF_SUPP_ALLOW:
case MDF_SUPP_MUST:
may_accept = true;
break;
default:
#ifdef INVARIANTS
__assert_unreachable();
#else
/* Better be safe than sorry. */
return (EPERM);
#endif
}
++old_idx;
break;
}
else
break;
}
}
/*
* Search by GID for a corresponding 'struct id_spec'.
*
* Again, linear search, with same note on not using binary
* search optimization as above (the trigger would be absence of
* MDF_EXPLICIT_SUPP_MUST this time).
*/
for (; rule_idx < rule->gids_nb; ++rule_idx) {
const struct id_spec is = rule->gids[rule_idx];
if (is.id < gid) {
/* Mandatory but absent. */
if ((is.flags & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0)
return (EPERM);
} else if (is.id == gid) {
switch (is.flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) {
case MDF_SUPP_DONT:
/* Present but forbidden. */
return (EPERM);
case MDF_SUPP_ALLOW:
case MDF_SUPP_MUST:
may_accept = true;
break;
case 0:
/* Primary group only. */
break;
default:
#ifdef INVARIANTS
__assert_unreachable();
#else
/* Better be safe than sorry. */
return (EPERM);
#endif
}
++rule_idx;
break;
}
else
break;
}
/* 'gid' wasn't explicitly accepted. */
if (!may_accept)
return (EPERM);
}
/*
* If we must have all current groups and we didn't browse all
* of them at this point (because the remaining ones have GIDs
* greater than the last requested group), we are simply missing
* them.
*/
if ((gid_flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
(gid_flags & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0 &&
old_idx < old_ngroups)
return (EPERM);
/*
* Similarly, we have to finish browsing all GIDs from the rule
* in case some are marked mandatory.
*/
if ((gid_flags & MDF_EXPLICIT_SUPP_MUST) != 0) {
for (; rule_idx < rule->gids_nb; ++rule_idx) {
const struct id_spec is = rule->gids[rule_idx];
if ((is.flags & MDF_SUPP_MUST) != 0)
return (EPERM);
}
}
return (0);
}
static int
rule_grant_primary_group(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const gid_t gid)
{
struct id_spec gid_is = {.flags = 0};
const struct id_spec *found_is;
int error;
if ((rule->gid_flags & MDF_ANY) != 0)
return (0);
/* Was MDF_CURRENT specified, and is 'gid' a current GID? */
if ((rule->gid_flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
group_is_primary(gid, old_cred)) {
error = grant_primary_group_from_flags(rule->gid_flags);
if (error == 0)
return (0);
}
/* Search by GID for a corresponding 'struct id_spec'. */
gid_is.id = gid;
found_is = bsearch(&gid_is, rule->gids, rule->gids_nb,
sizeof(*rule->gids), id_spec_cmp);
if (found_is != NULL) {
error = grant_primary_group_from_flags(found_is->flags);
if (error == 0)
return (0);
}
return (EPERM);
}
static int
rule_grant_primary_groups(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const struct ucred *const new_cred)
{
int error;
/* Shortcut. */
if ((rule->gid_flags & MDF_ANY) != 0)
return (0);
error = rule_grant_primary_group(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_gid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_primary_group(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_rgid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_primary_group(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_svgid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
return (0);
}
static bool
user_is_current(const uid_t uid, const struct ucred *const old_cred)
{
return (uid == old_cred->cr_uid || uid == old_cred->cr_ruid ||
uid == old_cred->cr_svuid);
}
static int
rule_grant_user(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const uid_t uid)
{
struct id_spec uid_is = {.flags = 0};
const struct id_spec *found_is;
if ((rule->uid_flags & MDF_ANY) != 0)
return (0);
/* Was MDF_CURRENT specified, and is 'uid' a current UID? */
if ((rule->uid_flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
user_is_current(uid, old_cred))
return (0);
/* Search by UID for a corresponding 'struct id_spec'. */
uid_is.id = uid;
found_is = bsearch(&uid_is, rule->uids, rule->uids_nb,
sizeof(*rule->uids), id_spec_cmp);
if (found_is != NULL)
return (0);
return (EPERM);
}
static int
rule_grant_users(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const struct ucred *const new_cred)
{
int error;
/* Shortcut. */
if ((rule->uid_flags & MDF_ANY) != 0)
return (0);
error = rule_grant_user(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_uid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_user(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_ruid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_user(rule, old_cred, new_cred->cr_svuid);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
return (0);
}
static int
rule_grant_setcred(const struct rule *const rule,
const struct ucred *const old_cred, const struct ucred *const new_cred)
{
int error;
error = rule_grant_users(rule, old_cred, new_cred);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_primary_groups(rule, old_cred, new_cred);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = rule_grant_supplementary_groups(rule, old_cred, new_cred);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
return (0);
}
static bool
rule_applies(const struct rule *const rule, const struct ucred *const cred)
{
if (rule->from_type == IT_UID && rule->from_id == cred->cr_ruid)
return (true);
if (rule->from_type == IT_GID && realgroupmember(rule->from_id, cred))
return (true);
return (false);
}
/*
* To pass data between check_setcred() and priv_grant() (on PRIV_CRED_SETCRED).
*/
struct mac_do_setcred_data {
struct mac_do_data_header hdr;
const struct ucred *new_cred;
u_int setcred_flags;
};
static int
mac_do_priv_grant(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
{
struct mac_do_setcred_data *const data = fetch_data();
const struct rules *rules;
const struct ucred *new_cred;
const struct rule *rule;
u_int setcred_flags;
int error;
/* Bail out fast if we aren't concerned. */
if (priv != PRIV_CRED_SETCRED)
return (EPERM);
/*
* Do we have to do something?
*/
if (check_data_usable(data, sizeof(*data), priv) != 0)
/* No. */
return (EPERM);
rules = data->hdr.rules;
new_cred = data->new_cred;
KASSERT(new_cred != NULL,
("priv_check*() called before mac_cred_check_setcred()"));
setcred_flags = data->setcred_flags;
/*
* Explicitly check that only the flags we currently support are present
* in order to avoid accepting transitions with other changes than those
* we are actually going to check. Currently, this rules out the
* SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL flag. This may be improved by adding code
* actually checking whether the requested label and the current one
* would differ.
*/
if ((setcred_flags & ~(SETCREDF_UID | SETCREDF_RUID | SETCREDF_SVUID |
SETCREDF_GID | SETCREDF_RGID | SETCREDF_SVGID |
SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS)) != 0)
return (EPERM);
/*
* Browse rules, and for those that match the requestor, call specific
* privilege granting functions interpreting the "to"/"target" part.
*/
error = EPERM;
STAILQ_FOREACH(rule, &rules->head, r_entries)
if (rule_applies(rule, cred)) {
error = rule_grant_setcred(rule, cred, new_cred);
if (error != EPERM)
break;
}
return (error);
}
static int
check_proc(void)
{
char *path, *to_free;
int error;
/*
* Only grant privileges if requested by the right executable.
*
* XXXOC: We may want to base this check on a tunable path and/or
* a specific MAC label. Going even further, e.g., envisioning to
* completely replace the path check with the latter, we would need to
* install FreeBSD on a FS with multilabel enabled by default, which in
* practice entails adding an option to ZFS to set MNT_MULTILABEL
* automatically on mounts, ensuring that root (and more if using
* different partitions) ZFS or UFS filesystems are created with
* multilabel turned on, and having the installation procedure support
* setting a MAC label per file (perhaps via additions to mtree(1)). So
* this probably isn't going to happen overnight, if ever.
*/
if (vn_fullpath(curproc->p_textvp, &path, &to_free) != 0)
return (EPERM);
error = strcmp(path, "/usr/bin/mdo") == 0 ? 0 : EPERM;
free(to_free, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
static void
mac_do_setcred_enter(void)
{
struct rules *rules;
struct prison *pr;
struct mac_do_setcred_data * data;
int error;
/*
* If not enabled, don't prepare data. Other hooks will check for that
* to know if they have to do something.
*/
if (do_enabled == 0)
return;
/*
* MAC/do only applies to a process launched from a given executable.
* For other processes, we just won't intervene (we don't deny requests,
* nor do we grant privileges to them).
*/
error = check_proc();
if (error != 0)
return;
/*
* Find the currently applicable rules.
*/
rules = find_rules(curproc->p_ucred->cr_prison, &pr);
hold_rules(rules);
prison_unlock(pr);
/*
* Setup thread data to be used by other hooks.
*/
data = fetch_data();
if (!is_data_reusable(data, sizeof(*data)))
data = alloc_data(data, sizeof(*data));
set_data_header(data, sizeof(*data), PRIV_CRED_SETCRED, rules);
/* Not really necessary, but helps to catch programming errors. */
data->new_cred = NULL;
data->setcred_flags = 0;
}
static int
mac_do_check_setcred(u_int flags, const struct ucred *const old_cred,
struct ucred *const new_cred)
{
struct mac_do_setcred_data *const data = fetch_data();
/*
* Do we have to do something?
*/
if (check_data_usable(data, sizeof(*data), PRIV_CRED_SETCRED) != 0)
/* No. */
return (0);
/*
* Keep track of the setcred() flags and the new credentials for
* priv_check*().
*/
data->new_cred = new_cred;
data->setcred_flags = flags;
return (0);
}
static void
mac_do_setcred_exit(void)
{
struct mac_do_setcred_data *const data = fetch_data();
if (check_data_usable(data, sizeof(*data), PRIV_CRED_SETCRED) == 0)
/*
* This doesn't deallocate the small per-thread data storage,
* which can be reused on subsequent calls. (That data is of
* course deallocated as the current thread dies or this module
* is unloaded.)
*/
clear_data(data);
}
static void
mac_do_init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
struct prison *pr;
osd_jail_slot = osd_jail_register(dealloc_jail_osd, osd_methods);
set_empty_rules(&prison0);
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list)
set_empty_rules(pr);
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
osd_thread_slot = osd_thread_register(dealloc_thread_osd);
}
static void
mac_do_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
/*
* osd_thread_deregister() must be called before osd_jail_deregister(),
* for the reason explained in dealloc_jail_osd().
*/
osd_thread_deregister(osd_thread_slot);
osd_jail_deregister(osd_jail_slot);
}
static struct mac_policy_ops do_ops = {
.mpo_init = mac_do_init,
.mpo_destroy = mac_do_destroy,
.mpo_cred_setcred_enter = mac_do_setcred_enter,
.mpo_cred_check_setcred = mac_do_check_setcred,
.mpo_cred_setcred_exit = mac_do_setcred_exit,
.mpo_priv_grant = mac_do_priv_grant,
};
MAC_POLICY_SET(&do_ops, mac_do, "MAC/do", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);
MODULE_VERSION(mac_do, 1);