opnsense-src/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
Ed Maste 802386cd37 openssh: Update to 9.9p1
Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below.  Bug fixes and
improvements that were previously merged into FreeBSD have been elided.

See the upstream release notes for full details of the 9.9p1 release
(https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html).

---

Future deprecation notice
=========================

OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
early 2025.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): processing of the arguments to the "Match"
   configuration directive now follows more shell-like rules for
   quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped
   characters.

New features
------------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add support for a new hybrid post-quantum key
   exchange based on the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation
   mechanism (ML-KEM) combined with X25519 ECDH as described by
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03
   This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is available by default.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): prevent private keys from being
   included in core dump files for most of their lifespans. This is
   in addition to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8)
   that prevented coredumps. This feature is supported on OpenBSD,
   Linux and FreeBSD.

 * All: convert key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with
   the exception of DSA.

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): do not apply authorized_keys options when signature
   verification fails. Prevents more restrictive key options being
   incorrectly applied to subsequent keys in authorized_keys. bz3733

 * ssh-keygen(1): include pathname in some of ssh-keygen's passphrase
   prompts. Helps the user know what's going on when ssh-keygen is
   invoked via other tools. Requested in GHPR503

 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): make parsing user@host consistently look for
   the last '@' in the string rather than the first. This makes it
   possible to more consistently use usernames that contain '@'
   characters.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): be more strict in parsing key type names. Only
   allow short names (e.g "rsa") in user-interface code and require
   full SSH protocol names (e.g. "ssh-rsa") everywhere else. bz3725

 * ssh-keygen(1): clarify that ed25519 is the default key type
   generated and clarify that rsa-sha2-512 is the default signature
   scheme when RSA is in use. GHPR505

---

Reviewed by:	jlduran (build infrastructure)
Reviewed by:	cy (build infrastructure)
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48947

(cherry picked from commit 3d9fd9fcb4)

Approved by:	re (accelerated MFC)
2025-02-20 12:50:31 -05:00

492 lines
14 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.19 2024/08/15 00:51:51 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
/* Reuse some ECDSA internals */
extern struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs;
static void
ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
{
sshkey_sk_cleanup(k);
sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.cleanup(k);
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
if (!sshkey_sk_fields_equal(a, b))
return 0;
if (!sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.equal(a, b))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshkey_serialize_sk(key, b)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int r;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key,
b, opts)) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshkey_serialize_private_sk(key, b)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.copy_public(from, to)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshkey_copy_public_sk(from, to)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
struct sshkey *key)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshkey_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
struct sshkey *key)
{
int r;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype,
b, key)) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/*
* Check FIDO/W3C webauthn signatures clientData field against the expected
* format and prepare a hash of it for use in signature verification.
*
* webauthn signatures do not sign the hash of the message directly, but
* instead sign a JSON-like "clientData" wrapper structure that contains the
* message hash along with a other information.
*
* Fortunately this structure has a fixed format so it is possible to verify
* that the hash of the signed message is present within the clientData
* structure without needing to implement any JSON parsing.
*/
static int
webauthn_check_prepare_hash(const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *origin, const struct sshbuf *wrapper,
uint8_t flags, const struct sshbuf *extensions,
u_char *msghash, size_t msghashlen)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *chall = NULL, *m = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(chall = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Ensure origin contains no quote character and that the flags are
* consistent with what we received
*/
if (strchr(origin, '\"') != NULL ||
(flags & 0x40) != 0 /* AD */ ||
((flags & 0x80) == 0 /* ED */) != (sshbuf_len(extensions) == 0)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/*
* Prepare the preamble to clientData that we expect, poking the
* challenge and origin into their canonical positions in the
* structure. The crossOrigin flag and any additional extension
* fields present are ignored.
*/
#define WEBAUTHN_0 "{\"type\":\"webauthn.get\",\"challenge\":\""
#define WEBAUTHN_1 "\",\"origin\":\""
#define WEBAUTHN_2 "\""
if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_0, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_0) - 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_dtourlb64(chall, m, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_1, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_1) - 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, origin, strlen(origin))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_2, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_2) - 1)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: received origin: %s\n", __func__, origin);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: received clientData:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(wrapper, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: expected clientData premable:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(m, stderr);
#endif
/* Check that the supplied clientData has the preamble we expect */
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(wrapper, 0, sshbuf_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m))) != 0)
goto out;
/* Prepare hash of clientData */
if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, wrapper,
msghash, msghashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(chall);
sshbuf_free(m);
return r;
}
static int
ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
u_char sig_flags;
u_char msghash[32], apphash[32];
u_int sig_counter;
u_char *sigb = NULL, *cp;
int is_webauthn = 0, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, len = 0;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL;
struct sshbuf *webauthn_wrapper = NULL, *webauthn_exts = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL, *webauthn_origin = NULL;
struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
char *tmp = NULL;
#endif
if (detailsp != NULL)
*detailsp = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->pkey == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK ||
sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(ktype, "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") == 0)
is_webauthn = 1;
else if (strcmp(ktype, "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (is_webauthn) {
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &webauthn_origin, NULL) != 0 ||
sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_wrapper) != 0 ||
sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_exts) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
/* parse signature */
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen);
/* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r)));
free(tmp);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s)));
free(tmp);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
__func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
if (is_webauthn) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn origin: %s\n", __func__,
webauthn_origin);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn_wrapper:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(webauthn_wrapper, stderr);
}
#endif
if ((esig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(esig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
/* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */
if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (is_webauthn) {
if ((ret = webauthn_check_prepare_hash(data, dlen,
webauthn_origin, webauthn_wrapper, sig_flags, webauthn_exts,
msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
goto out;
} else if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, dlen,
msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
goto out;
/* Application value is hashed before signature */
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
#endif
if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed,
apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_putb(original_signed, webauthn_exts)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
goto out;
details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr);
#endif
if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, NULL)) <= 0) {
len = 0;
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((sigb = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
cp = sigb; /* ASN1_item_i2d increments the pointer past the object */
if (i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, &cp) != len) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(sigb, len, stderr);
#endif
/* Verify it */
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
key->pkey) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
switch (EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, sigb, len,
sshbuf_ptr(original_signed), sshbuf_len(original_signed))) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
break;
case 0:
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (detailsp != NULL) {
*detailsp = details;
details = NULL;
}
out:
explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags));
explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter));
explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash));
explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash));
sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
sshbuf_free(webauthn_wrapper);
sshbuf_free(webauthn_exts);
free(webauthn_origin);
sshbuf_free(original_signed);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
free(ktype);
freezero(sigb, len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs = {
/* .size = */ NULL,
/* .alloc = */ NULL,
/* .cleanup = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup,
/* .equal = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal,
/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public,
/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public,
/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private,
/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private,
/* .generate = */ NULL,
/* .copy_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public,
/* .sign = */ NULL,
/* .verify = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify,
};
const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl = {
/* .name = */ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com",
/* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK",
/* .sigalg = */ NULL,
/* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK,
/* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
/* .cert = */ 0,
/* .sigonly = */ 0,
/* .keybits = */ 256,
/* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
};
const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl = {
/* .name = */ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
/* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK-CERT",
/* .sigalg = */ NULL,
/* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
/* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
/* .cert = */ 1,
/* .sigonly = */ 0,
/* .keybits = */ 256,
/* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
};
const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl = {
/* .name = */ "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com",
/* .shortname = */ "ECDSA-SK",
/* .sigalg = */ NULL,
/* .type = */ KEY_ECDSA_SK,
/* .nid = */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
/* .cert = */ 0,
/* .sigonly = */ 1,
/* .keybits = */ 256,
/* .funcs = */ &sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
};
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */