tcp: mitigate a side channel for detection of TCP connections

If a blind attacker wants to guess by sending ACK segments if there
exists a TCP connection , this might trigger a challenge ACK on an
existing TCP connection. To make this hit non-observable for the
attacker, also increment the global counter, which would have been
incremented if it would have been a non-hit.
This issue was reported as issue number 11 in Keyu Man et al.:
SCAD: Towards a Universal and Automated Network Side-Channel
      Vulnerability Detection

Reviewed by:		Nick Banks, Peter Lei
MFC after:		1 week
Sponsored by:		Netflix, Inc.
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D51724
This commit is contained in:
Michael Tuexen 2025-08-09 14:17:38 +02:00
parent 2eb786d96e
commit f0f6e50388

View file

@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet/icmp_var.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
@ -2156,6 +2157,13 @@ tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphdr *th, struct mbuf *m)
sbintime_t now;
bool send_challenge_ack;
/*
* The sending of a challenge ACK could be triggered by a blind attacker
* to detect an existing TCP connection. To mitigate that, increment
* also the global counter which would be incremented if the attacker
* would have guessed wrongly.
*/
(void)badport_bandlim(BANDLIM_TCP_RST);
if (V_tcp_ack_war_time_window == 0 || V_tcp_ack_war_cnt == 0) {
/* ACK war protection is disabled. */
send_challenge_ack = true;