Complete rewrite of pam_ssh(8). The previous version was becoming hard

to maintain, and had security issues which would have required a major
rewrite to address anyway.

This implementation currently starts a separate agent for each session
instead of connecting each new session to the agent started by the first
one.  While this would be a Good Thing (and the old pam_ssh(8) tried to
do it), it's hard to get right.  I'll revisit this issue when I've had a
chance to test some modifications to ssh-agent(1).
This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav 2003-02-09 21:20:44 +00:00
parent 6b4b77ad34
commit d902781908
4 changed files with 324 additions and 574 deletions

View file

@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ SSHSRC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../../crypto/openssh
LIB= pam_ssh
SRCS= pam_ssh.c
CFLAGS+= -I${SSHSRC}
DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBUTIL}
LDADD= -lssh -lcrypto -lcrypt -lutil
DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBCRYPT}
LDADD= -lssh -lcrypto -lcrypt
MAN= pam_ssh.8
.include <bsd.lib.mk>

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Mark R V Murray
.\" All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
.\" Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $Id: pam_ssh.8,v 1.3 2002/04/09 02:13:44 akorty Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd November 26, 2001
@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ parameter, they are the
and
.Dq Li session
features.
It also provides null functions for the remaining categories.
.Ss SSH Authentication Module
The
SSH
@ -74,11 +72,6 @@ decrypt the target user's SSH key using that passphrase.
.Pp
The following options may be passed to the authentication module:
.Bl -tag -width ".Cm use_first_pass"
.It Cm debug
.Xr syslog 3
debugging information at
.Dv LOG_DEBUG
level.
.It Cm use_first_pass
If the authentication module
is not the first in the stack,
@ -124,33 +117,36 @@ by sending it a
.Dv SIGTERM .
.Pp
The following options may be passed to the session management module:
.Bl -tag -width ".Cm use_first_pass"
.It Cm debug
.Xr syslog 3
debugging information at
.Dv LOG_DEBUG
level.
.Bl -tag -width ".Cm want_agent"
.It Cm want_agent
Start an agent even if no keys were decrypted during the
authentication phase.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_dsa_*" -compact
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity" -compact
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
SSH1/OpenSSH RSA key
SSH1 RSA key
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
SSH2 RSA key
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
OpenSSH DSA key
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_rsa_*
SSH2 RSA keys
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_dsa_*
SSH2 DSA keys
SSH2 DSA key
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr syslog 3 ,
.Xr pam.conf 5 ,
.Xr pam 8
.Sh AUTHORS
The
.Nm
module was originally written by
.An -nosplit
.An "Andrew J. Korty" Aq ajk@iu.edu
wrote
.Nm .
.An "Mark R V Murray"
wrote this manual page.
.An "Andrew J. Korty" Aq ajk@iu.edu .
The current implementation was developed for the
.Fx
Project by
ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
.Pq Dq CBOSS ,
as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
This manual page was written by
.An "Mark R V Murray" Aq markm@FreeBSD.ORG .

View file

@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Andrew J. Korty
* All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed for the FreeBSD Project by
* ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
* ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
* NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@ -17,6 +15,9 @@
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@ -29,22 +30,19 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id: pam_ssh.c,v 1.33 2002/08/09 15:32:06 akorty Exp $
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@ -55,563 +53,366 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <security/pam_modules.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "pam_ssh.h"
static char module_name[] = MODULE_NAME;
static void key_cleanup(pam_handle_t *, void *, int);
static void ssh_cleanup(pam_handle_t *, void *, int);
extern char **environ;
struct pam_ssh_key {
Key *key;
char *comment;
};
static const char *pam_ssh_prompt = "SSH passphrase: ";
static const char *pam_ssh_have_keys = "pam_ssh_have_keys";
static const char *pam_ssh_keyfiles[] = {
".ssh/identity", /* SSH1 RSA key */
".ssh/id_rsa", /* SSH2 RSA key */
".ssh/id_dsa", /* SSH2 DSA key */
NULL
};
static const char *pam_ssh_agent = "/usr/bin/ssh-agent";
static const char *pam_ssh_agent_argv[] = { "ssh_agent", "-s", NULL };
static const char *pam_ssh_agent_envp[] = { NULL };
/*
* Generic cleanup function for OpenSSH "Key" type.
* Attempts to load a private key from the specified file in the specified
* directory, using the specified passphrase. If successful, returns a
* struct pam_ssh_key containing the key and its comment.
*/
static void
key_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, void *data, int err __unused)
static struct pam_ssh_key *
pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase)
{
if (data)
key_free(data);
}
/*
* Generic PAM cleanup function for this module.
*/
static void
ssh_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, void *data, int err __unused)
{
if (data)
free(data);
}
/*
* Authenticate a user's key by trying to decrypt it with the password
* provided. The key and its comment are then stored for later
* retrieval by the session phase. An increasing index is embedded in
* the PAM variable names so this function may be called multiple times
* for multiple keys.
*/
static int
auth_via_key(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *file, const char *dir,
const struct passwd *user, const char *pass)
{
char *comment; /* private key comment */
char *data_name; /* PAM state */
static int index = 0; /* for saved keys */
Key *key; /* user's key */
char *path; /* to key files */
int retval; /* from calls */
/* locate the user's private key file */
if (!asprintf(&path, "%s/%s", dir, file)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
/* Try to decrypt the private key with the passphrase provided. If
success, the user is authenticated. */
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
char fn[PATH_MAX];
char *comment;
Key *key;
if (snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s/%s", dir, kfn) > (int)sizeof(fn))
return (NULL);
comment = NULL;
if ((retval = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, user)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
key = key_load_private(path, pass, &comment);
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
free(path);
if (!comment)
comment = strdup(file);
if (!key) {
free(comment);
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
key = key_load_private(fn, passphrase, &comment);
if (key == NULL) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to load key from %s\n", fn);
return (NULL);
}
/* save the key and comment to pass to ssh-agent in the session
phase */
if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", index)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
free(comment);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, key, key_cleanup);
free(data_name);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "loaded '%s' from %s\n", comment, fn);
if ((psk = malloc(sizeof(*psk))) == NULL) {
key_free(key);
free(comment);
return (retval);
return (NULL);
}
if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", index)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
free(comment);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, comment, ssh_cleanup);
free(data_name);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
free(comment);
return (retval);
}
++index;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
psk->key = key;
psk->comment = comment;
return (psk);
}
/*
* Add the keys stored by auth_via_key() to the agent connected to the
* socket provided.
* Wipes a private key and frees the associated resources.
*/
static int
add_keys(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *socket)
static void
pam_ssh_free_key(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused,
void *data, int pam_err __unused)
{
AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* connection to ssh-agent */
char *comment; /* private key comment */
char *data_name; /* PAM state */
int final; /* final return value */
int index; /* for saved keys */
Key *key; /* user's private key */
int retval; /* from calls */
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
/*
* Connect to the agent.
*
* XXX Because ssh_get_authentication_connection() gets the
* XXX agent parameters from the environment, we have to
* XXX temporarily replace the environment with the PAM
* XXX environment list. This is a hack.
*/
{
extern char **environ;
char **saved, **evp;
saved = environ;
if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) {
environ = saved;
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
}
ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
for (evp = environ; *evp; evp++)
free(*evp);
free(environ);
environ = saved;
}
if (!ac) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", module_name, socket);
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
}
/* hand off each private key to the agent */
final = 0;
for (index = 0; ; index++) {
if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", index)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, (const void **)&key);
free(data_name);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
break;
if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", index)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name,
(const void **)&comment);
free(data_name);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
break;
retval = ssh_add_identity(ac, key, comment);
if (!final)
final = retval;
}
ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
return (final ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_SESSION_ERR);
psk = data;
key_free(psk->key);
free(psk->comment);
free(psk);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
int authenticated; /* user authenticated? */
char *dotdir; /* .ssh dir name */
char *file; /* current key file */
char *keyfiles; /* list of key files to add */
const char *kfspec; /* list of key files to add */
const char *pass; /* passphrase */
const struct passwd *pwent; /* user's passwd entry */
struct passwd *pwent_keep; /* our own copy */
int retval; /* from calls */
const char *user; /* username */
const char **kfn, *passphrase, *user;
struct passwd *pwd;
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
int nkeys, pam_err, pass;
log_init(module_name, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
0);
/* PEM is not loaded by default */
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
keyfiles = NULL;
if ((kfspec = openpam_get_option(pamh, OPT_KEYFILES)) != NULL) {
if ((kfspec = strchr(kfspec, '=')) == NULL) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "invalid keyfile list");
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
/* get user name and home directory */
pam_err = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (pwd == NULL)
return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN);
if (pwd->pw_dir == NULL)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
/* switch to user credentials */
pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
pass = (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK,
(const void **)&passphrase) == PAM_SUCCESS);
load_keys:
/* get passphrase */
pam_err = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK,
&passphrase, pam_ssh_prompt);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (pam_err);
}
/* try to load keys from all keyfiles we know of */
nkeys = 0;
for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) {
psk = pam_ssh_load_key(pwd->pw_dir, *kfn, passphrase);
if (psk != NULL) {
pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, psk, pam_ssh_free_key);
++nkeys;
}
++kfspec;
} else {
kfspec = DEF_KEYFILES;
}
if ((retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
if (!(user && (pwent = getpwnam(user)) && pwent->pw_dir &&
*pwent->pw_dir))
/*
* If we tried an old token and didn't get anything, and
* try_first_pass was specified, try again after prompting the
* user for a new passphrase.
*/
if (nkeys == 0 && pass == 1 &&
openpam_get_option(pamh, "try_first_pass") != NULL) {
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL);
pass = 0;
goto load_keys;
}
/* switch back to arbitrator credentials before returning */
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
/* no keys? */
if (nkeys == 0)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
/* pass prompt message to application and receive passphrase */
if ((retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &pass,
NEED_PASSPHRASE)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* required for DSA */
/* any key will authenticate us, but if we can decrypt all of the
specified keys, we'll do so here so we can cache them in the
session phase */
if (!asprintf(&dotdir, "%s/%s", pwent->pw_dir, SSH_CLIENT_DIR)) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
authenticated = 0;
keyfiles = strdup(kfspec);
for (file = strtok(keyfiles, SEP_KEYFILES); file;
file = strtok(NULL, SEP_KEYFILES))
if (auth_via_key(pamh, file, dotdir, pwent, pass) ==
PAM_SUCCESS)
authenticated++;
free(dotdir);
free(keyfiles);
if (!authenticated)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
/* copy the passwd entry (in case successive calls are made) and
save it for the session phase */
if (!(pwent_keep = malloc(sizeof *pwent))) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%m");
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
(void) memcpy(pwent_keep, pwent, sizeof *pwent_keep);
if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry", pwent_keep,
ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
free(pwent_keep);
return (retval);
}
pam_set_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, NULL, NULL);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Parses a line from ssh-agent's output.
*/
static void
pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pam_handle_t *pamh, FILE *f)
{
char *line, *p, *key, *val;
size_t len;
while ((line = fgetln(f, &len)) != NULL) {
if (len < 4 || strncmp(line, "SSH_", 4) != 0)
continue;
/* find equal sign at end of key */
for (p = key = line; p < line + len; ++p)
if (*p == '=')
break;
if (p == line + len || *p != '=')
continue;
*p = '\0';
/* find semicolon at end of value */
for (val = ++p; p < line + len; ++p)
if (*p == ';')
break;
if (p == line + len || *p != ';')
continue;
*p = '\0';
/* store key-value pair in environment */
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "got %s: %s", key, val);
pam_setenv(pamh, key, val, 1);
}
}
/*
* Starts an ssh agent and stores the environment variables derived from
* its output.
*/
static int
pam_ssh_start_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
int agent_pipe[2];
pid_t pid;
FILE *f;
/* get a pipe which we will use to read the agent's output */
if (pipe(agent_pipe) == -1) {
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
}
/* start the agent */
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "starting an ssh agent");
pid = fork();
if (pid == (pid_t)-1) {
/* failed */
close(agent_pipe[0]);
close(agent_pipe[1]);
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
}
if (pid == 0) {
int fd;
/* child: drop privs, close fds and start agent */
setgid(getegid());
setuid(geteuid());
close(STDIN_FILENO);
open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDERR_FILENO);
for (fd = 3; fd < getdtablesize(); ++fd)
close(fd);
execve(pam_ssh_agent, pam_ssh_agent_argv, pam_ssh_agent_envp);
_exit(127);
}
/* parent */
close(agent_pipe[1]);
if ((f = fdopen(agent_pipe[0], "r")) == NULL)
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pamh, f);
fclose(f);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Adds previously stored keys to a running agent.
*/
static int
pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
AuthenticationConnection *ac;
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
const char **kfn;
char **envlist, **env;
int pam_err;
/* switch to PAM environment */
envlist = environ;
if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) {
environ = envlist;
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
}
/* get a connection to the agent */
if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection()) == NULL) {
pam_err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
goto end;
}
/* look for keys to add to it */
for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) {
pam_err = pam_get_data(pamh, *kfn, (const void **)&psk);
if (pam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && psk != NULL) {
if (ssh_add_identity(ac, psk->key, psk->comment))
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG,
"added %s to ssh agent", psk->comment);
else
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed "
"to add %s to ssh agent", psk->comment);
/* we won't need the key again, so wipe it */
pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, NULL, NULL);
}
}
pam_err = PAM_SUCCESS;
end:
/* disconnect from agent */
if (ac != NULL)
ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
/* switch back to original environment */
for (env = environ; *env != NULL; ++env)
free(*env);
free(environ);
environ = envlist;
return (pam_err);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
char *agent_pid; /* copy of agent PID */
char *agent_socket; /* agent socket */
char *env_end; /* end of env */
FILE *env_read; /* env data source */
char env_string[BUFSIZ]; /* environment string */
char *env_value; /* envariable value */
int env_write; /* env file descriptor */
char hname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; /* local hostname */
int no_link; /* link per-agent file? */
char *per_agent; /* to store env */
char *per_session; /* per-session filename */
const struct passwd *pwent; /* user's passwd entry */
int retval; /* from calls */
int start_agent; /* start agent? */
const char *tty; /* tty or display name */
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *user;
const void *data;
int pam_err;
log_init(module_name, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
0);
/* dump output of ssh-agent in ~/.ssh */
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry",
(const void **)&pwent)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
/*
* Use reference counts to limit agents to one per user per host.
*
* Technique: Create an environment file containing
* information about the agent. Only one file is created, but
* it may be given many names. One name is given for the
* agent itself, agent-<host>. Another name is given for each
* session, agent-<host>-<display> or agent-<host>-<tty>. We
* delete the per-session filename on session close, and when
* the link count goes to unity on the per-agent file, we
* delete the file and kill the agent.
*/
/* the per-agent file contains just the hostname */
(void) gethostname(hname, sizeof hname);
if (asprintf(&per_agent, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s", pwent->pw_dir, hname)
== -1) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
/* save the per-agent filename in case we want to delete it on
session close */
if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_agent", per_agent,
ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
free(per_agent);
return (retval);
}
/* take on the user's privileges for writing files and starting the
agent */
if ((retval = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwent)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
/* Try to create the per-agent file or open it for reading if it
exists. If we can't do either, we won't try to link a
per-session filename later. Start the agent if we can't open
the file for reading. */
env_write = no_link = 0;
env_read = NULL;
if ((env_write = open(per_agent, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY,
S_IRUSR)) < 0 && !(env_read = fopen(per_agent, "r")))
no_link = 1;
if (env_read) {
start_agent = 0;
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
} else {
start_agent = 1;
env_read = popen(SSH_AGENT, "r");
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
if (!env_read) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", module_name,
SSH_AGENT);
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) close(env_write);
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
}
}
/* save environment for application with pam_putenv() */
agent_socket = NULL;
while (fgets(env_string, sizeof env_string, env_read)) {
/* parse environment definitions */
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) write(env_write, env_string,
strlen(env_string));
if (!(env_value = strchr(env_string, '=')) ||
!(env_end = strchr(env_value, ';')))
continue;
*env_end = '\0';
/* pass to the application */
if (!((retval = pam_putenv(pamh, env_string)) ==
PAM_SUCCESS)) {
if (start_agent)
(void) pclose(env_read);
else
(void) fclose(env_read);
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) close(env_write);
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
*env_value++ = '\0';
/* save the agent socket so we can connect to it and add
the keys as well as the PID so we can kill the agent on
session close. */
if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
strlen(ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX)], ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX) == 0 &&
!(agent_socket = strdup(env_value))) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
if (start_agent)
(void) pclose(env_read);
else
(void) fclose(env_read);
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) close(env_write);
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
} else if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
strlen(ENV_PID_SUFFIX)], ENV_PID_SUFFIX) == 0 &&
((agent_pid = strdup(env_value)) == NULL ||
(retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid",
agent_pid, ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS)) {
if (start_agent)
(void) pclose(env_read);
else
(void) fclose(env_read);
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) close(env_write);
if (agent_pid)
free(agent_pid);
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (retval);
}
}
if (env_write >= 0)
(void) close(env_write);
if (start_agent) {
switch (retval = pclose(env_read)) {
case -1:
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", module_name,
SSH_AGENT);
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
case 0:
break;
case 127:
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: cannot execute %s",
module_name, SSH_AGENT);
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
default:
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s exited %s %d",
module_name, SSH_AGENT, WIFSIGNALED(retval) ?
"on signal" : "with status",
WIFSIGNALED(retval) ? WTERMSIG(retval) :
WEXITSTATUS(retval));
if (agent_socket)
free(agent_socket);
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
}
} else
(void) fclose(env_read);
if (!agent_socket)
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
if (start_agent && (retval = add_keys(pamh, agent_socket))
!= PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
free(agent_socket);
/* if we couldn't access the per-agent file, don't link a
per-session filename to it */
if (no_link)
/* no keys, no work */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, &data) != PAM_SUCCESS &&
openpam_get_option(pamh, "want_agent") == NULL)
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
/* the per-session file contains the display name or tty name as
well as the hostname */
/* switch to user credentials */
pam_err = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (pwd == NULL)
return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN);
pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
if ((retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void **)&tty))
!= PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
if (asprintf(&per_session, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s-%s", pwent->pw_dir,
hname, tty) == -1) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", module_name);
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
/* start the agent */
pam_err = pam_ssh_start_agent(pamh);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (pam_err);
}
/* save the per-session filename so we can delete it on session
close */
if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_session",
per_session, ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
free(per_session);
return (retval);
/* we have an agent, see if we can add any keys to it */
pam_err = pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pamh);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
/* XXX ignore failures */
}
(void) unlink(per_session); /* remove cruft */
(void) link(per_agent, per_session);
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
const char *env_file; /* ssh-agent environment */
pid_t pid; /* ssh-agent process id */
int retval; /* from calls */
const char *ssh_agent_pid; /* ssh-agent pid string */
struct stat sb; /* to check st_nlink */
const char *ssh_agent_pid;
char *end;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_session",
(const void **)&env_file)) == PAM_SUCCESS && env_file)
(void) unlink(env_file);
/* Retrieve per-agent filename and check link count. If it's
greater than unity, other sessions are still using this
agent. */
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_agent",
(const void **)&env_file)) == PAM_SUCCESS && env_file &&
stat(env_file, &sb) == 0) {
if (sb.st_nlink > 1)
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
(void) unlink(env_file);
if ((ssh_agent_pid = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AGENT_PID")) == NULL) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "no ssh agent");
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
/* retrieve the agent's process id */
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid",
(const void **)&ssh_agent_pid)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
/* Kill the agent. SSH's ssh-agent does not have a -k option, so
just call kill(). */
pid = atoi(ssh_agent_pid);
if (pid <= 0)
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) != 0) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", module_name,
ssh_agent_pid);
pid = (pid_t)strtol(ssh_agent_pid, &end, 10);
if (*ssh_agent_pid == '\0' || *end != '\0') {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "invalid ssh agent pid");
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "killing ssh agent %d", (int)pid);
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1 ||
waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_MODULE_ENTRY(MODULE_NAME);
PAM_MODULE_ENTRY("pam_ssh");

View file

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Andrew J. Korty
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id: pam_ssh.h,v 1.4 2002/04/09 01:15:18 akorty Exp $
* $FreeBSD$
*
*/
#define SSH_CLIENT_DIR ".ssh"
#define MODULE_NAME "pam_ssh"
#define NEED_PASSPHRASE "SSH passphrase: "
#define SSH_AGENT "ssh-agent"
#define ENV_PID_SUFFIX "_AGENT_PID"
#define ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX "_AUTH_SOCK"
#define DEF_KEYFILES "id_dsa,id_rsa,identity"
#define OPT_KEYFILES "keyfiles"
#define OPT_TRY_FIRST_PASS "try_first_pass"
#define OPT_USE_FIRST_PASS "use_first_pass"
#define SEP_KEYFILES ","