Vendor import of OpenSSH 5.2p1

Makefile.in

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.297 2008/07/08 14:21:12 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.298 2008/11/05 05:20:46 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
 	kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
-	entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o
+	entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
 	auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
-	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
 	auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \

PROTOCOL

@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
 still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
 window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
 
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
+message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
+Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
+upon request.
+
 4. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
    "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
 
@@ -87,6 +93,11 @@ connection.
 Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
 (that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
 
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
+servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
+whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
+
 5. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
 
 OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
@@ -240,4 +251,4 @@ The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
 Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
 advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.11 2008/07/05 05:16:01 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.12 2009/02/14 06:35:49 djm Exp $

README

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.2 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.69 2008/07/21 08:21:52 djm Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.70 2009/02/23 00:11:57 djm Exp $

addrmatch.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.3 2008/06/10 23:06:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.4 2008/12/10 03:55:20 stevesk Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 
 #include "match.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 struct xaddr {
 	sa_family_t	af;
@@ -97,7 +98,9 @@ addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
 			return -1;
 		xa->af = AF_INET6;
 		memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
 		xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
+#endif
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -1;
@@ -415,7 +418,7 @@ addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
 				goto foundit;
 		}
 	}
-	free(o);
+	xfree(o);
 
 	return ret;
 }

auth-options.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.43 2008/06/10 23:06:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.44 2009/01/22 10:09:16 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 		cp = "permitopen=\"";
 		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
 			char *host, *p;
-			u_short port;
+			int port;
 			char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
 
 			opts += strlen(cp);
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
 			host = cleanhostname(host);
-			if (p == NULL || (port = a2port(p)) == 0) {
+			if (p == NULL || (port = a2port(p)) <= 0) {
 				debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
 				    "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
 				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "

auth.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.79 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.80 2008/11/04 07:58:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *

auth.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.61 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.62 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
 	char		*style;
 	void		*kbdintctxt;
+	void		*jpake_ctx;
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 	auth_session_t	*as;
 #endif
@@ -156,6 +157,9 @@ int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int	skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int	skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
+void	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
+void	auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *);
+
 int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
 struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
 

auth2-chall.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.33 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.34 2008/12/09 04:32:22 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
-	int authenticated = 0, res, len;
+	int authenticated = 0, res;
 	u_int i, nresp;
 	char **response = NULL, *method;
 
@@ -330,11 +330,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	len = strlen("keyboard-interactive") + 2 +
-		strlen(kbdintctxt->device->name);
-	method = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(method, len, "keyboard-interactive/%s",
-	    kbdintctxt->device->name);
+	xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
 
 	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
 		if (authenticated) {

auth2-jpake.c

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.2 2008/11/07 23:34:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
+ * as described in:
+ *
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <login_cap.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+/*
+ * XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
+ * anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
+ */
+
+/* Dispatch handlers */
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+/*
+ * Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");
+
+	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
+		if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
+			authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
+		if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
+			authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
+	}
+
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_jpake = {
+	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
+	userauth_jpake,
+	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
+};
+
+/* Clear context and callbacks */
+void
+auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	/* unregister callbacks */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
+	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
+		jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+		authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
+static int
+valid_crypt_salt(int c)
+{
+	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+		return 1;
+	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+		return 1;
+	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
+ * This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
+ * users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
+ * oracle.
+ */
+static void
+derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
+{
+	u_char *digest;
+	u_int digest_len;
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *k;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
+	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
+	    (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
+	}
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (len > digest_len)
+		fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
+		    __func__, len, digest_len);
+	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
+	bzero(digest, digest_len);
+	xfree(digest);
+}
+
+/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
+static char
+pw_encode64(u_int i64)
+{
+	const u_char e64[] =
+	    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+	return e64[i64 % 64];
+}
+
+/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
+static char *
+makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
+{
+	u_char rawsalt[32];
+	static char ret[33];
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
+		fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);
+
+	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
+	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
+	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
+		ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
+	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
+ * a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
+ * Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
+ */
+static void
+fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
+{
+	char *rounds_s, *style;
+	long long rounds;
+	login_cap_t *lc;
+
+
+	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
+	    (lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
+	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
+	if (style == NULL)
+		style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
+	login_close(lc);
+	
+	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
+		*rounds_s++ = '\0';
+	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);
+	
+	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
+		xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
+	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
+		*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
+	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
+		rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
+		rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
+		xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
+		    pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
+		    pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
+		    makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
+	} else {
+		/* Default to blowfish */
+		rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
+		rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
+		xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
+		    makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+	}
+	xfree(style);
+	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
+	    __func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
+ * for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
+ * salt will be returned.
+ */
+void
+auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
+    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	u_char *secret;
+	u_int secret_len, salt_len;
+
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
+	    authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
+#endif
+
+	*salt = NULL;
+	*hash_scheme = NULL;
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
+			/*
+			 * old-variant bcrypt:
+			 *     "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
+			/*
+			 * current-variant bcrypt:
+			 *     "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
+			/*
+			 * md5crypt:
+			 *     "$1$", salt until "$"
+			 */
+			cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
+				*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+				strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
+				    salt_len);
+				*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
+			}
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
+			/*
+			 * BSDI extended crypt:
+			 *     "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
+		} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13  &&
+		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
+		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
+			/*
+			 * traditional crypt:
+			 *     2 chars salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 2 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
+		}
+		if (*salt == NULL) {
+			debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
+			    __func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+		}
+	}
+	if (*salt == NULL)
+		fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);
+
+	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
+	    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
+	    *salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
+	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
+#endif
+	bzero(secret, secret_len);
+	xfree(secret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Being authentication attempt.
+ * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
+ */
+static int
+auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
+	char *salt, *hash_scheme;
+
+	debug("%s: start", __func__);
+
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
+	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
+	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));
+
+	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
+	    &hash_scheme, &salt));
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
+	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
+	packet_put_cstring(salt);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
+	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(hash_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
+
+	/* Fetch step 1 values */
+	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
+	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
+	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
+	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
+	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->b,
+	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send values for step 2 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
+	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 2 values */
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
+	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
+	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x2_s_proof);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send key confirmation proof */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
+
+	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
+	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
+		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
+	else
+		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
+		
+	/* done */
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
+}
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+

auth2.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.119 2008/07/04 23:30:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.120 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -71,12 +71,18 @@ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
 #endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+extern Authmethod method_jpake;
+#endif
 
 Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
 	&method_none,
 	&method_pubkey,
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	&method_gssapi,
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	&method_jpake,
 #endif
 	&method_passwd,
 	&method_kbdint,
@@ -257,8 +263,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	/* reset state */
 	auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	auth2_jpake_stop(authctxt);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
 #endif

canohost.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.63 2008/06/12 00:03:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.64 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns)
 
 /* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
 
-static int
+int
 get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;

canohost.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.9 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.10 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -23,5 +23,7 @@ char		*get_local_name(int);
 
 int		 get_remote_port(void);
 int		 get_local_port(void);
+int		 get_sock_port(int, int);
+
 
 void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);

channels.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.286 2008/07/16 11:52:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.295 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 	buffer_init(&c->input);
 	buffer_init(&c->output);
 	buffer_init(&c->extended);
+	c->path = NULL;
 	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
 	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
 	c->flags = 0;
@@ -402,6 +403,10 @@ channel_free(Channel *c)
 		xfree(c->remote_name);
 		c->remote_name = NULL;
 	}
+	if (c->path) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
 	while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
 		if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
 			cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
@@ -691,7 +696,7 @@ channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
 	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
 
 	if (c == NULL) {
-		logit("channel_register_open_comfirm: %d: bad id", id);
+		logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id);
 		return;
 	}
 	c->open_confirm = fn;
@@ -980,7 +985,7 @@ static int
 channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	char *p, *host;
-	u_int len, have, i, found;
+	u_int len, have, i, found, need;
 	char username[256];
 	struct {
 		u_int8_t version;
@@ -996,10 +1001,20 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	if (have < len)
 		return 0;
 	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+
+	need = 1;
+	/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
+	if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
+		/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
+		need = 2;
+	}
+	/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
 	for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
 		if (p[i] == '\0') {
-			found = 1;
-			break;
+			found++;
+			if (found == need)
+				break;
 		}
 		if (i > 1024) {
 			/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
@@ -1008,7 +1023,7 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
-	if (!found)
+	if (found < need)
 		return 0;
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1);
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1);
@@ -1018,23 +1033,46 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
 	len = strlen(p);
 	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
+	len++;					/* trailing '\0' */
 	if (len > have)
 		fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d",
 		    c->self, len, have);
 	strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
 	buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
-	buffer_consume(&c->input, 1);		/* trailing '\0' */
 
-	host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
-	strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path));
+	if (c->path != NULL) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
+	if (need == 1) {			/* SOCKS4: one string */
+		host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+	} else {				/* SOCKS4A: two strings */
+		have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+		p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+		len = strlen(p);
+		debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
+		    c->self, p, len);
+		len++;				/* trailing '\0' */
+		if (len > have)
+			fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d",
+			    c->self, len, have);
+		if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
+			    c->self, p);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(p);
+		buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+	}
 	c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
 
 	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
-	    c->self, host, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
+	    c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
 
 	if (s4_req.command != 1) {
-		debug("channel %d: cannot handle: socks4 cn %d",
-		    c->self, s4_req.command);
+		debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
+		    c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	s4_rsp.version = 0;			/* vn: 0 for reply */
@@ -1065,7 +1103,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 		u_int8_t atyp;
 	} s5_req, s5_rsp;
 	u_int16_t dest_port;
-	u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1];
+	u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
 	u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
 
 	debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
@@ -1138,10 +1176,22 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_addr, addrlen);
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2);
 	dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
-	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
-		strlcpy(c->path, (char *)dest_addr, sizeof(c->path));
-	else if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, c->path, sizeof(c->path)) == NULL)
-		return -1;
+	if (c->path != NULL) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
+		if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
+			    "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
+	} else {
+		if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
 	c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
 
 	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
@@ -1370,7 +1420,8 @@ channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 		    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
 		nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
 		nc->host_port = c->host_port;
-		strlcpy(nc->path, c->path, sizeof(nc->path));
+		if (c->path != NULL)
+			nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
 
 		if (nextstate == SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) {
 			/*
@@ -2311,8 +2362,8 @@ channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			xfree(lang);
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
-	/* Free the channel.  This will also close the socket. */
-	channel_free(c);
+	/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
+	chan_mark_dead(c);
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
@@ -2377,18 +2428,18 @@ channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c;
 	struct channel_confirm *cc;
-	int remote_id;
+	int id;
 
 	/* Reset keepalive timeout */
 	keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
 
-	remote_id = packet_get_int();
+	id = packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	debug2("channel_input_confirm: type %d id %d", type, remote_id);
+	debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id);
 
-	if ((c = channel_lookup(remote_id)) == NULL) {
-		logit("channel_input_success_failure: %d: unknown", remote_id);
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id);
 		return;
 	}	
 	;
@@ -2409,7 +2460,8 @@ channel_set_af(int af)
 }
 
 static int
-channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_port,
+channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr,
+    u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port,
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	Channel *c;
@@ -2417,6 +2469,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
 	const char *host, *addr;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	in_port_t *lport_p;
 
 	host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
 	    listen_addr : host_to_connect;
@@ -2426,7 +2479,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 		error("No forward host name.");
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (strlen(host) > SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN - 1) {
+	if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
 		error("Forward host name too long.");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2485,10 +2538,29 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 		}
 		return 0;
 	}
-
+	if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
+		*allocated_listen_port = 0;
 	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
-		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+		switch (ai->ai_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin_port;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin6_port;
+			break;
+		default:
 			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
+		 * same port for all address families.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
+		    allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0)
+			*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
+
 		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
 		    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
 			error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: getnameinfo failed");
@@ -2504,7 +2576,8 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 
 		channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
 
-		debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+		debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
+		    ntop, strport);
 
 		/* Bind the socket to the address. */
 		if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
@@ -2523,11 +2596,24 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 			close(sock);
 			continue;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
+		 * record what we got.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
+		    allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+		    *allocated_listen_port == 0) {
+			*allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+			debug("Allocated listen port %d",
+			    *allocated_listen_port);
+		}
+
 		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
 		c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
 		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 		    0, "port listener", 1);
-		strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path));
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
 		c->host_port = port_to_connect;
 		c->listening_port = listen_port;
 		success = 1;
@@ -2549,8 +2635,7 @@ channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port)
 		Channel *c = channels[i];
 
 		if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
-		    strncmp(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path)) == 0 &&
-		    c->listening_port == port) {
+		    strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
 			debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
 			channel_free(c);
 			found = 1;
@@ -2566,17 +2651,18 @@ channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER,
-	    listen_host, listen_port, host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+	    listen_host, listen_port, NULL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
 	    gateway_ports);
 }
 
 /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
 int
 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address,
-    u_short listen_port, int gateway_ports)
+    u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER,
-	    listen_address, listen_port, NULL, 0, gateway_ports);
+	    listen_address, listen_port, allocated_listen_port,
+	    NULL, 0, gateway_ports);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2791,10 +2877,16 @@ channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	printf("permitopen");
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) {
+		printf(" any\n");
+		return;
+	}
 	for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
 		if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
 			printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect,
 			    permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect);
+	printf("\n");
 }
 
 /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
@@ -3074,7 +3166,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
 }
 
 static int
-connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
 {
 	int sock;
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
@@ -3084,7 +3176,7 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
 		return sock;
 	close(sock);
@@ -3092,6 +3184,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
+}
+
 int
 x11_connect_display(void)
 {
@@ -3113,6 +3213,17 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	 * connection to the real X server.
 	 */
 
+	/* Check if the display is from launchd. */
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+	if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
+		sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+		return sock;
+	}
+#endif
 	/*
 	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
 	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]

channels.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.96 2008/06/15 20:06:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.98 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -55,8 +55,6 @@
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE		14	/* Almost dead. */
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE		15
 
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN		256
-
 struct Channel;
 typedef struct Channel Channel;
 
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ struct Channel {
 	Buffer  output;		/* data received over encrypted connection for
 				 * send on socket */
 	Buffer  extended;
-	char    path[SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN];
+	char    *path;
 		/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
 	int     listening_port;	/* port being listened for forwards */
 	int     host_port;	/* remote port to connect for forwards */
@@ -247,7 +245,7 @@ int	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
 int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
 	     const char *, u_short, int);
 void	 channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
-int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int);
+int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int);
 int	 channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
 
 /* x11 forwarding */

cipher.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.81 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.82 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -63,31 +63,32 @@ struct Cipher {
 	u_int	block_size;
 	u_int	key_len;
 	u_int	discard_len;
+	u_int	cbc_mode;
 	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
 } ciphers[] = {
-	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, EVP_des_cbc },
-	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, evp_ssh1_3des },
-	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, evp_ssh1_bf },
+	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
 
-	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_bf_cbc },
-	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_cast5_cbc },
-	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "arcfour128",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "arcfour256",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
-	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
+	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour128",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour256",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
 	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
 #ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
-	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, EVP_acss },
+	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
 #endif
-	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*--*/
@@ -110,6 +111,12 @@ cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c)
 	return (c->number);
 }
 
+u_int
+cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->cbc_mode);
+}
+
 u_int
 cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
 {

cipher.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.36 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.37 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
 void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
 u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
 u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
 
 u_int	 cipher_get_number(const Cipher *);
 void	 cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);

clientloop.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.201 2008/07/16 11:51:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.209 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 
@@ -765,8 +764,8 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 	void (*handler)(int);
 	char *s, *cmd, *cancel_host;
 	int delete = 0;
-	int local = 0;
-	u_short cancel_port;
+	int local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
+	int cancel_port;
 	Forward fwd;
 
 	bzero(&fwd, sizeof(fwd));
@@ -790,6 +789,8 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 		    "Request local forward");
 		logit("      -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
 		    "Request remote forward");
+		logit("      -D[bind_address:]port                  "
+		    "Request dynamic forward");
 		logit("      -KR[bind_address:]port                 "
 		    "Cancel remote forward");
 		if (!options.permit_local_command)
@@ -809,17 +810,22 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 		delete = 1;
 		s++;
 	}
-	if (*s != 'L' && *s != 'R') {
+	if (*s == 'L')
+		local = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'R')
+		remote = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'D')
+		dynamic = 1;
+	else {
 		logit("Invalid command.");
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (*s == 'L')
-		local = 1;
-	if (local && delete) {
+
+	if ((local || dynamic) && delete) {
 		logit("Not supported.");
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((!local || delete) && !compat20) {
+	if (remote && delete && !compat20) {
 		logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1.");
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -837,17 +843,17 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 			cancel_port = a2port(cancel_host);
 			cancel_host = NULL;
 		}
-		if (cancel_port == 0) {
+		if (cancel_port <= 0) {
 			logit("Bad forwarding close port");
 			goto out;
 		}
 		channel_request_rforward_cancel(cancel_host, cancel_port);
 	} else {
-		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s)) {
+		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
 			logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if (local) {
+		if (local || dynamic) {
 			if (channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
 			    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
 			    fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
@@ -1036,7 +1042,6 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
 Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
   %c.  - terminate session\r\n\
   %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
-  %cC  - open a command line\r\n\
   %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
   %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
   %c?  - this message\r\n\
@@ -1045,8 +1050,7 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
 					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char, escape_char,
-					    escape_char);
+					    escape_char, escape_char);
 				} else {
 					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
 "%c?\r\n\
@@ -1081,6 +1085,8 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
 				continue;
 
 			case 'C':
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1)
+					goto noescape;
 				process_cmdline();
 				continue;
 
@@ -1632,7 +1638,7 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *listen_address, *originator_address;
-	int listen_port, originator_port;
+	u_short listen_port, originator_port;
 
 	/* Get rest of the packet */
 	listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
@@ -1658,7 +1664,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *originator;
-	int originator_port;
+	u_short originator_port;
 	int sock;
 
 	if (!options.forward_x11) {
@@ -1722,7 +1728,7 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!compat20) {
-		error("Tunnel forwarding is not support for protocol 1");
+		error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -1846,7 +1852,7 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (reply) {
 		packet_start(success ?
 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
-		packet_put_int(id);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
 		packet_send();
 	}
 	xfree(rtype);

compat.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.77 2006/12/12 03:58:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.78 2008/09/11 14:22:37 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_3.*",	SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
 		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
-		{ "OpenSSH*",		0 },
+		{ "OpenSSH_4*",		0 },
+		{ "OpenSSH*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
 		{ "2.1.0*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
 					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|

compat.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.41 2006/12/12 03:58:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.42 2008/09/11 14:22:37 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x00800000
 #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
 #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR	0x02000000
+#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);

config.guess

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 # Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
 #   Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
-#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
+#   Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
-timestamp='2005-05-27'
+timestamp='2008-04-14'
 
 # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 # under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -55,8 +56,8 @@ version="\
 GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
 
 Originally written by Per Bothner.
-Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
-Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
+2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
 This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
 warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ set_cc_for_build='
 trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ;
 trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ;
 : ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ;
- { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d -q "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
+ { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
  { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } ||
  { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
  { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ;
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
 	;;
  ,,*)   CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
  ,*,*)  CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
-esac ;'
+esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;'
 
 # This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
 # (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
@@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
 	    arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
 	    sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
 	    sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
+	    sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
 	    *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;;
 	esac
 	# The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
@@ -199,50 +201,18 @@ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
 	# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
 	echo "${machine}-${os}${release}"
 	exit ;;
-    amd64:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo x86_64-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    amiga:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    cats:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo arm-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    hp300:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    luna88k:OpenBSD:*:*)
-    	echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    mac68k:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    macppc:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo powerpc-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    mvme68k:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    mvme88k:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    mvmeppc:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo powerpc-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    sgi:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo mips64-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
-    sun3:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
-	exit ;;
     *:OpenBSD:*:*)
-	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
     *:ekkoBSD:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
+    *:SolidBSD:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
     macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
-	echo powerppc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
     *:MirBSD:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
@@ -360,7 +330,7 @@ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
     sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
 	echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
 	exit ;;
-    i86pc:SunOS:5.*:*)
+    i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
 	echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
 	exit ;;
     sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
@@ -562,7 +532,7 @@ EOF
 		echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
 	fi
 	exit ;;
-    *:AIX:*:[45])
+    *:AIX:*:[456])
 	IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
 	if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
 		IBM_ARCH=rs6000
@@ -658,8 +628,7 @@ EOF
 	esac
 	if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ]
 	then
-	    # avoid double evaluation of $set_cc_for_build
-	    test -n "$CC_FOR_BUILD" || eval $set_cc_for_build
+	    eval $set_cc_for_build
 
 	    # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
 	    # 32-bit code.  hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
@@ -800,12 +769,19 @@ EOF
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
     *:FreeBSD:*:*)
-	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+	    pc98)
+		echo i386-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	    amd64)
+		echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	    *)
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	esac
 	exit ;;
     i*:CYGWIN*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
 	exit ;;
-    i*:MINGW*:*)
+    *:MINGW*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
 	exit ;;
     i*:windows32*:*)
@@ -815,9 +791,18 @@ EOF
     i*:PW*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
 	exit ;;
-    x86:Interix*:[34]*)
-	echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/\..*//'
-	exit ;;
+    *:Interix*:[3456]*)
+    	case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+	    x86)
+		echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	    EM64T | authenticamd)
+		echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	    IA64)
+		echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	esac ;;
     [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
 	echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
 	exit ;;
@@ -830,7 +815,7 @@ EOF
     i*:UWIN*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
 	exit ;;
-    amd64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
+    amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
 	echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin
 	exit ;;
     p*:CYGWIN*:*)
@@ -851,6 +836,16 @@ EOF
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
 	exit ;;
     arm*:Linux:*:*)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+	    | grep -q __ARM_EABI__
+	then
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	else
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabi
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    avr32*:Linux:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
 	exit ;;
     cris:Linux:*:*)
@@ -887,7 +882,11 @@ EOF
 	#endif
 	#endif
 EOF
-	eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^CPU=`
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^CPU/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
 	test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
 	;;
     mips64:Linux:*:*)
@@ -906,9 +905,16 @@ EOF
 	#endif
 	#endif
 EOF
-	eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^CPU=`
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^CPU/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
 	test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
 	;;
+    or32:Linux:*:*)
+	echo or32-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
     ppc:Linux:*:*)
 	echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu
 	exit ;;
@@ -952,9 +958,15 @@ EOF
     sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
 	exit ;;
+    vax:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
     x86_64:Linux:*:*)
 	echo x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
 	exit ;;
+    xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
+    	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
     i*86:Linux:*:*)
 	# The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so
 	# first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent
@@ -973,9 +985,6 @@ EOF
 	  a.out-i386-linux)
 		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout"
 		exit ;;
-	  coff-i386)
-		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff"
-		exit ;;
 	  "")
 		# Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) or
 		# one that does not give us useful --help.
@@ -997,7 +1006,7 @@ EOF
 	LIBC=gnulibc1
 	# endif
 	#else
-	#ifdef __INTEL_COMPILER
+	#if defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) || defined(__PGI) || defined(__SUNPRO_C) || defined(__SUNPRO_CC)
 	LIBC=gnu
 	#else
 	LIBC=gnuaout
@@ -1007,7 +1016,11 @@ EOF
 	LIBC=dietlibc
 	#endif
 EOF
-	eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep ^LIBC=`
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^LIBC/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
 	test x"${LIBC}" != x && {
 		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}"
 		exit
@@ -1200,6 +1213,9 @@ EOF
     BePC:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
 	echo i586-pc-beos
 	exit ;;
+    BePC:Haiku:*:*)	# Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
+	echo i586-pc-haiku
+	exit ;;
     SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
 	echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
@@ -1209,6 +1225,15 @@ EOF
     SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
 	echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
+    SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
     Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
 	echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
 	exit ;;
@@ -1218,7 +1243,6 @@ EOF
     *:Darwin:*:*)
 	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown
 	case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
-	    *86) UNAME_PROCESSOR=i686 ;;
 	    unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
 	esac
 	echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
@@ -1297,6 +1321,9 @@ EOF
     i*86:skyos:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}` | sed -e 's/ .*$//'
 	exit ;;
+    i*86:rdos:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
+	exit ;;
 esac
 
 #echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2
@@ -1457,9 +1484,9 @@ This script, last modified $timestamp, has failed to recognize
 the operating system you are using. It is advised that you
 download the most up to date version of the config scripts from
 
-  http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/*checkout*/config/config/config.guess
+  http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
 and
-  http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/*checkout*/config/config/config.sub
+  http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub;hb=HEAD
 
 If the version you run ($0) is already up to date, please
 send the following data and any information you think might be

config.h.in

@@ -380,6 +380,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
 #undef HAVE_GETGRSET
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
 #undef HAVE_GETLUID
 
@@ -897,6 +900,9 @@
 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
 #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
 
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+
 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
 #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
 
@@ -1158,6 +1164,9 @@
 /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
 #undef KRB5
 
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+
 /* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
 #undef LIBWRAP
 

config.sub

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 # Configuration validation subroutine script.
 #   Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
-#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
+#   Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
-timestamp='2005-05-12'
+timestamp='2008-06-16'
 
 # This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software.
 # The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software
@@ -71,8 +72,8 @@ Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
 version="\
 GNU config.sub ($timestamp)
 
-Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
-Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
+2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
 This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
 warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
@@ -119,8 +120,9 @@ esac
 # Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations.
 maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'`
 case $maybe_os in
-  nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-dietlibc | linux-uclibc* | uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | \
-  kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*)
+  nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-dietlibc | linux-newlib* | linux-uclibc* | \
+  uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | \
+  storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*)
     os=-$maybe_os
     basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`
     ;;
@@ -171,6 +173,10 @@ case $os in
 	-hiux*)
 		os=-hiuxwe2
 		;;
+	-sco6)
+		os=-sco5v6
+		basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+		;;
 	-sco5)
 		os=-sco3.2v5
 		basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
@@ -187,6 +193,10 @@ case $os in
 		# Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
 		basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
 		;;
+	-sco5v6*)
+		# Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
+		basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+		;;
 	-sco*)
 		os=-sco3.2v2
 		basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
@@ -231,23 +241,27 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	| alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \
 	| alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \
 	| am33_2.0 \
-	| arc | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | avr \
+	| arc | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | avr | avr32 \
 	| bfin \
 	| c4x | clipper \
 	| d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \
-	| fr30 | frv \
+	| fido | fr30 | frv \
 	| h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \
 	| i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \
 	| ip2k | iq2000 \
-	| m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k | maxq | mcore \
+	| m32c | m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k \
+	| maxq | mb | microblaze | mcore | mep | metag \
 	| mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \
 	| mips16 \
 	| mips64 | mips64el \
-	| mips64vr | mips64vrel \
+	| mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \
 	| mips64orion | mips64orionel \
+	| mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \
+	| mips64vr | mips64vrel \
 	| mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \
 	| mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \
 	| mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \
+	| mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \
 	| mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \
 	| mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \
 	| mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \
@@ -256,21 +270,24 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	| mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \
 	| mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
 	| mn10200 | mn10300 \
+	| mt \
 	| msp430 \
+	| nios | nios2 \
 	| ns16k | ns32k \
-	| openrisc | or32 \
+	| or32 \
 	| pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \
 	| powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | ppcbe \
 	| pyramid \
-	| sh | sh[1234] | sh[23]e | sh[34]eb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \
+	| score \
+	| sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[23]e | sh[34]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \
 	| sh64 | sh64le \
-	| sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \
-	| sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \
-	| strongarm \
+	| sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \
+	| sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v \
+	| spu | strongarm \
 	| tahoe | thumb | tic4x | tic80 | tron \
 	| v850 | v850e \
 	| we32k \
-	| x86 | xscale | xscalee[bl] | xstormy16 | xtensa \
+	| x86 | xc16x | xscale | xscalee[bl] | xstormy16 | xtensa \
 	| z8k)
 		basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
 		;;
@@ -281,6 +298,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		;;
 	m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k)
 		;;
+	ms1)
+		basic_machine=mt-unknown
+		;;
 
 	# We use `pc' rather than `unknown'
 	# because (1) that's what they normally are, and
@@ -300,28 +320,31 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	| alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \
 	| alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* \
 	| arm-*  | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \
-	| avr-* \
+	| avr-* | avr32-* \
 	| bfin-* | bs2000-* \
 	| c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c4x-* | c54x-* | c55x-* | c6x-* \
 	| clipper-* | craynv-* | cydra-* \
 	| d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \
 	| elxsi-* \
-	| f30[01]-* | f700-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \
+	| f30[01]-* | f700-* | fido-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \
 	| h8300-* | h8500-* \
 	| hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \
 	| i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \
 	| ip2k-* | iq2000-* \
-	| m32r-* | m32rle-* \
+	| m32c-* | m32r-* | m32rle-* \
 	| m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \
-	| m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* \
+	| m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* | metag-* \
 	| mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \
 	| mips16-* \
 	| mips64-* | mips64el-* \
-	| mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \
+	| mips64octeon-* | mips64octeonel-* \
 	| mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \
+	| mips64r5900-* | mips64r5900el-* \
+	| mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \
 	| mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \
 	| mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \
 	| mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \
+	| mips64vr5900-* | mips64vr5900el-* \
 	| mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \
 	| mipsisa32r2-* | mipsisa32r2el-* \
 	| mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \
@@ -330,28 +353,34 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	| mipsisa64sr71k-* | mipsisa64sr71kel-* \
 	| mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \
 	| mmix-* \
+	| mt-* \
 	| msp430-* \
+	| nios-* | nios2-* \
 	| none-* | np1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \
 	| orion-* \
 	| pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \
 	| powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* | ppcbe-* \
 	| pyramid-* \
 	| romp-* | rs6000-* \
-	| sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | shbe-* \
+	| sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \
 	| shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \
-	| sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \
+	| sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc64v-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \
 	| sparclite-* \
-	| sparcv8-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | strongarm-* | sv1-* | sx?-* \
+	| sparcv8-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparcv9v-* | strongarm-* | sv1-* | sx?-* \
 	| tahoe-* | thumb-* \
-	| tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* \
+	| tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* | tile-* \
 	| tron-* \
 	| v850-* | v850e-* | vax-* \
 	| we32k-* \
-	| x86-* | x86_64-* | xps100-* | xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-* \
-	| xstormy16-* | xtensa-* \
+	| x86-* | x86_64-* | xc16x-* | xps100-* | xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-* \
+	| xstormy16-* | xtensa*-* \
 	| ymp-* \
 	| z8k-*)
 		;;
+	# Recognize the basic CPU types without company name, with glob match.
+	xtensa*)
+		basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
+		;;
 	# Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand
 	# for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS.
 	386bsd)
@@ -422,10 +451,22 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=ns32k-sequent
 		os=-dynix
 		;;
+	blackfin)
+		basic_machine=bfin-unknown
+		os=-linux
+		;;
+	blackfin-*)
+		basic_machine=bfin-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+		os=-linux
+		;;
 	c90)
 		basic_machine=c90-cray
 		os=-unicos
 		;;
+        cegcc)
+		basic_machine=arm-unknown
+		os=-cegcc
+		;;
 	convex-c1)
 		basic_machine=c1-convex
 		os=-bsd
@@ -454,8 +495,8 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=craynv-cray
 		os=-unicosmp
 		;;
-	cr16c)
-		basic_machine=cr16c-unknown
+	cr16)
+		basic_machine=cr16-unknown
 		os=-elf
 		;;
 	crds | unos)
@@ -493,6 +534,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=m88k-motorola
 		os=-sysv3
 		;;
+	dicos)
+		basic_machine=i686-pc
+		os=-dicos
+		;;
 	djgpp)
 		basic_machine=i586-pc
 		os=-msdosdjgpp
@@ -647,6 +692,14 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=m68k-isi
 		os=-sysv
 		;;
+	m68knommu)
+		basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+		os=-linux
+		;;
+	m68knommu-*)
+		basic_machine=m68k-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+		os=-linux
+		;;
 	m88k-omron*)
 		basic_machine=m88k-omron
 		;;
@@ -662,6 +715,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=i386-pc
 		os=-mingw32
 		;;
+	mingw32ce)
+		basic_machine=arm-unknown
+		os=-mingw32ce
+		;;
 	miniframe)
 		basic_machine=m68000-convergent
 		;;
@@ -687,6 +744,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=i386-pc
 		os=-msdos
 		;;
+	ms1-*)
+		basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/ms1-/mt-/'`
+		;;
 	mvs)
 		basic_machine=i370-ibm
 		os=-mvs
@@ -762,9 +822,8 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
 		os=-proelf
 		;;
-	or32 | or32-*)
+	openrisc | openrisc-*)
 		basic_machine=or32-unknown
-		os=-coff
 		;;
 	os400)
 		basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
@@ -786,6 +845,14 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=i860-intel
 		os=-osf
 		;;
+	parisc)
+		basic_machine=hppa-unknown
+		os=-linux
+		;;
+	parisc-*)
+		basic_machine=hppa-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+		os=-linux
+		;;
 	pbd)
 		basic_machine=sparc-tti
 		;;
@@ -795,6 +862,12 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	pc532 | pc532-*)
 		basic_machine=ns32k-pc532
 		;;
+	pc98)
+		basic_machine=i386-pc
+		;;
+	pc98-*)
+		basic_machine=i386-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+		;;
 	pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3)
 		basic_machine=i586-pc
 		;;
@@ -851,6 +924,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=i586-unknown
 		os=-pw32
 		;;
+	rdos)
+		basic_machine=i386-pc
+		os=-rdos
+		;;
 	rom68k)
 		basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
 		os=-coff
@@ -877,6 +954,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	sb1el)
 		basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1el-unknown
 		;;
+	sde)
+		basic_machine=mipsisa32-sde
+		os=-elf
+		;;
 	sei)
 		basic_machine=mips-sei
 		os=-seiux
@@ -888,6 +969,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=sh-hitachi
 		os=-hms
 		;;
+	sh5el)
+		basic_machine=sh5le-unknown
+		;;
 	sh64)
 		basic_machine=sh64-unknown
 		;;
@@ -977,6 +1061,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 		basic_machine=tic6x-unknown
 		os=-coff
 		;;
+	tile*)
+		basic_machine=tile-unknown
+		os=-linux-gnu
+		;;
 	tx39)
 		basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown
 		;;
@@ -1090,13 +1178,10 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	we32k)
 		basic_machine=we32k-att
 		;;
-	sh3 | sh4 | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele)
+	sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele)
 		basic_machine=sh-unknown
 		;;
-	sh64)
-		basic_machine=sh64-unknown
-		;;
-	sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b)
+	sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v)
 		basic_machine=sparc-sun
 		;;
 	cydra)
@@ -1169,20 +1254,23 @@ case $os in
 	      | -aos* \
 	      | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \
 	      | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \
-	      | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* | -openbsd* \
+	      | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* \
+	      | -openbsd* | -solidbsd* \
 	      | -ekkobsd* | -kfreebsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* | -lynxos* \
 	      | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \
 	      | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \
 	      | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \
-	      | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* \
+	      | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* | -cegcc* \
 	      | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \
-	      | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-uclibc* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \
+	      | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-newlib* | -linux-uclibc* \
+	      | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \
 	      | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \
 	      | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \
 	      | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \
 	      | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \
 	      | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* \
-	      | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly* | -skyos*)
+	      | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly* \
+	      | -skyos* | -haiku* | -rdos* | -toppers* | -drops*)
 	# Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number.
 		;;
 	-qnx*)
@@ -1200,7 +1288,7 @@ case $os in
 		os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|nto|nto-qnx|'`
 		;;
 	-sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \
-	      | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* \
+	      | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* | -haiku* \
 	      | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*)
 		;;
 	-mac*)
@@ -1312,6 +1400,9 @@ case $os in
 	-zvmoe)
 		os=-zvmoe
 		;;
+	-dicos*)
+		os=-dicos
+		;;
 	-none)
 		;;
 	*)
@@ -1334,6 +1425,12 @@ else
 # system, and we'll never get to this point.
 
 case $basic_machine in
+        score-*)
+		os=-elf
+		;;
+        spu-*)
+		os=-elf
+		;;
 	*-acorn)
 		os=-riscix1.2
 		;;
@@ -1343,9 +1440,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	arm*-semi)
 		os=-aout
 		;;
-    c4x-* | tic4x-*)
-        os=-coff
-        ;;
+        c4x-* | tic4x-*)
+        	os=-coff
+		;;
 	# This must come before the *-dec entry.
 	pdp10-*)
 		os=-tops20
@@ -1371,6 +1468,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	m68*-cisco)
 		os=-aout
 		;;
+        mep-*)
+		os=-elf
+		;;
 	mips*-cisco)
 		os=-elf
 		;;
@@ -1389,6 +1489,9 @@ case $basic_machine in
 	*-be)
 		os=-beos
 		;;
+	*-haiku)
+		os=-haiku
+		;;
 	*-ibm)
 		os=-aix
 		;;

configure

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #! /bin/sh
-# From configure.ac Revision: 1.409 .
+# From configure.ac Revision: 1.415 .
 # Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
 # Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61 for OpenSSH Portable.
 #
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ if as_func_ret_failure; then
   echo as_func_ret_failure succeeded.
 fi
 
-if (set x; as_func_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then
+if ( set x; as_func_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then
   :
 else
   exitcode=1
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ if as_func_ret_failure; then
   echo as_func_ret_failure succeeded.
 fi
 
-if (set x; as_func_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then
+if ( set x; as_func_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then
   :
 else
   exitcode=1
@@ -5461,7 +5461,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
 
 	# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
 	# and/or platforms, so we test if we can.  If it's not supported
-	# on a give platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+	# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
 	if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
 	    for t in -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector; do
 		{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
@@ -5477,8 +5477,8 @@ cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
 cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
 /* end confdefs.h.  */
 
-#include <stdlib.h>
-int main(void){return 0;}
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void){char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); return 0;}
 
 _ACEOF
 rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
@@ -5518,8 +5518,8 @@ cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
 cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
 /* end confdefs.h.  */
 
-#include <stdlib.h>
-int main(void){exit(0);}
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void){char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); return 0;}
 
 _ACEOF
 rm -f conftest$ac_exeext
@@ -7365,6 +7365,11 @@ _ACEOF
 
 	    #include <bsm/audit.h>
 
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
 fi
 
 	;;
@@ -7678,6 +7683,31 @@ _ACEOF
 
 	cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
 #define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
+_ACEOF
+
+	;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+	cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+	cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "!"
+_ACEOF
+
+	cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define _PATH_BTMP "/var/log/btmp"
+_ACEOF
+
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define USE_BTMP 1
 _ACEOF
 
 	;;
@@ -8744,7 +8774,6 @@ _ACEOF
 	;;
 # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
 *-*-sysv5*)
-	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 
 cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
 #define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1
@@ -8782,11 +8811,181 @@ _ACEOF
 #define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1
 _ACEOF
 
+		{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for getluid in -lprot... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+set}" = set; then
+  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lprot  $LIBS"
+cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h.  */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char getluid ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return getluid ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+  ac_status=$?
+  grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+  rm -f conftest.er1
+  cat conftest.err >&5
+  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  (exit $ac_status); } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+       $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+  ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
+else
+  echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+      conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid = yes; then
+   LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+
+
+for ac_func in getluid setluid
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+  cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h.  */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+   For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday.  */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+    which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+    Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+    <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.  */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+    to always fail with ENOSYS.  Some functions are actually named
+    something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias.  */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+  ac_status=$?
+  grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+  rm -f conftest.er1
+  cat conftest.err >&5
+  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  (exit $ac_status); } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+       $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+  eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+  echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+      conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+	       { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+  cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+			cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1
+_ACEOF
+
+			cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
 		;;
 	*)	cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
 #define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING "*LK*"
 _ACEOF
 
+		check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 		;;
 	esac
 	;;
@@ -14775,6 +14974,100 @@ fi
 done
 
 
+for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname
+do
+as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if { as_var=$as_ac_var; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
+  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+  cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h.  */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
+   For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday.  */
+#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+    which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
+    Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
+    <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.  */
+
+#ifdef __STDC__
+# include <limits.h>
+#else
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef $ac_func
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $ac_func ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+    to always fail with ENOSYS.  Some functions are actually named
+    something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias.  */
+#if defined __stub_$ac_func || defined __stub___$ac_func
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+return $ac_func ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.er1
+  ac_status=$?
+  grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+  rm -f conftest.er1
+  cat conftest.err >&5
+  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  (exit $ac_status); } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext &&
+       $as_test_x conftest$ac_exeext; then
+  eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
+else
+  echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	eval "$as_ac_var=no"
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo \
+      conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`
+	       { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
+if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
+  cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
+_ACEOF
+
+fi
+done
+
+
 { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for daemon" >&5
 echo $ECHO_N "checking for daemon... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
 if test "${ac_cv_func_daemon+set}" = set; then
@@ -22501,6 +22794,121 @@ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
 #define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1
 _ACEOF
 
+
+	{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id" >&5
+echo $ECHO_N "checking for struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
+if test "${ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id+set}" = set; then
+  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+else
+  cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h.  */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct sockaddr_in6 ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.sin6_scope_id)
+return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+  (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+  ac_status=$?
+  grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+  rm -f conftest.er1
+  cat conftest.err >&5
+  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  (exit $ac_status); } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+  ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=yes
+else
+  echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* confdefs.h.  */
+_ACEOF
+cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
+cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+static struct sockaddr_in6 ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.sin6_scope_id)
+return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
+if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
+  (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
+  ac_status=$?
+  grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
+  rm -f conftest.er1
+  cat conftest.err >&5
+  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  (exit $ac_status); } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
+  ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=yes
+else
+  echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id=no
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" >&5
+echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id = yes; then
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
+
 fi
 
 { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5

configure.ac

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.409 2008/07/09 11:07:19 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.415 2009/02/16 04:37:03 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org)
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.409 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.415 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 
 AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int main(void){char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));}
 
 	# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
 	# and/or platforms, so we test if we can.  If it's not supported
-	# on a give platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+	# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
 	if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
 	    for t in -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector; do
 		AC_MSG_CHECKING(if $CC supports $t)
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ int main(void){char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));}
 		LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
 		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([
-#include <stdlib.h>
-int main(void){return 0;}
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void){char x[[256]]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); return 0;}
 			 ])],
 		    [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
 		      CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
@@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ int main(void){return 0;}
 		      AC_MSG_CHECKING(if $t works)
 		      AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([
-#include <stdlib.h>
-int main(void){exit(0);}
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void){char x[[256]]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); return 0;}
 			])],
 			[ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
 			  break ],
@@ -477,6 +477,8 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], 
 	    AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
 	    [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
+	AC_DEFINE(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE, 1,
+	    [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
 	)
 	;;
 *-*-dragonfly*)
@@ -561,6 +563,14 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY)
 	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
 	;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+	AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, "!")
+	AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_REUSEARGV)
+	AC_DEFINE(_PATH_BTMP, "/var/log/btmp", [log for bad login attempts])
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_BTMP, 1, [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+	;;
 *-*-linux*)
 	no_dev_ptmx=1
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
@@ -728,7 +738,6 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	;;
 # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
 *-*-sysv5*)
-	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	AC_DEFINE(UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS, 1, [Support passwords > 8 chars])
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
@@ -741,8 +750,14 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 		AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_LIBIAF, 1,
 			[ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
 		AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX)
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(prot, getluid,[ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid,,,-lprot)
+			AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+			],,)
 		;;
 	*)	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
+		check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 		;;
 	esac
 	;;
@@ -1503,6 +1518,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(utmpname)
 dnl    Checks for utmpx functions
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline pututxline )
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname)
+dnl    Checks for lastlog functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getlastlogxbyname)
 
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(daemon,
 	[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DAEMON, 1, [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
@@ -2824,6 +2841,15 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
 if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR, 1,
 		[define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
+
+dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
+	AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id],,,
+		[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+		])
 fi
 
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [

contrib/caldera/openssh.spec

@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@
 #old cvs stuff.  please update before use.  may be deprecated.
 %define use_stable	1
 %if %{use_stable}
-  %define version 	5.1p1
+  %define version 	5.2p1
   %define cvs		%{nil}
   %define release 	1
 %else
-  %define version 	5.1p1
+  %define version 	5.2p1
   %define cvs		cvs20050315
   %define release 	0r1
 %endif
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen $SKG
 # install remaining docs
 DocD="%{buildroot}%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}"
 mkdir -p $DocD/%{askpass}
-cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog LICENCE OVERVIEW README* TODO  $DocD
+cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog LICENCE OVERVIEW README* TODO PROTOCOL* $DocD
 install -p -m 0444 %{SOURCE3}  $DocD/faq.html
 cp -a %{askpass}/{README,ChangeLog,TODO,SshAskpass*.ad}  $DocD/%{askpass}
 %if %{use_stable}
@@ -358,4 +358,4 @@ fi
 * Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
 Template Version: 1.31
 
-$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.65 2008/07/21 08:21:53 djm Exp $
+$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.66 2009/02/21 07:03:05 djm Exp $

contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 #
-# $Id: ssh-host-keygen,v 1.2 2003/11/21 12:48:57 djm Exp $
+# $Id: ssh-host-keygen,v 1.3 2008/11/03 09:16:01 djm Exp $
 #
 # This script is normally run only *once* for a given host
 # (in a given period of time) -- on updates/upgrades/recovery
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -o \
 	     -f $keydir/ssh_host_key.pub ]; then
   echo "You already have an SSH1 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_key."
 else
-  echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH1 RSA host key."
-  $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa1 -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -C '' -N ''
+  echo "Generating SSH1 RSA host key."
+  $keygen -t rsa1 -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -C '' -N ''
 fi
 
 if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -o \
 	     -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ]; then
   echo "You already have an SSH2 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key."
 else
-  echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH2 RSA host key."
-  $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -C '' -N ''
+  echo "Generating SSH2 RSA host key."
+  $keygen -t rsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -C '' -N ''
 fi
 
 if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -o \

contrib/caldera/sshd.pam

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
 auth       required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay
-auth       required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
 account    required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
 password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
 password   required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok

contrib/cygwin/Makefile

@@ -38,11 +38,13 @@ install-sshdoc:
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/ChangeLog $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/ChangeLog
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/LICENCE $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/LICENCE
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/OVERVIEW $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/OVERVIEW
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.agent $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.agent
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.dns $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.dns
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.platform $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.platform
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.privsep $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.privsep
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.smartcard $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.smartcard
-	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/RFC.nroff $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/RFC.nroff
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/TODO $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/TODO
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/WARNING.RNG $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/WARNING.RNG
 

contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
 port_number=22
 privsep_configured=no
 privsep_used=yes
-cygwin_value="ntsec"
+cygwin_value=""
 password_value=
 
 # ======================================================================
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ create_host_keys() {
     csih_inform "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key"
     ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key -N '' > /dev/null
   fi
-  
+
   if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" ]
   then
     csih_inform "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key"
     ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' > /dev/null
   fi
-  
+
   if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key" ]
   then
     csih_inform "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key"
@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ update_services_file() {
     _spaces="                  # "
   fi
   _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
-  
-  mount -t -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
-  
+
+  mount -o text -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
+
   # Depends on the above mount
   _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
-  
+
   # Remove sshd 22/port from services
   if [ `grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
   then
@@ -89,16 +89,16 @@ update_services_file() {
     then
       if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
       then
-        csih_inform "Removing sshd from ${_wservices}"
+	csih_inform "Removing sshd from ${_wservices}"
       else
-        csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
+	csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
       fi
       rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
     else
       csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!"
     fi
   fi
-  
+
   # Add ssh 22/tcp  and ssh 22/udp to services
   if [ `grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
   then
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ update_services_file() {
     then
       if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
       then
-        csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
+	csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
       else
-        csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+	csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
       fi
       rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
     else
@@ -134,16 +134,16 @@ sshd_privsep() {
       csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
       if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
       then
-        privsep_used=yes
-        if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
-        then
+	privsep_used=yes
+	if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
+	then
   	  csih_warning "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
-          csih_warning "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
-          csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+	  csih_warning "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
+	  csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
   	  privsep_used=no
-        fi
+	fi
       else
-        privsep_used=no
+	privsep_used=no
       fi
     else
       # On 9x don't use privilege separation.  Since security isn't
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ sshd_privsep() {
       privsep_used=no
     fi
   fi
-  
+
   # Create default sshd_config from skeleton files in /etc/defaults/etc or
   # modify to add the missing privsep configuration option
   if cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ sshd_privsep() {
     sed -e "s/^#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/
   	  s/^#Port 22/Port ${port_number}/
   	  s/^#StrictModes yes/StrictModes no/" \
-        < ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config \
-        > "${sshdconfig_tmp}"
+	< ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config \
+	> "${sshdconfig_tmp}"
     mv "${sshdconfig_tmp}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
   elif [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ]
   then
@@ -193,19 +193,19 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
       # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
       if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
       then
-        grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
-        if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
-        then
-          if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
-          then
+	grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+	then
+	  if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	  then
   	    csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
-          else
+	  else
   	    csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
-          fi
-          rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
-        else
-          csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
-        fi
+	  fi
+	  rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	else
+	  csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	fi
       fi
     fi
 
@@ -214,13 +214,13 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
     then
       if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
       then
-        sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+	sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
       else
-        sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+	sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
       fi
       mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
       csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
-    fi 
+    fi
 
   elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
   then
@@ -233,26 +233,26 @@ update_inetd_conf() {
       grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
       if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
       then
-        if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
-        then
+	if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	then
 	    csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
-        else
+	else
 	    csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
-        fi
-        rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	fi
+	rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
       else
-        csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
       fi
     fi
-  
+
     # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
     if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
     then
       if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
       then
-        echo 'ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+	echo 'ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
       else
-        echo '# ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+	echo '# ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
       fi
       csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
     fi
@@ -278,80 +278,83 @@ install_service() {
       echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
       if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
       then
-	csih_inform "Note that the CYGWIN variable must contain at least \"ntsec\""
-        csih_inform "for sshd to be able to change user context without password."
-        csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
+	csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
 
-        if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
-        then
-          csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
-          csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
-          csih_inform "sshd requires.  You need to have or to create a privileged"
-          csih_inform "account.  This script will help you do so."
-          echo
-          if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
-          then
-            csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
-            csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
-          fi
-        fi
+	if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+	then
+	  csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
+	  csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
+	  csih_inform "sshd requires.  You need to have or to create a privileged"
+	  csih_inform "account.  This script will help you do so."
+	  echo
+	  if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
+	  then
+	    csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
+	    csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
+	  fi
+	fi
 
-        # never returns empty if NT or above
-        run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
+	# never returns empty if NT or above
+	run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
 
-        if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
-        then
-          password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
-          if [ -z "${password}" ]
-          then
-            csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
-            password="${csih_value}"
-          fi
-        fi
+	if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
+	then
+	  password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
+	  if [ -z "${password}" ]
+	  then
+	    csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
+	    password="${csih_value}"
+	  fi
+	fi
 
-        # at this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and $password is empty,
-        # or $run_service_as is some privileged user and (hopefully) $password contains
-        # the correct password.  So, from here out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate
-        # the two cases.
+	# at this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and $password is empty,
+	# or $run_service_as is some privileged user and (hopefully) $password contains
+	# the correct password.  So, from here out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate
+	# the two cases.
 
-        csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
+	csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
 
-        if [ -z "${password}" ]
-        then
-	  if cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd -a "-D" -y tcpip \
-             -e CYGWIN="${csih_cygenv}"
-          then
-            echo
-            csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
-            csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
-            csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it"
-            csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
-          fi
-        else
-	  if cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd -a "-D" -y tcpip \
-             -e CYGWIN="${csih_cygenv}" -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
-          then
+	if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
+	then
+	  cygwin_env="-e CYGWIN=\"${csih_cygenv}\""
+	fi
+	if [ -z "${password}" ]
+	then
+	  if eval cygrunsrv -I sshd -d \"CYGWIN sshd\" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			    -a "-D" -y tcpip ${cygwin_env}
+	  then
+	    echo
+	    csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
+	    csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
+	    csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it"
+	    csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
+	  fi
+	else
+	  if eval cygrunsrv -I sshd -d \"CYGWIN sshd\" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			    -a "-D" -y tcpip ${cygwin_env} \
+			    -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
+	  then
 	    echo
 	    csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
 	    csih_inform "account.  To start the service now, call \`net start sshd' or"
-            csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
-            csih_inform "after the next reboot."
-          fi
-        fi
+	    csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
+	    csih_inform "after the next reboot."
+	  fi
+	fi
 
-        # now, if successfully installed, set ownership of the affected files 
-        if cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
-        then
-          chown "${run_service_as}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh*
-          chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty
-          chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
-          if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
-          then
+	# now, if successfully installed, set ownership of the affected files
+	if cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+	  chown "${run_service_as}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh*
+	  chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty
+	  chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
+	  if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
+	  then
 	    chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log
-          fi
-        else
-          csih_warning "Something went wrong installing the sshd service."
-        fi
+	  fi
+	else
+	  csih_warning "Something went wrong installing the sshd service."
+	fi
       fi # user allowed us to install as service
     fi # service not yet installed
   fi # csih_is_nt
@@ -456,7 +459,7 @@ done
 
 # Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
 # some ssh processes are still running
-if ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep -q ssh
+if ps -ef | grep -q '/sshd\?$'
 then
   echo
   csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
@@ -475,9 +478,9 @@ setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log"
 # Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
 if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
 then
-  echo 
+  echo
   csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
-                   "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
+		   "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
 fi
 if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
 then
@@ -520,7 +523,7 @@ sshd_privsep
 
 
 
-update_services_file 
+update_services_file
 update_inetd_conf
 install_service
 

contrib/redhat/openssh.spec

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 5.1p1
+%define ver 5.2p1
 %define rel 1
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ fi
 
 %files
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* RFC* TODO WARNING*
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO WARNING*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh

contrib/redhat/sshd.pam

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
 auth       required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
-auth       required     pam_nologin.so
+account    required     pam_nologin.so
 account    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
 password   required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
 session    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth

contrib/ssh-copy-id

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
-# Shell script to install your identity.pub on a remote machine
+# Shell script to install your public key on a remote machine
 # Takes the remote machine name as an argument.
 # Obviously, the remote machine must accept password authentication,
 # or one of the other keys in your ssh-agent, for this to work.
 
-ID_FILE="${HOME}/.ssh/identity.pub"
+ID_FILE="${HOME}/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"
 
 if [ "-i" = "$1" ]; then
   shift

contrib/ssh-copy-id.1

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ the original English.
 ..
 .TH SSH-COPY-ID 1 "14 November 1999" "OpenSSH"
 .SH NAME
-ssh-copy-id \- install your identity.pub in a remote machine's authorized_keys
+ssh-copy-id \- install your public key in a remote machine's authorized_keys
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 .B ssh-copy-id [-i [identity_file]]
 .I "[user@]machine"
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ set in its configuration).
 If the
 .B -i
 option is given then the identity file (defaults to
-.BR ~/.ssh/identity.pub )
+.BR ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub )
 is used, regardless of whether there are any keys in your
 .BR ssh-agent .
 Otherwise, if this:

contrib/sshd.pam.generic

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
 auth       required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay
-auth       required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
 account    required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so
 password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
 password   required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok

contrib/suse/openssh.spec

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	5.1p1
+Version:	5.2p1
 URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ fi
 
 %files
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README*
+%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
 %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config

contrib/suse/rc.sshd

@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ case "$1" in
     start)
         if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key ; then
 	    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.
-	    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ''
+	    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ''
         fi
         if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ; then
 	    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.
 	    
-	    ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ''
+	    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ''
         fi
         if ! test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ; then
 	    echo Generating /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
 	    
-	    ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''
+	    ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''
         fi
 	echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
 	## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails

defines.h

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.151 2008/07/04 13:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.153 2009/02/01 11:19:54 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ struct winsize {
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
 #endif
 
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID)
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
 #endif
 #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
@@ -738,4 +738,8 @@ struct winsize {
 # define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
 #endif
 
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN	/* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _DEFINES_H */

dispatch.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.21 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.22 2008/10/31 15:05:34 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 
-#define DISPATCH_MIN	0
 #define DISPATCH_MAX	255
 
 dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];

jpake.c

@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.1 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Shared components of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
+ * as described in:
+ *
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+
+/* RFC3526 group 5, 1536 bits */
+#define JPAKE_GROUP_G "2"
+#define JPAKE_GROUP_P \
+	"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74" \
+	"020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F1437" \
+	"4FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF05" \
+	"98DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB" \
+	"9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+
+struct jpake_group *
+jpake_default_group(void)
+{
+	struct jpake_group *ret;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->p = ret->q = ret->g = NULL;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&ret->p, JPAKE_GROUP_P) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&ret->g, JPAKE_GROUP_G) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: BN_hex2bn", __func__);
+	/* Subgroup order is p/2 (p is a safe prime) */
+	if ((ret->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	if (BN_rshift1(ret->q, ret->p) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_rshift1", __func__);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate uniformly distributed random number in range (1, high).
+ * Return number on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+BIGNUM *
+bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high)
+{
+	BIGNUM *r, *tmp;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_sub(tmp, high, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_sub failed (tmp = high - 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_rand_range(r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_rand_range failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_add(r, r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_add failed (r = r + 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	if (success == 0)
+		return r;
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash contents of buffer 'b' with hash 'md'. Returns 0 on success,
+ * with digest via 'digestp' (caller to free) and length via 'lenp'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+hash_buffer(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const EVP_MD *md,
+    u_char **digestp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	u_int digest_len;
+	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
+
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&evp_md_ctx, md, NULL) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestInit_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&evp_md_ctx, buf, len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestUpdate", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&evp_md_ctx, digest, &digest_len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestFinal_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*digestp = xmalloc(digest_len);
+	*lenp = digest_len;
+	memcpy(*digestp, digest, *lenp);
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
+	bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	digest_len = 0;
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by bignum */
+void
+jpake_debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, *h;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	if (n == NULL)
+		debug3("%s(null)", out);
+	else {
+		h = BN_bn2hex(n);
+		debug3("%s0x%s", out, h);
+		free(h);
+	}
+	free(out);
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by buffer contents in hex */
+void
+jpake_debug3_buf(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, h[65];
+	u_int i, j;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s length %u%s", out, len, buf == NULL ? " (null)" : "");
+	free(out);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	*h = '\0';
+	for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		snprintf(h + j, sizeof(h) - j, "%02x", buf[i]);
+		j += 2;
+		if (j >= sizeof(h) - 1 || i == len - 1) {
+			debug3("    %s", h);
+			*h = '\0';
+			j = 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+struct jpake_ctx *
+jpake_new(void)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *ret;
+
+	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+
+	ret->grp = jpake_default_group();
+
+	ret->s = ret->k = NULL;
+	ret->x1 = ret->x2 = ret->x3 = ret->x4 = NULL;
+	ret->g_x1 = ret->g_x2 = ret->g_x3 = ret->g_x4 = NULL;
+	ret->a = ret->b = NULL;
+
+	ret->client_id = ret->server_id = NULL;
+	ret->h_k_cid_sessid = ret->h_k_sid_sessid = NULL;
+
+	debug3("%s: alloc %p", __func__, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+void
+jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *pctx)
+{
+	debug3("%s: free %p", __func__, pctx);
+
+#define JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(v)			\
+	do {					\
+		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
+			BN_clear_free(v);	\
+			(v) = NULL;		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+#define JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(v, l)		\
+	do {					\
+		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
+			bzero((v), (l));	\
+			xfree(v);		\
+			(v) = NULL;		\
+			(l) = 0;		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->s);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->k);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x1);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x2);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x3);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x4);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x1);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x2);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x3);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x4);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->a);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->b);
+
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+#undef JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE
+#undef JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE
+
+	bzero(pctx, sizeof(pctx));
+	xfree(pctx);
+}
+
+/* dump entire jpake_ctx. NB. includes private values! */
+void
+jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *pctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s: %s (ctx at %p)", __func__, out, pctx);
+	if (pctx == NULL) {
+		free(out);
+		return;
+	}
+
+#define JPAKE_DUMP_BN(a)	do { \
+		if ((a) != NULL) \
+			JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(((a), "%s = ", #a)); \
+	} while (0)
+#define JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(a, b)	do { \
+		if ((a) != NULL) \
+			JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((a, b, "%s", #a)); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->s);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->k);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x1);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x2);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x3);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x4);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x1);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x2);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x3);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x4);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->a);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->b);
+
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: %s done", __func__, out);
+	free(out);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of step 1 exchange calculation */
+void
+jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
+    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
+    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
+    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
+    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Random nonce to prevent replay */
+	*id = xmalloc(KZP_ID_LEN);
+	*id_len = KZP_ID_LEN;
+	arc4random_buf(*id, *id_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * x1/x3 is a random element of Zq
+	 * x2/x4 is a random element of Z*q
+	 * We also exclude [1] from x1/x3 candidates and [0, 1] from
+	 * x2/x4 candiates to avoid possible degeneracy (i.e. g^0, g^1).
+	 */
+	if ((*priv1 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL ||
+	    (*priv2 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: bn_rand_range_gt_one", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: g_x1 = g^x1 mod p / server: g_x3 = g^x3 mod p
+	 * client: g_x2 = g^x2 mod p / server: g_x4 = g^x4 mod p
+	 */
+	if ((*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv1, grp->g, *priv1, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv2, grp->g, *priv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
+
+	/* Generate proofs for holding x1/x3 and x2/x4 */
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	    *priv1, *g_priv1, *id, *id_len,
+	    priv1_proof, priv1_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	    *priv2, *g_priv2, *id, *id_len,
+	    priv2_proof, priv2_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of step 2 exchange calculation */
+void
+jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
+    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
+    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **newpub,
+    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+	BIGNUM *tmp, *exponent;
+
+	/* Validate peer's step 1 values */
+	if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: theirpub1 <= 1", __func__);
+	if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: theirpub2 <= 1", __func__);
+
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
+	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub1 failed", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
+	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub2 failed", __func__);
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+
+	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: exponent = x2 * s mod p
+	 * server: exponent = x4 * s mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(exponent, mypriv2, s, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (exponent = mypriv2 * s mod p)",
+		    __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: tmp = g^(x1 + x3 + x4) mod p
+	 * server: tmp = g^(x1 + x2 + x3) mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * theirpub1 mod p)",
+		    __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub2 mod p)", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: a = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x3+x4) * x2 * s) mod p
+	 * server: b = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x2+x3) * x4 * s) mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*newpub, tmp, exponent, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (newpub = tmp^exponent mod p)", __func__);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((exponent, "%s: exponent = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Note the generator here is 'tmp', not g */
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
+	    myid, myid_len,
+	    newpub_exponent_proof, newpub_exponent_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign newpub", __func__);
+
+	BN_clear_free(tmp); /* XXX stash for later use? */
+	BN_clear_free(exponent); /* XXX stash for later use? (yes, in conf) */
+
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Confirmation hash calculation */
+void
+jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *endpoint_id, u_int endpoint_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate confirmation proof:
+	 *     client: H(k || client_id || session_id)
+	 *     server: H(k || server_id || session_id)
+	 */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, endpoint_id, endpoint_id_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, sess_id, sess_id_len);
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of key derivation and confirmation calculation */
+void
+jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
+    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
+    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
+    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **k,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+	BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*k = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Validate step 2 values */
+	if (BN_cmp(step2_val, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: step2_val <= 1", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * theirpriv2_s_proof is calculated with a different generator:
+	 * tmp = g^(mypriv1+mypriv2+theirpub1) = g^mypub1*g^mypub2*g^theirpub1
+	 * Calculate it here so we can check the signature.
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, mypub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * mypub2 mod p)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub1 mod p)", __func__);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
+
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val, 
+	    their_id, their_id_len,
+	    theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpriv2_s_proof failed", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * Derive shared key:
+	 *     client: k = (b / g^(x2*x4*s))^x2 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
+	 *     server: k = (a / g^(x2*x4*s))^x4 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
+	 *
+	 * Computed as:
+	 *     client: k = (g_x4^(q - (x2 * s)) * b)^x2 mod p
+	 *     server: k = (g_x2^(q - (x4 * s)) * b)^x4 mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mul(tmp, mypriv2, s, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mul (tmp = mypriv2 * s)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_sub(tmp, grp->q, tmp, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_sub (tmp = q - tmp mod q)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(tmp, theirpub2, tmp, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (tmp = theirpub2^tmp) mod p", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, step2_val, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * step2_val) mod p", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*k, tmp, mypriv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (k = tmp^mypriv2) mod p", __func__);
+	
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	jpake_confirm_hash(*k, my_id, my_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
+	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate and check confirmation hash from peer. Returns 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure/mismatch.
+ */
+int
+jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	u_char *expected_confirm_hash;
+	u_int expected_confirm_hash_len;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	/* Calculate and verify expected confirmation hash */
+	jpake_confirm_hash(k, peer_id, peer_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
+	    &expected_confirm_hash, &expected_confirm_hash_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len,
+	    "%s: expected confirm hash", __func__));
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len,
+	    "%s: received confirm hash", __func__));
+
+	if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
+		error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
+		    __func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	else if (memcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
+	    expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
+		success = 1;
+	bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);
+	xfree(expected_confirm_hash);
+	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* XXX main() function with tests */
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+

jpake.h

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.h,v 1.1 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef JPAKE_H
+#define JPAKE_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* Set JPAKE_DEBUG in CFLAGS for privacy-violating debugging */
+#ifndef JPAKE_DEBUG
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)
+#else
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)	jpake_debug3_bn a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)	jpake_debug3_buf a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)	jpake_dump a
+#endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
+
+struct jpake_group {
+	BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
+};
+
+#define KZP_ID_LEN	16	/* Length of client and server IDs */
+
+struct jpake_ctx {
+	/* Parameters */
+	struct jpake_group *grp;
+
+	/* Private values shared by client and server */
+	BIGNUM *s;			/* Secret (salted, crypted password) */
+	BIGNUM *k;			/* Derived key */
+
+	/* Client private values (NULL for server) */
+	BIGNUM *x1;			/* random in Zq */
+	BIGNUM *x2;			/* random in Z*q */
+
+	/* Server private values (NULL for server) */
+	BIGNUM *x3;			/* random in Zq */
+	BIGNUM *x4;			/* random in Z*q */
+
+	/* Step 1: C->S */
+	u_char *client_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
+	u_int client_id_len;
+	BIGNUM *g_x1;			/* g^x1 */
+	BIGNUM *g_x2;			/* g^x2 */
+
+	/* Step 1: S->C */
+	u_char *server_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
+	u_int server_id_len;
+	BIGNUM *g_x3;			/* g^x3 */
+	BIGNUM *g_x4;			/* g^x4 */
+
+	/* Step 2: C->S */
+	BIGNUM *a;			/* g^((x1+x3+x4)*x2*s) */
+
+	/* Step 2: S->C */
+	BIGNUM *b;			/* g^((x1+x2+x3)*x4*s) */
+
+	/* Confirmation: C->S */
+	u_char *h_k_cid_sessid;		/* H(k || client_id || session_id) */
+	u_int h_k_cid_sessid_len;
+
+	/* Confirmation: S->C */
+	u_char *h_k_sid_sessid;		/* H(k || server_id || session_id) */
+	u_int h_k_sid_sessid_len;
+};
+
+/* jpake.c */
+struct jpake_group *jpake_default_group(void);
+BIGNUM *bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high);
+int hash_buffer(const u_char *, u_int, const EVP_MD *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void jpake_debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void jpake_debug3_buf(const u_char *, u_int, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+void jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+struct jpake_ctx *jpake_new(void);
+void jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *);
+
+void jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
+    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int,
+    u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+int jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+/* schnorr.c */
+int schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int ,
+    u_char **, u_int *);
+int schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, 
+    const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int);
+
+#endif /* JPAKE_H */
+

kex.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.79 2007/06/05 06:52:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.80 2008/09/06 12:24:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *

kexgexs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.10 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.11 2009/01/01 21:17:36 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 	DH *dh;
 	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
 	u_int sbloblen, klen, slen, hashlen;
-	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1, type, kout;
+	int omin = -1, min = -1, omax = -1, max = -1, onbits = -1, nbits = -1;
+	int type, kout;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_key == NULL)
 		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
@@ -68,27 +69,29 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 	switch (type) {
 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
-		min = packet_get_int();
-		nbits = packet_get_int();
-		max = packet_get_int();
+		omin = min = packet_get_int();
+		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+		omax = max = packet_get_int();
 		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
 		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+		nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
 		break;
 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
-		nbits = packet_get_int();
-		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
 		/* unused for old GEX */
+		omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+		omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
 		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type);
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+	if (omax < omin || onbits < omin || omax < onbits)
 		fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-		    min, nbits, max);
+		    omin, onbits, omax);
 
 	/* Contact privileged parent */
 	dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
@@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 	key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
 
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
-		min = max = -1;
+		omin = min = omax = max = -1;
 
 	/* calc H */
 	kexgex_hash(
@@ -159,7 +162,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
 	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    min, nbits, max,
+	    omin, onbits, omax,
 	    dh->p, dh->g,
 	    dh_client_pub,
 	    dh->pub_key,

key.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.78 2008/07/07 23:32:51 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.80 2008/10/10 05:00:12 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * read_bignum():
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -369,7 +369,8 @@ key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
 			y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
 
 			/* augment the field */
-			field[x][y]++;
+			if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
+				field[x][y]++;
 			input = input >> 2;
 		}
 	}
@@ -427,7 +428,7 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
 		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
 		break;
 	default:
-		fatal("key_fingerprint_ex: bad digest representation %d",
+		fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
 		    dgst_rep);
 		break;
 	}

loginrec.c

@@ -1456,25 +1456,14 @@ syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  **/
 
 #ifdef USE_LASTLOG
-#define LL_FILE 1
-#define LL_DIR 2
-#define LL_OTHER 3
-
-static void
-lastlog_construct(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last)
-{
-	/* clear the structure */
-	memset(last, '\0', sizeof(*last));
-
-	line_stripname(last->ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last->ll_line));
-	strlcpy(last->ll_host, li->hostname,
-		MIN_SIZEOF(last->ll_host, li->hostname));
-	last->ll_time = li->tv_sec;
-}
 
+#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
 static int
-lastlog_filetype(char *filename)
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
 {
+	off_t offset;
+	char lastlog_file[1024];
 	struct stat st;
 
 	if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
@@ -1482,34 +1471,12 @@ lastlog_filetype(char *filename)
 		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return (0);
 	}
-	if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
-		return (LL_DIR);
-	else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
-		return (LL_FILE);
-	else
-		return (LL_OTHER);
-}
-
-
-/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
-static int
-lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
-{
-	off_t offset;
-	int type;
-	char lastlog_file[1024];
-
-	type = lastlog_filetype(LASTLOG_FILE);
-	switch (type) {
-	case LL_FILE:
-		strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE,
-		    sizeof(lastlog_file));
-		break;
-	case LL_DIR:
+	if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
 		snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
 		    LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
-		break;
-	default:
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+	} else {
 		logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
 		    LASTLOG_FILE);
 		return (0);
@@ -1522,7 +1489,7 @@ lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
 		return (0);
 	}
 
-	if (type == LL_FILE) {
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
 		/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
 		offset = (off_t) ((long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
 
@@ -1535,52 +1502,74 @@ lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
 
 	return (1);
 }
+#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
 
-static int
-lastlog_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	struct lastlog last;
-	int fd;
-
-	/* create our struct lastlog */
-	lastlog_construct(li, &last);
-
-	if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
-		return (0);
-
-	/* write the entry */
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
-		close(fd);
-		logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
-		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	close(fd);
-	return (1);
-}
-
+#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
 int
 lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	switch(li->type) {
 	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
-		return (lastlog_perform_login(li));
+		return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
+	default:
+		logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd;
+
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		/* create our struct lastlog */
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
+		strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
+		last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+	
+		if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+			return (0);
+	
+		/* write the entry */
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+			close(fd);
+			logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
+			    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+	
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
 	default:
 		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
 		return (0);
 	}
 }
+#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
 
-static void
-lastlog_populate_entry(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last)
+#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 {
-	line_fullname(li->line, last->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
-	strlcpy(li->hostname, last->ll_host,
-	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last->ll_host));
-	li->tv_sec = last->ll_time;
-}
+	struct lastlogx l, *ll;
 
+	if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
+		memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
+		ll = &l;
+	}
+	line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
+		MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
+	li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
+	return (1);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
 int
 lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 {
@@ -1598,7 +1587,10 @@ lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
 		/* FALLTHRU */
 	case sizeof(last):
-		lastlog_populate_entry(li, &last);
+		line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
+		li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
 		return (1);
 	case -1:
 		error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
@@ -1613,6 +1605,7 @@ lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	/* NOTREACHED */
 	return (0);
 }
+#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
 #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
 
 #ifdef USE_BTMP

misc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.69 2008/06/13 01:38:23 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.71 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -221,23 +221,19 @@ pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
 
 /*
  * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
- * Port must be >0 and <=65535.
- * Return 0 if invalid.
+ * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
+ * Return -1 if invalid.
  */
 int
 a2port(const char *s)
 {
-	long port;
-	char *endp;
+	long long port;
+	const char *errstr;
 
-	errno = 0;
-	port = strtol(s, &endp, 0);
-	if (s == endp || *endp != '\0' ||
-	    (errno == ERANGE && (port == LONG_MIN || port == LONG_MAX)) ||
-	    port <= 0 || port > 65535)
-		return 0;
-
-	return port;
+	port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		return -1;
+	return (int)port;
 }
 
 int
@@ -718,7 +714,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
 	int nullfd, dupfd;
 
 	if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
+		    strerror(errno));
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	while (++dupfd <= 2) {
@@ -726,7 +723,7 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
 		if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0)
 			continue;
 		if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
 			exit(1);
 		}
 	}

moduli.0

@@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ SEE ALSO
      Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
      Protocol, RFC 4419, 2006.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      June 26, 2008                               2
+OpenBSD 4.5                      June 26, 2008                               2

monitor.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.99 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.101 2009/02/12 03:26:22 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -149,6 +150,11 @@ int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
@@ -233,6 +239,13 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -379,6 +392,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 			if (!authenticated)
 				authctxt->failures++;
 		}
+#ifdef JPAKE
+		/* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+			if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
+				jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+				authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
 	}
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid)
@@ -1478,7 +1500,9 @@ mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
 	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
-
+	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
 	if (ssh1_challenge)
 		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
 	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
@@ -1969,3 +1993,206 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
+
+	if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
+		fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
+
+	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
+		    __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+	authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
+	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
+	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
+
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	char *hash_scheme, *salt;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	/* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
+
+	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(hash_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
+	pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
+	x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
+	x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
+
+	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
+	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
+	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->b,
+	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
+	x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
+	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	/* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
+	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
+	u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
+
+	authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
+
+	auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */

monitor.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.15 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -60,7 +60,12 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
-	MONITOR_REQ_TERM
+	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM,
 };
 
 struct mm_master;

monitor_fdpass.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.17 2008/03/24 16:11:07 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.18 2008/11/30 11:59:26 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -45,17 +45,16 @@ mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
 {
 #if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
 	struct msghdr msg;
-	struct iovec vec;
-	char ch = '\0';
-	ssize_t n;
 #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
 	union {
 		struct cmsghdr hdr;
-		char tmp[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
 		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
 	} cmsgbuf;
 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
 #endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	char ch = '\0';
+	ssize_t n;
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
@@ -76,7 +75,10 @@ mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
 	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
 	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
 
-	if ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1) {
+	while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EINTR))
+		debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
+	if (n == -1) {
 		error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
@@ -99,10 +101,6 @@ mm_receive_fd(int sock)
 {
 #if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
 	struct msghdr msg;
-	struct iovec vec;
-	ssize_t n;
-	char ch;
-	int fd;
 #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
 	union {
 		struct cmsghdr hdr;
@@ -110,6 +108,10 @@ mm_receive_fd(int sock)
 	} cmsgbuf;
 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
 #endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	ssize_t n;
+	char ch;
+	int fd;
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 	vec.iov_base = &ch;
@@ -124,10 +126,14 @@ mm_receive_fd(int sock)
 	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
 #endif
 
-	if ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1) {
+	while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EINTR))
+		debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (n == -1) {
 		error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
+
 	if (n != 1) {
 		error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld",
 		    __func__, (long)n);
@@ -145,6 +151,7 @@ mm_receive_fd(int sock)
 		error("%s: no message header", __func__);
 		return -1;
 	}
+
 #ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
 	if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
 		error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__,

monitor_wrap.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.63 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.64 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
 
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
@@ -1256,3 +1257,165 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+void
+mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
+    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
+
+	*hash_scheme = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	*salt = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
+    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
+    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
+    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
+    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
+
+	if ((*priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	*id = buffer_get_string(&m, id_len);
+	/* priv1 and priv2 are, well, private */
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv1);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv2);
+	*priv1_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv1_proof_len);
+	*priv2_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv2_proof_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
+    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
+    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **newpub,
+    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* monitor already has all bignums except theirpub1, theirpub2 */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub1);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub2);
+	/* monitor already knows our id */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirid, theirid_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
+
+	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *newpub);
+	*newpub_exponent_proof = buffer_get_string(&m,
+	    newpub_exponent_proof_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
+    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
+    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
+    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **k,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* monitor already has all bignums except step2_val */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, step2_val);
+	/* monitor already knows all the ids */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	/* 'k' is sensitive and stays in the monitor */
+	*confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(&m, confirm_hash_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* k is dummy in slave, ignored */
+	/* monitor knows all the ids */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
+	return success;
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */

monitor_wrap.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.21 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -101,6 +101,26 @@ int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
+/* jpake */
+struct jpake_group;
+void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
+void mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
+    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+int mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+
 /* zlib allocation hooks */
 
 void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);

myproposal.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.22 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.23 2009/01/23 07:58:11 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -41,11 +41,12 @@
 #endif
 
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
+
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
 	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
-	"arcfour128,arcfour256,arcfour," \
-	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
 	"hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160," \
 	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \

nchan.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.60 2008/06/30 12:16:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.62 2008/11/07 18:50:18 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ chan_send_eow2(Channel *c)
 		    c->self);
 		return;
 	}
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH))
+		return;
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
 	packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
 	packet_put_cstring("eow@openssh.com");
@@ -484,12 +486,12 @@ chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c)
 	if (c->sock != -1) {
 		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0)
 			debug2("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
-			    "shutdown() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+			    "shutdown() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
 			    c->self, c->sock, strerror(errno));
 	} else {
 		if (channel_close_fd(&c->wfd) < 0)
 			logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
-			    "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+			    "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
 			    c->self, c->wfd, strerror(errno));
 	}
 }
@@ -508,13 +510,13 @@ chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c)
 		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0
 		    && errno != ENOTCONN)
 			error("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
-			    "shutdown() failed for fd%d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
+			    "shutdown() failed for fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
 			    c->self, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate,
 			    strerror(errno));
 	} else {
 		if (channel_close_fd(&c->rfd) < 0)
 			logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
-			    "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+			    "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
 			    c->self, c->rfd, strerror(errno));
 	}
 }

openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.3 2008/04/04 05:16:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.4 2008/08/29 21:32:38 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@ poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
 	struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
 		if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
 			errno = EINVAL;
 			return -1;
 		}
-		maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fds[i].fd);
+		maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd);
 	}
 
 	nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS);

openbsd-compat/port-uw.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBIAF
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
 # include <crypt.h>
@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
 		fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
 }
 #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
 

openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 
-# ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 #  include <crypt.h>
 # endif
 

openbsd-compat/xmmap.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.14 2007/06/11 02:52:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.15 2009/02/16 04:21:40 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ xmmap(size_t size)
 			fatal("mkstemp(\"%s\"): %s",
 			    MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
 		unlink(tmpname);
-		ftruncate(tmpfd, size);
+		if (ftruncate(tmpfd, size) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: ftruncate: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 		address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
 		    tmpfd, (off_t)0);
 		close(tmpfd);

packet.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.157 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.160 2009/02/13 11:50:21 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@
 #define DBG(x)
 #endif
 
+#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
+
 /*
  * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
  * the other side.  connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
@@ -160,6 +162,10 @@ static u_int ssh1_keylen;
 /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
 static u_char extra_pad = 0;
 
+/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+static u_int packet_discard = 0;
+static Mac *packet_discard_mac = NULL;
+
 struct packet {
 	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
 	u_char type;
@@ -209,6 +215,36 @@ packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count)
 		packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
 }
 
+static void
+packet_stop_discard(void)
+{
+	if (packet_discard_mac) {
+		char buf[1024];
+		
+		memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
+		while (buffer_len(&incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		(void) mac_compute(packet_discard_mac,
+		    p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+	}
+	logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+static void
+packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
+{
+	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher))
+		packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
+	if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
+		packet_discard_mac = mac;
+	if (buffer_len(&input) >= discard)
+		packet_stop_discard();
+	packet_discard = discard - buffer_len(&input);
+}
+
 /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
 
 int
@@ -1127,6 +1163,9 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
 
+	if (packet_discard)
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
 	if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
 		enc  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
 		mac  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
@@ -1148,11 +1187,14 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		    block_size);
 		cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
 		packet_length = get_u32(cp);
-		if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
+		if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 			buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
 #endif
-			packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 		}
 		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length+4));
 		buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
@@ -1161,9 +1203,13 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
 	DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
 	    need, maclen));
-	if (need % block_size != 0)
-		fatal("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+	if (need % block_size != 0) {
+		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
 		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
+		packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
 	 * decrypt into incoming_packet
@@ -1185,11 +1231,19 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_read.seqnr,
 		    buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
 		    buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
-		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0)
-			packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0) {
+			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+				fatal("internal error need %d", need);
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+		}
+				
 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", p_read.seqnr));
 		buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
 	}
+	/* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */
 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
 		*seqnr_p = p_read.seqnr;
 	if (++p_read.seqnr == 0)
@@ -1322,6 +1376,13 @@ packet_read_poll(void)
 void
 packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
 {
+	if (packet_discard) {
+		keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+		if (len >= packet_discard)
+			packet_stop_discard();
+		packet_discard -= len;
+		return;
+	}
 	buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
 }
 

pathnames.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.17 2008/12/29 02:23:26 stevesk Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
 #define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE	_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
 
 /*
- * The directory in user\'s home directory in which the files reside. The
+ * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
  * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
  */
 #define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR		".ssh"
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@
 #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA		".ssh/id_rsa"
 
 /*
- * Configuration file in user\'s home directory.  This file need not be
+ * Configuration file in user's home directory.  This file need not be
  * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
- * particularly secret.  If the user\'s home directory resides on an NFS
+ * particularly secret.  If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
  * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
  */
 #define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE		".ssh/config"
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
 /*
  * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
  * user.  This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
- * but does not contain anything particularly secret.  If the user\'s home
+ * but does not contain anything particularly secret.  If the user's home
  * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
  * may need to be world-readable.  (This file is read by the daemon which is
  * running as root.)

readconf.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.167 2008/06/26 11:46:31 grunk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.176 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
-	oVisualHostKey,
+	oVisualHostKey, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
 	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
-	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* alias */
+	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
 	{ "hostname", oHostName },
 	{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "host", oHost },
 	{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
 	{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
-	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },		/* obsolete */
-	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 },	/* obsolete */
+	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
 	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oUserKnownHostsFile2 },	/* obsolete */
 	{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
 	{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
@@ -228,6 +228,13 @@ static struct {
 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
+	    oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
+#else
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
 };
 
@@ -249,10 +256,9 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
 		fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
 	fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
 
-	fwd->listen_host = (newfwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
-	    NULL : xstrdup(newfwd->listen_host);
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
 	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
-	fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(newfwd->connect_host);
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
 	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
 }
 
@@ -270,10 +276,9 @@ add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
 		    SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
 	fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
 
-	fwd->listen_host = (newfwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
-	    NULL : xstrdup(newfwd->listen_host);
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
 	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
-	fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(newfwd->connect_host);
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
 	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
 }
 
@@ -412,6 +417,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -706,56 +715,40 @@ parse_int:
 
 	case oLocalForward:
 	case oRemoteForward:
+	case oDynamicForward:
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		arg2 = strdelim(&s);
-		if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
-			    filename, linenum);
 
-		/* construct a string for parse_forward */
-		snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
+		if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+		    opcode == oRemoteForward) {
+			arg2 = strdelim(&s);
+			if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
+				    filename, linenum);
 
-		if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg) == 0)
+			/* construct a string for parse_forward */
+			snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
+		} else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) {
+			strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
+		}
+
+		if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg,
+		    opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0,
+		    opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0)
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 
 		if (*activep) {
-			if (opcode == oLocalForward)
+			if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+			    opcode == oDynamicForward)
 				add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
 			else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
 				add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
 		}
 		break;
 
-	case oDynamicForward:
-		arg = strdelim(&s);
-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
-			    filename, linenum);
-		memset(&fwd, '\0', sizeof(fwd));
-		fwd.connect_host = "socks";
-		fwd.listen_host = hpdelim(&arg);
-		if (fwd.listen_host == NULL ||
-		    strlen(fwd.listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
-			    filename, linenum);
-		if (arg) {
-			fwd.listen_port = a2port(arg);
-			fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
-		} else {
-			fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
-			fwd.listen_host = NULL;
-		}
-		if (fwd.listen_port == 0)
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
-			    filename, linenum);
-		if (*activep)
-			add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
-		break;
-
 	case oClearAllForwardings:
 		intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -959,7 +952,6 @@ read_config_file(const char *filename, const char *host, Options *options,
 	int active, linenum;
 	int bad_options = 0;
 
-	/* Open the file. */
 	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1072,6 +1064,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->local_command = NULL;
 	options->permit_local_command = -1;
 	options->visual_host_key = -1;
+	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1208,6 +1201,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->permit_local_command = 0;
 	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
 		options->visual_host_key = 0;
+	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
 	/* options->local_command should not be set by default */
 	/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
 	/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
@@ -1219,11 +1214,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 /*
  * parse_forward
  * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
+ *   dynamicfwd == 0
  *	[listenhost:]listenport:connecthost:connectport
+ *   dynamicfwd == 1
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport
  * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
  */
 int
-parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec)
+parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
 {
 	int i;
 	char *p, *cp, *fwdarg[4];
@@ -1240,11 +1238,23 @@ parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec)
 		if ((fwdarg[i] = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
 			break;
 
-	/* Check for trailing garbage in 4-arg case*/
+	/* Check for trailing garbage */
 	if (cp != NULL)
 		i = 0;	/* failure */
 
 	switch (i) {
+	case 1:
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		break;
+
 	case 3:
 		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
 		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
@@ -1264,19 +1274,37 @@ parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec)
 
 	xfree(p);
 
-	if (fwd->listen_port == 0 || fwd->connect_port == 0)
+	if (dynamicfwd) {
+		if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
+			goto fail_free;
+	} else {
+		if (!(i == 3 || i == 4))
+			goto fail_free;
+		if (fwd->connect_port <= 0)
+			goto fail_free;
+	}
+
+	if (fwd->listen_port < 0 || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
 		goto fail_free;
 
 	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
 	    strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
 		goto fail_free;
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+
 
 	return (i);
 
  fail_free:
-	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL)
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL) {
 		xfree(fwd->connect_host);
-	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL)
+		fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) {
 		xfree(fwd->listen_host);
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+	}
 	return (0);
 }

readconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.74 2008/06/26 11:46:31 grunk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.78 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@
 
 typedef struct {
 	char	 *listen_host;		/* Host (address) to listen on. */
-	u_short	  listen_port;		/* Port to forward. */
+	int	  listen_port;		/* Port to forward. */
 	char	 *connect_host;		/* Host to connect. */
-	u_short	  connect_port;		/* Port to connect on connect_host. */
+	int	  connect_port;		/* Port to connect on connect_host. */
 }       Forward;
 /* Data structure for representing option data. */
 
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
 	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;	/* Try jpake */
 	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
 	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ typedef struct {
 void     initialize_options(Options *);
 void     fill_default_options(Options *);
 int	 read_config_file(const char *, const char *, Options *, int);
-int	 parse_forward(Forward *, const char *);
+int	 parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int);
 
 int
 process_config_line(Options *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *);

regress/conch-ciphers.sh

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ DATA=/bin/ls
 COPY=${OBJ}/copy
 
 if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then
-	fatal "conch interop tests not enabled"
+	echo "conch interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
 fi
 
 start_sshd

regress/putty-ciphers.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.2 2008/06/30 10:31:11 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.3 2008/11/10 02:06:35 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="putty ciphers"
@@ -7,10 +7,11 @@ DATA=/bin/ls
 COPY=${OBJ}/copy
 
 if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
-	fatal "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
 fi
 
-for c in aes blowfish 3des arcfour ; do
+for c in aes blowfish 3des arcfour aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do
 	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
 	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
 	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c

regress/putty-kex.sh

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ DATA=/bin/ls
 COPY=${OBJ}/copy
 
 if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
-	fatal "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
 fi
 
 for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do

regress/putty-transfer.sh

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ DATA=/bin/ls
 COPY=${OBJ}/copy
 
 if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
-	fatal "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
 fi
 
 # XXX support protocol 1 too

schnorr.c

@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.2 2009/02/18 04:31:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of Schnorr signatures / zero-knowledge proofs, based on
+ * description in:
+ * 	
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+/* #define SCHNORR_DEBUG */		/* Privacy-violating debugging */
+/* #define SCHNORR_MAIN */		/* Include main() selftest */
+
+/* XXX */
+/* Parametise signature hash? (sha256, sha1, etc.) */
+/* Signature format - include type name, hash type, group params? */
+
+#ifndef SCHNORR_DEBUG
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)
+#else
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)	jpake_debug3_bn a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)	jpake_debug3_buf a
+#endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash component of Schnorr signature H(g || g^v || g^x || id)
+ * using SHA1. Returns signature as bignum or NULL on error.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *
+schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen)
+{
+	u_char *digest;
+	u_int digest_len;
+	BIGNUM *h;
+	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
+	Buffer b;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	if ((h = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
+
+	/* h = H(g || p || q || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, p);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, q);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_x);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, id, idlen);
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: hashblob", __func__));
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0) {
+		error("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_bin2bn(digest, (int)digest_len, h) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_bin2bn", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 0;
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((h, "%s: h = ", __func__));
+ out:
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
+	bzero(digest, digest_len);
+	xfree(digest);
+	digest_len = 0;
+	if (success == 0)
+		return h;
+	BN_clear_free(h);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
+ * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
+ * replay salt.
+ * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
+ * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+{
+	int success = -1;
+	Buffer b;
+	BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((x, "%s: x = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
+	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	h = g_v = r = tmp = v = NULL;
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * v must be a random element of Zq, so 1 <= v < q
+	 * we also exclude v = 1, since g^1 looks dangerous
+	 */
+	if ((v = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp_p)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: bn_rand_range2", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((v, "%s: v = ", __func__));
+
+	/* g_v = g^v mod p */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_v, grp_g, v, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g^v mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
+
+	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* r = v - xh mod q */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, x, h, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = xv mod q)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_mod_sub(r, v, tmp, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Signature is (g_v, r) */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	/* XXX sigtype-hash as string? */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, r);
+	*siglen = buffer_len(&b);
+	*sig = xmalloc(*siglen);
+	memcpy(*sig, buffer_ptr(&b), *siglen);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (h != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(h);
+	if (v != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(v);
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	BN_clear_free(g_v);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
+ * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'.
+ * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+{
+	int success = -1;
+	Buffer b;
+	BIGNUM *g_v, *h, *r, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+	u_int rlen;
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
+	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	g_v = h = r = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (expected = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (rlen != 0) {
+		error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
+
+	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* g_xh = (g^x)^h */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_xh, g_x, h, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g_x^h mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_xh, "%s: g_xh = ", __func__));
+
+	/* g_r = g^r */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_r, grp_g, r, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g_x^h mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_r, "%s: g_r = ", __func__));
+
+	/* expected = g^r * g_xh */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(expected, g_r, g_xh, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (expected = g_r mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((expected, "%s: expected = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Check g_v == expected */
+	success = BN_cmp(expected, g_v) == 0;
+ out:
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (h != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(h);
+	BN_clear_free(g_v);
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	BN_clear_free(g_xh);
+	BN_clear_free(g_r);
+	BN_clear_free(expected);
+	return success;
+}
+
+#ifdef SCHNORR_MAIN
+static void
+schnorr_selftest_one(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g, const BIGNUM *x)
+{
+	BIGNUM *g_x;
+	u_char *sig;
+	u_int siglen;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+	if ((g_x = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_x, grp_g, x, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: g_x", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4, &sig, &siglen))
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: verify fail", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bad ID)", __func__);
+	sig[4] ^= 1;
+	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bit error)", __func__);
+	xfree(sig);
+	BN_free(g_x);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+schnorr_selftest(void)
+{
+	BIGNUM *x;
+	struct jpake_group *grp;
+	u_int i;
+	char *hh;
+
+	grp = jpake_default_group();
+	if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->p, "%s: grp->p = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->q, "%s: grp->q = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->g, "%s: grp->g = ", __func__));
+
+	/* [1, 20) */
+	for (i = 1; i < 20; i++) {
+		printf("x = %u\n", i);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if (BN_set_word(x, i) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: set x word", __func__);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+	}
+
+	/* 100 x random [0, p) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+		if (BN_rand_range(x, grp->p) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: BN_rand_range", __func__);
+		hh = BN_bn2hex(x);
+		printf("x = (random) 0x%s\n", hh);
+		free(hh);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+	}
+
+	/* [q-20, q) */
+	if (BN_set_word(x, 20) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_set_word (x = 20)", __func__);
+	if (BN_sub(x, grp->q, x) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_sub (q - x)", __func__);
+	for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) {
+		hh = BN_bn2hex(x);
+		printf("x = (q - %d) 0x%s\n", 20 - i, hh);
+		free(hh);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+		if (BN_add(x, x, BN_value_one()) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: BN_add (x + 1)", __func__);
+	}
+	BN_free(x);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	schnorr_selftest();
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+

scp.0

@@ -145,4 +145,4 @@ AUTHORS
      Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
      Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      July 12, 2008                               3
+OpenBSD 4.5                      July 12, 2008                               3

scp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.163 2008/06/13 18:55:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.164 2008/10/10 04:55:16 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
-	 * and no error has occured yet
+	 * and no error has occurred yet
 	 */
 	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
 		if (remin != -1)

servconf.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.186 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.194 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "groupaccess.h"
 
-static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
-static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
+static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
 
 /* Use of privilege separation or not */
 extern int use_privsep;
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
 	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 }
 
 void
@@ -258,6 +259,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS;
 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
 
 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
 	if (use_privsep == -1)
@@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
@@ -368,6 +372,11 @@ static struct {
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#else
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#endif
 	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -380,7 +389,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -451,7 +460,7 @@ parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
 }
 
 static void
-add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
+add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
@@ -467,7 +476,7 @@ add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 }
 
 static void
-add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
+add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
 {
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
@@ -477,7 +486,7 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 	hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
 		fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
 		    addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
@@ -633,7 +642,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
-	u_short port;
+	int port;
 	u_int i, flags = 0;
 	size_t len;
 
@@ -690,7 +699,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
-		if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] == 0)
+		if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
 			fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		break;
@@ -743,7 +752,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		p = cleanhostname(p);
 		if (arg == NULL)
 			port = 0;
-		else if ((port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+		else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
 			fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
 
 		add_listen_addr(options, p, port);
@@ -890,6 +899,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -1252,7 +1265,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 				fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
 				    filename, linenum);
 			p = cleanhostname(p);
-			if (arg == NULL || (port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+			if (arg == NULL || (port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
 				fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
 				    "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
 			if (*activep && n == -1)
@@ -1377,7 +1390,9 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
 	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
 
 	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
@@ -1439,7 +1454,7 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 	if (code == sPermitRootLogin) {
 		switch (val) {
 		case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
-			return "without-passord";
+			return "without-password";
 		case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
 			return "forced-commands-only";
 		case PERMIT_YES:
@@ -1544,11 +1559,15 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	}
 
 	/* integer arguments */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
 	dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
 
@@ -1562,12 +1581,22 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	    o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+#ifdef KRB5
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
+# ifdef USE_AFS
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	    o->zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 	    o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
@@ -1626,7 +1655,5 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 		}
 	dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
 
-	printf("permitopen");
 	channel_print_adm_permitted_opens();
-	printf("\n");
 }

servconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.85 2008/06/10 04:50:25 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.87 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@
 #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
 
 typedef struct {
-	u_int num_ports;
-	u_int ports_from_cmdline;
-	u_short ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
+	u_int	num_ports;
+	u_int	ports_from_cmdline;
+	int	ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
 	char   *listen_addr;		/* Address on which the server listens. */
 	struct addrinfo *listen_addrs;	/* Addresses on which the server listens. */
 	int     address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+					/* If true, permit jpake auth */
 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
 					 * passwords. */
 	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */

serverloop.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.153 2008/06/30 12:15:39 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.157 2009/02/12 03:16:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 {
 	Channel *c;
 	char *target, *originator;
-	int target_port, originator_port;
+	u_short target_port, originator_port;
 
 	target = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	target_port = packet_get_int();
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	char *rtype;
 	int want_reply;
-	int success = 0;
+	int success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
 
 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
@@ -1117,7 +1117,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 		/* check permissions */
 		if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding ||
-		    no_port_forwarding_flag
+		    no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+		    (!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
 #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
 		    || (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)
 #endif
@@ -1127,7 +1128,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		} else {
 			/* Start listening on the port */
 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
-			    listen_address, listen_port, options.gateway_ports);
+			    listen_address, listen_port,
+			    &allocated_listen_port, options.gateway_ports);
 		}
 		xfree(listen_address);
 	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
@@ -1149,6 +1151,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (want_reply) {
 		packet_start(success ?
 		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+		if (success && allocated_listen_port > 0)
+			packet_put_int(allocated_listen_port);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
 	}
@@ -1202,9 +1206,9 @@ server_init_dispatch_20(void)
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
 	/* client_alive */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
 	/* rekeying */

session.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.241 2008/06/16 13:22:53 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.245 2009/01/22 09:46:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -95,6 +95,12 @@
 #include <kafs.h>
 #endif
 
+#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
+	(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
+	 (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
+
 /* func */
 
 Session *session_new(void);
@@ -228,7 +234,7 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 	    0, "auth socket", 1);
-	strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path));
+	nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
 	return 1;
 
  authsock_err:
@@ -781,7 +787,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
 		original_command = command;
 		command = options.adm_forced_command;
-		if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command) == 0)
+		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command))
 			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
 		else if (s->is_subsystem)
 			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
@@ -789,7 +795,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 	} else if (forced_command) {
 		original_command = command;
 		command = forced_command;
-		if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command) == 0)
+		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command))
 			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
 		else if (s->is_subsystem)
 			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
@@ -926,7 +932,7 @@ check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
 
 /*
  * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the variable
- * already exists, its value is overriden.
+ * already exists, its value is overridden.
  */
 void
 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
@@ -1789,7 +1795,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		char *p, *args;
 
 		setproctitle("%s@internal-sftp-server", s->pw->pw_name);
-		args = strdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+		args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
 		for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
 			if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
 				argv[i++] = p;

sftp-server-main.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.3 2008/03/26 23:44:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.4 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	sanitise_stdfd();
 
 	if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+		fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
+		    (u_long)getuid());
 		return 1;
 	}
 

sftp-server.0

@@ -47,4 +47,4 @@ HISTORY
 AUTHORS
      Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      July 18, 2008                               1
+OpenBSD 4.5                      July 18, 2008                               1

sftp.0

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ SYNOPSIS
      sftp [-1Cv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-F ssh_config]
           [-o ssh_option] [-P sftp_server_path] [-R num_requests] [-S program]
           [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host
-     sftp [[user@]host[:file [file]]]
-     sftp [[user@]host[:dir[/]]]
+     sftp [user@]host[:file ...]
+     sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]]
      sftp -b batchfile [user@]host
 
 DESCRIPTION
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
      version
              Display the sftp protocol version.
 
-     ! command
+     !command
              Execute command in local shell.
 
      !       Escape to local shell.
@@ -271,4 +271,4 @@ SEE ALSO
      T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
      filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      July 15, 2008                               5
+OpenBSD 4.5                    December 9, 2008                              5

sftp.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.67 2008/07/15 02:23:14 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.69 2008/12/09 15:35:00 sobrado Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 15 2008 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 9 2008 $
 .Dt SFTP 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -43,13 +43,12 @@
 .Ar host
 .Ek
 .Nm sftp
-.Oo Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
-.Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar file Oo
-.Ar file Oc Oc Oc
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar
 .Nm sftp
-.Oo Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
 .Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns
-.Oo Ar / Oc Oc Oc
+.Op Ar / Oc
 .Nm sftp
 .Fl b Ar batchfile
 .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host
@@ -442,7 +441,7 @@ to
 Display the
 .Nm
 protocol version.
-.It Ic \&! Ar command
+.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
 Execute
 .Ar command
 in local shell.

sftp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.103 2008/07/13 22:16:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.107 2009/02/02 11:15:14 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -207,36 +207,37 @@ cmd_interrupt(int signo)
 static void
 help(void)
 {
-	printf("Available commands:\n");
-	printf("cd path                       Change remote directory to 'path'\n");
-	printf("lcd path                      Change local directory to 'path'\n");
-	printf("chgrp grp path                Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n");
-	printf("chmod mode path               Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n");
-	printf("chown own path                Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n");
-	printf("df [path]                     Display statistics for current directory or\n");
-	printf("                              filesystem containing 'path'\n");
-	printf("help                          Display this help text\n");
-	printf("get remote-path [local-path]  Download file\n");
-	printf("lls [ls-options [path]]       Display local directory listing\n");
-	printf("ln oldpath newpath            Symlink remote file\n");
-	printf("lmkdir path                   Create local directory\n");
-	printf("lpwd                          Print local working directory\n");
-	printf("ls [path]                     Display remote directory listing\n");
-	printf("lumask umask                  Set local umask to 'umask'\n");
-	printf("mkdir path                    Create remote directory\n");
-	printf("progress                      Toggle display of progress meter\n");
-	printf("put local-path [remote-path]  Upload file\n");
-	printf("pwd                           Display remote working directory\n");
-	printf("exit                          Quit sftp\n");
-	printf("quit                          Quit sftp\n");
-	printf("rename oldpath newpath        Rename remote file\n");
-	printf("rmdir path                    Remove remote directory\n");
-	printf("rm path                       Delete remote file\n");
-	printf("symlink oldpath newpath       Symlink remote file\n");
-	printf("version                       Show SFTP version\n");
-	printf("!command                      Execute 'command' in local shell\n");
-	printf("!                             Escape to local shell\n");
-	printf("?                             Synonym for help\n");
+	printf("Available commands:\n"
+	    "bye                                Quit sftp\n"
+	    "cd path                            Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "chgrp grp path                     Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
+	    "chmod mode path                    Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
+	    "chown own path                     Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
+	    "df [-hi] [path]                    Display statistics for current directory or\n"
+	    "                                   filesystem containing 'path'\n"
+	    "exit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "get [-P] remote-path [local-path]  Download file\n"
+	    "help                               Display this help text\n"
+	    "lcd path                           Change local directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "lls [ls-options [path]]            Display local directory listing\n"
+	    "lmkdir path                        Create local directory\n"
+	    "ln oldpath newpath                 Symlink remote file\n"
+	    "lpwd                               Print local working directory\n"
+	    "ls [-1aflnrSt] [path]              Display remote directory listing\n"
+	    "lumask umask                       Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
+	    "mkdir path                         Create remote directory\n"
+	    "progress                           Toggle display of progress meter\n"
+	    "put [-P] local-path [remote-path]  Upload file\n"
+	    "pwd                                Display remote working directory\n"
+	    "quit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "rename oldpath newpath             Rename remote file\n"
+	    "rm path                            Delete remote file\n"
+	    "rmdir path                         Remove remote directory\n"
+	    "symlink oldpath newpath            Symlink remote file\n"
+	    "version                            Show SFTP version\n"
+	    "!command                           Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
+	    "!                                  Escape to local shell\n"
+	    "?                                  Synonym for help\n");
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1234,8 +1235,8 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
     int err_abort)
 {
 	char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
-	int pflag, lflag, iflag, hflag, cmdnum, i;
-	unsigned long n_arg;
+	int pflag = 0, lflag = 0, iflag = 0, hflag = 0, cmdnum, i;
+	unsigned long n_arg = 0;
 	Attrib a, *aa;
 	char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
 	int err = 0;
@@ -1386,17 +1387,19 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
 		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
 		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
 			if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
-				if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
 					break;
-				else
+				} else
 					continue;
 			}
 			if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
 				error("Can't get current ownership of "
 				    "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
-				if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
 					break;
-				else
+				} else
 					continue;
 			}
 			aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
@@ -1668,8 +1671,8 @@ usage(void)
 	    "usage: %s [-1Cv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-F ssh_config]\n"
 	    "            [-o ssh_option] [-P sftp_server_path] [-R num_requests]\n"
 	    "            [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n"
-	    "       %s [[user@]host[:file [file]]]\n"
-	    "       %s [[user@]host[:dir[/]]]\n"
+	    "       %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n"
+	    "       %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n"
 	    "       %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n", __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname);
 	exit(1);
 }

ssh-add.0

@@ -103,4 +103,4 @@ AUTHORS
      ated OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      June 12, 2007                               2
+OpenBSD 4.5                      June 12, 2007                               2

ssh-agent.0

@@ -114,4 +114,4 @@ AUTHORS
      ated OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      June 5, 2007                                2
+OpenBSD 4.5                      June 5, 2007                                2

ssh-keygen.0

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SYNOPSIS
      ssh-keygen -l [-f input_keyfile]
      ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
      ssh-keygen -D reader
-     ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]
      ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
      ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
      ssh-keygen -U reader [-f input_keyfile]
@@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      June 12, 2008                               5
+OpenBSD 4.5                      July 24, 2008                               5

ssh-keygen.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.78 2008/06/12 19:10:09 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.79 2008/07/24 23:55:30 sthen Exp $
 .\"
 .\"  -*- nroff -*-
 .\"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2008 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 24 2008 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
 .Nm ssh-keygen
 .Fl F Ar hostname
 .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Op Fl l
 .Nm ssh-keygen
 .Fl H
 .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file

ssh-keygen.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.171 2008/07/13 21:22:52 sthen Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.173 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
 			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
 			break;
 		default:
-			fprintf(stderr, "bad key type");
+			fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n");
 			exit(1);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 		 PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) :
 	    key_write(k, stdout);
 	if (!ok) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "key write failed");
+		fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	key_free(k);
@@ -1015,11 +1015,11 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 	}
 	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
 	if (f == NULL) {
-		printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
+		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	if (!key_write(public, f))
-		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed");
+		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
 	key_free(public);
 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
 	fclose(f);
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name);
 	private = key_generate(type, bits);
 	if (private == NULL) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed");
+		fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	public  = key_from_private(private);
@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ passphrase_again:
 	if (identity_comment) {
 		strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
 	} else {
-		/* Create default commend field for the passphrase. */
+		/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
 		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 	}
 
@@ -1456,11 +1456,11 @@ passphrase_again:
 	}
 	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
 	if (f == NULL) {
-		printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
+		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	if (!key_write(public, f))
-		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed");
+		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
 	fclose(f);
 

ssh-keyscan.0

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ NAME
 
 SYNOPSIS
      ssh-keyscan [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
-                 [host | addrlist namelist] [...]
+                 [host | addrlist namelist] ...
 
 DESCRIPTION
      ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a num-
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ FILES
      /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 
 EXAMPLES
-     Print the rsa1 host key for machine hostname:
+     Print the rsa host key for machine hostname:
 
      $ ssh-keyscan hostname
 
@@ -104,4 +104,4 @@ BUGS
      This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
      key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                     April 30, 2008                               2
+OpenBSD 4.5                    December 29, 2008                             2

ssh-keyscan.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.24 2008/04/30 10:14:03 djm Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.26 2008/12/29 01:12:36 stevesk Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
 .\"
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
 .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: April 30 2008 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 29 2008 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 .Op Fl T Ar timeout
 .Op Fl t Ar type
 .Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
-.Op Ar ...
+.Ar ...
 .Ek
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 .Nm
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ or
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 .Sh EXAMPLES
 Print the
-.Pa rsa1
+.Pa rsa
 host key for machine
 .Pa hostname :
 .Bd -literal

ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.76 2008/04/30 10:14:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.78 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
  *
@@ -713,8 +713,9 @@ fatal(const char *fmt,...)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
-	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist] [...]\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
+	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n",
 	    __progname);
 	exit(1);
 }
@@ -747,7 +748,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			break;
 		case 'p':
 			ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
-			if (ssh_port == 0) {
+			if (ssh_port <= 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
 				exit(1);
 			}

ssh-keysign.0

@@ -39,4 +39,4 @@ HISTORY
 AUTHORS
      Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      May 31, 2007                                1
+OpenBSD 4.5                      May 31, 2007                                1

ssh-rand-helper.0

@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ AUTHORS
 SEE ALSO
      ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                     April 14, 2002                               1
+OpenBSD 4.5                     April 14, 2002                               1

ssh.0

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
      ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
 
 SYNOPSIS
-     ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
+     ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
          [-D [bind_address:]port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]
          [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]
          [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
@@ -304,12 +304,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
              [bind_address/]host/port/hostport.
 
              By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
-             the loopback interface only.  This may be overriden by specifying
-             a bind_address.  An empty bind_address, or the address `*', indi-
-             cates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+             the loopback interface only.  This may be overridden by specify-
+             ing a bind_address.  An empty bind_address, or the address `*',
+             indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
              Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the serv-
              er's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).
 
+             If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+
      -S ctl_path
              Specifies the location of a control socket for connection shar-
              ing.  Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster
@@ -365,6 +368,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
      -Y      Enables trusted X11 forwarding.  Trusted X11 forwardings are not
              subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
 
+     -y      Send log information using the syslog(3) system module.  By de-
+             fault this information is sent to stderr.
+
      ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configura-
      tion file and a system-wide configuration file.  The file format and con-
      figuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
@@ -500,8 +506,8 @@ ESCAPE CHARACTERS
              version 2 and if the peer supports it).
 
      ~C      Open command line.  Currently this allows the addition of port
-             forwardings using the -L and -R options (see above).  It also al-
-             lows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings using
+             forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above).  It also
+             allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings using
              -KR[bind_address:]port.  !command allows the user to execute a
              local command if the PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in
              ssh_config(5).  Basic help is available, using the -h option.
@@ -864,4 +870,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      July 2, 2008                               14
+OpenBSD 4.5                    February 12, 2009                            14

ssh.1

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.277 2008/07/02 13:47:39 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 2 2008 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.282 2009/02/12 03:44:25 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 12 2009 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 .Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm ssh
-.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY
+.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
 .Op Fl b Ar bind_address
 .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
 .Oo Fl D\ \&
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ using an alternative syntax:
 .Pp
 By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback
 interface only.
-This may be overriden by specifying a
+This may be overridden by specifying a
 .Ar bind_address .
 An empty
 .Ar bind_address ,
@@ -563,6 +563,13 @@ will only succeed if the server's
 .Cm GatewayPorts
 option is enabled (see
 .Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
 .It Fl S Ar ctl_path
 Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing.
 Refer to the description of
@@ -658,6 +665,11 @@ Disables X11 forwarding.
 Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
 Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
 controls.
+.It Fl y
+Send log information using the
+.Xr syslog 3
+system module.
+By default this information is sent to stderr.
 .El
 .Pp
 .Nm
@@ -893,9 +905,10 @@ Send a BREAK to the remote system
 .It Cm ~C
 Open command line.
 Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
-.Fl L
-and
+.Fl L ,
 .Fl R
+and
+.Fl D
 options (see above).
 It also allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings
 using

ssh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.318 2008/07/02 13:47:39 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.324 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
 "           [-D [bind_address:]port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]\n"
 "           [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
 "           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void muxserver_listen(void);
 int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
-	int i, opt, exit_status;
+	int i, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
 	char *p, *cp, *line, buf[256];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
@@ -269,10 +269,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
 	host = NULL;
+	use_syslog = 0;
 
  again:
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
-	    "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XY")) != -1) {
+	    "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XYy")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '1':
 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
@@ -299,6 +300,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		case 'X':
 			options.forward_x11 = 1;
 			break;
+		case 'y':
+			use_syslog = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'Y':
 			options.forward_x11 = 1;
 			options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
@@ -439,7 +443,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 		case 'p':
 			options.port = a2port(optarg);
-			if (options.port == 0) {
+			if (options.port <= 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
 				exit(255);
 			}
@@ -449,7 +453,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 
 		case 'L':
-			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg))
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
 				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
 			else {
 				fprintf(stderr,
@@ -460,7 +464,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 
 		case 'R':
-			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg)) {
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) {
 				add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
 			} else {
 				fprintf(stderr,
@@ -471,30 +475,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 
 		case 'D':
-			cp = p = xstrdup(optarg);
-			memset(&fwd, '\0', sizeof(fwd));
-			fwd.connect_host = "socks";
-			if ((fwd.listen_host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) {
-				fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding "
-				    "specification '%.100s'\n", optarg);
-				exit(255);
-			}
-			if (cp != NULL) {
-				fwd.listen_port = a2port(cp);
-				fwd.listen_host =
-				    cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
 			} else {
-				fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
-				fwd.listen_host = NULL;
-			}
-
-			if (fwd.listen_port == 0) {
-				fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic port '%s'\n",
-				    optarg);
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
 				exit(255);
 			}
-			add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
-			xfree(p);
 			break;
 
 		case 'C':
@@ -614,7 +602,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 */
 	log_init(av[0],
 	    options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
-	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
 
 	/*
 	 * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
@@ -640,7 +628,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
 
 	/* reinit */
-	log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+	log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
 
 	seed_rng();
 
@@ -849,9 +837,16 @@ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Forward *rfwd = (Forward *)ctxt;
 
+	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
 	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
 	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
 	    rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+		logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+			packet_get_int(),
+			rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	}
+	
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
 		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
 			fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for "
@@ -1200,7 +1195,8 @@ ssh_session2(void)
 		id = ssh_session2_open();
 
 	/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
-	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
+	    (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
 		debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
 		packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com");

ssh2.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.10 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.11 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ		60
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST			60
 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE			61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1		61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2		62
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2		63
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM		64
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM		65
 
 /* connection protocol: generic */
 
@@ -159,3 +165,4 @@
 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE			4
 
 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR			1
+

ssh_config

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.23 2007/06/08 04:40:40 pvalchev Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.25 2009/02/17 01:28:32 djm Exp $
 
 # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
 # ssh_config(5) for more information.  This file provides defaults for
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@
 #   Port 22
 #   Protocol 2,1
 #   Cipher 3des
-#   Ciphers aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
+#   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
 #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
 #   EscapeChar ~
 #   Tunnel no
 #   TunnelDevice any:any
 #   PermitLocalCommand no
+#   VisualHostKey no

ssh_config.0

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
      Host    Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host key-
              word) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
              given after the keyword.  If more than one pattern is provided,
-             they should be separated by whitepsace.  A single `*' as a pat-
+             they should be separated by whitespace.  A single `*' as a pat-
              tern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts.  The
              host is the hostname argument given on the command line (i.e. the
              name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before match-
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
              ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'',
              and ``cast128-cbc''.  The default is:
 
-                aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-                arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-                aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+                aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+                aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
+                aes256-cbc,arcfour
 
      ClearAllForwardings
              Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
@@ -463,8 +463,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
              specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or by using
              an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port and host/hostport.
              Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings
-             can be given on the command line.  Only the superuser can forward
-             privileged ports.
+             can be given on the command line.  Privileged ports can be for-
+             warded only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
+
+             If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
 
              If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
              to loopback addresses.  If the bind_address is `*' or an empty
@@ -609,9 +612,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
 
      VisualHostKey
              If this flag is set to ``yes'', an ASCII art representation of
-             the remote host key fingerprint is printed additionally to the
-             hex fingerprint string.  If this flag is set to ``no'', only the
-             hex fingerprint string will be printed.  The default is ``no''.
+             the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the hex
+             fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys.  If this
+             flag is set to ``no'', no fingerprint strings are printed at lo-
+             gin and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for un-
+             known host keys.  The default is ``no''.
 
      XAuthLocation
              Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program.  The default
@@ -662,4 +667,4 @@ AUTHORS
      ated OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      June 26, 2008                              11
+OpenBSD 4.5                    February 22, 2009                            11

ssh_config.5

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.111 2008/06/26 11:46:31 grunk Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 26 2008 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.119 2009/02/22 23:50:57 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 22 2009 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
 .Cm Host
 keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
 given after the keyword.
-If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitepsace.
+If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
 A single
 .Ql *
 as a pattern can be used to provide global
@@ -204,9 +204,9 @@ and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
+aes256-cbc,arcfour
 .Ed
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
 Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
@@ -811,7 +811,15 @@ and
 .Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
 Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
 forwardings can be given on the command line.
-Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
 .Pp
 If the
 .Ar bind_address
@@ -1064,10 +1072,12 @@ in
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
 an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
-printed additionally to the hex fingerprint string.
+printed in addition to the hex fingerprint string at login and
+for unknown host keys.
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq no ,
-only the hex fingerprint string will be printed.
+no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
+only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm XAuthLocation

sshconnect.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.211 2008/07/01 07:24:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.212 2008/10/14 18:11:33 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -70,10 +70,6 @@ extern uid_t original_real_uid;
 extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
 extern pid_t proxy_command_pid;
 
-#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN		/* for non IPv6 machines */
-#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
-#endif
-
 static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
 static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
 
@@ -741,8 +737,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
 		    port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
 			debug("checking without port identifier");
-			if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, 2,
-			    user_hostfile, system_hostfile) == 0) {
+			if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
+			    ROQUIET, user_hostfile, system_hostfile) == 0) {
 				debug("found matching key w/out port");
 				break;
 			}

sshconnect2.c

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.166 2008/07/17 08:48:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.170 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -201,6 +203,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 struct Authmethod {
 	char	*name;		/* string to compare against server's list */
 	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+	void	(*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
 	int	*enabled;	/* flag in option struct that enables method */
 	int	*batch_flag;	/* flag in option struct that disables method */
 };
@@ -212,13 +215,18 @@ void	input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 int	userauth_none(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
-int	userauth_kerberos(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_jpake(Authctxt *);
+
+void	userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *);
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 int	userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
@@ -244,30 +252,43 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
 		userauth_gssapi,
+		NULL,
 		&options.gss_authentication,
 		NULL},
 #endif
 	{"hostbased",
 		userauth_hostbased,
+		NULL,
 		&options.hostbased_authentication,
 		NULL},
 	{"publickey",
 		userauth_pubkey,
+		NULL,
 		&options.pubkey_authentication,
 		NULL},
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{"jpake-01@openssh.com",
+		userauth_jpake,
+		userauth_jpake_cleanup,
+		&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+#endif
 	{"keyboard-interactive",
 		userauth_kbdint,
+		NULL,
 		&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
 		&options.batch_mode},
 	{"password",
 		userauth_passwd,
+		NULL,
 		&options.password_authentication,
 		&options.batch_mode},
 	{"none",
 		userauth_none,
 		NULL,
+		NULL,
 		NULL},
-	{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+	{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
 };
 
 void
@@ -335,6 +356,9 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 void
 userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
 {
+	if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+		authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+
 	if (authctxt->methoddata) {
 		xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
 		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
@@ -367,6 +391,7 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -374,6 +399,7 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    "type %d", type);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -383,12 +409,11 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
 	raw = packet_get_string(&len);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	if (options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+	if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
 		if (len > 65536)
 			len = 65536;
 		msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
-		strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
-		msg[len*4] = '\0';
+		strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
 		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
 		xfree(msg);
 	}
@@ -396,6 +421,7 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	xfree(lang);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -413,6 +439,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -433,6 +460,8 @@ input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	userauth(authctxt, authlist);
 }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -615,6 +644,7 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
 	return status;
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -654,6 +684,7 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -681,6 +712,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -710,6 +742,7 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -774,9 +807,11 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	return 1;
 }
+
 /*
  * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
  */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -841,6 +876,209 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
 }
 
+#ifdef JPAKE
+static char *
+pw_encrypt(const char *password, const char *crypt_scheme, const char *salt)
+{
+	/* OpenBSD crypt(3) handles all of these */
+	if (strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "bcrypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "md5crypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt-extended") == 0)
+		return xstrdup(crypt(password, salt));
+	error("%s: unsupported password encryption scheme \"%.100s\"",
+	    __func__, crypt_scheme);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *
+jpake_password_to_secret(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *crypt_scheme,
+    const char *salt)
+{
+	char prompt[256], *password, *crypted;
+	u_char *secret;
+	u_int secret_len;
+	BIGNUM *ret;
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password (JPAKE): ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+
+	if ((crypted = pw_encrypt(password, crypt_scheme, salt)) == NULL) {
+		logit("Disabling %s authentication", authctxt->method->name);
+		authctxt->method->enabled = NULL;
+		/* Continue with an empty password to fail gracefully */
+		crypted = xstrdup("");
+	}
+
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: salt = %s", __func__, salt);
+	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, crypt_scheme);
+	debug3("%s: crypted = %s", __func__, crypted);
+#endif
+
+	if (hash_buffer(crypted, strlen(crypted), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+
+	bzero(password, strlen(password));
+	bzero(crypted, strlen(crypted));
+	xfree(password);
+	xfree(crypted);
+
+	if ((ret = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
+	bzero(secret, secret_len);
+	xfree(secret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof, *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len, x2_s_proof_len;
+	char *crypt_scheme, *salt;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->g_x3 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x4 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 1 values */
+	crypt_scheme = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	salt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	pctx->server_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->server_id_len);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
+	x3_proof = packet_get_string(&x3_proof_len);
+	x4_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Obtain password and derive secret */
+	pctx->s = jpake_password_to_secret(authctxt, crypt_scheme, salt);
+	bzero(crypt_scheme, strlen(crypt_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(crypt_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((pctx->s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Calculate step 2 values */
+	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x1,
+	    pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    x3_proof, x3_proof_len,
+	    x4_proof, x4_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->a,
+	    &x2_s_proof, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send values for step 2 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->a);
+	packet_put_string(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x2_s_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step2);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+	u_char *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->b = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 2 values */
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->b);
+	x4_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_s_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
+	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->b,
+	    pctx->x2, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send key confirmation proof */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM, NULL);
+
+	pctx->h_k_sid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
+	if (jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len) == 1)
+		debug("%s: %s success", __func__, authctxt->method->name);
+	else {
+		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
+		/* XXX stash this so if auth succeeds then we can warn/kill */
+	}
+
+	userauth_jpake_cleanup(authctxt);
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
 static int
 identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
@@ -1415,6 +1653,76 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len;
+	static int attempt = 0; /* XXX share with userauth_password's? */
+
+	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+	if (attempt != 1)
+		error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt->methoddata already set (%p)",
+		    __func__, authctxt->methoddata);
+
+	authctxt->methoddata = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+	/*
+	 * Send request immediately, to get the protocol going while
+	 * we do the initial computations.
+	 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->client_id, &pctx->client_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x1, &pctx->x2, &pctx->g_x1, &pctx->g_x2,
+	    &x1_proof, &x1_proof_len,
+	    &x2_proof, &x2_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
+	packet_put_string(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	packet_put_string(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step1);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	debug3("%s: clean up", __func__);
+	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL) {
+		jpake_free(authctxt->methoddata);
+		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
 /* find auth method */
 
 /*
@@ -1516,3 +1824,4 @@ authmethods_get(void)
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	return list;
 }
+

sshd.0

@@ -458,8 +458,7 @@ FILES
              are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
              replaced by unauthorized users.  In this case, sshd will not al-
              low it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
-             ``no''.  The recommended permissions can be set by executing
-             ``chmod go-w ~/ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys''.
+             ``no''.
 
      ~/.ssh/environment
              This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
@@ -572,4 +571,4 @@ CAVEATS
      System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are dis-
      abled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).
 
-OpenBSD 4.4                      July 2, 2008                                9
+OpenBSD 4.5                     October 3, 2008                              9

sshd.8

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.246 2008/07/02 02:24:18 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 2 2008 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.247 2008/10/03 13:08:12 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 3 2008 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -741,8 +741,6 @@ will not allow it to be used unless the
 .Cm StrictModes
 option has been set to
 .Dq no .
-The recommended permissions can be set by executing
-.Dq chmod go-w ~/ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
 .Pp
 .It ~/.ssh/environment
 This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).

sshd.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.364 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.366 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "version.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
@@ -1334,7 +1333,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				exit(1);
 			}
 			options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
-			if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
+			if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
 				exit(1);
 			}