From 56e9d8e38e7eed84901acddca24170eb352d2ed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Macklem Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 20:31:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: Fix NFSv4.1/4.2 Secinfo_no_name when security flavors empty Commit 947bd2479ba9 added support for the Secinfo_no_name operation. When a non-exported file system is being traversed, the list of security flavors is empty. It turns out that the Linux client mount attempt fails when the security flavors list in the Secinfo_no_name reply is empty. This patch modifies Secinfo/Secinfo_no_name so that it replies with all four security flavors when the list is empty. This fixes Linux NFSv4.1/4.2 mounts when the file system at the NFSv4 root (as specified on a V4: exports(5) line) is not exported. MFC after: 2 weeks --- sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c b/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c index f4d6dbe42a2..d7049ba1fed 100644 --- a/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c +++ b/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c @@ -3709,6 +3709,31 @@ nfsrvd_secinfo(struct nfsrv_descript *nd, int isdgram, */ len = 0; NFSM_BUILD(sizp, u_int32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED); + + /* If nes_numsecflavor == 0, all are allowed. */ + if (retnes.nes_numsecflavor == 0) { + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_UNIX); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCNONE); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCINTEGRITY); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCPRIVACY); + len = 4; + } for (i = 0; i < retnes.nes_numsecflavor; i++) { if (retnes.nes_secflavors[i] == AUTH_SYS) { NFSM_BUILD(tl, u_int32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED); @@ -3819,6 +3844,31 @@ nfsrvd_secinfononame(struct nfsrv_descript *nd, int isdgram, */ len = 0; NFSM_BUILD(sizp, uint32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED); + + /* If nes_numsecflavor == 0, all are allowed. */ + if (retnes.nes_numsecflavor == 0) { + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_UNIX); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCNONE); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 3 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCINTEGRITY); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTH_GSS); + nfsm_strtom(nd, nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].str, + nfsgss_mechlist[KERBV_MECH].len); + NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, 2 * NFSX_UNSIGNED); + *tl++ = txdr_unsigned(GSS_KERBV_QOP); + *tl = txdr_unsigned(RPCAUTHGSS_SVCPRIVACY); + len = 4; + } for (i = 0; i < retnes.nes_numsecflavor; i++) { if (retnes.nes_secflavors[i] == AUTH_SYS) { NFSM_BUILD(tl, uint32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED);