From 564f8f0fee165503b0b366ccdcc2bd933080a39b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robert Watson Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2008 21:53:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a new file, mac_cred.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project --- sys/conf/files | 1 + sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ sys/security/mac/mac_process.c | 141 ---------------------- 3 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-) create mode 100644 sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c diff --git a/sys/conf/files b/sys/conf/files index 1af545a15df..a80db3047b7 100644 --- a/sys/conf/files +++ b/sys/conf/files @@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ security/audit/audit_trigger.c optional audit security/audit/audit_worker.c optional audit security/mac/mac_atalk.c optional mac netatalk security/mac/mac_audit.c optional mac audit +security/mac/mac_cred.c optional mac security/mac/mac_framework.c optional mac security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet security/mac/mac_inet6.c optional mac inet6 diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4d46f9a6696 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra + * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the + * TrustedBSD Project. + * + * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network + * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network + * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), + * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. + * + * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract + * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include "opt_mac.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +struct label * +mac_cred_label_alloc(void) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); + MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label); + return (label); +} + +void +mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED) + cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); + else + cred->cr_label = NULL; +} + +void +mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label); + mac_labelzone_free(label); +} + +void +mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + if (cred->cr_label != NULL) { + mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); + cred->cr_label = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be + * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system + * operations originate from the network. + * + * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS + * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to + * provide more fine-grained access control. + */ +void +mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred); +} + +/* + * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel + * processes and threads are spawned. + */ +void +mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred); +} + +/* + * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other + * userland processes and threads are spawned. + */ +void +mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred); +} + +int +mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, + * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. + * This function allows that processing to take place. + */ +void +mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); +} + +/* + * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege + * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified + * buffer cache. + */ +void +mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); +} + +int +mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) +{ + int error; + + MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) +{ + int error; + + MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2); + + return (error); +} diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c index bb29aaabb8e..dba4769d438 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c @@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW, static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); -struct label * -mac_cred_label_alloc(void) -{ - struct label *label; - - label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); - MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label); - return (label); -} - -void -mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED) - cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); - else - cred->cr_label = NULL; -} - static struct label * mac_proc_label_alloc(void) { @@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p) p->p_label = NULL; } -void -mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label); - mac_labelzone_free(label); -} - -void -mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - if (cred->cr_label != NULL) { - mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); - cred->cr_label = NULL; - } -} - static void mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label) { @@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p) } } -/* - * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be - * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system - * operations originate from the network. - * - * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS - * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to - * provide more fine-grained access control. - */ -void -mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred); -} - -/* - * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel - * processes and threads are spawned. - */ -void -mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred); -} - -/* - * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other - * userland processes and threads are spawned. - */ -void -mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred); -} - -int -mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements, - char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) -{ - int error; - - MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string) -{ - int error; - - MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); - - return (error); -} - void mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) { @@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); } -/* - * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, - * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. - * This function allows that processing to take place. - */ -void -mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); -} - int mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p) { @@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, vm_map_unlock_read(map); } -/* - * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege - * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified - * buffer cache. - */ -void -mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); -} - -int -mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) -{ - int error; - - MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) -{ - int error; - - MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2); - - return (error); -} - int mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) {