Fix vt console memory disclosure. [SA-18:04.vt]

Bump newvers.sh and UPDATING for today's patches.

Submitted by:	emaste
Reported by:	Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect
Approved by:	so
Security:	CVE-2018-6917
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-18:04.vt
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation

(cherry picked from commit ec50e7cb61)
This commit is contained in:
gordon 2018-04-04 05:33:56 +00:00 committed by Franco Fichtner
parent 7f3d1cf1a3
commit 3412de73f3
3 changed files with 17 additions and 2 deletions

View file

@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITHOUT_CLANG and WITH_GCC to bootstrap to
the tip of head, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process
from older version of current across the gcc/clang cutover is a bit fragile.
20180404 p9 FreeBSD-SA-18:04.vt
FreeBSD-SA-18:05.ipsec
FreeBSD-EN-18:03.tzdata
FreeBSD-EN-18:04.mem
Fix vt console memory disclosure. [SA-18:04.vt]
Fix ipsec crash or denial of service. [SA-18:05.ipsec]
Update timezone database information. [EN-18:03.tzdata]
Fix multiple small kernel memory disclosures. [EN-18:04.mem]
20180314 p8 FreeBSD-SA-18:03.speculative_execution
Add mitigations for two classes of speculative execution vulnerabilities

View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
TYPE="FreeBSD"
REVISION="11.1"
BRANCH="RELEASE-p8"
BRANCH="RELEASE-p9"
if [ -n "${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" ]; then
BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
fi

View file

@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_VTFONT, "vtfont", "vt font");
/* Some limits to prevent abnormal fonts from being loaded. */
#define VTFONT_MAXMAPPINGS 65536
#define VTFONT_MAXGLYPHS 131072
#define VTFONT_MAXGLYPHSIZE 2097152
#define VTFONT_MAXDIMENSION 128
@ -171,7 +172,8 @@ vtfont_load(vfnt_t *f, struct vt_font **ret)
/* Make sure the dimensions are valid. */
if (f->width < 1 || f->height < 1)
return (EINVAL);
if (f->width > VTFONT_MAXDIMENSION || f->height > VTFONT_MAXDIMENSION)
if (f->width > VTFONT_MAXDIMENSION || f->height > VTFONT_MAXDIMENSION ||
f->glyph_count > VTFONT_MAXGLYPHS)
return (E2BIG);
/* Not too many mappings. */