2005-01-05 15:17:21 -05:00
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/*-
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1997-04-26 07:46:25 -04:00
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
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* <phk@FreeBSD.org> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
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* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
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* this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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1999-08-27 21:08:13 -04:00
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* $FreeBSD$
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1997-04-26 07:46:25 -04:00
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*
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*/
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#ifndef _MACHINE_SMP_H_
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#define _MACHINE_SMP_H_
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2003-11-17 03:58:16 -05:00
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#ifdef _KERNEL
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#ifdef SMP
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#ifndef LOCORE
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2015-12-07 12:41:20 -05:00
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#include <x86/x86_smp.h>
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2003-11-17 03:58:16 -05:00
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/* global symbols in mpboot.S */
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extern char mptramp_start[];
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extern u_int32_t mptramp_pagetables;
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/* IPI handlers */
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inthand_t
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 06:44:21 -05:00
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IDTVEC(justreturn), /* interrupt CPU with minimum overhead */
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IDTVEC(justreturn1_pti),
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amd64: allow parallel shootdown IPIs
Stop using smp_ipi_mtx to protect global shootdown state, and
move/multiply the global state into pcpu. Now each CPU can initiate
shootdown IPI independently from other CPUs. Initiator enters
critical section, then fills its local PCPU shootdown info
(pc_smp_tlb_XXX), then clears scoreboard generation at location (cpu,
my_cpuid) for each target cpu. After that IPI is sent to all targets
which scan for zeroed scoreboard generation words. Upon finding such
word the shootdown data is read from corresponding cpu' pcpu, and
generation is set. Meantime initiator loops waiting for all zeroed
generations in scoreboard to update.
Initiator does not disable interrupts, which should allow
non-invalidation IPIs from deadlocking, it only needs to disable
preemption to pin itself to the instance of the pcpu smp_tlb data.
The generation is set before the actual invalidation is performed in
handler. It is safe because target CPU cannot return to userspace
before handler finishes. In principle only NMI can preempt the
handler, but NMI would see the kernel handler frame and not touch
not-invalidated user page table.
Handlers loop until they do not see zeroed scoreboard generations.
This, together with hardware keeping one pending IPI in LAPIC IRR
should prevent lost shootdowns.
Notes.
1. The code does protect writes to LAPIC ICR with exclusion. I believe
this is fine because we in fact do not send IPIs from interrupt
handlers. More for !x2APIC mode where ICR access for write requires
two registers write, we disable interrupts around it. If considered
incorrect, I can add per-cpu spinlock around ipi_send().
2. Scoreboard lines owned by given target CPU can be padded to the
cache line, to reduce ping-pong.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25510
2020-07-14 16:37:50 -04:00
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IDTVEC(invlop_pti),
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IDTVEC(invlop),
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 06:44:21 -05:00
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IDTVEC(ipi_intr_bitmap_handler_pti),
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2020-07-25 11:19:38 -04:00
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IDTVEC(ipi_swi_pti),
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 06:44:21 -05:00
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IDTVEC(cpustop_pti),
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IDTVEC(cpususpend_pti),
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IDTVEC(rendezvous_pti);
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2003-11-17 03:58:16 -05:00
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amd64: allow parallel shootdown IPIs
Stop using smp_ipi_mtx to protect global shootdown state, and
move/multiply the global state into pcpu. Now each CPU can initiate
shootdown IPI independently from other CPUs. Initiator enters
critical section, then fills its local PCPU shootdown info
(pc_smp_tlb_XXX), then clears scoreboard generation at location (cpu,
my_cpuid) for each target cpu. After that IPI is sent to all targets
which scan for zeroed scoreboard generation words. Upon finding such
word the shootdown data is read from corresponding cpu' pcpu, and
generation is set. Meantime initiator loops waiting for all zeroed
generations in scoreboard to update.
Initiator does not disable interrupts, which should allow
non-invalidation IPIs from deadlocking, it only needs to disable
preemption to pin itself to the instance of the pcpu smp_tlb data.
The generation is set before the actual invalidation is performed in
handler. It is safe because target CPU cannot return to userspace
before handler finishes. In principle only NMI can preempt the
handler, but NMI would see the kernel handler frame and not touch
not-invalidated user page table.
Handlers loop until they do not see zeroed scoreboard generations.
This, together with hardware keeping one pending IPI in LAPIC IRR
should prevent lost shootdowns.
Notes.
1. The code does protect writes to LAPIC ICR with exclusion. I believe
this is fine because we in fact do not send IPIs from interrupt
handlers. More for !x2APIC mode where ICR access for write requires
two registers write, we disable interrupts around it. If considered
incorrect, I can add per-cpu spinlock around ipi_send().
2. Scoreboard lines owned by given target CPU can be padded to the
cache line, to reduce ping-pong.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25510
2020-07-14 16:37:50 -04:00
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void invlop_handler(void);
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2021-05-12 06:17:53 -04:00
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int start_all_aps(void);
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2003-11-17 03:58:16 -05:00
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#endif /* !LOCORE */
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#endif /* SMP */
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#endif /* _KERNEL */
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1997-04-26 07:46:25 -04:00
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#endif /* _MACHINE_SMP_H_ */
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