2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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/*-
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2023-05-10 11:40:58 -04:00
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2019 Bjoern A. Zeeb
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inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
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* Copyright (c) 2024 Stormshield
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
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#include <sys/param.h>
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
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2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
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#include <errno.h>
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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#include <poll.h>
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inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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#include <atf-c.h>
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ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet);
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ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet, tc)
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{
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int sd;
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sd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
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ATF_CHECK(sd >= 0);
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close(sd);
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}
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ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet_bind_zero);
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ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_bind_zero, tc)
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{
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int sd, rc;
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struct sockaddr_in sin;
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2020-04-20 10:24:13 -04:00
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if (atf_tc_get_config_var_as_bool_wd(tc, "ci", false))
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atf_tc_skip("doesn't work when mac_portacl(4) loaded (https://bugs.freebsd.org/238781)");
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2019-06-23 15:37:12 -04:00
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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sd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
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ATF_CHECK(sd >= 0);
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bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
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/*
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* For AF_INET we do not check the family in in_pcbbind_setup(9),
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* sa_len gets set from the syscall argument in getsockaddr(9),
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* so we bind to 0:0.
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*/
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rc = bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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close(sd);
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}
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ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet_bind_ok);
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ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_bind_ok, tc)
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{
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int sd, rc;
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struct sockaddr_in sin;
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sd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
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ATF_CHECK(sd >= 0);
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bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
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sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
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sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
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2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
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sin.sin_port = htons(0);
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2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
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sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
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rc = bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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close(sd);
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}
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet_poll_no_rdhup);
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ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_poll_no_rdhup, tc)
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{
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int ss, ss2, cs, rc;
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struct sockaddr_in sin;
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2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
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socklen_t slen;
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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struct pollfd pfd;
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int one = 1;
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/* Verify that we don't expose POLLRDHUP if not requested. */
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/* Server setup. */
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ss = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
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ATF_CHECK(ss >= 0);
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rc = setsockopt(ss, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &one, sizeof(one));
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
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sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
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sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
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2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
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sin.sin_port = htons(0);
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
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rc = bind(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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rc = listen(ss, 1);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
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slen = sizeof(sin);
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rc = getsockname(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, &slen);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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/* Client connects, server accepts. */
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cs = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
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ATF_CHECK(cs >= 0);
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rc = connect(cs, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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ss2 = accept(ss, NULL, NULL);
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ATF_CHECK(ss2 >= 0);
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/* Server can write, sees only POLLOUT. */
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pfd.fd = ss2;
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pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
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rc = poll(&pfd, 1, 0);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(POLLOUT, pfd.revents);
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/* Client closes socket! */
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rc = close(cs);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
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/*
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* Server now sees POLLIN, but not POLLRDHUP because we didn't ask.
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* Need non-zero timeout to wait for the FIN to arrive and trigger the
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* socket to become readable.
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*/
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pfd.fd = ss2;
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pfd.events = POLLIN;
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rc = poll(&pfd, 1, 60000);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
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ATF_CHECK_EQ(POLLIN, pfd.revents);
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close(ss2);
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close(ss);
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}
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ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet_poll_rdhup);
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ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_poll_rdhup, tc)
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{
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int ss, ss2, cs, rc;
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struct sockaddr_in sin;
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2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
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socklen_t slen;
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2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
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struct pollfd pfd;
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char buffer;
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int one = 1;
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/* Verify that server sees POLLRDHUP if it asks for it. */
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/* Server setup. */
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|
|
ss = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK(ss >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = setsockopt(ss, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &one, sizeof(one));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(0);
|
2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = bind(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = listen(ss, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
|
|
|
slen = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = getsockname(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, &slen);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Client connects, server accepts. */
|
|
|
|
|
cs = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK(cs >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = connect(cs, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
ss2 = accept(ss, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK(ss2 >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Server can write, so sees POLLOUT. */
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.fd = ss2;
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT | POLLRDHUP;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = poll(&pfd, 1, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(POLLOUT, pfd.revents);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Client writes two bytes, server reads only one of them. */
|
|
|
|
|
rc = write(cs, "xx", 2);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(2, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = read(ss2, &buffer, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Server can read, so sees POLLIN. */
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.fd = ss2;
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT | POLLRDHUP;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = poll(&pfd, 1, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(POLLIN | POLLOUT, pfd.revents);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Client closes socket! */
|
|
|
|
|
rc = close(cs);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Server sees Linux-style POLLRDHUP. Note that this is the case even
|
|
|
|
|
* though one byte of data remains unread.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This races against the delivery of FIN caused by the close() above.
|
|
|
|
|
* Sometimes (more likely when run under truss or if another system
|
|
|
|
|
* call is added in between) it hits the path where sopoll_generic()
|
|
|
|
|
* immediately sees SBS_CANTRCVMORE, and sometimes it sleeps with flag
|
|
|
|
|
* SB_SEL so that it's woken up almost immediately and runs again,
|
|
|
|
|
* which is why we need a non-zero timeout here.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.fd = ss2;
|
|
|
|
|
pfd.events = POLLRDHUP;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = poll(&pfd, 1, 60000);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(1, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(POLLRDHUP, pfd.revents);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
close(ss2);
|
|
|
|
|
close(ss);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
ATF_TC_WITHOUT_HEAD(socket_afinet_stream_reconnect);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_stream_reconnect, tc)
|
2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
|
|
|
socklen_t slen;
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
int ss, cs, rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Make sure that an attempt to connect(2) a connected or disconnected
|
|
|
|
|
* stream socket fails with EISCONN.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Server setup. */
|
|
|
|
|
ss = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK(ss >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(0);
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = bind(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = listen(ss, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
2023-07-04 15:11:24 -04:00
|
|
|
slen = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = getsockname(ss, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, &slen);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Client connects, shuts down. */
|
|
|
|
|
cs = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK(cs >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = connect(cs, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = shutdown(cs, SHUT_RDWR);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A subsequent connect(2) fails with EISCONN. */
|
|
|
|
|
rc = connect(cs, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(-1, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(errno, EISCONN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = close(cs);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = close(ss);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Make sure that unprivileged users can't set the IP_BINDANY or IPV6_BINDANY
|
|
|
|
|
* socket options.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC(socket_afinet_bindany);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_HEAD(socket_afinet_bindany, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "unprivileged");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_bindany, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
|
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) ==
|
|
|
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
|
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) ==
|
|
|
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
|
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) ==
|
|
|
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM,
|
|
|
|
|
setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) ==
|
|
|
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Bind a socket to the specified address, optionally dropping privileges and
|
|
|
|
|
* setting one of the SO_REUSE* options first.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Returns true if the bind succeeded, and false if it failed with EADDRINUSE.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
2024-12-23 10:31:11 -05:00
|
|
|
child_bind(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt,
|
|
|
|
|
bool unpriv)
|
inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const char *user;
|
|
|
|
|
pid_t child;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unpriv) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!atf_tc_has_config_var(tc, "unprivileged_user"))
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_skip("unprivileged_user not set");
|
|
|
|
|
user = atf_tc_get_config_var(tc, "unprivileged_user");
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
user = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
child = fork();
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(child != -1);
|
|
|
|
|
if (child == 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
int s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (user != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct passwd *passwd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
passwd = getpwnam(user);
|
|
|
|
|
if (seteuid(passwd->pw_uid) != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(1);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(sa->sa_family, type, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
if (s < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(2);
|
|
|
|
|
if (bind(s, sa, sa->sa_len) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(3);
|
|
|
|
|
if (errno != EADDRINUSE)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(4);
|
|
|
|
|
if (opt != 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, opt, &(int){1},
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(int)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(5);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (bind(s, sa, sa->sa_len) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(6);
|
|
|
|
|
if (errno != EADDRINUSE)
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(7);
|
|
|
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_EQ(waitpid(child, &status, 0), child);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(WIFEXITED(status));
|
|
|
|
|
status = WEXITSTATUS(status);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(status == 0 || status == 6,
|
|
|
|
|
"child exited with %d", status);
|
|
|
|
|
return (status == 6);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
|
child_bind_priv(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return (child_bind(tc, type, sa, opt, false));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
|
child_bind_unpriv(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return (child_bind(tc, type, sa, opt, true));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
bind_socket(int domain, int type, int opt, bool unspec, struct sockaddr *sa)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
socklen_t slen;
|
|
|
|
|
int s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = socket(domain, type, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (domain == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(unspec ?
|
|
|
|
|
INADDR_ANY : INADDR_LOOPBACK);
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
slen = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
|
} else /* if (domain == AF_INET6) */ {
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6));
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6);
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_addr = unspec ? in6addr_any : in6addr_loopback;
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_port = htons(0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
slen = sizeof(sin6);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (opt != 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, opt, &(int){1},
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(int)) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(getsockname(s, sa, &slen) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (s);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
multibind_test(const atf_tc_t *tc, int domain, int type)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
|
|
|
|
|
int opts[4] = { 0, SO_REUSEADDR, SO_REUSEPORT, SO_REUSEPORT_LB };
|
|
|
|
|
int s;
|
|
|
|
|
bool flags[2] = { false, true };
|
|
|
|
|
bool res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t flagi = 0; flagi < nitems(flags); flagi++) {
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t opti = 0; opti < nitems(opts); opti++) {
|
|
|
|
|
s = bind_socket(domain, type, opts[opti], flags[flagi],
|
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ss);
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t optj = 0; optj < nitems(opts); optj++) {
|
|
|
|
|
int opt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
opt = opts[optj];
|
|
|
|
|
res = child_bind_priv(tc, type,
|
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ss, opt);
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Multi-binding is only allowed when both
|
|
|
|
|
* sockets have SO_REUSEPORT or SO_REUSEPORT_LB
|
|
|
|
|
* set.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (opts[opti] != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
|
opts[opti] != SO_REUSEADDR && opti == optj)
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(res);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(!res);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = child_bind_unpriv(tc, type,
|
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ss, opt);
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Multi-binding is only allowed when both
|
|
|
|
|
* sockets have the same owner.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2024-12-23 10:31:11 -05:00
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(!res);
|
inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Try to bind two sockets to the same address/port tuple. Under some
|
|
|
|
|
* conditions this is permitted.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC(socket_afinet_multibind);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_HEAD(socket_afinet_multibind, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.config", "unprivileged_user");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_multibind, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
multibind_test(tc, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM);
|
|
|
|
|
multibind_test(tc, AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM);
|
|
|
|
|
multibind_test(tc, AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM);
|
|
|
|
|
multibind_test(tc, AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-12-23 10:31:11 -05:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
bind_connected_port_test(const atf_tc_t *tc, int domain)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sinp;
|
|
|
|
|
int error, sd[3], tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
bool res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Create a connected socket pair.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
sd[0] = socket(domain, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sd[0] >= 0, "socket failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
sd[1] = socket(domain, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(sd[1] >= 0, "socket failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
if (domain == PF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
|
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = htons(0);
|
|
|
|
|
sinp = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(domain == PF_INET6);
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&sin6, 0, sizeof(sin6));
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6);
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
|
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_port = htons(0);
|
|
|
|
|
sinp = (struct sockaddr *)&sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = bind(sd[0], sinp, sinp->sa_len);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == 0, "bind failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
error = listen(sd[0], 1);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == 0, "listen failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = getsockname(sd[0], sinp, &(socklen_t){ sinp->sa_len });
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == 0, "getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = connect(sd[1], sinp, sinp->sa_len);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(error == 0, "connect failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = accept(sd[0], NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(tmp >= 0, "accept failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(close(sd[0]) == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
sd[0] = tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* bind() should succeed even from an unprivileged user. */
|
|
|
|
|
res = child_bind(tc, SOCK_STREAM, sinp, 0, false);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(!res);
|
|
|
|
|
res = child_bind(tc, SOCK_STREAM, sinp, 0, true);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_REQUIRE(!res);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Normally bind() prevents port stealing by a different user, even when
|
|
|
|
|
* SO_REUSE* are specified. However, if the port is bound by a connected
|
|
|
|
|
* socket, then it's fair game.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC(socket_afinet_bind_connected_port);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_HEAD(socket_afinet_bind_connected_port, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
|
|
|
|
|
atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.config", "unprivileged_user");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_bind_connected_port, tc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
bind_connected_port_test(tc, AF_INET);
|
|
|
|
|
bind_connected_port_test(tc, AF_INET6);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_bind_zero);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_bind_ok);
|
2021-04-28 05:31:38 -04:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_poll_no_rdhup);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_poll_rdhup);
|
2023-06-23 10:06:13 -04:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_stream_reconnect);
|
inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
2024-12-12 09:06:06 -05:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_bindany);
|
|
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_multibind);
|
2024-12-23 10:31:11 -05:00
|
|
|
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_bind_connected_port);
|
2019-05-21 15:42:04 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return atf_no_error();
|
|
|
|
|
}
|