Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

Previously, if a mode was selected where packet ids are not allowed to roll
over, but renegotiation does not succeed for some reason (e.g. no password
entered in time, certificate expired or a malicious peer that refuses the
renegotiaion on purpose) we would continue to use the old keys.  Until the
packet ID would roll over and we would ASSERT() out.

Given that this can be triggered on purpose by an authenticated peer, this
is a fix for an authenticated remote DoS vulnerability.  An attack is
rather inefficient though; a peer would need to get us to send 2^32
packets (min-size packet is IP+UDP+OPCODE+PID+TAG (no payload), results in
(20+8+1+4+16)*2^32 bytes, or approx. 196 GB).

This is a fix for finding 5.2 from the OSTIF / Quarkslab audit.

CVE: 2017-7479
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1494358209-4568-3-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=1494358209-4568-3-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
This commit is contained in:
Steffan Karger 2017-05-09 21:30:09 +02:00 committed by David Sommerseth
parent 5774cf4c25
commit e498cb0ea8
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 86CF944C9671FDF2
6 changed files with 51 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -335,3 +335,7 @@ Security
to hit an ASSERT() and stop the process. If ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``
is used, only attackers that have the ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt`` key
can mount an attack. (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.1, CVE-2017-7478)
- Fix an authenticated remote DoS vulnerability that could be triggered by
causing a packet id roll over. An attack is rather inefficient; a peer
would need to get us to send at least about 196 GB of data.
(OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.2, CVE-2017-7479)

View file

@ -93,7 +93,11 @@ openvpn_encrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
buf_set_write(&iv_buffer, iv, iv_len);
/* IV starts with packet id to make the IV unique for packet */
ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false));
if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
/* Remainder of IV consists of implicit part (unique per session) */
ASSERT(buf_write(&iv_buffer, ctx->implicit_iv, ctx->implicit_iv_len));
@ -191,11 +195,13 @@ openvpn_encrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
prng_bytes(iv_buf, iv_size);
/* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer */
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
&& !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM,
true))
{
ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM,
true));
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
}
else if (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher_kt))
@ -251,11 +257,12 @@ openvpn_encrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
}
else /* No Encryption */
{
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
&& !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM, true))
{
ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
BOOL_CAST(opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM),
true));
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
if (ctx->hmac)
{

View file

@ -325,27 +325,37 @@ packet_id_read(struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form)
return true;
}
static void
static bool
packet_id_send_update(struct packet_id_send *p, bool long_form)
{
if (!p->time)
{
p->time = now;
}
p->id++;
if (!p->id)
if (p->id == PACKET_ID_MAX)
{
ASSERT(long_form);
/* Packet ID only allowed to roll over if using long form and time has
* moved forward since last roll over.
*/
if (!long_form || now <= p->time)
{
return false;
}
p->time = now;
p->id = 1;
p->id = 0;
}
p->id++;
return true;
}
bool
packet_id_write(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form,
bool prepend)
{
packet_id_send_update(p, long_form);
if (!packet_id_send_update(p, long_form))
{
return false;
}
const packet_id_type net_id = htonpid(p->id);
const net_time_t net_time = htontime(p->time);

View file

@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
* to for network transmission.
*/
typedef uint32_t packet_id_type;
#define PACKET_ID_MAX UINT32_MAX
typedef uint32_t net_time_t;
/*

View file

@ -98,7 +98,11 @@ tls_crypt_wrap(const struct buffer *src, struct buffer *dst,
format_hex(BPTR(src), BLEN(src), 80, &gc));
/* Get packet ID */
ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, dst, true, false));
if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, dst, true, false))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "TLS-CRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over.");
goto err;
}
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "TLS-CRYPT WRAP AD: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(dst), BLEN(dst), 0, &gc));

View file

@ -129,8 +129,7 @@ test_packet_id_write_short_wrap(void **state)
struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
data->pis.id = ~0;
expect_assert_failure(
packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
}
static void
@ -139,8 +138,16 @@ test_packet_id_write_long_wrap(void **state)
struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
data->pis.id = ~0;
data->pis.time = 5006;
/* Write fails if time did not change */
now = 5006;
assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
/* Write succeeds if time moved forward */
now = 5010;
assert_true(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
assert(data->pis.id == 1);
assert(data->pis.time == now);
assert_true(data->test_buf_data.buf_id == htonl(1));