Add client-side support for cipher negotiation

Based on the 'IV_NCP=2' mechanism described in
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/9385.

This is the first patch of a set that adds support for cipher negotiation.
Follow-up patches will add ways to restrict or disable the mechanism, and
add server-side support.

v2:
 * Account for crypto overhead through struct frame.  This is less
   transparant, but the code has been built to work this way.  The
   previous approach didn't work with TCP mode (or --port-share).
 * Calculate the link-mtu sent in the options string based on the crypto
   parameters specified in the config file (prevents link-mtu warnings in
   older peers when connecting).

v3:
 * Use existing max_int() function, instead of new MAX() macro.
 * Fix typo in comment.
 * Do not regenerate keys if the server sends a second push msg
 * Only push IV_NCP if we're pull-client (and thus can do NCP)

v4:
 * Fix rebase errors (OPT_P_NCP sneaked in, but is not introduced till 4/5,
   and tls_peer_info_ncp_ver() is not needed until 5/5).
 * Don't remove comment about key_id increment behaviour in init.c (but
   still add the extra comments in the .h files).

Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1467149635-9726-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/12007
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This commit is contained in:
Steffan Karger 2016-06-28 23:33:55 +02:00 committed by Gert Doering
parent 6dd307c864
commit 97894360fa
9 changed files with 177 additions and 19 deletions

View file

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "crypto.h"
#include "error.h"
#include "integer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "memdbg.h"
@ -709,10 +710,6 @@ openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
return ret;
}
/*
* How many bytes will we add to frame buffer for a given
* set of crypto options?
*/
void
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
const struct key_type* kt,
@ -746,6 +743,14 @@ crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
__func__, crypto_overhead);
}
size_t
crypto_max_overhead(void)
{
return packet_id_size(true) + OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE +
max_int (OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE, OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH);
}
/*
* Build a struct key_type.
*/
@ -774,6 +779,9 @@ init_key_type (struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername,
#endif
))
msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' mode not supported", ciphername);
if (OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE < cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher))
msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' not allowed: block size too big.", ciphername);
}
else
{
@ -785,6 +793,9 @@ init_key_type (struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername,
if (!aead_cipher) { /* Ignore auth for AEAD ciphers */
kt->digest = md_kt_get (authname);
kt->hmac_length = md_kt_size (kt->digest);
if (OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE < kt->hmac_length)
msg (M_FATAL, "HMAC '%s' not allowed: digest size too big.", authname);
}
}
else if (!aead_cipher)

View file

@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ struct key_ctx_bi
* direction. */
struct key_ctx decrypt; /**< cipher and/or HMAC contexts for
* receiving direction. */
bool initialized;
};
/**
@ -385,6 +386,7 @@ bool openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
/** @} name Functions for performing security operations on data channel packets */
/** Calculate crypto overhead and adjust frame to account for that */
void crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
const struct key_type* kt,
bool cipher_defined,
@ -392,6 +394,8 @@ void crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
bool packet_id,
bool packet_id_long_form);
/** Return the worst-case OpenVPN crypto overhead (in bytes) */
size_t crypto_max_overhead(void);
/* Minimum length of the nonce used by the PRNG */
#define NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN 16

View file

@ -41,6 +41,12 @@
/* TLS uses a tag of 128 bytes, let's do the same for OpenVPN */
#define OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH 16
/* Maximum cipher block size (bytes) */
#define OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 32
/* Maximum HMAC digest size (bytes) */
#define OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE 64
/** Struct used in cipher name translation table */
typedef struct {
const char *openvpn_name; /**< Cipher name used by OpenVPN */

View file

@ -1825,6 +1825,7 @@ pull_permission_mask (const struct context *c)
| OPT_P_SHAPER
| OPT_P_TIMER
| OPT_P_COMP
| OPT_P_CRYPTO
| OPT_P_PERSIST
| OPT_P_MESSAGES
| OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY
@ -1928,6 +1929,19 @@ do_deferred_options (struct context *c, const unsigned int found)
" MTU problems", TUN_MTU_SIZE(&c->c2.frame) );
}
}
/* process (potentially pushed) crypto options */
if (c->options.pull)
{
struct tls_session *session = &c->c2.tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
if (found & OPT_P_CRYPTO)
msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: data channel crypto options modified");
/* Do not regenerate keys if server sends an extra push request */
if (!session->key[KS_PRIMARY].crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized)
{
tls_session_update_crypto_params(session, &c->options, &c->c2.frame);
}
}
#endif
}
@ -2043,6 +2057,7 @@ frame_finalize_options (struct context *c, const struct options *o)
|FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_STREAM);
}
frame_add_to_extra_buffer (&c->c2.frame, PAYLOAD_ALIGN);
frame_finalize (&c->c2.frame,
o->ce.link_mtu_defined,
o->ce.link_mtu,
@ -2298,12 +2313,18 @@ do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)
/* In short form, unique datagram identifier is 32 bits, in long form 64 bits */
packet_id_long_form = cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb (c->c1.ks.key_type.cipher);
/* Compute MTU parameters */
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame,
&c->c1.ks.key_type,
options->ciphername_defined,
options->use_iv,
options->replay, packet_id_long_form);
/* Compute MTU parameters (postpone if we pull options) */
if (c->options.pull)
{
/* Account for worst-case crypto overhead before allocating buffers */
frame_add_to_extra_frame (&c->c2.frame, crypto_max_overhead());
}
else
{
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(&c->c2.frame, &c->c1.ks.key_type,
options->ciphername_defined, options->use_iv, options->replay,
packet_id_long_form);
}
tls_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame);
/* Set all command-line TLS-related options */
@ -2334,6 +2355,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)
to.renegotiate_packets = options->renegotiate_packets;
to.renegotiate_seconds = options->renegotiate_seconds;
to.single_session = options->single_session;
to.pull = options->pull;
#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO
if (options->push_peer_info) /* all there is */
to.push_peer_info_detail = 2;

View file

@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ frame_finalize (struct frame *frame,
}
frame->link_mtu_dynamic = frame->link_mtu;
frame->extra_buffer += PAYLOAD_ALIGN;
}
/*

View file

@ -2965,6 +2965,38 @@ pre_pull_restore (struct options *o, struct gc_arena *gc)
#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
/**
* Calculate the link-mtu to advertise to our peer. The actual value is not
* relevant, because we will possibly perform data channel cipher negotiation
* after this, but older clients will log warnings if we do not supply them the
* value they expect. This assumes that the traditional cipher/auth directives
* in the config match the config of the peer.
*/
static size_t
calc_options_string_link_mtu(const struct options *o, const struct frame *frame)
{
size_t link_mtu = EXPANDED_SIZE (frame);
#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO
if (o->pull || o->mode == MODE_SERVER)
{
struct frame fake_frame = *frame;
struct key_type fake_kt;
init_key_type (&fake_kt, o->ciphername, o->ciphername_defined,
o->authname, o->authname_defined, o->keysize, true, false);
frame_add_to_extra_frame (&fake_frame, -(crypto_max_overhead()));
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (&fake_frame, &fake_kt,
o->ciphername_defined, o->use_iv, o->replay,
cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb (fake_kt.cipher));
frame_finalize(&fake_frame, o->ce.link_mtu_defined, o->ce.link_mtu,
o->ce.tun_mtu_defined, o->ce.tun_mtu);
msg (D_MTU_DEBUG, "%s: link-mtu %zu -> %d", __func__, link_mtu,
EXPANDED_SIZE (&fake_frame));
link_mtu = EXPANDED_SIZE (&fake_frame);
}
#endif
return link_mtu;
}
/*
* Build an options string to represent data channel encryption options.
* This string must match exactly between peers. The keysize is checked
@ -3009,7 +3041,6 @@ pre_pull_restore (struct options *o, struct gc_arena *gc)
* --tls-server [matched with --tls-client on
* the other end of the connection]
*/
char *
options_string (const struct options *o,
const struct frame *frame,
@ -3027,7 +3058,7 @@ options_string (const struct options *o,
*/
buf_printf (&out, ",dev-type %s", dev_type_string (o->dev, o->dev_type));
buf_printf (&out, ",link-mtu %d", EXPANDED_SIZE (frame));
buf_printf (&out, ",link-mtu %zu", calc_options_string_link_mtu(o, frame));
buf_printf (&out, ",tun-mtu %d", PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame));
buf_printf (&out, ",proto %s", proto_remote (o->ce.proto, remote));

View file

@ -1613,6 +1613,7 @@ generate_key_expansion (struct key_ctx_bi *key,
key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->decrypt, key2.keys[1-(int)server].hmac,
MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH);
key->initialized = true;
ret = true;
exit:
@ -1639,6 +1640,50 @@ key_ctx_update_implicit_iv(struct key_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *key, size_t key_len) {
}
}
bool
tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session,
const struct options *options, struct frame *frame)
{
bool ret = false;
struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */
ASSERT (!session->opt->server);
ASSERT (ks->authenticated);
init_key_type (&session->opt->key_type, options->ciphername,
options->ciphername_defined, options->authname, options->authname_defined,
options->keysize, true, true);
bool packet_id_long_form = cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb (session->opt->key_type.cipher);
session->opt->crypto_flags_and &= ~(CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM);
if (packet_id_long_form)
session->opt->crypto_flags_and = CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM;
/* Update frame parameters: undo worst-case overhead, add actual overhead */
frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, -(crypto_max_overhead()));
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (frame, &session->opt->key_type,
options->ciphername_defined, options->use_iv, options->replay,
packet_id_long_form);
frame_finalize(frame, options->ce.link_mtu_defined, options->ce.link_mtu,
options->ce.tun_mtu_defined, options->ce.tun_mtu);
frame_print (frame, D_MTU_INFO, "Data Channel MTU parms");
if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi,
&session->opt->key_type,
ks->key_src,
&session->session_id,
&ks->session_id_remote,
false))
{
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: server generate_key_expansion failed");
goto cleanup;
}
ret = true;
cleanup:
CLEAR (*ks->key_src);
return ret;
}
static bool
random_bytes_to_buf (struct buffer *buf,
uint8_t *out,
@ -1885,6 +1930,10 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)
/* support for P_DATA_V2 */
buf_printf(&out, "IV_PROTO=2\n");
/* support for Negotiable Crypto Paramters */
if (session->opt->pull)
buf_printf(&out, "IV_NCP=2\n");
/* push compression status */
#ifdef USE_COMP
comp_generate_peer_info_string(&session->opt->comp_options, &out);
@ -2211,9 +2260,11 @@ key_method_2_read (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessi
}
/*
* Generate tunnel keys if client
* Generate tunnel keys if we're a client.
* If --pull is enabled, the first key generation is postponed until after the
* pull/push, so we can process pushed cipher directives.
*/
if (!session->opt->server)
if (!session->opt->server && (!session->opt->pull || ks->key_id > 0))
{
if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi,
&session->opt->key_type,
@ -2225,7 +2276,7 @@ key_method_2_read (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessi
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client generate_key_expansion failed");
goto error;
}
CLEAR (*ks->key_src);
}
@ -2891,6 +2942,14 @@ tls_pre_decrypt (struct tls_multi *multi,
#endif
&& (floated || link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr)))
{
if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized)
{
msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
"Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet.",
print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id);
goto error_lite;
}
/* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */
*opt = &ks->crypto_options;
if (op == P_DATA_V2)
@ -3428,6 +3487,7 @@ tls_pre_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi,
struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i];
if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE
&& ks->authenticated
&& ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized
#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
&& !ks->auth_deferred
#endif

View file

@ -475,6 +475,20 @@ bool tls_rec_payload (struct tls_multi *multi,
void tls_update_remote_addr (struct tls_multi *multi,
const struct link_socket_actual *addr);
/**
* Update TLS session crypto parameters (cipher and auth) and derive data
* channel keys based on the supplied options.
*
* @param session The TLS session to update.
* @param options The options to use when updating session.
* @param frame The frame options for this session (frame overhead is
* adjusted based on the selected cipher/auth).
*
* @return true if updating succeeded, false otherwise.
*/
bool tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session,
const struct options *options, struct frame *frame);
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
static inline char *
tls_get_peer_info(const struct tls_multi *multi)

View file

@ -149,7 +149,12 @@ struct key_source2 {
struct key_state
{
int state;
int key_id; /* inherited from struct tls_session below */
/**
* Key id for this key_state, inherited from struct tls_session.
* @see tls_session::key_id.
*/
int key_id;
struct key_state_ssl ks_ssl; /* contains SSL object and BIOs for the control channel */
@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ struct tls_options
#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
bool disable_occ;
#endif
bool pull;
#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO
int push_peer_info_detail;
#endif
@ -367,7 +373,13 @@ struct tls_session
int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */
struct session_id session_id; /* our random session ID */
int key_id; /* increments with each soft reset (for key renegotiation) */
/**
* The current active key id, used to keep track of renegotiations.
* key_id increments with each soft reset to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back
* to 1. This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key.
*/
int key_id;
int limit_next; /* used for traffic shaping on the control channel */