Fix 'uninitialized pointer read' in openvpn_decrypt_aead

Coverity complains that if we error out in the first
error condition we try to free gc without initializing
it.

While here move the declaration of outlen to the first
usage.

Change-Id: I0391f30a1e962ee242e9bcdec4f605bf7e831cca
Signed-off-by: Frank Lichtenheld <frank@lichtenheld.com>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Message-Id: <20250113112226.17728-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg30421.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This commit is contained in:
Frank Lichtenheld 2025-01-13 12:22:26 +01:00 committed by Gert Doering
parent 0671a4d009
commit 5e086c08f2

View file

@ -406,17 +406,15 @@ openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init(&gc);
if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
{
CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached.");
}
int outlen;
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init(&gc);
ASSERT(opt);
ASSERT(frame);
ASSERT(buf->len > 0);
@ -506,6 +504,8 @@ openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT AD: %s",
format_hex(ad_start, ad_size, 0, &gc));
int outlen;
/* Decrypt and authenticate packet */
if (!cipher_ctx_update(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work), &outlen, BPTR(buf),
data_len))