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Internet-Draft D. Boreham, Bozeman Pass
LDAPext Working Group J. Sermersheim, Novell
Intended Category: Standards Track A. Kashi, Microsoft
<draft-ietf-ldapext-ldapv3-vlv-06.txt>
Expires: Nov 2002 May 2002
LDAP Extensions for Scrolling View Browsing of Search Results
1. Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This document is intended to be submitted, after review and revision,
as a Standards Track document. Distribution of this memo is
unlimited.
Please send comments to the authors.
2. Abstract
This document describes a Virtual List View control extension for the
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Search operation. This
control is designed to allow the "virtual list box" feature, common
in existing commercial e-mail address book applications, to be
supported efficiently by LDAP servers. LDAP servers' inability to
support this client feature is a significant impediment to LDAP
replacing proprietary protocols in commercial e-mail systems.
The control allows a client to specify that the server return, for a
given LDAP search with associated sort keys, a contiguous subset of
the search result set. This subset is specified in terms of offsets
into the ordered list, or in terms of a greater than or equal
comparison value.
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3. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are
to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Bradner97].
4. Background
A Virtual List is a graphical user interface technique employed where
ordered lists containing a large number of entries need to be
displayed. A window containing a small number of visible list entries
is drawn. The visible portion of the list may be relocated to
different points within the list by means of user input. This input
can be to a scroll bar slider; from cursor keys; from page up/down
keys; from alphanumeric keys for "typedown". The user is given the
impression that they may browse the complete list at will, even
though it may contain millions of entries. It is the fact that the
complete list contents are never required at any one time that
characterizes Virtual List View. Rather than fetch the complete list
from wherever it is stored (typically from disk or a remote server),
only that information which is required to display the part of the
list currently in view is fetched. The subject of this document is
the interaction between client and server required to implement this
functionality in the context of the results from a sorted LDAP search
request.
For example, suppose an e-mail address book application displays a
list view onto the list containing the names of all the holders of e-
mail accounts at a large university. The list is sorted
alphabetically. While there may be tens of thousands of entries in
this list, the address book list view displays only 20 such accounts
at any one time. The list has an accompanying scroll bar and text
input window for type-down. When first displayed, the list view shows
the first 20 entries in the list, and the scroll bar slider is
positioned at the top of its range. Should the user drag the slider
to the bottom of its range, the displayed contents of the list view
should be updated to show the last 20 entries in the list. Similarly,
if the slider is positioned somewhere in the middle of its travel,
the displayed contents of the list view should be updated to contain
the 20 entries located at that relative position within the complete
list. Starting from any display point, if the user uses the cursor
keys or clicks on the scroll bar to request that the list be scrolled
up or down by one entry, the displayed contents should be updated to
reflect this. Similarly the list should be displayed correctly when
the user requests a page scroll up or down. Finally, when the user
types characters in the type-down window, the displayed contents of
the list should "jump" or "seek" to the appropriate point within the
list. For example, if the user types "B", the displayed list could
center around the first user with a name beginning with the letter
"B". When this happens, the scroll bar slider should also be updated
to reflect the new relative location within the list.
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This document defines a request control which extends the LDAP search
operation. Always used in conjunction with the server side sorting
control [SSS], this allows a client to retrieve selected portions of
large search result set in a fashion suitable for the implementation
of a virtual list view.
5. Client-Server Interaction
The Virtual List View control extends a regular LDAP Search operation
which must also include a server-side sorting control [SSS]. Rather
than returning the complete set of appropriate SearchResultEntry
messages, the server is instructed to return a contiguous subset of
those entries, taken from the sorted result set, centered around a
particular target entry. Henceforth, in the interests of brevity, the
sorted search result set will be referred to as "the list".
The sort control MAY contain any sort specification valid for the
server. The attributeType field in the first SortKeyList sequence
element has special significance for "typedown".
The desired target entry and the number of entries to be returned,
both before and after that target entry in the list, are determined
by the client's VirtualListViewRequest control.
When the server returns the set of entries to the client, it attaches
a VirtualListViewResponse control to the SearchResultDone message.
The server returns in this control: its current estimate for the list
content count, the location within the list corresponding to the
target entry, any error codes, and optionally a context identifier.
The target entry is specified in the VirtualListViewRequest control
by one of two methods. The first method is for the client to indicate
the target entry's offset within the list. The second way is for the
client to supply an attribute assertion value. The value is compared
against the values of the attribute specified as the primary sort key
in the sort control attached to the search operation. The first sort
key in the SortKeyList is the primary sort key. The target entry is
the first entry in the list with value greater than or equal to (in
the primary sort order), the presented value. The order is determined
by rules defined in [SSS]. Selection of the target entry by this
means is designed to implement "typedown". Note that it is possible
that no entry satisfies these conditions, in which case there is no
target entry. This condition is indicated by the server returning the
special value contentCount + 1 in the target position field.
Because the server may not have an accurate estimate of the number of
entries in the list, and to take account of cases where the list size
is changing during the time the user browses the list, and because
the client needs a way to indicate specific list targets "beginning"
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and "end", offsets within the list are transmitted between client and
server as ratios---offset to content count. The server sends its
latest estimate as to the number of entries in the list (content
count) to the client in every response control. The client sends its
assumed value for the content count in every request control. The
server examines the content count and offsets presented by the client
and computes the corresponding offsets within the list, based on its
own idea of the content count.
Si = Sc * (Ci / Cc)
Where:
Si is the actual list offset used by the server
Sc is the server's estimate for content count
Ci is the client's submitted offset
Cc is the client's submitted content count
The result is rounded to the nearest integer.
If the content count is stable, and the client returns to the server
the content count most recently received, Cc = Sc and the offsets
transmitted become the actual server list offsets.
The following special cases exist when the client is specifying the
offset and content count:
- an offset of one and a content count of non-one (Ci = 1, Cc != 1)
indicates that the target is the first entry in the list.
- equivalent values (Ci = Cc) indicate that the target is the last
entry in the list.
- a content count of zero, and a non-zero offset (Cc = 0, Ci != 0)
means the client has no idea what the content count is, the server
MUST use its own content count estimate in place of the client's.
Because the server always returns contentCount and targetPosition,
the client can always determine which of the returned entries is the
target entry. Where the number of entries returned is the same as the
number requested, the client is able to identify the target by simple
arithmetic. Where the number of entries returned is not the same as
the number requested (because the requested range crosses the
beginning or end of the list, or both), the client must use the
target position and content count values returned by the server to
identify the target entry. For example, suppose that 10 entries
before and 10 after the target were requested, but the server returns
13 entries, a content count of 100 and a target position of 3. The
client can determine that the first entry must be entry number 1 in
the list, therefore the 13 entries returned are the first 13 entries
in the list, and the target is the third one.
A server-generated context identifier MAY be returned to clients. A
client receiving a context identifier SHOULD return it unchanged in a
subsequent request which relates to the same list. The purpose of
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this interaction is to enhance the performance and effectiveness of
servers which employ approximate positioning.
6. The Controls
Support for the virtual list view control extension is indicated by
the presence of the OID "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.9" in the
supportedControl attribute of a server's root DSE.
6.1. Request Control
This control is included in the SearchRequest message as part of the
controls field of the LDAPMessage, as defined in Section 4.1.12 of
[LDAPv3]. The controlType is set to "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.9". The
criticality SHOULD be set to TRUE. If this control is included in a
SearchRequest message, a Server Side Sorting request control [SSS]
MUST also be present in the message. The controlValue is an OCTET
STRING whose value is the BER-encoding of the following SEQUENCE:
VirtualListViewRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
beforeCount INTEGER (0..maxInt),
afterCount INTEGER (0..maxInt),
CHOICE {
byoffset [0] SEQUENCE {
offset INTEGER (0 .. maxInt),
contentCount INTEGER (0 .. maxInt) },
greaterThanOrEqual [1] AssertionValue },
contextID OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
beforeCount indicates how many entries before the target entry the
client wants the server to send. afterCount indicates the number of
entries after the target entry the client wants the server to send.
offset and contentCount identify the target entry as detailed in
section 4. greaterThanOrEqual is an attribute assertion value defined
in [LDAPv3]. If present, the value supplied in greaterThanOrEqual is
used to determine the target entry by comparison with the values of
the attribute specified as the primary sort key. The first list entry
who's value is no less than (less than or equal to when the sort
order is reversed) the supplied value is the target entry. If
present, the contextID field contains the value of the most recently
received contextID field from a VirtualListViewResponse control. The
type AssertionValue and value maxInt are defined in [LDAPv3].
contextID values have no validity outwith the connection on which
they were received. That is, a client should not submit a contextID
which it received from another connection, a connection now closed,
or a different server.
6.2. Response Control
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This control is included in the SearchResultDone message as part of
the controls field of the LDAPMessage, as defined in Section 4.1.12
of [LDAPv3].
The controlType is set to "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.10". The criticality
is FALSE (MAY be absent). The controlValue is an OCTET STRING, whose
value is the BER encoding of a value of the following SEQUENCE:
VirtualListViewResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
targetPosition INTEGER (0 .. maxInt),
contentCount INTEGER (0 .. maxInt),
virtualListViewResult ENUMERATED {
success (0),
operationsError (1),
unwillingToPerform (53),
insufficientAccessRights (50),
busy (51),
timeLimitExceeded (3),
adminLimitExceeded (11),
sortControlMissing (60),
offsetRangeError (61),
other (80) },
contextID OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
targetPosition gives the list offset for the target entry.
contentCount gives the server's estimate of the current number of
entries in the list. Together these give sufficient information for
the client to update a list box slider position to match the newly
retrieved entries and identify the target entry. The contentCount
value returned SHOULD be used in a subsequent VirtualListViewRequest
control. contextID is a server-defined octet string. If present, the
contents of the contextID field SHOULD be returned to the server by a
client in a subsequent VirtualListViewRequest control.
The virtualListViewResult codes which are common to the LDAP
searchResponse (adminLimitExceeded, timeLimitExceeded, busy,
operationsError, unwillingToPerform, insufficientAccessRights) have
the same meanings as defined in [LDAPv3], but they pertain
specifically to the VLV operation. For example, the server could
exceed an administration limit processing a SearchRequest with a
VirtualListViewRequest control. However, the same administration
limit would not be exceeded should the same SearchRequest be
submitted by the client without the VirtualListViewRequest control.
In this case, the client can determine that an administration limit
has been exceeded in servicing the VLV request, and can if it chooses
resubmit the SearchRequest without the VirtualListViewRequest
control.
insufficientAccessRights means that the server denied the client
permission to perform the VLV operation.
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If the server determines that the results of the search presented
exceed the range specified in INTEGER values, it MUST return
offsetRangeError.
6.2.1 virtualListViewError
A new LDAP error is introduced called virtualListViewError. Its value
is 76.
[Note to the IESG/IANA/RFC Editor: the value 76 has been suggested by
experts, had expert review, and is currently being used by some
implementations. The intent is to have this number designated as an
official IANA assigned LDAP Result Code (see draft-ietf-ldapbis-iana-
xx.txt, Section 3.5)]
If the server returns any code other than success (0) for
virtualListViewResult, then the server SHOULD return
virtualListViewError as the resultCode of the SearchResultDone
message.
7. Protocol Example
Here we walk through the client-server interaction for a specific
virtual list view example: The task is to display a list of all 78564
people in the US company "Ace Industry". This will be done by
creating a graphical user interface object to display the list
contents, and by repeatedly sending different versions of the same
virtual list view search request to the server. The list view
displays 20 entries on the screen at a time.
We form a search with baseDN "o=Ace Industry, c=us"; search scope
subtree; filter "objectClass=inetOrgPerson". We attach a server sort
order control to the search, specifying ascending sort on attribute
"cn". To this base search, we attach a virtual list view request
control with contents determined by the user activity and send the
search to the server. We display the results from each search in the
list window and update the slider position.
When the list view is first displayed, we want to initialize the
contents showing the beginning of the list. Therefore, we set
beforeCount = 0, afterCount = 19, contentCount = 0, offset = 1 and
send the request to the server. The server duly returns the first 20
entries in the list, plus the content count = 78564 and
targetPosition = 1. We therefore leave the scroll bar slider at its
current location (the top of its range).
Say that next the user drags the scroll bar slider down to the bottom
of its range. We now wish to display the last 20 entries in the list,
so we set beforeCount = 19, afterCount = 0, contentCount = 78564,
offset = 78564 and send the request to the server. The server returns
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the last 20 entries in the list, plus the content count = 78564 and
targetPosition = 78564.
Next the user presses a page up key. Our page size is 20, so we set
beforeCount = 0, afterCount = 19, contentCount = 78564, offset =
78564-19-20 and send the request to the server. The server returns
the preceding 20 entries in the list, plus the content count = 78564
and targetPosition = 78525.
Now the user grabs the scroll bar slider and drags it to 68% of the
way down its travel. 68% of 78564 is 53424 so we set beforeCount = 9,
afterCount = 10, contentCount = 78564, offset = 53424 and send the
request to the server. The server returns the preceding 20 entries in
the list, plus the content count = 78564 and targetPosition = 53424.
Lastly, the user types the letter "B". We set beforeCount = 9,
afterCount = 10 and greaterThanOrEqual = "B". The server finds the
first entry in the list not less than "B", let's say "Babs Jensen",
and returns the nine preceding entries, the target entry, and the
proceeding 10 entries. The server returns content count = 78564 and
targetPosition = 5234 and so the client updates its scroll bar slider
to 6.7% of full scale.
8. Notes for Implementers
While the feature is expected to be generally useful for arbitrary
search and sort specifications, it is specifically designed for those
cases where the result set is very large. The intention is that this
feature be implemented efficiently by means of pre-computed indices
pertaining to a set of specific cases. For example, an offset
relating to "all the employees in the local organization, sorted by
surname" would be a common case.
The intention for client software is that the feature should fit
easily with the host platform's graphical user interface facilities
for the display of scrolling lists. Thus the task of the client
implementers should be one of reformatting up the requests for
information received from the list view code to match the format of
the virtual list view request and response controls.
Client implementers should note that any offset value returned by the
server may be approximate. Do not design clients > which only operate
correctly when offsets are exact.
Server implementers using indexing technology which features
approximate positioning should consider returning context identifiers
to clients. The use of a context identifier will allow the server to
distinguish between client requests which relate to different
displayed lists on the client. Consequently the server can decide
more intelligently whether to reposition an existing database cursor
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accurately to within a short distance of its current position, or to
reposition to an approximate position. Thus the client will see
precise offsets for "short" repositioning (e.g. paging up or down),
but approximate offsets for a "long" reposition (e.g. a slider
movement).
Server implementers are free to return status code unwillingToPerform
should their server be unable to service any particular VLV search.
This might be because the resolution of the search is computationally
infeasible, or because excessive server resources would be required
to service the search.
Client implementers should note that this control is only defined on
a client interaction with a single server. If a server returns
referrals as a part of its response to the search request, the client
is responsible for deciding when and how to apply this control to the
referred-to servers, and how to collate the results from multiple
servers.
9. Relationship to "Simple Paged Results"
These controls are designed to support the virtual list view, which
has proved hard to implement with the Simple Paged Results mechanism
[SPaged]. However, the controls described here support any operation
possible with the Simple Paged Results mechanism. The two mechanisms
are not complementary; rather one has a superset of the other's
features. One area where the mechanism presented here is not a strict
superset of the Simple Paged Results scheme is that here we require a
sort order to be specified. No such requirement is made for paged
results.
10. Security Considerations
Server implementers may wish to consider whether clients are able to
consume excessive server resources in requesting virtual list
operations. Access control to the feature itself; configuration
options limiting the featureÆs use to certain predetermined search
base DNs and filters; throttling mechanisms designed to limit the
ability for one client to soak up server resources, may be
appropriate.
Consideration should be given as to whether a client will be able to
retrieve the complete contents, or a significant subset of the
complete contents of the directory using this feature. This may be
undesirable in some circumstances and consequently it may be
necessary to enforce some access control.
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Clients can, using this control, determine how many entries are
contained within a portion of the DIT. This may constitute a security
hazard. Again, access controls may be appropriate.
Server implementers SHOULD exercise caution concerning the content of
the contextID. Should the contextID contain internal server state, it
may be possible for a malicious client to use that information to
gain unauthorized access to information.
11. Acknowledgements
Chris Weider, Anoop Anantha, and Michael Armijo of Microsoft co-
authored previous versions of this document.
12. References
[LDAPv3] Wahl, M., Kille, S. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3)", Internet Standard, RFC 2251,
December, 1997.
[SPaged] Weider, C., Herron, A., Anantha, A. and T. Howes, "LDAP
Control Extension for Simple Paged Results Manipulation",
RFC2696, September 1999.
[SSS] Wahl, M., Herron, A. and T. Howes, "LDAP Control
Extension for Server Side Sorting of Search Results",
RFC 2891, August, 2000.
[Bradner97] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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13. Authors' Addresses
David Boreham
Bozeman Pass, Inc
+1 406 222 7093
david@bozemanpass.com
Jim Sermersheim
Novell, Inc
1800 South Novell Place
Provo, Utah 84606, USA
jimse@novell.com
Asaf Kashi
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052, USA
+1 425 882-8080
asafk@microsoft.com
14. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will
not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
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INTERNET-DRAFT Rob Weltman
Intended Category: Standards Track Netscape Communications Corp.
May 2002
LDAP Proxied Authorization Control
draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-11.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Task Force
(IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups
may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract
This document defines the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) Proxied Authorization Control. The Proxied Authorization
Control allows a client to request that an operation be processed
under a provided authorization identity [AUTH] instead of as the
current authorization identity associated with the connection.
1. Introduction
This document defines support for proxied authorization using the
Control mechanism. LDAP [LDAPV3] supports the use of SASL [SASL] for
authentication and for supplying an authorization identity distinct
from the authentication identity, where the authorization identity
applies to the whole LDAP session. The proposed Proxied Authorization
Control provides a mechanism for specifying an authorization identity
on a per operation basis, benefiting clients that need to efficiently
perform operations on behalf of multiple users.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY", and
"MAY NOT" used in this document are to be interpreted as described
in [KEYWORDS].
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2. Publishing support for the Proxied Authorization Control
Support for the Proxied Authorization Control is indicated by the
presence of the OID "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18" in the
supportedControl attribute of a server's root DSE.
3. Proxied Authorization Control
A single Proxied Authorization Control may be included in any search,
compare, modify, add, delete, modDN or extended operation request
message (with the exception of any extension that causes a change in
authentication, authorization, or data confidentiality [RFC 2828],
such as startTLS) as part of the controls field of the LDAPMessage,
as defined in [LDAPV3].
The controlType of the proxied authorization control is
"2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18".
The criticality MUST be present and MUST be TRUE. This requirement
protects clients from submitting a request that is executed with an
unintended authorization identity.
The controlValue is either an LDAPString [LDAPv3] containing an
authzId as defined in section 9 of [AUTH] to use as the authorization
identity for the request, or an empty value if the anonymous identity
is to be used.
The mechanism for determining proxy access rights is specific to the
server's access control policy.
If the requested authorization identity is recognized by the server,
and the client is authorized to adopt the requested authorization
identity, the request will be executed as if submitted by the proxied
authorization identity, otherwise the result code TBD is returned.
[Note to the IESG/IANA/RFC Editor: the value TBD is to be replaced
with an IANA assigned LDAP Result Code (see draft-ietf-ldapbis-iana-
xx.txt, Section 3.5)]
4. Implementation Considerations
The interaction of proxied authorization access control and normal
access control is illustrated here for the case of search requests.
During evaluation of a search request, an entry which would have been
returned for the search if submitted by the proxied authorization
identity directly may not be returned if the server finds that the
requester does not have the right to assume the requested identity
for searching the entry, even if the entry is within the scope of a
search request under a base DN which does imply such rights. This
means that fewer results, or no results, may be returned compared to
the case where the proxied authorization identity issued the request
directly. An example of such a case may be a system with fine-grained
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PROXIED AUTHORIZATION CONTROL May 2002
access control, where the proxy right requester has proxy rights at
the top of a search tree, but not at or below a point or points
within the tree.
5. Security Considerations
The Proxied Authorization Control method is subject to general LDAP
security considerations [LDAPV3] [AUTH] [LDAPTLS]. The control may be
passed over a secure as well as over an insecure channel.
The control allows for an additional authorization identity to be
passed. In some deployments, these identities may contain
confidential information which require privacy protection.
Note that the server is responsible for determining if a proxied
authorization request is to be honored. "Anonymous" users SHOULD NOT
be allowed to assume the identity of others.
6. Copyright
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
7. References
[LDAPV3] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
Expires November 2002 [Page 3]
PROXIED AUTHORIZATION CONTROL May 2002
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, Scott, "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", draft-bradner-key-words-03.txt, January,
1997.
[SASL] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",
RFC 2222, October 1997
[AUTH] M. Wahl, H. Alvestrand, J. Hodges, R. Morgan, "Authentication
Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000
[LDAPTLS] J. Hodges, R. Morgan, M. Wahl, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer Security",
RFC 2830, May 2000
[RFC 2828] R. Shirey, "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May
2000
8. Author's Address
Rob Weltman
Netscape Communications Corp.
466 Ellis Street
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
+1 650 937-3194
rweltman@netscape.com
9. Acknowledgements
Mark Smith of Netscape Communications Corp., Mark Wahl of Sun
Microsystems, Inc, Kurt Zeilenga of OpenLDAP Foundation, Jim
Sermersheim of Novell, and Steven Legg of Adacel have contributed
with reviews of this draft.
10. Revision History
10.1 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-10.txt
Clarified the interaction of proxy access rights and normal access
control evaluation.
10.2 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-09.txt
Removed description of Control mechanism from Abstract.
Added description of how this is different from SASL authz to the
Introduction.
Expires November 2002 [Page 4]
PROXIED AUTHORIZATION CONTROL May 2002
Reworded description of the value of the control (no semantic
changes).
Added new result code TBD for failure to acquire proxy rights.
Added references to RFCs 2829 and 2830 in Security section.
10.3 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-08.txt
Proxied Authorization Control
Clarifications: the control may not be submitted with a startTLS
request; an empty controlValue implies the anonymous identity; only
one control may be included with a request.
Permission to execute as proxy
Replaced "proxy identity" with "proxied authorization identity".
Security Considerations
Added statement that anonymous users should not be allowed to assume
the identity of others.
10.4 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-07.txt
Proxied Authorization Control
Clarification: the content of the control is an LDAPString.
10.5 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-06.txt
None
Expires November 2002 [Page 5]
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10.6 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-05.txt
The control also applies to add and extended operations.
The control value is an authorization ID, not necessarily a DN.
Confidentiality concerns are mentioned.
10.7 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-04.txt
The control does not apply to bind, unbind, or abandon operations.
The proxy DN is represented as a string in the control, rather than
embedded in a sequence.
Support for the control is published in the supportedControl
attribute of the root DSE, not in supportedExtensions.
The security section mentions confidentiality issues with exposing an
additional identity.
10.8 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-03.txt
None
10.9 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-02.txt
The Control is now called Proxied Authorization Control, rather than
Proxied Authentication Control, to reflect that no authentication
occurs as a consequence of processing the Control.
Rather than containing an LDAPDN as the Control value, the Control
contains a Sequence (which contains an LDAPDN). This is to provide
for future extensions.
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INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation
Expires in six months 17 May 2002
LDAP Cancel Extended Operation
<draft-zeilenga-ldap-cancel-05.txt>
1. Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Working Group
mailing list <ietf-ldapext@netscape.com>. Please send editorial
comments directly to the author <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt>. The list of
Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>.
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
more information.
Abstract
This specification describes an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol) extended operation to cancel (or abandon) an outstanding
operation. Unlike the LDAP Abandon operation but like the X.511 DAP
Abandon operation, this operation has a response which provides an
indication of its outcome.
Zeilenga LDAP Cancel [Page 1]
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Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119].
Protocol elements are described using ASN.1 [X.680]. The term
"BER-encoded" means the element is to be encoded using the Basic
Encoding Rules [X.690] under the restrictions detailed in Section 5.1
of [RFC2251].
1. Background and Intent of Use
LDAP [RFC2251] provides an Abandon operation which clients may use to
cancel other operations. The Abandon operation does not have a
response and also calls for there to be no response of the abandoned
operation. These semantics provide the client with no clear
indication of the outcome of the Abandon operation.
X.511 DAP [X.511] provides an Abandon operation which does have a
response and also requires the abandoned operation to return a
response with indicating it was canceled. The Cancel operation is
modeled after the DAP Abandon operation.
The Cancel operation SHOULD be used instead of the LDAP Abandon
operation when the client needs an indication of the outcome. This
operation may be used to cancel both interrogation and update
operations.
4. Cancel Operation
The Cancel operation is defined as a LDAPv3 Extended Operation
[RFC2251, Section 4.12] identified by the OBJECT IDENTIFIER cancelOID.
This section details the syntax of the Cancel request and response
messages and defines additional LDAP resultCodes.
cancelOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= IANA-ASSIGNED
cancelRequestValue ::= SEQUENCE {
cancelID MessageID
}
4.1. Cancel Request
The Cancel request is an ExtendedRequest with the requestName field
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containing cancelOID OID and a requestValue field which contains a
cancelRequestValue value encoded per [RFC2251, Section 5.1]. The
cancelID field contains the message id associated with the operation
to be canceled.
4.2. Cancel Response
A Cancel response is an ExtendedResponse where the responseName and
response fields are absent.
4.3. Additional Result Codes
Implementations of this specification SHALL recognize the following
additional resultCode values:
canceled (IANA-ASSIGNED-1)
noSuchOperation (IANA-ASSIGNED-2)
tooLate (IANA-ASSIGNED-3)
cannotCancel (IANA-ASSIGNED-4)
5. Operational Semantics
The function of the Cancel Operation is to request that the server
cancel an outstanding operation issued within the same session.
The client requests the cancelation of an outstanding operation by
issuing a Cancel Response with a cancelID with the message id
identifying the outstanding operation. The Cancel Request itself has
a distinct message id. Clients SHOULD NOT request cancelation of an
operation multiple times.
If the server is unable to parse the requestValue or the requestValue
is absent, the server shall return protocolError.
If the server is willing and able to cancel the outstanding operation
identified by the cancelId, the server SHALL return a Cancel Response
with a success resultCode and the canceled operation SHALL fail with
canceled resultCode. Otherwise the Cancel Response SHALL have a
non-success resultCode and SHALL NOT have impact upon the outstanding
operation (if it exists).
The server SHALL return noSuchOperation if it has no knowledge of the
operation requested to be canceled.
The server SHALL return cannotCancel if the identified operation does
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not support cancelation or the cancel operation could not be
performed. The following classes of operations are not cancelable:
- operations which have no response,
- operations which associate or disassociate authentication and/or
authorization associations,
- operations which establish or tear-down security services, and
- operations which abandon or cancel other operations.
Specifically, Abandon, Bind, Start TLS [RFC2830], Unbind and Cancel
operations are not cancelable.
If the result of the outstanding operation has been determined by the
server, the outstanding operation SHALL NOT be canceled and the cancel
operation SHALL result in tooLate.
Servers SHOULD indicate their support for this extended operation by
providing cancelOID as a value of the supportedExtension attribute
type in their root DSE. A server MAY choose to advertise this
extension only when the client is authorized and/or has established
the necessary security protections to use this operation. Clients
SHOULD verify the server implements this extended operation prior to
attempting the operation by asserting the supportedExtension attribute
contains a value of cancelOID.
6. Security Considerations
This operation is intended to allow a user to cancel operations they
previously issued. No user should be allowed to cancel an operation
issued by another user (within the same session or not). However, as
this operation may only be used to cancel within the same session and
LDAP requires operations to be abandoned upon bind requests, this is a
non-issue.
Some operations should not be cancelable for security reasons. This
specification disallows cancelation of Bind operation and Start TLS
extended operation so as to avoid adding complexity to authentication,
authorization, and security layer semantics. Designers of future
extended operations and/or controls SHOULD disallow abandonment and
cancelation when appropriate.
7. IANA Considerations
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7.1. Object Identifiers
It is requested that IANA register a Directory Number OID for use in
this document upon Standards Action by the IESG. This OID will be
used to identify the LDAP Cancel extended operation as indicated
above. The following registration template is suggested:
Subject: Request for LDAP OID Registration
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Specification: RFCXXX
Author/Change Controller: IESG
7.2. LDAP Result Codes
It is requested that IANA register the LDAP result codes:
canceled (IANA-ASSIGNED-1)
noSuchOperation (IANA-ASSIGNED-2)
tooLate (IANA-ASSIGNED-3)
cannotCancel (IANA-ASSIGNED-4)
upon Standards Action by the IESG. The following registration
template is suggested:
Subject: LDAP Result Code Registration
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Result Code Name: canceled
Result Code Name: noSuchOperation
Result Code Name: tooLate
Result Code Name: cannotCancel
Specification: RFCXXXX
Author/Change Controller: IESG
Comments: request four consecutive result codes be assigned
8. Acknowledgment
This document is based upon input from the IETF LDAPext working group.
9. Normative References
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997.
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[RFC2251] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
[RFC2830] J. Hodges, R. Morgan, and M. Wahl, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer
Security", RFC 2830, May 2000.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification
of Basic Notation", X.680, 1994.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic,
Canonical, and Distinguished Encoding Rules", X.690, 1994.
9. Informative References
[X.511] ITU-T Rec. X.511, "The Directory: Abstract Service
Definition", 1993.
11. Author's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
<Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed,
or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE AUTHORS, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
Zeilenga LDAP Cancel [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-cancel-05 17 May 2002
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation
Expires in six months 17 May 2002
Collective Attributes in LDAP
<draft-zeilenga-ldap-collective-07.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Working Group
mailing list <ietf-ldapext@netscape.com>. Please send editorial
comments directly to the author <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt>. The list of
Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>.
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
more information.
Abstract
X.500 collective attributes allow common characteristics to be shared
between collections of entries. This document summarizes the X.500
information model for collective attributes and describes use of
collective attributes in LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).
This document provides schema definitions for collective attributes
for use in LDAP.
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Conventions
Schema definitions are provided using LDAPv3 description formats
[RFC2252]. Definitions provided here are formatted (line wrapped) for
readability.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119].
1. Introduction
In X.500, a collective attribute is "a user attribute whose values are
the same for each member of an entry collection" [X.501]. This
document details their use in the Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) [LDAPTS].
1.1. Entry Collections
A collection of entries is a grouping of object and alias entries
based upon common properties or shared relationship between the
corresponding entries which share certain attributes. An entry
collection consists of all entries within scope of a collective
attributes subentry [SUBENTRY]. An entry can belong to several entry
collections.
1.2. Collective Attributes
Attributes shared by the entries comprising an entry collection are
called collective attributes. Values of collective attributes are
visible but not updateable to clients accessing entries within the
collection. Collective attributes are updated (i.e. modified) via
their associated collective attributes subentry.
When an entry belongs to multiple entry collections, the entry's
values of each collective attribute are combined such that independent
sources of these values are not manifested to clients.
Entries can specifically exclude a particular collective attribute by
listing the attribute as a value of the collectiveExclusions
attribute. Like other user attributes, collective attributes are
subject to a variety of controls including access, administrative, and
content controls.
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2. System Schema for Collective Attributes
The following operational attributes are used to manage Collective
Attributes. LDAP servers [LDAPTS] MUST act in accordance with the
X.500 Directory Models [X.501] when providing this service.
2.1. collectiveAttributeSubentry
Subentries of this object class are used to administer collective
attributes and are referred to as collective attribute subentries.
( 2.5.20.2 NAME 'collectiveAttributeSubentry' AUXILIARY )
A collective attribute subentry SHOULD contain at least one collective
attribute. The collective attributes contained within a collective
attribute subentry are available for finding, searching, and
comparison at every entry within the scope of the subentry. The
collective attributes, however, are administered (e.g. modified) via
the subentry.
Implementations of this specification SHOULD support collective
attribute subentries in both collectiveAttributeSpecificArea
(2.5.23.5) and collectiveAttributeInnerArea (2.5.23.6) administrative
areas [SUBENTRY][X.501].
2.2. collectiveAttributeSubentries
The collectiveAttributeSubentries operational attribute identifies all
collective attribute subentries that affect the entry.
( 2.5.18.12 NAME 'collectiveAttributeSubentries'
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12
USAGE directoryOperation NO-USER-MODIFICATION )
2.3. collectiveExclusions
The collectiveExclusions operational attribute allows particular
collective attributes to be excluded from an entry. It MAY appear in
any entry and MAY have multiple values.
( 2.5.18.7 NAME 'collectiveExclusions'
EQUALITY objectIdentifierMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38
USAGE directoryOperation )
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The descriptor excludeAllCollectiveAttributes is associated with the
OID 2.5.18.0. When this descriptor or OID is present as a value of
the collectiveExclusions attribute, all collective attributes are
excluded from an entry.
3. Collective Attribute Types
A userApplications attribute type can be defined to be COLLECTIVE
[RFC2252]. This indicates that the same attribute values will appear
in the entries of an entry collection subject to the use of the
collectiveExclusions attribute and other administrative controls.
These administrative controls MAY include DIT Content Rules, if
implemented.
Collective attribute types are commonly defined as subtypes of non-
collective attribute types. By convention, collective attributes are
named by prefixing the name of their non-collective supertype with
"c-". For example, the collective telephone attribute is named
c-TelephoneNumber after its non-collective supertype telephoneNumber.
Non-collective attributes types SHALL NOT subtype collective
attributes.
Collective attributes SHALL NOT be SINGLE-VALUED. Collective
attribute types SHALL NOT appear in the attribute types of an object
class definition.
Operational attributes SHALL NOT be defined to be collective.
The remainder of section provides a summary of collective attributes
derived from those defined in [X.520]. The SUPerior attribute types
are described in [RFC 2256] for use with LDAP.
Implementations of this specification SHOULD support the following
collective attributes and MAY support additional collective
attributes.
3.1. Collective Locality Name
The c-l attribute type specifies a locality name for a collection of
entries.
( 2.5.4.7.1 NAME 'c-l'
SUP l COLLECTIVE )
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3.2. Collective State or Province Name
The c-st attribute type specifies a state or province name for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.8.1 NAME 'c-st'
SUP st COLLECTIVE )
3.3. Collective Street Address
The c-street attribute type specifies a street address for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.9.1 NAME 'c-street'
SUP street COLLECTIVE )
3.4. Collective Organization Name
The c-o attribute type specifies an organization name for a collection
of entries.
( 2.5.4.10.1 NAME 'c-o'
SUP o COLLECTIVE )
3.5. Collective Organizational Unit Name
The c-ou attribute type specifies an organizational unit name for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.11.1 NAME 'c-ou'
SUP ou COLLECTIVE )
3.6. Collective Postal Address
The c-PostalAddress attribute type specifies a postal address for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.16.1 NAME 'c-PostalAddress'
SUP postalAddress COLLECTIVE )
3.7. Collective Postal Code
The c-PostalCode attribute type specifies a postal code for a
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collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.17.1 NAME 'c-PostalCode'
SUP postalCode COLLECTIVE )
3.8. Collective Post Office Box
The c-PostOfficeBox attribute type specifies a post office box for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.18.1 NAME 'c-PostOfficeBox'
SUP postOfficeBox COLLECTIVE )
3.9. Collective Physical Delivery Office Name
The c-PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName attribute type specifies a physical
delivery office name for a collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.19.1 NAME 'c-PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName'
SUP physicalDeliveryOfficeName COLLECTIVE )
3.10. Collective Telephone Number
The c-TelephoneNumber attribute type specifies a telephone number for
a collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.20.1 NAME 'c-TelephoneNumber'
SUP telephoneNumber COLLECTIVE )
3.11. Collective Telex Number
The c-TelexNumber attribute type specifies a telex number for a
collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.21.1 NAME 'c-TelexNumber'
SUP telexNumber COLLECTIVE )
3.13. Collective Facsimile Telephone Number
The c-FacsimileTelephoneNumber attribute type specifies a facsimile
telephone number for a collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.23.1 NAME 'c-FacsimileTelephoneNumber'
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SUP facsimileTelephoneNumber COLLECTIVE )
3.14. Collective International ISDN Number
The c-InternationalISDNNumber attribute type specifies an
international ISDN number for a collection of entries.
( 2.5.4.25.1 NAME 'c-InternationalISDNNumber'
SUP internationalISDNNumber COLLECTIVE )
4. Security Considerations
Collective attributes are not believed to introduce any additional
security considerations to LDAP [LDAPTS].
5. IANA Considerations
It is requested that IANA register the LDAP descriptors used in this
document per the following registration template:
Subject: Request for LDAP Descriptor Registration
Descriptor (short name): see comment
Object Identifier: see comment
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Usage: see comment
Specification: RFCXXXX
Author/Change Controller: IESG
Comments:
NAME Type OID
------------------------ ---- -----------------
c-FacsimileTelephoneNumber A 2.5.4.23.1
c-InternationalISDNNumber A 2.5.4.25.1
c-PhysicalDeliveryOffice A 2.5.4.19.1
c-PostOfficeBox A 2.5.4.18.1
c-PostalAddress A 2.5.4.16.1
c-PostalCode A 2.5.4.17.1
c-TelephoneNumber A 2.5.4.20.1
c-TelexNumber A 2.5.4.21.1
c-l A 2.5.4.7.1
c-o A 2.5.4.10.1
c-ou A 2.5.4.11.1
c-st A 2.5.4.8.1
c-street A 2.5.4.9.1
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collectiveAttributeSubentries A 2.5.18.12
collectiveAttributeSubentry O 2.5.20.2
collectiveExclusions A 2.5.18.7
where Type A is Attribute and Type O is ObjectClass.
This document uses in this document were assigned by the ISO/IEC Joint
Technical Committee 1 - Subcommitte 6 to identify elements of X.500
schema. This document make no OID assignments, it only associates
LDAP schema descriptions with existing elements of X.500 schema.
6. Acknowledgments
This document is based upon the ITU Recommendations for the Directory
[X.501][X.520].
7. Author's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
<Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997.
[RFC2251] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
[RFC2252] M. Wahl, A. Coulbeck, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (v3): Attribute Syntax
Definitions", RFC 2252, December 1997.
[RFC2256] M. Wahl, "A Summary of the X.500(96) User Schema for use
with LDAPv3", RFC 2256, December 1997.
[LDAPTS] J. Hodges, R.L. Morgan, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3): Technical Specification",
draft-ietf-ldapbis-ldapv3-ts-xx.txt.
[SUBENTRY] K. Zeilenga, S. Legg, "Subentries in LDAP",
draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-xx.txt, a work in progress.
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-collective-07 [Page 8]
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[X.501] "The Directory: Models", ITU-T Recommendation X.501, 1993.
9. Informative References
[X.500] "The Directory: Overview of Concepts, Models", ITU-T
Recommendation X.500, 1993.
[X.520] "The Directory: Selected Attribute Types", ITU-T
Recommendation X.520, 1993.
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed,
or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE AUTHORS, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation
Date: 17 May 2002 Steven Legg
Expires in six months Adacel Technologies
Subentries in LDAP
<draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Working Group
mailing list <ietf-ldapext@netscape.com>. Please send editorial
comments directly to the author <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt>. The list of
Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>.
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
more information.
Abstract
In X.500 directories, subentries are special entries used to hold
information associated with a subtree or subtree refinement. This
document adapts X.500 subentries mechanisms for use with Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).
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Conventions
Schema definitions are provided using LDAP description formats
[RFC2252]. Definitions provided here are formatted (line wrapped) for
readability.
Protocol elements are described using ASN.1 [X.680]. The term
"BER-encoded" means the element is to be encoded using the Basic
Encoding Rules [X.690] under the restrictions detailed in Section 5.1
of [RFC2251].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119].
1. Overview
From [X.501]:
A subentry is a special kind of entry immediately subordinate to
an administrative point. It contains attributes that pertain to a
subtree (or subtree refinement) associated with its administrative
point. The subentries and their administrative point are part of
the same naming context.
A single subentry may serve all or several aspects of
administrative authority. Alternatively, a specific aspect of
administrative authority may be handled through one or more of its
own subentries.
Subentries in Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [LDAPTS]
SHALL behave in accordance with X.501 unless noted otherwise in this
specification.
In absence of the subentries control (detailed in Section 3),
subentries SHALL NOT be considered in one-level and subtree scope
search operations. For all other operations, including base scope
search operations, subentries SHALL be considered.
2. Subentry Schema
2.1. Subtree Specification Syntax
The Subtree Specification syntax provides a general purpose mechanism
for the specification of a subset of entries in a subtree of the
Directory Information Tree (DIT). A subtree begins at some base entry
and includes the subordinates of that entry down to some identified
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lower boundary, possibly extending to the leaf entries. A subtree
specification is always used within a context or scope which
implicitly determines the bounds of the subtree. For example, the
scope of a subtree specification for a subschema administrative area
does not include the subtrees of any subordinate administrative point
entries for subschema administration. Where a subtree specification
does not identify a contiguous subset of the entries within a single
subtree the collection is termed a subtree refinement.
This syntax corresponds to the SubtreeSpecification ASN.1 type
described in [X.501], Section 11.3. This ASN.1 data type definition
is reproduced here for completeness.
SubtreeSpecification ::= SEQUENCE {
base [0] LocalName DEFAULT { },
COMPONENTS OF ChopSpecification,
specificationFilter [4] Refinement OPTIONAL }
LocalName ::= RDNSequence
ChopSpecification ::= SEQUENCE {
specificExclusions [1] SET OF CHOICE {
chopBefore [0] LocalName,
chopAfter [1] LocalName } OPTIONAL,
minimum [2] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
maximum [3] BaseDistance OPTIONAL}
BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0 .. MAX)
Refinement ::= CHOICE {
item [0] OBJECT-CLASS.&id,
and [1] SET OF Refinement,
or [2] SET OF Refinement,
not [3] Refinement }
The components of SubtreeSpecification are: base, which identifies the
base entry of the subtree or subtree refinement, and
specificExclusions, minimum, maximum and specificationFilter, which
then reduce the set of subordinate entries of the base entry. The
subtree or subtree refinement contains all the entries within scope
that are not excluded by any of the components of the subtree
specification. When all of the components of SubtreeSpecification are
absent (i.e. when a value of the Subtree Specification syntax is the
empty sequence, {}), the subtree so specified implicitly includes all
the entries within scope.
Any particular use of this mechanism MAY impose limitations or
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 3]
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constraints on the components of SubtreeSpecification.
The LDAP syntax specification is:
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.45 DESC 'SubtreeSpecification' )
The native LDAP encoding of values of this syntax is defined by the
Generic String Encoding Rules [GSER]. Appendix A provides an
equivalent ABNF for this syntax.
2.1.1. Base
The base component of SubtreeSpecification nominates the base entry of
the subtree or subtree refinement. The base entry may be an entry
which is subordinate to the root entry of the scope in which the
subtree specification is used, in which case the base component
contains a sequence of RDNs relative to the root entry of the scope,
or may be the root entry of the scope itself (the default), in which
case the base component is absent or contains an empty sequence of
RDNs.
Entries that are not subordinates of the base entry are excluded from
the subtree or subtree refinement.
2.1.2. Specific Exclusions
The specificExclusions component of a ChopSpecification is a list of
exclusions that specify entries and their subordinates to be excluded
from the the subtree or subtree refinement. The entry is specified by
a sequence of RDNs relative to the base entry (i.e. a LocalName).
Each exclusion is of either the chopBefore or chopAfter form. If the
chopBefore form is used then the specified entry and its subordinates
are excluded from the subtree or subtree refinement. If the chopAfter
form is used then only the subordinates of the specified entry are
excluded from the subtree or subtree refinement.
2.1.3. Minimum and Maximum
The minimum and maximum components of a ChopSpecification allow the
exclusion of entries based on their depth in the DIT.
Entries that are less than the minimum number of RDN arcs below the
base entry are excluded from the subtree or subtree refinement. A
minimum value of zero (the default) corresponds to the base entry.
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Entries that are more than the maximum number of RDN arcs below the
base entry are excluded from the subtree or subtree refinement. An
absent maximum component indicates that there is no upper limit on the
number of RDN arcs below the base entry for entries in the subtree or
subtree refinement.
2.1.4. Specification Filter
The specificationFilter component is a boolean expression of
assertions about the values of the objectClass attribute of the base
entry and its subordinates. A Refinement assertion item evaluates to
true for an entry if that entry's objectClass attribute contains the
OID nominated in the assertion. Entries for which the overall filter
evaluates to false are excluded from the subtree refinement. If the
specificationFilter is absent then no entries are excluded from the
subtree or subtree refinement because of their objectClass attribute
values.
2.2. Administrative Role Attribute Type
The Administrative Model defined in [X.501], clause 10 requires that
administrative entries contain an administrativeRole attribute to
indicate that the associated administrative area is concerned with one
or more administrative roles.
The administrativeRole operational attribute is specified as follows:
( 2.5.18.5 NAME 'administrativeRole'
EQUALITY objectIdentifierMatch
USAGE directoryOperation
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38 )
The possible values of this attribute defined in X.501 are:
OID NAME
-------- -------------------------------
2.5.23.1 autonomousArea
2.5.23.2 accessControlSpecificArea
2.5.23.3 accessControlInnerArea
2.5.23.4 subschemaAdminSpecificArea
2.5.23.5 collectiveAttributeSpecificArea
2.5.23.6 collectiveAttributeInnerArea
Other values may be defined in other specifications. Names associated
with each administrative role are Object Identifier Descriptors
[LDAPIANA].
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 5]
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The administrativeRole operational attribute is also used to regulate
the subentries permitted to be subordinate to an administrative entry.
A subentry not of a class permitted by the administrativeRole
attribute cannot be subordinate to the administrative entry.
2.3. Subtree Specification Attribute Type
The subtreeSpecification operational attribute is defined as follows:
( 2.5.18.6 NAME 'subtreeSpecification'
SINGLE-VALUE
USAGE directoryOperation
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.45 )
This attribute is present in all subentries. See [X.501], clause 10.
Values of the subtreeSpecification attribute nominate collections of
entries within the DIT for one or more aspects of administrative
authority.
2.4. Subentry Object Class
The subentry object class is a structural object class.
( 2.5.20.0 NAME 'subentry'
SUP top STRUCTURAL
MUST ( cn $ subtreeSpecification ) )
3. Subentries Control
The subentries control MAY be sent with a searchRequest to control the
visibility of entries and subentries which are within scope.
Non-visible entries or subentries are not returned in response to the
request.
The subentries control is an LDAP Control whose controlType is
1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.10.1, criticality is TRUE or FALSE (hence absent),
and controlValue contains a BER-encoded BOOLEAN indicating visibility.
A controlValue containing the value TRUE indicates that subentries are
visible and normal entries are not. A controlValue containing the
value FALSE indicates that normal entries are visible and subentries
are not.
Note that TRUE visibility has the three octet encoding { 01 01 FF }
and FALSE visibility has the three octet encoding { 01 01 00 }.
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 6]
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The controlValue SHALL NOT be absent.
In absence of this control, subentries are not visible to singleLevel
and wholeSubtree scope Search requests but are visible to baseObject
scope Search requests.
There is no corresponding response control.
This control is not appropriate for non-Search operations.
4. Security Considerations
Subentries often hold administrative information or other sensitive
information and should be protected from unauthorized access and
disclosure as described in [RFC2829][RFC2830].
General LDAP [LDAPTS] security considerations also apply.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1 Descriptors
It is requested that IANA register the LDAP descriptors used in this
document per the following registration template:
Subject: Request for LDAP Descriptor Registration
Descriptor (short name): see comment
Object Identifier: see comment
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Usage: see comment
Specification: RFCXXXX
Author/Change Controller: IESG
Comments:
NAME Type OID
------------------------ ---- --------
accessControlInnerArea R 2.5.23.3
accessControlSpecificArea R 2.5.23.2
administrativeRole A 2.5.18.5
autonomousArea R 2.5.23.1
collectiveAttributeInnerArea R 2.5.23.6
collectiveAttributeSpecificArea R 2.5.23.5
subentry O 2.5.20.0
subschemaAdminSpecificArea R 2.5.23.4
subtreeSpecification A 2.5.18.6
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 7]
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where Type A is Attribute, Type O is ObjectClass, and Type R is
Administrative Role.
5.2 Object Identifiers
No IANA assignment of object identifiers is requested.
This document uses the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.10.1 to identify an LDAP
protocol element defined herein. This OID was assigned [ASSIGN] by
OpenLDAP Foundation under its IANA assigned private enterprise
allocation [PRIVATE] for use in this specification.
Other OIDs which appear in this document were either assigned by the
ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 - Subcommitte 6 to identify
elements of X.500 schema or assigned in RFC 2252 for the use described
here.
6. Acknowledgment
This document is based on engineering done by IETF LDUP and LDAPext
Working Groups including "LDAP Subentry Schema" by Ed Reed. This
document also borrows from a number of ITU documents including X.501.
7. Authors' Addresses
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org
Steven Legg
Adacel Technologies Ltd.
405-409 Ferntree Gully Road
Mount Waverley, Victoria 3149
AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 3 9451 2107
Fax: +61 3 9541 2121
EMail: steven.legg@adacel.com.au
8. Normative References
[X.501] ITU-T, "The Directory -- Models," X.501, 1993.
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 8]
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[X.680] ITU-T, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) -
Specification of Basic Notation", X.680, 1994.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic,
Canonical, and Distinguished Encoding Rules", X.690, 1994.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (was RFC 2119), March 1997.
[RFC2251] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
[RFC2252] M. Wahl, A. Coulbeck, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (v3): Attribute Syntax
Definitions", RFC 2252, December 1997.
[RFC2829] M. Wahl, H. Alvestrand, J. Hodges, R. Morgan,
"Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000
[RFC2830] J. Hodges, R. Morgan, M. Wahl, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer
Security", RFC 2830, May 2000.
[LDAPTS] J. Hodges, R.L. Morgan, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (v3): Technical Specification",
draft-ietf-ldapbis-ldapv3-ts-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[GSER] S. Legg, "Generic String Encoding Rules for ASN.1 Types",
draft-legg-ldapext-gser--xx.txt, a work in progress.
[LDAPIANA] K. Zeilenga, "IANA Considerations for LDAP", draft-ietf-
ldapbis-iana-xx.txt, a work in progress.
9. Informative References
[RFC2234] D. Crocker, P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[GCE] S. Legg, "Common Elements of GSER Encodings",
draft-legg-ldap-gser-abnf-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[ASSIGN] OpenLDAP Foundation, "OpenLDAP OID Delegations",
http://www.openldap.org/foundation/oid-delegate.txt.
[PRIVATE] IANA, "Private Enterprise Numbers",
http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers.
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A. Subtree Specification ABNF
This appendix is non-normative.
The LDAP-specific native string encoding for the Subtree Specification
syntax is specified by the Generic String Encoding Rules [GSER]. The
ABNF [RFC2234] in this appendix for this syntax is provided only as a
convenience and is equivalent to the encoding specified by the
application of [GSER]. Since the SubtreeSpecification ASN.1 type may
be extended in future editions of [X.501], the provided ABNF should be
regarded as a snapshot in time. The native LDAP encoding for any
extension to the SubtreeSpecification ASN.1 type can be determined
from [GSER].
In the event that there is a discrepancy between this ABNF and the
encoding determined by [GSER], [GSER] is to be taken as definitive.
SubtreeSpecification = "{" [ sp base ]
[ sep sp specificExclusions ]
[ sep sp minimum ]
[ sep sp maximum ]
[ sep sp specificationFilter ]
sp "}"
base = id-base msp LocalName
specificExclusions = id-specificExclusions msp SpecificExclusions
minimum = id-minimum msp BaseDistance
maximum = id-maximum msp BaseDistance
specificationFilter = id-specificationFilter msp Refinement
id-base = %x62.61.73.65 ; "base"
id-specificExclusions = %x73.70.65.63.69.66.69.63.45.78.63.6C.75.73
%x69.6F.6E.73 ; "specificExclusions"
id-minimum = %x6D.69.6E.69.6D.75.6D ; "minimum"
id-maximum = %x6D.61.78.69.6D.75.6D ; "maximum"
id-specificationFilter = %x73.70.65.63.69.66.69.63.61.74.69.6F.6E.46
%x69.6C.74.65.72 ; "specificationFilter"
SpecificExclusions = "{" sp SpecificExclusion
*( "," sp SpecificExclusion ) sp "}"
SpecificExclusion = chopBefore / chopAfter
chopBefore = id-chopBefore ":" LocalName
chopAfter = id-chopAfter ":" LocalName
id-chopBefore = %x63.68.6F.70.42.65.66.6F.72.65 ; "chopBefore"
id-chopAfter = %x63.68.6F.70.41.66.74.65.72 ; "chopAfter"
Refinement = item / and / or / not
item = id-item ":" OBJECT-IDENTIFIER
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and = id-and ":" Refinements
or = id-or ":" Refinements
not = id-not ":" Refinement
Refinements = "{" [ sp Refinement
*( "," sp Refinement ) ] sp "}"
id-item = %x69.74.65.6D ; "item"
id-and = %x61.6E.64 ; "and"
id-or = %x6F.72 ; "or"
id-not = %x6E.6F.74 ; "not"
BaseDistance = INTEGER
The <sp>, <msp>, <sep>, <INTEGER>, <OBJECT-IDENTIFIER> and <LocalName>
rules are defined in [GCE].
Copyright 2002, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed,
or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE AUTHORS, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Zeilenga draft-zeilenga-ldap-subentry-05 [Page 11]