upstream/haproxy
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy.git synced 2026-04-24 15:49:14 -04:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 9

BUG/MEDIUM: mux-fcgi: prevent record-length truncation with large bufsize

Browse source 
FCGI content_length is a 16-bit field but fcgi_set_record_size()
is called with size_t/uint32_t arguments. With tune.bufsize >= 65544
(legal; cfgparse-global.c only enforces <= INT_MAX-16), a single
HTX DATA block or accumulated outbuf can exceed 65535 bytes. The
implicit conversion to uint16_t silently truncates the length field
while b_add(mbuf, outbuf.data) writes the full body.

A client posting ~99000 bytes can craft the body so that bytes
after the truncated length are parsed by PHP-FPM as fresh FCGI
records on the connection: a smuggled BEGIN_REQUEST + PARAMS with
arbitrary SCRIPT_FILENAME / PHP_VALUE bypasses all haproxy ACLs.

Fix the zero-copy path by refusing it when the block exceeds 65535
bytes (falls through to copy). Fix the copy path by capping
outbuf.size to 65535 + header so the data-fill loop naturally
stops at the FCGI maximum and emits the rest in a subsequent record.

The PARAMS path at line 2084 is similarly affected but harder to
trigger (requires combined header+param size > 65535) and is
covered by the same outbuf.size cap pattern if applied there.

This patch must be backported to all stable versions.
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2026-04-09 13:06:46 +02:00 committed by Christopher Faulet
parent e6c3660327
commit 0aeae23056
1 changed files with 18 additions and 1 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

19
src/mux_fcgi.c
View file

@ -1914,6 +1914,11 @@ static size_t fcgi_strm_send_params(struct fcgi_conn *fconn, struct fcgi_strm *f
if (outbuf.size < FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ)
goto full;
/* FCGI record size is uint16_t; cap output to avoid truncation in
* fcgi_set_record_size() when tune.bufsize is large. */
if (outbuf.size > 0xFFFF + FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ)
outbuf.size = 0xFFFF + FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ;
/* vsn: 1(FCGI_VERSION), type: (4)FCGI_PARAMS, id: fstrm->id,
* len: 0x0000 (fill later), padding: 0x00, rsv: 0x00 */
memcpy(outbuf.area, "\x01\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ);
@ -2153,7 +2158,14 @@ static size_t fcgi_strm_send_stdin(struct fcgi_conn *fconn, struct fcgi_strm *fs
goto end;
type = htx_get_blk_type(blk);
size = htx_get_blksz(blk);
if (unlikely(size == count && b_size(mbuf) == b_size(buf) &&
/* FCGI content_len is uint16_t. With tune.bufsize >= 65544 a single
* HTX block can exceed 65535 bytes; the implicit truncation in
* fcgi_set_record_size() would then desynchronize the record
* stream and let the client smuggle a forged FCGI request to the
* backend. Refuse zero-copy in that case and let the copy path
* split the data across multiple records.
*/
if (unlikely(size <= 0xFFFF && size == count && b_size(mbuf) == b_size(buf) &&
htx_nbblks(htx) == 1 && type == HTX_BLK_DATA)) {
void *old_area = mbuf->area;
int eom = (htx->flags & HTX_FL_EOM);
@ -2212,6 +2224,11 @@ static size_t fcgi_strm_send_stdin(struct fcgi_conn *fconn, struct fcgi_strm *fs
if (outbuf.size < FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ + extra_bytes)
goto full;
/* FCGI content_len is uint16_t; cap output to avoid truncation in
* fcgi_set_record_size() when tune.bufsize is large. */
if (outbuf.size > 0xFFFF + FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ)
outbuf.size = 0xFFFF + FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ;
/* vsn: 1(FCGI_VERSION), type: (5)FCGI_STDIN, id: fstrm->id,
* len: 0x0000 (fill later), padding: 0x00, rsv: 0x00 */
memcpy(outbuf.area, "\x01\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", FCGI_RECORD_HEADER_SZ);