The PTHREAD_MUTEX_ADAPTIVE_NP and PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK_NP are
usually not defines, but enum values, so simple preprocessor check
doesn't work.
Check for PTHREAD_MUTEX_ADAPTIVE_NP from the autoconf AS_COMPILE_IFELSE
block and define HAVE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_ADAPTIVE_NP. This should enable
adaptive mutex on Linux and FreeBSD.
As PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK actually comes from POSIX and Linux glibc
does define it when compatibility macros are being set, we can just use
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK instead of PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK_NP.
When automatic-interface-scan is disabled, the route socket was still
being opened. Add new API to connect / disconnect from the route socket
only as needed.
Additionally, move the block that disables periodic interface rescans to
a place where it actually have access to the configuration values.
Previously, the values were being checked before the configuration was
loaded.
Decrementing optlen immediately before calling continue is unneccesary
and inconsistent with the rest of dns_message_pseudosectiontoyaml
and dns_message_pseudosectiontotext. Coverity was also reporting
an impossible false positive overflow of optlen (CID 499061).
4176 } else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_CLIENT_TAG) {
4177 uint16_t id;
4178 ADD_STRING(target, "; CLIENT-TAG:");
4179 if (optlen == 2U) {
4180 id = isc_buffer_getuint16(&optbuf);
4181 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), " %u\n", id);
4182 ADD_STRING(target, buf);
CID 499061: (#1 of 1): Overflowed constant (INTEGER_OVERFLOW)
overflow_const: Expression optlen, which is equal to 65534, underflows
the type that receives it, an unsigned integer 16 bits wide.
4183 optlen -= 2;
4184 POST(optlen);
4185 continue;
4186 }
4187 } else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_SERVER_TAG) {
There are use cases for which shorter timeout values make sense.
For example if there is a load balancer which sets RD=1 and
forwards queries to a BIND resolver which is then configured to
talk to backend servers which are not visible in the public NS set.
WIth a shorter timeout value the frontend can give back SERVFAIL
early when backends are not available and the ultimate client will
not penalize the BIND-frontend for non-response.
The period between the most significant nibble of the IPv4 address
and the 2.0.0.2.IP6.ARPA suffix was missing resulting in the wrong
name being checked.
In yaml mode we emit a string for each question and record. Certain
names and data could result in invalid yaml being produced. Use single
quote string for all questions and records. This requires that single
quotes get converted to two quotes within the string.
ALPN are defined as 1*255OCTET in RFC 9460. commatxt_fromtext was not
rejecting invalid inputs produces by missing a level of escaping
which where later caught be dns_rdata_fromwire on reception.
These inputs should have been rejected
svcb in svcb 1 1.svcb alpn=\,abc
svcb1 in svcb 1 1.svcb alpn=a\,\,abc
and generated 00 03 61 62 63 and 01 61 00 02 61 62 63 respectively.
The correct inputs to include commas in the alpn requires double
escaping.
svcb in svcb 1 1.svcb alpn=\\,abc
svcb1 in svcb 1 1.svcb alpn=a\\,\\,abc
and generate 04 2C 61 62 63 and 06 61 2C 2C 61 62 63 respectively.
Due to the maximum query restart limitation a long CNAME chain
it is cut after 16 queries but named still returns NOERROR.
Return SERVFAIL instead and the partial answer.
On a 32 bit machine casting to size_t can still lead to an overflow.
Cast to uint64_t. Also detect all possible negative values for
pages and pagesize to silence warning about possible negative value.
39#if defined(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE)
1. tainted_data_return: Called function sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES),
and a possible return value may be less than zero.
2. assign: Assigning: pages = sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES).
40 long pages = sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES);
41 long pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
42
3. Condition pages == -1, taking false branch.
4. Condition pagesize == -1, taking false branch.
43 if (pages == -1 || pagesize == -1) {
44 return (0);
45 }
46
5. overflow: The expression (size_t)pages * pagesize might be negative,
but is used in a context that treats it as unsigned.
CID 498034: (#1 of 1): Overflowed return value (INTEGER_OVERFLOW)
6. return_overflow: (size_t)pages * pagesize, which might have underflowed,
is returned from the function.
47 return ((size_t)pages * pagesize);
48#endif /* if defined(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE) */
The key lifetime should no longer be adjusted if the key is being
retired earlier, for example because a manual rollover was started.
This would falsely be seen as a dnssec-policy lifetime reconfiguration,
and would adjust the retire/removed time again.
This also means we should update the status output, and the next
rollover scheduled is now calculated using (retire-active) instead of
key lifetime.
If dnssec-policy is reconfigured and the key lifetime has changed,
update existing keys with the new lifetime and adjust the retire
and removed timing metadata accordingly.
If the key has no lifetime yet, just initialize the lifetime. It
may be that the retire/removed timing metadata has already been set.
Skip keys which goal is not set to omnipresent. These keys are already
in the progress of retiring, or still unused.
This commit ensures that we are not attempting to accept an expired
TCP connection as we are not interested in any data that could have
been accumulated in its internal buffers. Now we just drop them for
good.
When sending fails, the ns__client_request() would not reset the
connection and continue as nothing is happening. This comes from the
model that we don't care about failed UDP sends because datagrams are
unreliable anyway, but it greatly affects TCP connections with
keep-alive.
The worst case scenario is as follows:
1. the 3-way TCP handshake gets completed
2. the libuv calls the "uv_connection_cb" callback
3. the TCP connection gets queue because of the tcp-clients quota
4. the TCP client sends as many DNS messages as the buffers allow
5. the TCP connection gets dropped by the client due to the timeout
6. the TCP connection gets accepted by the server
7. the data already sent by the client gets read
8. all sending fails immediately because the TCP connection is dead
9. we consume all the data in the buffer in a very tight loop
As it doesn't make sense to trying to process more data on the TCP
connection when the sending is failing, drop the connection immediately
on the first sending error.
As ns_query_init() cannot fail now, remove the error paths, especially
in ns__client_setup() where we now don't have to care what to do with
the connection if setting up the client could fail. It couldn't fail
even before, but now it's formal.
Be more aggressive when throttling the reading - when we can't send the
outgoing TCP synchronously with uv_try_write(), we start throttling the
reading immediately instead of waiting for the send buffers to fill up.
This should not affect behaved clients that read the data from the TCP
on the other end.
Instead of outright refusing to add new RR types to the cache, be a bit
smarter:
1. If the new header type is in our priority list, we always add either
positive or negative entry at the beginning of the list.
2. If the new header type is negative entry, and we are over the limit,
we mark it as ancient immediately, so it gets evicted from the cache
as soon as possible.
3. Otherwise add the new header after the priority headers (or at the
head of the list).
4. If we are over the limit, evict the last entry on the normal header
list.
Add HTTPS, SVCB, SRV, PTR, NAPTR, DNSKEY and TXT records to the list of
the priority types that are put at the beginning of the slabheader list
for faster access and to avoid eviction when there are more types than
the max-types-per-name limit.
Due to omission it was possible to un-throttle a TCP connection
previously throttled due to the peer not reading back data we are
sending.
In particular, that affected DoH code, but it could also affect other
transports (the current or future ones) that pause/resume reading
according to its internal state.
Clear qctx->zversion when clearing qctx->zrdataset et al in
lib/ns/query.c:qctx_freedata. The uncleared pointer could lead to
an assertion failure if zone data needed to be re-saved which could
happen with stale data support enabled.
A different solution in the future might be adopted depending
on feedback and other new information, so it makes sense to mark
these options as EXPERIMENTAL until we have more data.
View matching on an incoming query checks the query's signature,
which can be a CPU-heavy task for a SIG(0)-signed message. Implement
an asynchronous mode of the view matching function which uses the
offloaded signature checking facilities, and use it for the incoming
queries.
Add support for using the offload threadpool to perform message
signature verifications. This should allow check SIG(0)-signed
messages without affecting the worker threads.
This is a tiny helper function which is used only once and can be
replaced with two function calls instead. Removing this makes
supporting asynchronous signature checking less complicated.
In order to protect from a malicious DNS client that sends many
queries with a SIG(0)-signed message, add a quota of simultaneously
running SIG(0) checks.
This protection can only help when named is using more than one worker
threads. For example, if named is running with the '-n 4' option, and
'sig0checks-quota 2;' is used, then named will make sure to not use
more than 2 workers for the SIG(0) signature checks in parallel, thus
leaving the other workers to serve the remaining clients which do not
use SIG(0)-signed messages.
That limitation is going to change when SIG(0) signature checks are
offloaded to "slow" threads in a future commit.
The 'sig0checks-quota-exempt' ACL option can be used to exempt certain
clients from the quota requirements using their IP or network addresses.
The 'sig0checks-quota-maxwait-ms' option is used to define a maximum
amount of time for named to wait for a quota to appear. If during that
time no new quota becomes available, named will answer to the client
with DNS_R_REFUSED.
By default we log a rekey failure on debug level. We should probably
change the log level to error. We make an exception for when the zone
is not loaded yet, it often happens at startup that a rekey is
run before the zone is fully loaded.
when signatures were not added because of too many types already
existing at a node, the diff was not being cleaned up; this led to
a memory leak being reported at shutdown.
Previously, the number of RR types for a single owner name was limited
only by the maximum number of the types (64k). As the data structure
that holds the RR types for the database node is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through the whole list (again and
again), adding a large number of RR types for a single owner named with
would slow down processing of such name (database node).
Add a configurable limit to cap the number of the RR types for a single
owner. This is enforced at the database (rbtdb, qpzone, qpcache) level
and configured with new max-types-per-name configuration option that
can be configured globally, per-view and per-zone.
Previously, the number of RRs in the RRSets were internally unlimited.
As the data structure that holds the RRs is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through all of the RRs, adding an
RRSet with huge number of RRs inside would slow down processing of said
RRSets.
Add a configurable limit to cap the number of the RRs in a single RRSet.
This is enforced at the database (rbtdb, qpzone, qpcache) level and
configured with new max-records-per-type configuration option that can
be configured globally, per-view and per-zone.
The changes in this MR prevent the memory used for sending the outgoing
TCP requests to spike so much. That strictly remove the extra need for
own memory context, and thus since we generally prefer simplicity,
remove the extra memory context with own jemalloc arenas just for the
outgoing send buffers.
The single TCP read can create as much as 64k divided by the minimum
size of the DNS message. This can clog the processing thread and trash
the memory allocator because we need to do as much as ~20k allocations in
a single UV loop tick.
Limit the number of the DNS messages processed in a single UV loop tick
to just single DNS message and limit the number of the outstanding DNS
messages back to 23. This effectively limits the number of pipelined
DNS messages to that number (this is the limit we already had before).
As a single thread can process only one TCP send at the time, we don't
really need a memory pool for the TCP buffers, but it's enough to have
a single per-loop (client manager) static buffer that's being used to
assemble the DNS message and then it gets copied into own sending
buffer.
In the future, this should get optimized by exposing the uv_try API
from the network manager, and first try to send the message directly
and allocate the sending buffer only if we need to send the data
asynchronously.
