- all tests with "recursion yes" now also specify "dnssec-validation yes",
and all tests with "recursion no" also specify "dnssec-validation no".
this must be maintained in all new tests, or else validation will fail
when we use local root zones for testing.
- clean.sh has been modified where necessary to remove managed-keys.bind
and viewname.mkeys files.
- the default setting for dnssec-validation is now "auto", which
activates DNSSEC validation using the IANA root key. The old behavior
can be restored by explicitly setting "dnssec-validation yes", which
"yes", which activates DNSSEC validation only if keys are explicitly
configured in named.conf.
- the ARM has been updated to describe the new behavior
This commit reverts the previous change to use system provided
entropy, as (SYS_)getrandom is very slow on Linux because it is
a syscall.
The change introduced in this commit adds a new call isc_nonce_buf
that uses CSPRNG from cryptographic library provider to generate
secure data that can be and must be used for generating nonces.
Example usage would be DNS cookies.
The isc_random() API has been changed to use fast PRNG that is not
cryptographically secure, but runs entirely in user space. Two
contestants have been considered xoroshiro family of the functions
by Villa&Blackman and PCG by O'Neill. After a consideration the
xoshiro128starstar function has been used as uint32_t random number
provider because it is very fast and has good enough properties
for our usage pattern.
The other change introduced in the commit is the more extensive usage
of isc_random_uniform in places where the usage pattern was
isc_random() % n to prevent modulo bias. For usage patterns where
only 16 or 8 bits are needed (DNS Message ID), the isc_random()
functions has been renamed to isc_random32(), and isc_random16() and
isc_random8() functions have been introduced by &-ing the
isc_random32() output with 0xffff and 0xff. Please note that the
functions that uses stripped down bit count doesn't pass our
NIST SP 800-22 based random test.
- added a 1-second floor to max-stale-ttl similar to stale-answer-ttl;
if set to 0, it will be silently updated to 1.
- fixed the ARM entry on max-stale-ttl, which incorrectly suggested that
the default was 0 instead of 1 week.
- clarified rndc serve-stale documentation.
- mark the 'geoip-use-ecs' option obsolete; warn when it is used
in named.conf
- prohibit 'ecs' ACL tags in named.conf; note that this is a fatal error
since simply ignoring the tags could make ACLs behave unpredictably
- re-simplify the radix and iptable code
- clean up dns_acl_match(), dns_aclelement_match(), dns_acl_allowed()
and dns_geoip_match() so they no longer take ecs options
- remove the ECS-specific unit and system test cases
- remove references to ECS from the ARM
- Replace external -DOPENSSL/-DPKCS11CRYPTO with properly AC_DEFINEd
HAVE_OPENSSL/HAVE_PKCS11
- Don't enforce the crypto provider from platform.h, just from dst_api.c
and configure scripts
The three functions has been modeled after the arc4random family of
functions, and they will always return random bytes.
The isc_random family of functions internally use these CSPRNG (if available):
1. getrandom() libc call (might be available on Linux and Solaris)
2. SYS_getrandom syscall (might be available on Linux, detected at runtime)
3. arc4random(), arc4random_buf() and arc4random_uniform() (available on BSDs and Mac OS X)
4. crypto library function:
4a. RAND_bytes in case OpenSSL
4b. pkcs_C_GenerateRandom() in case PKCS#11 library
When inline signing is enabled for a zone without creating signing keys
for it, changes subsequently applied to the raw zone will not be
reflected in the secure zone due to the dns_update_signaturesinc() call
inside receive_secure_serial() failing. Given that an inline zone will
be served (without any signatures) even with no associated signing keys
being present, keep applying raw zone deltas to the secure zone until
keys become available in an attempt to follow the principle of least
astonishment.
