From 7c5b8ef055900224f0424c341927562c5a9ebe19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 08:07:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Fail the DNSSEC validation if matching but invalid
 DNSKEY is found

If a matching but cryptographically invalid key was encountered during
the DNSSEC validation, the key would be just skipped and not counted
towards validation failures.  Treat such DNSSEC keys as hard failures
and fail the DNSSEC validation immediatelly instead of continuing the
DNSSEC validation with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.

Co-authored-by: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@isc.org>

(cherry picked from commit f00117a4226be90d1bc865aff19bddf114242914)
---
 lib/dns/validator.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/dns/validator.c b/lib/dns/validator.c
index 55138d2590..6c21d35e64 100644
--- a/lib/dns/validator.c
+++ b/lib/dns/validator.c
@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ fetch_callback_dnskey(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
 			result = select_signing_key(val, rdataset);
 			if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 				val->keyset = &val->frdataset;
+			} else {
+				val->failed = true;
 			}
 		}
 		result = validate_answer(val, true);
@@ -1174,6 +1176,8 @@ select_signing_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset) {
 				goto done;
 			}
 			dst_key_free(&val->key);
+		} else {
+			break;
 		}
 		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
 		result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset);
@@ -1291,13 +1295,15 @@ seek_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 				      "keyset with trust %s",
 				      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
 			result = select_signing_key(val, val->keyset);
-			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
 				/*
-				 * Either the key we're looking for is not
-				 * in the rrset, or something bad happened.
-				 * Give up.
+				 * The key we're looking for is not
+				 * in the rrset
 				 */
 				result = DNS_R_CONTINUE;
+			} else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				/* Something bad happened. Give up. */
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 		break;
@@ -1417,7 +1423,7 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 			result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(name, &keyrdata, mctx,
 							 &dstkey);
 			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
-				continue;
+				return result;
 			}
 
 			/*
@@ -1688,10 +1694,7 @@ check_signer(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_t *keyrdata, uint16_t keyid,
 				val->event->name, keyrdata, val->view->mctx,
 				&dstkey);
 			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
-				/*
-				 * This really shouldn't happen, but...
-				 */
-				continue;
+				return result;
 			}
 		}
 		result = verify(val, dstkey, &rdata, sig.keyid);

From 025d61bacd0f57f994a631654aff7a933d89a547 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 09:37:36 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Tighten restrictions on caching NS RRsets in authority
 section

To prevent certain spoofing attacks, a new check has been added
to the existing rules for whether NS data can be cached: the owner
name of the NS RRset must be an ancestor of the name being queried.

(cherry picked from commit fa153f791f9324bf84abf8d259e11c0531fe6e25)
---
 lib/dns/resolver.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
index dc9c5b1c87..eb5d671c8f 100644
--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
+++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
@@ -9247,7 +9247,9 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
 		dns_message_currentname(rctx->query->rmessage,
 					DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, &name);
 
-		if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, fctx)) {
+		if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, fctx) &&
+		    dns_name_issubdomain(fctx->name, name))
+		{
 			dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL;
 
 			/*

From cd17dfe696cdf9b8ef23fbc8738de7c79f957846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 14:35:46 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 03/14] Further restrict addresses that are cached when
 processing referrals

Use the owner name of the NS record as the bailwick apex name
when determining which additional records to cache, rather than
the name of the delegating zone (or a parent thereof).

(cherry picked from commit a41054e9e606a61f1b3c8bc0c54e2f1059347165)
---
 lib/dns/resolver.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
index eb5d671c8f..4364f0ac19 100644
--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
+++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
@@ -7141,7 +7141,8 @@ mark_related(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, bool external,
  * locally served zone.
  */
 static inline bool
-name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) {
+name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, respctx_t *rctx) {
+	fetchctx_t *fctx = rctx->fctx;
 	isc_result_t result;
 	dns_forwarders_t *forwarders = NULL;
 	dns_fixedname_t fixed, zfixed;
@@ -7154,7 +7155,7 @@ name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) {
 	dns_namereln_t rel;
 
 	apex = (ISDUALSTACK(fctx->addrinfo) || !ISFORWARDER(fctx->addrinfo))
-		       ? fctx->domain
+		       ? rctx->ns_name != NULL ? rctx->ns_name : fctx->domain
 		       : fctx->fwdname;
 
 	/*
@@ -7263,7 +7264,7 @@ check_section(void *arg, const dns_name_t *addname, dns_rdatatype_t type,
 	result = dns_message_findname(rctx->query->rmessage, section, addname,
 				      dns_rdatatype_any, 0, &name, NULL);
 	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
-		external = name_external(name, type, fctx);
+		external = name_external(name, type, rctx);
 		if (type == dns_rdatatype_a) {
 			for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
 			     rdataset != NULL;
@@ -8923,7 +8924,7 @@ rctx_answer_scan(respctx_t *rctx) {
 			/*
 			 * Don't accept DNAME from parent namespace.
 			 */
-			if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, fctx)) {
+			if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, rctx)) {
 				continue;
 			}
 
@@ -9247,7 +9248,7 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
 		dns_message_currentname(rctx->query->rmessage,
 					DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, &name);
 
-		if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, fctx) &&
+		if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, rctx) &&
 		    dns_name_issubdomain(fctx->name, name))
 		{
 			dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL;

From 4c6d03b0bb2ffbafcde8e8a5bc0e49908b978a72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2025 13:56:01 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] Retry lookups with unsigned DNAME over TCP

To prevent spoofed unsigned DNAME responses being accepted retry
response with unsigned DNAMEs over TCP if the response is not TSIG
signed or there isn't a good DNS CLIENT COOKIE.

To prevent test failures, this required adding TCP support to the
ans3 and ans4 servers in the chain system test.

(cherry picked from commit 2e40705c06831988106335ed77db3cf924d431f6)
---
 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl | 143 -------------------
 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py |  57 ++++++--
 lib/dns/include/dns/message.h      |   8 ++
 lib/dns/message.c                  |  12 ++
 lib/dns/resolver.c                 |  97 ++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 366 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl
 create mode 100644 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py

diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl
deleted file mode 100644
index e42240be63..0000000000
--- a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-
-# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
-#
-# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
-# License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
-# file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
-#
-# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
-# information regarding copyright ownership.
-
-use strict;
-use warnings;
-
-use IO::File;
-use Getopt::Long;
-use Net::DNS::Nameserver;
-
-my $pidf = new IO::File "ans.pid", "w" or die "cannot open pid file: $!";
-print $pidf "$$\n" or die "cannot write pid file: $!";
-$pidf->close or die "cannot close pid file: $!";
-sub rmpid { unlink "ans.pid"; exit 1; };
-sub term { };
-
-$SIG{INT} = \&rmpid;
-if ($Net::DNS::VERSION > 1.41) {
-    $SIG{TERM} = \&term;
-} else {
-    $SIG{TERM} = \&rmpid;
-}
-
-my $localaddr = "10.53.0.3";
-
-my $localport = int($ENV{'PORT'});
-if (!$localport) { $localport = 5300; }
-
-my $verbose = 0;
-my $ttl = 60;
-my $zone = "example.broken";
-my $nsname = "ns3.$zone";
-my $synth = "synth-then-dname.$zone";
-my $synth2 = "synth2-then-dname.$zone";
-
-sub reply_handler {
-    my ($qname, $qclass, $qtype, $peerhost, $query, $conn) = @_;
-    my ($rcode, @ans, @auth, @add);
-
-    print ("request: $qname/$qtype\n");
-    STDOUT->flush();
-
-    if ($qname eq "example.broken") {
-        if ($qtype eq "SOA") {
-	    my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass SOA . . 0 0 0 0 0");
-	    push @ans, $rr;
-        } elsif ($qtype eq "NS") {
-	    my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass NS $nsname");
-	    push @ans, $rr;
-	    $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$nsname $ttl $qclass A $localaddr");
-	    push @add, $rr;
-        }
-        $rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "cname-to-$synth2") {
-        my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name.$synth2");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-        $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("name.$synth2 $ttl $qclass CNAME name");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-        $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth2 $ttl $qclass DNAME .");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "$synth" || $qname eq "$synth2") {
-	if ($qtype eq "DNAME") {
-	    my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass DNAME .");
-	    push @ans, $rr;
-	}
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "name.$synth") {
-	my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name.");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth $ttl $qclass DNAME .");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "name.$synth2") {
-	my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name.");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth2 $ttl $qclass DNAME .");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    # The following three code branches referring to the "example.dname"
-    # zone are necessary for the resolver variant of the CVE-2021-25215
-    # regression test to work.  A named instance cannot be used for
-    # serving the DNAME records below as a version of BIND vulnerable to
-    # CVE-2021-25215 would crash while answering the queries asked by
-    # the tested resolver.
-    } elsif ($qname eq "ns3.example.dname") {
-	if ($qtype eq "A") {
-		my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass A 10.53.0.3");
-		push @ans, $rr;
-	}
-	if ($qtype eq "AAAA") {
-		my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("example.dname. $ttl $qclass SOA . . 0 0 0 0 $ttl");
-		push @auth, $rr;
-	}
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "self.example.self.example.dname") {
-	my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("self.example.dname. $ttl $qclass DNAME dname.");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME self.example.dname.");
-	push @ans, $rr;
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } elsif ($qname eq "self.example.dname") {
-	if ($qtype eq "DNAME") {
-		my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass DNAME dname.");
-		push @ans, $rr;
-	}
-	$rcode = "NOERROR";
-    } else {
-	$rcode = "REFUSED";
-    }
-    return ($rcode, \@ans, \@auth, \@add, { aa => 1 });
-}
-
-GetOptions(
-    'port=i' => \$localport,
-    'verbose!' => \$verbose,
-);
-
-my $ns = Net::DNS::Nameserver->new(
-    LocalAddr => $localaddr,
-    LocalPort => $localport,
-    ReplyHandler => \&reply_handler,
-    Verbose => $verbose,
-);
-
-if ($Net::DNS::VERSION >= 1.42) {
-    $ns->start_server();
-    select(undef, undef, undef, undef);
-    $ns->stop_server();
-    unlink "ans.pid";
-} else {
-    $ns->main_loop;
-}
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a031c1145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+#
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+#
+# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+# information regarding copyright ownership.
+
+############################################################################
+# ans.py: See README.anspy for details.
+############################################################################
+
+from __future__ import print_function
+import os
+import sys
+import signal
+import socket
+import select
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+import functools
+
+import dns, dns.message, dns.query
+from dns.rdatatype import *
+from dns.rdataclass import *
+from dns.rcode import *
+from dns.name import *
+
+
+############################################################################
+# Respond to a DNS query.
+############################################################################
+def create_response(msg):
+    ttl = 60
+    zone = "example.broken."
+    nsname = f"ns3.{zone}"
+    synth = f"synth-then-dname.{zone}"
+    synth2 = f"synth2-then-dname.{zone}"
+
+    m = dns.message.from_wire(msg)
+    qname = m.question[0].name.to_text()
+
+    # prepare the response and convert to wire format
+    r = dns.message.make_response(m)
+
+    # get qtype
+    rrtype = m.question[0].rdtype
+    qtype = dns.rdatatype.to_text(rrtype)
+    print(f"request: {qname}/{qtype}")
+
+    rcode = "NOERROR"
+    if qname == zone:
+        if qtype == "SOA":
+            r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, SOA, ". . 0 0 0 0 0"))
+        elif qtype == "NS":
+            r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, NS, nsname))
+            r.additional.append(dns.rrset.from_text(nsname, ttl, IN, A, ip4))
+    elif qname == f"cname-to-{synth2}":
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, f"name.{synth2}"))
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(f"name.{synth2}", ttl, IN, CNAME, "name."))
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth2, ttl, IN, DNAME, "."))
+    elif qname == f"{synth}" or qname == f"{synth2}":
+        if qtype == "DNAME":
+            r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, DNAME, "."))
+    elif qname == f"name.{synth}":
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "name."))
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth, ttl, IN, DNAME, "."))
+    elif qname == f"name.{synth2}":
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "name."))
+        r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth2, ttl, IN, DNAME, "."))
+    elif qname == "ns3.example.dname.":
+        # This and the next two code branches referring to the "example.dname"
+        # zone are necessary for the resolver variant of the CVE-2021-25215
+        # regression test to work.  A named instance cannot be used for
+        # serving the DNAME records below as a version of BIND vulnerable to
+        # CVE-2021-25215 would crash while answering the queries asked by
+        # the tested resolver.
+        if qtype == "A":
+            r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, A, ip4))
+        elif qtype == "AAAA":
+            r.authority.append(
+                dns.rrset.from_text("example.dname.", ttl, IN, SOA, ". . 0 0 0 0 0")
+            )
+    elif qname == "self.example.self..example.dname.":
+        r.answer.append(
+            dns.rrset.from_text("self.example.dname.", ttl, IN, DNAME, "dname.")
+        )
+        r.answer.append(
+            dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "self.example.dname.")
+        )
+    elif qname == "self.example.dname.":
+        if qtype == "DNAME":
+            r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, DNAME, "dname."))
+    else:
+        rcode = "REFUSED"
+
+    r.flags |= dns.flags.AA
+    r.use_edns()
+    return r.to_wire()
+
+
+def sigterm(signum, frame):
+    print("Shutting down now...")
+    os.remove("ans.pid")
+    running = False
+    sys.exit(0)
+
+
+############################################################################
+# Main
+#
+# Set up responder and control channel, open the pid file, and start
+# the main loop, listening for queries on the query channel or commands
+# on the control channel and acting on them.
+############################################################################
+ip4 = "10.53.0.3"
+ip6 = "fd92:7065:b8e:ffff::3"
+
+try:
+    port = int(os.environ["PORT"])
+except:
+    port = 5300
+
+query4_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+query4_udp.bind((ip4, port))
+
+query4_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+query4_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+query4_tcp.listen(1)
+query4_tcp.settimeout(1)
+
+havev6 = True
+try:
+    query6_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+    try:
+        query6_udp.bind((ip6, port))
+    except:
+        query6_udp.close()
+        havev6 = False
+
+    query6_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    try:
+        query6_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+        query6_tcp.listen(1)
+        query6_tcp.settimeout(1)
+    except:
+        query6_tcp.close()
+        havev6 = False
+except:
+    havev6 = False
+
+signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, sigterm)
+
+f = open("ans.pid", "w")
+pid = os.getpid()
+print(pid, file=f)
+f.close()
+
+running = True
+
+print("Listening on %s port %d" % (ip4, port))
+if havev6:
+    print("Listening on %s port %d" % (ip6, port))
+print("Ctrl-c to quit")
+
+if havev6:
+    input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, query6_udp, query6_tcp]
+else:
+    input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp]
+
+while running:
+    try:
+        inputready, outputready, exceptready = select.select(input, [], [])
+    except select.error as e:
+        break
+    except socket.error as e:
+        break
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        break
+
+    for s in inputready:
+        if s == query4_udp or s == query6_udp:
+            print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_udp else ip6))
+            # Handle incoming queries
+            msg = s.recvfrom(65535)
+            rsp = create_response(msg[0])
+            if rsp:
+                s.sendto(rsp, msg[1])
+        elif s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+            try:
+                conn, _ = s.accept()
+                if s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+                    print(
+                        "TCP Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_tcp else ip6),
+                        end=" ",
+                    )
+                # get TCP message length
+                msg = conn.recv(2)
+                if len(msg) != 2:
+                    print("couldn't read TCP message length")
+                    continue
+                length = struct.unpack(">H", msg[:2])[0]
+                msg = conn.recv(length)
+                if len(msg) != length:
+                    print("couldn't read TCP message")
+                    continue
+                rsp = create_response(msg)
+                if rsp:
+                    conn.send(struct.pack(">H", len(rsp)))
+                    conn.send(rsp)
+                conn.close()
+            except socket.error as e:
+                print("error: %s" % str(e))
+    if not running:
+        break
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
index 839067faa5..66f0193cac 100755
--- a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
+++ b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py
@@ -316,16 +316,30 @@ try:
 except:
     ctrlport = 5300
 
-query4_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
-query4_socket.bind((ip4, port))
+query4_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+query4_udp.bind((ip4, port))
+
+query4_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+query4_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+query4_tcp.listen(1)
+query4_tcp.settimeout(1)
 
 havev6 = True
 try:
-    query6_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+    query6_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
     try:
-        query6_socket.bind((ip6, port))
+        query6_udp.bind((ip6, port))
     except:
-        query6_socket.close()
+        query6_udp.close()
+        havev6 = False
+
+    query6_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    try:
+        query6_tcp.bind((ip4, port))
+        query6_tcp.listen(1)
+        query6_tcp.settimeout(1)
+    except:
+        query6_tcp.close()
         havev6 = False
 except:
     havev6 = False
@@ -350,9 +364,9 @@ print("Control channel on %s port %d" % (ip4, ctrlport))
 print("Ctrl-c to quit")
 
 if havev6:
-    input = [query4_socket, query6_socket, ctrl_socket]
+    input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, query6_udp, query6_tcp, ctrl_socket]
 else:
-    input = [query4_socket, ctrl_socket]
+    input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, ctrl_socket]
 
 while running:
     try:
@@ -375,12 +389,37 @@ while running:
                     break
                 ctl_channel(msg)
             conn.close()
-        if s == query4_socket or s == query6_socket:
-            print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_socket else ip6))
+        elif s == query4_udp or s == query6_udp:
+            print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_udp else ip6))
             # Handle incoming queries
             msg = s.recvfrom(65535)
             rsp = create_response(msg[0])
             if rsp:
                 s.sendto(rsp, msg[1])
+        elif s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+            try:
+                conn, _ = s.accept()
+                if s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp:
+                    print(
+                        "TCP Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_tcp else ip6),
+                        end=" ",
+                    )
+                # get TCP message length
+                msg = conn.recv(2)
+                if len(msg) != 2:
+                    print("couldn't read TCP message length")
+                    continue
+                length = struct.unpack(">H", msg[:2])[0]
+                msg = conn.recv(length)
+                if len(msg) != length:
+                    print("couldn't read TCP message")
+                    continue
+                rsp = create_response(msg)
+                if rsp:
+                    conn.send(struct.pack(">H", len(rsp)))
+                    conn.send(rsp)
+                conn.close()
+            except socket.error as e:
+                print("error: %s" % str(e))
     if not running:
         break
diff --git a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
index b4c2c8ee9c..d90a0837df 100644
--- a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
+++ b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ struct dns_message {
 	unsigned int tkey	      : 1;
 	unsigned int rdclass_set      : 1;
 	unsigned int fuzzing	      : 1;
+	unsigned int has_dname	      : 1;
 
 	unsigned int opt_reserved;
 	unsigned int sig_reserved;
@@ -1527,4 +1528,11 @@ dns_message_response_minttl(dns_message_t *msg, dns_ttl_t *pttl);
  * \li   'pttl != NULL'.
  */
 
+bool
+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg);
+/*%<
+ * Return whether a DNAME was detected in the ANSWER section of a QUERY
+ * message when it was parsed.
+ */
+
 ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS
diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
index 22d328c0f1..541a854db0 100644
--- a/lib/dns/message.c
+++ b/lib/dns/message.c
@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ msginit(dns_message_t *m) {
 	m->cc_bad = 0;
 	m->tkey = 0;
 	m->rdclass_set = 0;
+	m->has_dname = 0;
 	m->querytsig = NULL;
 	m->indent.string = "\t";
 	m->indent.count = 0;
@@ -1654,6 +1655,11 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg, dns_decompress_t *dctx,
 			 */
 			msg->tsigname->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_NOCOMPRESS;
 			free_name = false;
+		} else if (rdtype == dns_rdatatype_dname &&
+			   sectionid == DNS_SECTION_ANSWER &&
+			   msg->opcode == dns_opcode_query)
+		{
+			msg->has_dname = 1;
 		}
 		rdataset = NULL;
 
@@ -4798,3 +4804,9 @@ dns_message_response_minttl(dns_message_t *msg, dns_ttl_t *pttl) {
 
 	return ISC_R_SUCCESS;
 }
+
+bool
+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg) {
+	REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
+	return msg->has_dname;
+}
diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
index 4364f0ac19..1bacec6470 100644
--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
+++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
@@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ typedef struct respctx {
 	bool get_nameservers; /* get a new NS rrset at
 			       * zone cut? */
 	bool resend;	      /* resend this query? */
+	bool secured;	      /* message was signed or had a valid cookie */
 	bool nextitem;	      /* invalid response; keep
 			       * listening for the correct one */
 	bool truncated;	      /* response was truncated */
@@ -7894,6 +7895,47 @@ betterreferral(respctx_t *rctx) {
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool
+rctx_need_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) {
+	resquery_t *query = rctx->query;
+	if ((rctx->retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) != 0) {
+		/* TCP is already in the retry flags */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the message was secured, no need to continue.
+	 */
+	if (rctx->secured) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Currently the only extra reason why we might need to
+	 * retry a UDP response over TCP is a DNAME in the message.
+	 */
+	if (dns_message_hasdname(query->rmessage)) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static isc_result_t
+rctx_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) {
+	/*
+	 * Do we need to retry a UDP response over TCP?
+	 */
+	if (rctx_need_tcpretry(rctx)) {
+		rctx->retryopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP;
+		rctx->resend = true;
+		rctx_done(rctx, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		return ISC_R_COMPLETE;
+	}
+
+	return ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 /*
  * resquery_response():
  * Handles responses received in response to iterative queries sent by
@@ -8083,6 +8125,17 @@ resquery_response(isc_result_t eresult, isc_region_t *region, void *arg) {
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Remember whether this message was signed or had a
+	 * valid client cookie; if not, we may need to retry over
+	 * TCP later.
+	 */
+	if (query->rmessage->cc_ok || query->rmessage->tsig != NULL ||
+	    query->rmessage->sig0 != NULL)
+	{
+		rctx.secured = true;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The dispatcher should ensure we only get responses with QR
 	 * set.
@@ -8094,10 +8147,7 @@ resquery_response(isc_result_t eresult, isc_region_t *region, void *arg) {
 	 * TCP. This may be a misconfigured anycast server or an attempt
 	 * to send a spoofed response.  Skip if we have a valid tsig.
 	 */
-	if (dns_message_gettsig(query->rmessage, NULL) == NULL &&
-	    !query->rmessage->cc_ok && !query->rmessage->cc_bad &&
-	    (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0)
-	{
+	if (!rctx.secured && (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) {
 		unsigned char cookie[COOKIE_BUFFER_SIZE];
 		if (dns_adb_getcookie(fctx->adb, query->addrinfo, cookie,
 				      sizeof(cookie)) > CLIENT_COOKIE_SIZE)
@@ -8109,8 +8159,7 @@ resquery_response(isc_result_t eresult, isc_region_t *region, void *arg) {
 				isc_log_write(
 					dns_lctx, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_RESOLVER,
 					DNS_LOGMODULE_RESOLVER, ISC_LOG_INFO,
-					"missing expected cookie "
-					"from %s",
+					"missing expected cookie from %s",
 					addrbuf);
 			}
 			rctx.retryopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP;
@@ -8120,6 +8169,17 @@ resquery_response(isc_result_t eresult, isc_region_t *region, void *arg) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we need to retry over TCP for some other reason.
+	 */
+	result = rctx_tcpretry(&rctx);
+	if (result == ISC_R_COMPLETE) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for EDNS issues.
+	 */
 	rctx_edns(&rctx);
 
 	/*
@@ -8851,8 +8911,8 @@ rctx_answer_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Cache records in the authority section, if
-	 * there are any suitable for caching.
+	 * Cache records in the authority section, if there are
+	 * any suitable for caching.
 	 */
 	rctx_authority_positive(rctx);
 
@@ -9225,14 +9285,14 @@ rctx_answer_dname(respctx_t *rctx) {
 
 /*
  * rctx_authority_positive():
- * Examine the records in the authority section (if there are any) for a
- * positive answer.  We expect the names for all rdatasets in this
- * section to be subdomains of the domain being queried; any that are
- * not are skipped.  We expect to find only *one* owner name; any names
- * after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find only
- * rdatasets of type NS, RRSIG, or SIG; all others are ignored. Whatever
- * remains can be cached at trust level authauthority or additional
- * (depending on whether the AA bit was set on the answer).
+ * If a positive answer was received over TCP or secured with a cookie
+ * or TSIG, examine the authority section.  We expect names for all
+ * rdatasets in this section to be subdomains of the domain being queried;
+ * any that are not are skipped.  We expect to find only *one* owner name;
+ * any names after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find
+ * only rdatasets of type NS; all others are ignored. Whatever remains can
+ * be cached at trust level authauthority or additional (depending on
+ * whether the AA bit was set on the answer).
  */
 static void
 rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
@@ -9240,6 +9300,11 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) {
 	bool done = false;
 	isc_result_t result;
 
+	/* If it's spoofable, don't cache it. */
+	if (!rctx->secured && (rctx->query->options & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) {
+		return;
+	}
+
 	result = dns_message_firstname(rctx->query->rmessage,
 				       DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
 	while (!done && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {

From 8330b49fb90bfeae14b47b7983e9459cc2bbaffe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 19:22:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] Use cryptographically-secure pseudo-random generator
 everywhere

It was discovered in an upcoming academic paper that a xoshiro128**
internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd party allowing to
predict UDP ports and DNS IDs in the outgoing queries.  This could lead
to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with great efficiency and
poisoning the DNS cache.

Change the internal random generator to system CSPRNG with buffering to
avoid excessive syscalls.

Thanks Omer Ben Simhon and Amit Klein of Hebrew University of Jerusalem
for responsibly reporting this to us.  Very cool research!

(cherry picked from commit cffcab9d5f3e709002f331b72498fcc229786ae2)
---
 lib/isc/include/isc/random.h |   2 +-
 lib/isc/random.c             | 225 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 tests/isc/random_test.c      |   4 +-
 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h b/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h
index 1e30d0c87d..fd55343778 100644
--- a/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h
+++ b/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <isc/types.h>
 
 /*! \file isc/random.h
- * \brief Implements wrapper around a non-cryptographically secure
+ * \brief Implements wrapper around a cryptographically secure
  * pseudo-random number generator.
  *
  */
diff --git a/lib/isc/random.c b/lib/isc/random.c
index fb0466953d..6f37f5dedf 100644
--- a/lib/isc/random.c
+++ b/lib/isc/random.c
@@ -31,176 +31,135 @@
  */
 
 #include <inttypes.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
 
-#include <isc/once.h>
+#include <isc/os.h>
 #include <isc/random.h>
-#include <isc/result.h>
 #include <isc/thread.h>
-#include <isc/types.h>
 #include <isc/util.h>
 
 #include "entropy_private.h"
 
-/*
- * The specific implementation for PRNG is included as a C file
- * that has to provide a static variable named seed, and a function
- * uint32_t next(void) that provides next random number.
- *
- * The implementation must be thread-safe.
- */
+#define ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE (ISC_OS_CACHELINE_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t))
 
-/*
- * Two contestants have been considered: the xoroshiro family of the
- * functions by Villa&Blackman, and PCG by O'Neill.  After
- * consideration, the xoshiro128starstar function has been chosen as
- * the uint32_t random number provider because it is very fast and has
- * good enough properties for our usage pattern.
- */
-
-/*
- * Written in 2018 by David Blackman and Sebastiano Vigna (vigna@acm.org)
- *
- * To the extent possible under law, the author has dedicated all
- * copyright and related and neighboring rights to this software to the
- * public domain worldwide. This software is distributed without any
- * warranty.
- *
- * See <http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>.
- */
-
-/*
- * This is xoshiro128** 1.0, our 32-bit all-purpose, rock-solid generator.
- * It has excellent (sub-ns) speed, a state size (128 bits) that is large
- * enough for mild parallelism, and it passes all tests we are aware of.
- *
- * For generating just single-precision (i.e., 32-bit) floating-point
- * numbers, xoshiro128+ is even faster.
- *
- * The state must be seeded so that it is not everywhere zero.
- */
-static thread_local uint32_t seed[4] = { 0 };
+thread_local static uint32_t isc__random_pool[ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE];
+thread_local static size_t isc__random_pos = ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE;
 
 static uint32_t
-rotl(const uint32_t x, int k) {
-	return (x << k) | (x >> (32 - k));
-}
-
-static uint32_t
-next(void) {
-	uint32_t result_starstar, t;
-
-	result_starstar = rotl(seed[0] * 5, 7) * 9;
-	t = seed[1] << 9;
-
-	seed[2] ^= seed[0];
-	seed[3] ^= seed[1];
-	seed[1] ^= seed[2];
-	seed[0] ^= seed[3];
-
-	seed[2] ^= t;
-
-	seed[3] = rotl(seed[3], 11);
-
-	return result_starstar;
-}
-
-static thread_local isc_once_t isc_random_once = ISC_ONCE_INIT;
-
-static void
-isc_random_initialize(void) {
-	int useed[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 1 };
+random_u32(void) {
 #if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
 	/*
-	 * Set a constant seed to help in problem reproduction should fuzzing
-	 * find a crash or a hang.  The seed array must be non-zero else
-	 * xoshiro128starstar will generate an infinite series of zeroes.
+	 * A fixed stream of numbers helps with problem reproduction when
+	 * fuzzing.  The first result needs to be non-zero as expected by
+	 * random_test.c (it starts with ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE, see above).
 	 */
-#else  /* if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
-	isc_entropy_get(useed, sizeof(useed));
+	return (uint32_t)(isc__random_pos++);
 #endif /* if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
-	memmove(seed, useed, sizeof(seed));
+
+	if (isc__random_pos == ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE) {
+		isc_entropy_get(isc__random_pool, sizeof(isc__random_pool));
+		isc__random_pos = 0;
+	}
+
+	return isc__random_pool[isc__random_pos++];
 }
 
 uint8_t
 isc_random8(void) {
-	RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) ==
-		      ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-	return next() & 0xff;
+	return (uint8_t)random_u32();
 }
 
 uint16_t
 isc_random16(void) {
-	RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) ==
-		      ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-	return next() & 0xffff;
+	return (uint16_t)random_u32();
 }
 
 uint32_t
 isc_random32(void) {
-	RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) ==
-		      ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-	return next();
+	return random_u32();
 }
 
 void
 isc_random_buf(void *buf, size_t buflen) {
-	int i;
-	uint32_t r;
+	REQUIRE(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL);
 
-	REQUIRE(buf != NULL);
-	REQUIRE(buflen > 0);
-
-	RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) ==
-		      ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-
-	for (i = 0; i + sizeof(r) <= buflen; i += sizeof(r)) {
-		r = next();
-		memmove((uint8_t *)buf + i, &r, sizeof(r));
+	if (buf == NULL || buflen == 0) {
+		return;
 	}
-	r = next();
-	memmove((uint8_t *)buf + i, &r, buflen % sizeof(r));
-	return;
+
+	isc_entropy_get(buf, buflen);
 }
 
 uint32_t
-isc_random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound) {
-	/* Copy of arc4random_uniform from OpenBSD */
-	uint32_t r, min;
-
-	RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) ==
-		      ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-
-	if (upper_bound < 2) {
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-#if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
-	min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
-#else  /* if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) */
-	/* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
-	if (upper_bound > 0x80000000) {
-		min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */
-	} else {
-		/* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
-		min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
-	}
-#endif /* if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) */
-
+isc_random_uniform(uint32_t limit) {
 	/*
-	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
-	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
-	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
-	 * to re-roll.
+	 * Daniel Lemire's nearly-divisionless unbiased bounded random numbers.
+	 *
+	 * https://lemire.me/blog/?p=17551
+	 *
+	 * The raw random number generator `next()` returns a 32-bit value.
+	 * We do a 64-bit multiply `next() * limit` and treat the product as a
+	 * 32.32 fixed-point value less than the limit. Our result will be the
+	 * integer part (upper 32 bits), and we will use the fraction part
+	 * (lower 32 bits) to determine whether or not we need to resample.
 	 */
-	for (;;) {
-		r = next();
-		if (r >= min) {
-			break;
+	uint64_t num = (uint64_t)random_u32() * (uint64_t)limit;
+	/*
+	 * In the fast path, we avoid doing a division in most cases by
+	 * comparing the fraction part of `num` with the limit, which is
+	 * a slight over-estimate for the exact resample threshold.
+	 */
+	if ((uint32_t)(num) < limit) {
+		/*
+		 * We are in the slow path where we re-do the approximate test
+		 * more accurately. The exact threshold for the resample loop
+		 * is the remainder after dividing the raw RNG limit `1 << 32`
+		 * by the caller's limit. We use a trick to calculate it
+		 * within 32 bits:
+		 *
+		 *     (1 << 32) % limit
+		 * == ((1 << 32) - limit) % limit
+		 * ==  (uint32_t)(-limit) % limit
+		 *
+		 * This division is safe: we know that `limit` is strictly
+		 * greater than zero because of the slow-path test above.
+		 */
+		uint32_t residue = (uint32_t)(-limit) % limit;
+		/*
+		 * Unless we get one of `N = (1 << 32) - residue` valid
+		 * values, we reject the sample. This `N` is a multiple of
+		 * `limit`, so our results will be unbiased; and `N` is the
+		 * largest multiple that fits in 32 bits, so rejections are as
+		 * rare as possible.
+		 *
+		 * There are `limit` possible values for the integer part of
+		 * our fixed-point number. Each one corresponds to `N/limit`
+		 * or `N/limit + 1` possible fraction parts. For our result to
+		 * be unbiased, every possible integer part must have the same
+		 * number of possible valid fraction parts. So, when we get
+		 * the superfluous value in the `N/limit + 1` cases, we need
+		 * to reject and resample.
+		 *
+		 * Because of the multiplication, the possible values in the
+		 * fraction part are equally spaced by `limit`, with varying
+		 * gaps at each end of the fraction's 32-bit range. We will
+		 * choose a range of size `N` (a multiple of `limit`) into
+		 * which valid fraction values must fall, with the rest of the
+		 * 32-bit range covered by the `residue`. Lemire's paper says
+		 * that exactly `N/limit` possible values spaced apart by
+		 * `limit` will fit into our size `N` valid range, regardless
+		 * of the size of the end gaps, the phase alignment of the
+		 * values, or the position of the range.
+		 *
+		 * So, when a fraction value falls in the `residue` outside
+		 * our valid range, it is superfluous, and we resample.
+		 */
+		while ((uint32_t)(num) < residue) {
+			num = (uint64_t)random_u32() * (uint64_t)limit;
 		}
 	}
-
-	return r % upper_bound;
+	/*
+	 * Return the integer part (upper 32 bits).
+	 */
+	return (uint32_t)(num >> 32);
 }
diff --git a/tests/isc/random_test.c b/tests/isc/random_test.c
index ccba317023..52f219bb3a 100644
--- a/tests/isc/random_test.c
+++ b/tests/isc/random_test.c
@@ -321,7 +321,9 @@ random_test(pvalue_func_t *func, isc_random_func test_func) {
 			}
 			break;
 		case ISC_RANDOM_BYTES:
-			isc_random_buf(values, sizeof(values));
+			for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(values); i++) {
+				values[i] = isc_random32();
+			}
 			break;
 		case ISC_RANDOM_UNIFORM:
 			uniform_values = (uint16_t *)values;

From 7f39361721487aac2ee3830157274961032d71cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2025 18:13:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Generate changelog for BIND 9.18.40

---
 doc/arm/changelog.rst               |   1 +
 doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst

diff --git a/doc/arm/changelog.rst b/doc/arm/changelog.rst
index fca3263d94..c30a357f22 100644
--- a/doc/arm/changelog.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/changelog.rst
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ Changelog
    development. Regular users should refer to :ref:`Release Notes <relnotes>`
    for changes relevant to them.
 
+.. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.39.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.38.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.37.rst
diff --git a/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a83eaf5691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+..
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+..
+.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+.. License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+..
+.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+.. information regarding copyright ownership.
+
+BIND 9.18.40
+------------
+
+Security Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- [CVE-2025-8677] DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY
+  is found. ``85d08e06831``
+
+  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
+  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
+  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
+  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
+  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
+  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
+  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40778] Address various spoofing attacks. ``4c99ba5a462``
+
+  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
+  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
+  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
+  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
+
+  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
+  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
+  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
+  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
+
+  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
+  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5414`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40780] Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number
+  generator. ``f74fb05265b``
+
+  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
+  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
+  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
+  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
+  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
+
+  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
+  secure pseudo-random generator.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
+  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5484`
+
+New Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
+  ``d7d4e94d085``
+
+  :gl:`#5444` :gl:`!10933`
+
+Removed Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement. ``e28c95c1160``
+
+  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
+  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
+  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204` :gl:`!10783`
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement. ``2705307f818``
+
+  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
+  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
+  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
+
+  For configurations currently using a combination of both
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
+  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
+  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
+  :gl:`!10925`
+
+Feature Changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Update clang-format style with options added in newer versions.
+  ``1bc0f245c79``
+
+  Add and apply InsertBraces statement to add missing curly braces
+  around one-line statements and use
+  ControlStatementsExceptControlMacros for SpaceBeforeParens to remove
+  space between foreach macro and the brace, e.g. `FOREACH (x) {`
+  becomes `FOREACH(x) {`. :gl:`!10865`
+
+Bug Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
+  ``f5a6a8be45f``
+
+  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
+  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records with
+  0-TTL. :gl:`#5294` :gl:`!10899`
+
+- Use DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT to hide branch differences. ``aef4682e4aa``
+
+  Initialization of the common members of rdata type structures varies
+  across branches. Standardize it by using the `DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT`
+  macro for all types, so that new types are more likely to use it, and
+  hence backport more cleanly. :gl:`#5467` :gl:`!10833`
+
+- RPZ canonical warning displays zone entry incorrectly. ``3e787e98930``
+
+  When an IPv6 rpz prefix entry is entered incorrectly the log message
+  was just displaying the prefix rather than the full entry.  This has
+  been corrected. :gl:`#5491` :gl:`!10931`
+
+- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
+  ``990586f0496``
+
+  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
+  queries.  This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502` :gl:`!10957`
+
+- Add and use __attribute__((nonnull)) in dnssec-signzone.c.
+  ``48c30cfcd08``
+
+  Clang 20 was spuriously warning about the possibility of passing a
+  NULL file pointer to `fprintf()`, which uses the 'nonnull' attribute.
+  To silence the warning, the functions calling `fprintf()` have been
+  marked with the same attribute to assure that NULL can't be passed to
+  them in the first place.
+
+  Close #5487 :gl:`!10914`
+
+

From ad2f3659c249107bffb99a630a3e784e385ea582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2025 18:13:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] Prepare release notes for BIND 9.18.40

---
 doc/arm/notes.rst           |   1 +
 doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst

diff --git a/doc/arm/notes.rst b/doc/arm/notes.rst
index 7349a8b8f0..29ebaeb38b 100644
--- a/doc/arm/notes.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/notes.rst
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ The list of known issues affecting the latest version in the 9.18 branch can be
 found at
 https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/wikis/Known-Issues-in-BIND-9.18
 
+.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.39.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.38.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.37.rst
diff --git a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8cd51d218
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+..
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+..
+.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+.. License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+..
+.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+.. information regarding copyright ownership.
+
+Notes for BIND 9.18.40
+----------------------
+
+Security Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- [CVE-2025-8677] DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY
+  is found.
+
+  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
+  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
+  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
+  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
+  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
+  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
+  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40778] Address various spoofing attacks.
+
+  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
+  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
+  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
+  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
+
+  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
+  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
+  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
+  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
+
+  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
+  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5414`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40780] Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number
+  generator.
+
+  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
+  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
+  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
+  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
+  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
+
+  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
+  secure pseudo-random generator.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
+  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5484`
+
+New Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
+
+  :gl:`#5444`
+
+Removed Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement.
+
+  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
+  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
+  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204`
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement.
+
+  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
+  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
+  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
+
+  For configurations currently using a combination of both
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
+  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
+  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
+
+Bug Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
+
+  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
+  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records with
+  0-TTL. :gl:`#5294`
+
+- RPZ canonical warning displays zone entry incorrectly.
+
+  When an IPv6 rpz prefix entry is entered incorrectly the log message
+  was just displaying the prefix rather than the full entry.  This has
+  been corrected. :gl:`#5491`
+
+- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
+
+  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
+  queries.  This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502`
+
+

From 2e90895cc05b1aee75ee1404b7d2297d5390746b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2025 18:13:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] Tweak and reword release notes

---
 doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst | 24 ++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
index e8cd51d218..28609fb683 100644
--- a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
+++ b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ Notes for BIND 9.18.40
 Security Fixes
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
-- [CVE-2025-8677] DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY
-  is found.
+- DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY is found.
+  :cve:`2025-8677`
 
   Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
   encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Security Fixes
   Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
   vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
 
-- [CVE-2025-40778] Address various spoofing attacks.
+- Address various spoofing attacks. :cve:`2025-40778`
 
   Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
   with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ Security Fixes
   Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
   attention. :gl:`#5414`
 
-- [CVE-2025-40780] Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number
-  generator.
+- Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number generator.
+  :cve:`2025-40780`
 
   It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
   a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
@@ -97,18 +97,10 @@ Bug Fixes
 - Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
 
   Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
-  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records with
-  0-TTL. :gl:`#5294`
-
-- RPZ canonical warning displays zone entry incorrectly.
-
-  When an IPv6 rpz prefix entry is entered incorrectly the log message
-  was just displaying the prefix rather than the full entry.  This has
-  been corrected. :gl:`#5491`
+  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records that have a
+  TTL of zero. :gl:`#5294`
 
 - Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
 
   The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
-  queries.  This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502`
-
-
+  queries. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502`

From 8cc8743c23d4dd055cce099dfb41b825e941f2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2025 18:20:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/14] Update BIND version for release

---
 configure.ac | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 4ecc6a2bd6..ecae6e9c76 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_MAJOR], 9)dnl
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_MINOR], 18)dnl
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_PATCH], 40)dnl
-m4_define([bind_VERSION_EXTRA], -dev)dnl
+m4_define([bind_VERSION_EXTRA], )dnl
 m4_define([bind_DESCRIPTION], [(Extended Support Version)])dnl
 m4_define([bind_SRCID], [m4_esyscmd_s([git rev-parse --short HEAD | cut -b1-7])])dnl
 m4_define([bind_PKG_VERSION], [[bind_VERSION_MAJOR.bind_VERSION_MINOR.bind_VERSION_PATCH]bind_VERSION_EXTRA])dnl

From 40c396ba2d955c32d70db04e900e40bf96519c59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aram Sargsyan <aram@isc.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 14:51:21 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] Fix an issue with selfsigned_dnskey() return value

The selfsigned_dnskey() function currently returns boolean. There
was a recent change to make it return a isc_result_t error code,
which is implicitly converted to bool, which is obviously an error.

If instead of the result code we return true/false, it still doesn't
indicate the error to the caller that has happened before.

Change the function to return isc_result_t, and change the caller
routine to process the new return type.
---
 lib/dns/validator.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/dns/validator.c b/lib/dns/validator.c
index 6c21d35e64..12b2aed57c 100644
--- a/lib/dns/validator.c
+++ b/lib/dns/validator.c
@@ -1364,17 +1364,17 @@ compute_keytag(dns_rdata_t *rdata) {
 /*%
  * Is the DNSKEY rrset in val->event->rdataset self-signed?
  */
-static bool
+static isc_result_t
 selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = val->event->rdataset;
 	dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset = val->event->sigrdataset;
 	dns_name_t *name = val->event->name;
 	isc_result_t result;
 	isc_mem_t *mctx = val->view->mctx;
-	bool answer = false;
+	bool match = false;
 
 	if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_dnskey) {
-		return false;
+		return DNS_R_NOKEYMATCH;
 	}
 
 	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset); result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
@@ -1396,8 +1396,6 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 		     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
 		     result = dns_rdataset_next(sigrdataset))
 		{
-			dst_key_t *dstkey = NULL;
-
 			dns_rdata_reset(&sigrdata);
 			dns_rdataset_current(sigrdataset, &sigrdata);
 			result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&sigrdata, &sig, NULL);
@@ -1412,18 +1410,16 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 
 			/*
 			 * If the REVOKE bit is not set we have a
-			 * theoretically self signed DNSKEY RRset.
-			 * This will be verified later.
+			 * theoretically self-signed DNSKEY RRset;
+			 * this will be verified later.
+			 *
+			 * We don't return the answer yet, though,
+			 * because we need to check the remaining keys
+			 * and possbly remove them if they're revoked.
 			 */
 			if ((key.flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_REVOKE) == 0) {
-				answer = true;
-				continue;
-			}
-
-			result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(name, &keyrdata, mctx,
-							 &dstkey);
-			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
-				return result;
+				match = true;
+				break;
 			}
 
 			/*
@@ -1433,6 +1429,14 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(rdataset->trust) &&
 			    dns_view_istrusted(val->view, name, &key))
 			{
+				dst_key_t *dstkey = NULL;
+
+				result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(
+					name, &keyrdata, mctx, &dstkey);
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+					break;
+				}
+
 				result = dns_dnssec_verify(
 					name, rdataset, dstkey, true,
 					val->view->maxbits, mctx, &sigrdata,
@@ -1445,6 +1449,8 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 					 */
 					dns_view_untrust(val->view, name, &key);
 				}
+
+				dst_key_free(&dstkey);
 			} else if (rdataset->trust >= dns_trust_secure) {
 				/*
 				 * We trust this RRset so if the key is
@@ -1452,12 +1458,14 @@ selfsigned_dnskey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 				 */
 				dns_view_untrust(val->view, name, &key);
 			}
-
-			dst_key_free(&dstkey);
 		}
 	}
 
-	return answer;
+	if (!match) {
+		return DNS_R_NOKEYMATCH;
+	}
+
+	return ISC_R_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 /*%
@@ -3054,11 +3062,22 @@ validator_start(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
 
 		INSIST(dns_rdataset_isassociated(val->event->rdataset));
 		INSIST(dns_rdataset_isassociated(val->event->sigrdataset));
-		if (selfsigned_dnskey(val)) {
+
+		result = selfsigned_dnskey(val);
+		switch (result) {
+		case ISC_R_SUCCESS:
 			result = validate_dnskey(val);
-		} else {
+			break;
+		case DNS_R_NOKEYMATCH:
 			result = validate_answer(val, false);
+			break;
+		default:
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO,
+				      "invalid selfsigned DNSKEY: %s",
+				      isc_result_totext(result));
+			goto cleanup;
 		}
+
 		if (result == DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG &&
 		    (val->attributes & VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY) == 0)
 		{
@@ -3127,6 +3146,7 @@ validator_start(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
 		UNREACHABLE();
 	}
 
+cleanup:
 	if (result != DNS_R_WAIT) {
 		want_destroy = exit_check(val);
 		validator_done(val, result);

From 113f64d31b298b0b0500105bf8e8a01db2f7aaa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2025 09:50:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/14] Prepare changelog for BIND 9.18.41

---
 doc/arm/changelog.rst               |   1 +
 doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst | 136 +------------------------
 doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst

diff --git a/doc/arm/changelog.rst b/doc/arm/changelog.rst
index c30a357f22..32239a5889 100644
--- a/doc/arm/changelog.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/changelog.rst
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ Changelog
    development. Regular users should refer to :ref:`Release Notes <relnotes>`
    for changes relevant to them.
 
+.. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.39.rst
 .. include:: ../changelog/changelog-9.18.38.rst
diff --git a/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
index a83eaf5691..4a8d883a9c 100644
--- a/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
+++ b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.40.rst
@@ -12,137 +12,7 @@
 BIND 9.18.40
 ------------
 
-Security Fixes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- [CVE-2025-8677] DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY
-  is found. ``85d08e06831``
-
-  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
-  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
-  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
-  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
-  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
-
-  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
-  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
-  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
-
-- [CVE-2025-40778] Address various spoofing attacks. ``4c99ba5a462``
-
-  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
-  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
-  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
-  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
-
-  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
-  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
-  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
-  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
-
-  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
-  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
-  attention. :gl:`#5414`
-
-- [CVE-2025-40780] Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number
-  generator. ``f74fb05265b``
-
-  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
-  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
-  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
-  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
-  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
-
-  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
-  secure pseudo-random generator.
-
-  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
-  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
-  attention. :gl:`#5484`
-
-New Features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
-  ``d7d4e94d085``
-
-  :gl:`#5444` :gl:`!10933`
-
-Removed Features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement. ``e28c95c1160``
-
-  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
-  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
-  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204` :gl:`!10783`
-
-- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement. ``2705307f818``
-
-  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
-  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
-  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
-
-  For configurations currently using a combination of both
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
-  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
-  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
-  :gl:`!10925`
-
-Feature Changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Update clang-format style with options added in newer versions.
-  ``1bc0f245c79``
-
-  Add and apply InsertBraces statement to add missing curly braces
-  around one-line statements and use
-  ControlStatementsExceptControlMacros for SpaceBeforeParens to remove
-  space between foreach macro and the brace, e.g. `FOREACH (x) {`
-  becomes `FOREACH(x) {`. :gl:`!10865`
-
-Bug Fixes
-~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
-  ``f5a6a8be45f``
-
-  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
-  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records with
-  0-TTL. :gl:`#5294` :gl:`!10899`
-
-- Use DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT to hide branch differences. ``aef4682e4aa``
-
-  Initialization of the common members of rdata type structures varies
-  across branches. Standardize it by using the `DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT`
-  macro for all types, so that new types are more likely to use it, and
-  hence backport more cleanly. :gl:`#5467` :gl:`!10833`
-
-- RPZ canonical warning displays zone entry incorrectly. ``3e787e98930``
-
-  When an IPv6 rpz prefix entry is entered incorrectly the log message
-  was just displaying the prefix rather than the full entry.  This has
-  been corrected. :gl:`#5491` :gl:`!10931`
-
-- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
-  ``990586f0496``
-
-  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
-  queries.  This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502` :gl:`!10957`
-
-- Add and use __attribute__((nonnull)) in dnssec-signzone.c.
-  ``48c30cfcd08``
-
-  Clang 20 was spuriously warning about the possibility of passing a
-  NULL file pointer to `fprintf()`, which uses the 'nonnull' attribute.
-  To silence the warning, the functions calling `fprintf()` have been
-  marked with the same attribute to assure that NULL can't be passed to
-  them in the first place.
-
-  Close #5487 :gl:`!10914`
-
+.. note::
 
+   The BIND 9.18.40 release was withdrawn after the discovery of a
+   regression in a security fix in it during pre-release testing.
diff --git a/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3404e52958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/changelog/changelog-9.18.41.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+..
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+..
+.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+.. License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+..
+.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+.. information regarding copyright ownership.
+
+BIND 9.18.41
+------------
+
+Security Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- [CVE-2025-8677] DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY
+  is found. ``85d08e06831``
+
+  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
+  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
+  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
+  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
+  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
+  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
+  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40778] Address various spoofing attacks. ``4c99ba5a462``
+
+  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
+  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
+  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
+  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
+
+  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
+  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
+  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
+  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
+
+  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
+  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5414`
+
+- [CVE-2025-40780] Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number
+  generator. ``f74fb05265b``
+
+  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
+  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
+  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
+  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
+  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
+
+  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
+  secure pseudo-random generator.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
+  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5484`
+
+New Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
+  ``d7d4e94d085``
+
+  :gl:`#5444` :gl:`!10933`
+
+Removed Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement. ``e28c95c1160``
+
+  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
+  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
+  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204` :gl:`!10783`
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement. ``2705307f818``
+
+  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
+  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
+  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
+
+  For configurations currently using a combination of both
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
+  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
+  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
+  :gl:`!10925`
+
+Feature Changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Update clang-format style with options added in newer versions.
+  ``1bc0f245c79``
+
+  Add and apply InsertBraces statement to add missing curly braces
+  around one-line statements and use
+  ControlStatementsExceptControlMacros for SpaceBeforeParens to remove
+  space between foreach macro and the brace, e.g. `FOREACH (x) {`
+  becomes `FOREACH(x) {`. :gl:`!10865`
+
+Bug Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
+  ``f5a6a8be45f``
+
+  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
+  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records with
+  0-TTL. :gl:`#5294` :gl:`!10899`
+
+- Use DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT to hide branch differences. ``aef4682e4aa``
+
+  Initialization of the common members of rdata type structures varies
+  across branches. Standardize it by using the `DNS_RDATACOMMON_INIT`
+  macro for all types, so that new types are more likely to use it, and
+  hence backport more cleanly. :gl:`#5467` :gl:`!10833`
+
+- RPZ canonical warning displays zone entry incorrectly. ``3e787e98930``
+
+  When an IPv6 rpz prefix entry is entered incorrectly the log message
+  was just displaying the prefix rather than the full entry.  This has
+  been corrected. :gl:`#5491` :gl:`!10931`
+
+- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
+  ``990586f0496``
+
+  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
+  queries.  This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502` :gl:`!10957`
+
+- Add and use __attribute__((nonnull)) in dnssec-signzone.c.
+  ``48c30cfcd08``
+
+  Clang 20 was spuriously warning about the possibility of passing a
+  NULL file pointer to `fprintf()`, which uses the 'nonnull' attribute.
+  To silence the warning, the functions calling `fprintf()` have been
+  marked with the same attribute to assure that NULL can't be passed to
+  them in the first place.
+
+  Close #5487 :gl:`!10914`
+
+

From 270da7e02d0d6510f844728bafad33c3e0304a81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2025 09:50:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 12/14] Prepare release notes for BIND 9.18.41

---
 doc/arm/notes.rst           |   1 +
 doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst |  94 +-------------------------------
 doc/notes/notes-9.18.41.rst | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/notes/notes-9.18.41.rst

diff --git a/doc/arm/notes.rst b/doc/arm/notes.rst
index 29ebaeb38b..c63ca973b1 100644
--- a/doc/arm/notes.rst
+++ b/doc/arm/notes.rst
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ The list of known issues affecting the latest version in the 9.18 branch can be
 found at
 https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/wikis/Known-Issues-in-BIND-9.18
 
+.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.41.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.39.rst
 .. include:: ../notes/notes-9.18.38.rst
diff --git a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
index 28609fb683..4cb72e1d4e 100644
--- a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
+++ b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.40.rst
@@ -12,95 +12,7 @@
 Notes for BIND 9.18.40
 ----------------------
 
-Security Fixes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.. note::
 
-- DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY is found.
-  :cve:`2025-8677`
-
-  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
-  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
-  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
-  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
-  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
-
-  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
-  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
-  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
-
-- Address various spoofing attacks. :cve:`2025-40778`
-
-  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
-  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
-  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
-  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
-
-  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
-  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
-  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
-  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
-
-  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
-  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
-  attention. :gl:`#5414`
-
-- Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number generator.
-  :cve:`2025-40780`
-
-  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
-  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
-  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
-  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
-  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
-
-  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
-  secure pseudo-random generator.
-
-  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
-  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
-  attention. :gl:`#5484`
-
-New Features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
-
-  :gl:`#5444`
-
-Removed Features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement.
-
-  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
-  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
-  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204`
-
-- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement.
-
-  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
-  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
-  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
-
-  For configurations currently using a combination of both
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
-  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
-  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
-  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
-
-Bug Fixes
-~~~~~~~~~
-
-- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
-
-  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
-  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records that have a
-  TTL of zero. :gl:`#5294`
-
-- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
-
-  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
-  queries. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502`
+   The BIND 9.18.40 release was withdrawn after the discovery of a
+   regression in a security fix in it during pre-release testing.
diff --git a/doc/notes/notes-9.18.41.rst b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.41.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c55bd370ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/notes/notes-9.18.41.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+..
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+..
+.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+.. License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+..
+.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+.. information regarding copyright ownership.
+
+Notes for BIND 9.18.41
+----------------------
+
+Security Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- DNSSEC validation fails if matching but invalid DNSKEY is found.
+  :cve:`2025-8677`
+
+  Previously, if a matching but cryptographically invalid key was
+  encountered during DNSSEC validation, the key was skipped and not
+  counted towards validation failures. :iscman:`named` now treats such
+  DNSSEC keys as hard failures and the DNSSEC validation fails
+  immediately, instead of continuing with the next DNSKEYs in the RRset.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li from the All-in-One
+  Security and Privacy Laboratory at Nankai University for bringing this
+  vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5343`
+
+- Address various spoofing attacks. :cve:`2025-40778`
+
+  Previously, several issues could be exploited to poison a DNS cache
+  with spoofed records for zones which were not DNSSEC-signed or if the
+  resolver was configured to not do DNSSEC validation. These issues were
+  assigned CVE-2025-40778 and have now been fixed.
+
+  As an additional layer of protection, :iscman:`named` no longer
+  accepts DNAME records or extraneous NS records in the AUTHORITY
+  section unless these are received via spoofing-resistant transport
+  (TCP, UDP with DNS cookies, TSIG, or SIG(0)).
+
+  ISC would like to thank Yuxiao Wu, Yunyi Zhang, Baojun Liu, and Haixin
+  Duan from Tsinghua University for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5414`
+
+- Cache-poisoning due to weak pseudo-random number generator.
+  :cve:`2025-40780`
+
+  It was discovered during research for an upcoming academic paper that
+  a xoshiro128\*\* internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd
+  party, allowing the prediction of UDP ports and DNS IDs in outgoing
+  queries. This could lead to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with
+  great efficiency and poisoning the DNS cache.
+
+  The internal random generator has been changed to a cryptographically
+  secure pseudo-random generator.
+
+  ISC would like to thank Prof. Amit Klein and Omer Ben Simhon from
+  Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this vulnerability to our
+  attention. :gl:`#5484`
+
+New Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Support for parsing HHIT and BRID records has been added.
+
+  :gl:`#5444`
+
+Removed Features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-domain" statement.
+
+  Mark the :any:`tkey-domain` statement as deprecated since it is only
+  used by code implementing TKEY Mode 2 (Diffie-Hellman), which was
+  removed from newer BIND 9 branches. :gl:`#4204`
+
+- Deprecate the "tkey-gssapi-credential" statement.
+
+  The :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` statement allows GSS-TSIG to be set up
+  in a simpler and more reliable way than using the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement and setting environment
+  variables (e.g. ``KRB5_KTNAME``). Therefore, the
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential` statement has been deprecated;
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should be used instead.
+
+  For configurations currently using a combination of both
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` *and* :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`, the
+  latter should be dropped and the keytab pointed to by
+  :any:`tkey-gssapi-keytab` should now only contain the credential
+  previously specified by :any:`tkey-gssapi-credential`. :gl:`#4204`
+
+Bug Fixes
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+- Prevent spurious SERVFAILs for certain 0-TTL resource records.
+
+  Under certain circumstances, BIND 9 can return SERVFAIL when updating
+  existing entries in the cache with new NS, A, AAAA, or DS records that have a
+  TTL of zero. :gl:`#5294`
+
+- Missing DNSSEC information when CD bit is set in query.
+
+  The RRSIGs for glue records were not being cached correctly for CD=1
+  queries. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5502`

From 8162d3ec3c515b52093e8926e9b46a78042019b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicki=20K=C5=99=C3=AD=C5=BEek?= <nicki@isc.org>
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 17:45:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] Remove reuse annotations for unused m4 libtool files

The files in question are no longer included in the git tree and
distributed with the code. Remove the reuse annotations as they caused
issues with reuse 6.0.0, as multiline annotation for
SPDX-FileCopyrightText breaks the parsing.

(cherry picked from commit 66ebb5cf2fe911442d74f7acf3c95e020a41ba79)
---
 REUSE.toml | 12 ------------
 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/REUSE.toml b/REUSE.toml
index 1a72f5e94d..00d7805bad 100644
--- a/REUSE.toml
+++ b/REUSE.toml
@@ -127,18 +127,6 @@ precedence = "aggregate"
 SPDX-FileCopyrightText = "Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. (\"ISC\")"
 SPDX-License-Identifier = "MPL-2.0"
 
-[[annotations]]
-path = [
-	"m4/libtool.m4",
-	"m4/ltoptions.m4",
-	"m4/ltsugar.m4",
-	"m4/ltversion.m4",
-	"m4/ltversion.m4",
-	"m4/lt~obsolete.m4"
-]
-precedence = "aggregate"
-SPDX-FileCopyrightText = "Free Software Foundation, Inc.\n This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation gives unlimited\n permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without modifications, as long\n as this notice is preserved."
-
 [[annotations]]
 path = [
 	"contrib/dlz/modules/**/testing/**"

From e8adafa196d83e347b1f4d2e09fbb4d510bbf2d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2025 11:50:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 14/14] Update BIND version for release

---
 configure.ac | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index ecae6e9c76..7eb5d73d37 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_MAJOR], 9)dnl
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_MINOR], 18)dnl
-m4_define([bind_VERSION_PATCH], 40)dnl
+m4_define([bind_VERSION_PATCH], 41)dnl
 m4_define([bind_VERSION_EXTRA], )dnl
 m4_define([bind_DESCRIPTION], [(Extended Support Version)])dnl
 m4_define([bind_SRCID], [m4_esyscmd_s([git rev-parse --short HEAD | cut -b1-7])])dnl