diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index a8cf9b21e8..5456bcf7d2 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+5959.	[security]	Fix memory leaks in the DH code when using OpenSSL 3.0.0
+			and later versions. The openssldh_compare(),
+			openssldh_paramcompare(), and openssldh_todns()
+			functions were affected. (CVE-2022-2906) [GL #3491]
+
 5958.	[security]	When an HTTP connection was reused to get
 			statistics from the stats channel, and zlib
 			compression was in use, each successive
diff --git a/doc/notes/notes-current.rst b/doc/notes/notes-current.rst
index f0bd64c74c..34bddc1bc5 100644
--- a/doc/notes/notes-current.rst
+++ b/doc/notes/notes-current.rst
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ Security Fixes
   in size past the end of the allocated buffer. This has been fixed.
   (CVE-2022-2881) :gl:`#3493`
 
+- Memory leaks in code handling Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys were fixed that
+  could be externally triggered, when using TKEY records in DH mode with
+  OpenSSL 3.0.0 and later versions. (CVE-2022-2906) :gl:`#3491`
+
 Known Issues
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
diff --git a/lib/dns/openssldh_link.c b/lib/dns/openssldh_link.c
index d5dbc2e889..1a01c2b351 100644
--- a/lib/dns/openssldh_link.c
+++ b/lib/dns/openssldh_link.c
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ openssldh_computesecret(const dst_key_t *pub, const dst_key_t *priv,
 
 static bool
 openssldh_compare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
+	bool ret = true;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
 	DH *dh1, *dh2;
 	const BIGNUM *pub_key1 = NULL, *pub_key2 = NULL;
@@ -214,18 +215,17 @@ openssldh_compare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
 	if (BN_cmp(p1, p2) != 0 || BN_cmp(g1, g2) != 0 ||
 	    BN_cmp(pub_key1, pub_key2) != 0)
 	{
-		return (false);
+		DST_RET(false);
 	}
 
 	if (priv_key1 != NULL || priv_key2 != NULL) {
-		if (priv_key1 == NULL || priv_key2 == NULL) {
-			return (false);
-		}
-		if (BN_cmp(priv_key1, priv_key2) != 0) {
-			return (false);
+		if (priv_key1 == NULL || priv_key2 == NULL ||
+		    BN_cmp(priv_key1, priv_key2) != 0) {
+			DST_RET(false);
 		}
 	}
 
+err:
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
 	if (p1 != NULL) {
 		BN_free(p1);
@@ -253,11 +253,12 @@ openssldh_compare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
 	}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
 
-	return (true);
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 static bool
 openssldh_paramcompare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
+	bool ret = true;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
 	DH *dh1, *dh2;
 	const BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *g1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *g2 = NULL;
@@ -295,9 +296,10 @@ openssldh_paramcompare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L */
 
 	if (BN_cmp(p1, p2) != 0 || BN_cmp(g1, g2) != 0) {
-		return (false);
+		DST_RET(false);
 	}
 
+err:
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
 	if (p1 != NULL) {
 		BN_free(p1);
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ openssldh_paramcompare(const dst_key_t *key1, const dst_key_t *key2) {
 	}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
 
-	return (true);
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
@@ -675,6 +677,7 @@ uint16_fromregion(isc_region_t *region) {
 
 static isc_result_t
 openssldh_todns(const dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) {
+	isc_result_t ret = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
 	DH *dh;
 	const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
@@ -716,7 +719,7 @@ openssldh_todns(const dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) {
 	publen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
 	dnslen = plen + glen + publen + 6;
 	if (r.length < (unsigned int)dnslen) {
-		return (ISC_R_NOSPACE);
+		DST_RET(ISC_R_NOSPACE);
 	}
 
 	uint16_toregion(plen, &r);
@@ -745,6 +748,7 @@ openssldh_todns(const dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) {
 
 	isc_buffer_add(data, dnslen);
 
+err:
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
 	if (p != NULL) {
 		BN_free(p);
@@ -757,7 +761,7 @@ openssldh_todns(const dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data) {
 	}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
 
-	return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 static isc_result_t