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Tweak and reword release notes
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2 changed files with 25 additions and 25 deletions
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@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ Feature Changes
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- Reduce memory sizes of common structures. ``008e5201098``
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* Reduce `sizeof(isc_sockaddr_t)` from 152 to 48 bytes * Reduce
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`sizeof(struct isc__nm_uvreq)` from 1560 to 560 bytes
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* Reduce `sizeof(isc_sockaddr_t)` from 152 to 48 bytes
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* Reduce `sizeof(struct isc__nm_uvreq)` from 1560 to 560 bytes
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Partial backport of !8299 :gl:`!9953`
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@ -30,51 +30,51 @@ Removed Features
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Bug Fixes
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~~~~~~~~~
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- Fix :iscman:`rndc flushname` for longer name server names.
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- Fix :option:`rndc flushname` for longer name server names.
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:option:`rndc flushname` did not work for name server names longer
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than 16 bytes. This has been fixed. :gl:`#3885`
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- Recently expired records could be returned with timestamp in future.
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- Recently expired records could be returned with a timestamp in future.
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Under rare circumstances, the RRSet that expired at the time of the
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query could be returned with TTL far in the future. This has been
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fixed.
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Under rare circumstances, an RRSet that expired at the time of the
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query could be returned with a TTL in the future. This has been fixed.
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As a side-effect, the expiration time of expired RRSets are no longer
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printed out in the cache dump. :gl:`#5094`
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As a side effect, the expiration time of expired RRSets is no longer
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returned in a cache dump. :gl:`#5094`
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- Yaml string not terminated in negative response in delv.
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- YAML string not terminated in negative response in delv.
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:gl:`#5098`
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- Apply the memory limit only to ADB database items.
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The resolver under heavy-load could exhaust the memory available for
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storing the information in the Address Database (ADB) effectively
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evicting already stored information in the ADB. The memory used to
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retrieve and provide information from the ADB is now not a subject of
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the same memory limits that are applied for storing the information in
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Under heavy load, a resolver could exhaust the memory available for
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storing the information in the Address Database (ADB), effectively
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discarding previously stored information in the ADB. The memory used to
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retrieve and provide information from the ADB is no longer subject to
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the same memory limits that are applied to
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the Address Database. :gl:`#5127`
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- Avoid unnecessary locking in the zone/cache database.
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Prevent lock contention among many worker threads referring to the
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same database node at the same time. This improves zone and cache
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database performance for the heavily contended database nodes.
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Lock contention among many worker threads referring to the
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same database node at the same time is now prevented. This improves zone and
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cache database performance for any heavily contended database nodes.
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:gl:`#5130`
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- Improve the resolver performance under attack.
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A remote client can force the DNS resolver component to consume the
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memory faster than cleaning up the resources for the canceled resolver
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fetches due to `recursive-clients` limit. If the such traffic pattern
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is sustained for a long period of time, the DNS server might
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Previously, a remote client could force the DNS resolver component to consume
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memory faster than resources were cleaned up for the canceled resolver
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fetches, due to the `recursive-clients` limit. If such a traffic pattern
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was sustained for a long period of time, the DNS server might
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eventually run out of the available memory. This has been fixed.
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It should be noted that when under such heavy attack for a BIND 9
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version both with and without the fix, no outgoing DNS queries will be
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successful as the generated traffic pattern will consume all the
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It should be noted that, under such a heavy attack, no outgoing DNS queries will be successful in BIND 9
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versions both with and without the fix, as the generated traffic pattern will consume all the
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available slots for the recursive clients.
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