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[v9_10] address TSIG bypass/forgery vulnerabilities

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4643.	[security]	An error in TSIG handling could permit unauthorized
			zone transfers or zone updates. (CVE-2017-3142)
			(CVE-2017-3143) [RT #45383]

(cherry picked from commit 581c1526ab)
(cherry picked from commit a03f4b1ea4)
This commit is contained in:
Evan Hunt 2017-06-27 11:40:31 -07:00
parent a71114e8bd
commit 88dc9d367d
7 changed files with 88 additions and 33 deletions
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4
CHANGES
View file

@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
--- 9.10.6b1 released ---
4643. [security] An error in TSIG handling could permit unauthorized
zone transfers or zone updates. (CVE-2017-3142)
(CVE-2017-3143) [RT #45383]
4642. [cleanup] Add more logging of RFC 5011 events affecting the
status of managed keys: newly observed keys,
deletion of revoked keys, etc. [RT #45354]

10
README
View file

@ -263,8 +263,14 @@ CVE-2017-3137, and CVE-2017-3138.
BIND 9.10.6
BIND 9.10.6 is a maintenance release, and addresses the security flaws
disclosed in CVE-2017-3140 and CVE-2017-3141.
<<<<<<< HEAD BIND 9.10.6 is a maintenance release, and addresses the
security flaws disclosed in CVE-2017-3140 and CVE-2017-3141. ======= BIND
9.11.2 is a maintenance release, and addresses the security flaws
disclosed in CVE-2017-3140, CVE-2017-3141, CVE-2017-3142 and
CVE-2017-3143. It also addresses several bugs related to the use of an
LMDB database to store data related to zones added via rndc addzone or
catalog zones. >>>>>>> a03f4b1... [v9_11] address TSIG bypass/forgery
vulnerabilities
Building BIND

7
README.md
View file

@ -277,8 +277,15 @@ CVE-2017-3137, and CVE-2017-3138.
#### BIND 9.10.6
<<<<<<< HEAD
BIND 9.10.6 is a maintenance release, and addresses the security flaws
disclosed in CVE-2017-3140 and CVE-2017-3141.
=======
BIND 9.11.2 is a maintenance release, and addresses the security flaws
disclosed in CVE-2017-3140, CVE-2017-3141, CVE-2017-3142 and CVE-2017-3143.
It also addresses several bugs related to the use of an LMDB database to
store data related to zones added via `rndc addzone` or catalog zones.
>>>>>>> a03f4b1... [v9_11] address TSIG bypass/forgery vulnerabilities
### <a name="build"/> Building BIND

7
doc/arm/notes.xml
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@ -69,6 +69,13 @@
<section xml:id="relnotes_security"><info><title>Security Fixes</title></info>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
An error in TSIG handling could permit unauthorized zone
transfers or zone updates. These flaws are disclosed in
CVE-2017-3142 and CVE-2017-3143. [RT #45383]
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
The BIND installer on Windows used an unquoted service path,

3
lib/dns/dnssec.c
View file

@ -980,6 +980,8 @@ dns_dnssec_verifymessage(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
mctx = msg->mctx;
msg->verify_attempted = 1;
msg->verified_sig = 0;
msg->sig0status = dns_tsigerror_badsig;
if (is_response(msg)) {
if (msg->query.base == NULL)
@ -1075,6 +1077,7 @@ dns_dnssec_verifymessage(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
}
msg->verified_sig = 1;
msg->sig0status = dns_rcode_noerror;
dst_context_destroy(&ctx);
dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig);

17
lib/dns/message.c
View file

@ -3068,12 +3068,19 @@ dns_message_signer(dns_message_t *msg, dns_name_t *signer) {
result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &tsig, NULL);
INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
if (msg->tsigstatus != dns_rcode_noerror)
result = DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE;
else if (tsig.error != dns_rcode_noerror)
result = DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET;
else
if (msg->verified_sig &&
msg->tsigstatus == dns_rcode_noerror &&
tsig.error == dns_rcode_noerror)
{
result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
} else if ((!msg->verified_sig) ||
(msg->tsigstatus != dns_rcode_noerror))
{
result = DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE;
} else {
INSIST(tsig.error != dns_rcode_noerror);
result = DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET;
}
dns_rdata_freestruct(&tsig);
if (msg->tsigkey == NULL) {

73
lib/dns/tsig.c
View file

@ -979,9 +979,10 @@ dns_tsig_sign(dns_message_t *msg) {
return (ret);
/*
* If this is a response, digest the query signature.
* If this is a response and the query's signature
* validated, digest the query signature.
*/
if (response) {
if (response && (tsig.error == dns_rcode_noerror)) {
dns_rdata_t querytsigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
ret = dns_rdataset_first(msg->querytsig);
@ -1218,6 +1219,8 @@ dns_tsig_verify(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
REQUIRE(tsigkey == NULL || VALID_TSIG_KEY(tsigkey));
msg->verify_attempted = 1;
msg->verified_sig = 0;
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badsig;
if (msg->tcp_continuation) {
if (tsigkey == NULL || msg->querytsig == NULL)
@ -1341,27 +1344,31 @@ dns_tsig_verify(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
#endif
alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA1 ||
alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA224 || alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA256 ||
alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA384 || alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA512) {
alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA384 || alg == DST_ALG_HMACSHA512)
{
isc_uint16_t digestbits = dst_key_getbits(key);
if (tsig.siglen > siglen) {
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2, "signature length too big");
return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
}
if (tsig.siglen > 0 &&
(tsig.siglen < 10 || tsig.siglen < ((siglen + 1) / 2))) {
(tsig.siglen < 10 || tsig.siglen < ((siglen + 1) / 2)))
{
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
"signature length below minimum");
return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
}
if (tsig.siglen > 0 && digestbits != 0 &&
tsig.siglen < ((digestbits + 1) / 8)) {
tsig.siglen < ((digestbits + 1) / 8))
{
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badtrunc;
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
"truncated signature length too small");
return (DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE);
}
if (tsig.siglen > 0 && digestbits == 0 &&
tsig.siglen < siglen) {
tsig.siglen < siglen)
{
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badtrunc;
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2, "signature length too small");
return (DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE);
@ -1380,7 +1387,7 @@ dns_tsig_verify(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
if (response) {
if (response && (tsig.error == dns_rcode_noerror)) {
isc_buffer_init(&databuf, data, sizeof(data));
isc_buffer_putuint16(&databuf, querytsig.siglen);
isc_buffer_usedregion(&databuf, &r);
@ -1485,10 +1492,9 @@ dns_tsig_verify(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
"signature failed to verify(1)");
goto cleanup_context;
} else if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
} else if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup_context;
dst_context_destroy(&ctx);
}
} else if (tsig.error != dns_tsigerror_badsig &&
tsig.error != dns_tsigerror_badkey) {
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badsig;
@ -1496,18 +1502,18 @@ dns_tsig_verify(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
return (DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE);
}
msg->tsigstatus = dns_rcode_noerror;
if (tsig.error != dns_rcode_noerror) {
msg->tsigstatus = tsig.error;
if (tsig.error == dns_tsigerror_badtime)
return (DNS_R_CLOCKSKEW);
ret = DNS_R_CLOCKSKEW;
else
return (DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET);
ret = DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET;
goto cleanup_context;
}
msg->tsigstatus = dns_rcode_noerror;
msg->verified_sig = 1;
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
ret = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
cleanup_context:
if (ctx != NULL)
@ -1539,6 +1545,9 @@ tsig_verify_tcp(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg) {
REQUIRE(msg->tcp_continuation == 1);
REQUIRE(msg->querytsig != NULL);
msg->verified_sig = 0;
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badsig;
if (!is_response(msg))
return (DNS_R_EXPECTEDRESPONSE);
@ -1577,7 +1586,8 @@ tsig_verify_tcp(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg) {
* Do the key name and algorithm match that of the query?
*/
if (!dns_name_equal(keyname, &tsigkey->name) ||
!dns_name_equal(&tsig.algorithm, &querytsig.algorithm)) {
!dns_name_equal(&tsig.algorithm, &querytsig.algorithm))
{
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badkey;
ret = DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE;
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
@ -1596,7 +1606,8 @@ tsig_verify_tcp(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg) {
ret = DNS_R_CLOCKSKEW;
goto cleanup_querystruct;
} else if (now + msg->timeadjust <
tsig.timesigned - tsig.fudge) {
tsig.timesigned - tsig.fudge)
{
msg->tsigstatus = dns_tsigerror_badtime;
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
"signature is in the future");
@ -1702,10 +1713,12 @@ tsig_verify_tcp(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg) {
sig_r.length = tsig.siglen;
if (tsig.siglen == 0) {
if (tsig.error != dns_rcode_noerror) {
if (tsig.error == dns_tsigerror_badtime)
msg->tsigstatus = tsig.error;
if (tsig.error == dns_tsigerror_badtime) {
ret = DNS_R_CLOCKSKEW;
else
} else {
ret = DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET;
}
} else {
tsig_log(msg->tsigkey, 2,
"signature is empty");
@ -1721,24 +1734,32 @@ tsig_verify_tcp(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg) {
"signature failed to verify(2)");
ret = DNS_R_TSIGVERIFYFAILURE;
goto cleanup_context;
}
else if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
} else if (ret != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
goto cleanup_context;
}
dst_context_destroy(&msg->tsigctx);
if (tsig.error != dns_rcode_noerror) {
msg->tsigstatus = tsig.error;
if (tsig.error == dns_tsigerror_badtime)
ret = DNS_R_CLOCKSKEW;
else
ret = DNS_R_TSIGERRORSET;
goto cleanup_context;
}
}
msg->tsigstatus = dns_rcode_noerror;
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
msg->verified_sig = 1;
ret = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
cleanup_context:
dst_context_destroy(&msg->tsigctx);
if (msg->tsigctx != NULL)
dst_context_destroy(&msg->tsigctx);
cleanup_querystruct:
dns_rdata_freestruct(&querytsig);
return (ret);
}
isc_result_t