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Prepare release notes for BIND 9.20.23
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@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ The list of known issues affecting the latest version in the 9.20 branch can be
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found at
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https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/wikis/Known-Issues-in-BIND-9.20
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.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.20.23.rst
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.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.20.22.rst
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.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.20.21.rst
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.. include:: ../notes/notes-9.20.20.rst
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246
doc/notes/notes-9.20.23.rst
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doc/notes/notes-9.20.23.rst
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.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
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..
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.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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..
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.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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.. License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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..
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.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
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.. information regarding copyright ownership.
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Notes for BIND 9.20.23
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----------------------
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Security Fixes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- Fix outgoing zone transfers' quota issue.
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Unauthorized clients could consume outgoing zone transfers quota and
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block authorized zone transfer clients. This has been fixed.
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:gl:`#3589`
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- [CVE-2026-3592] Limit resolver server list size.
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When resolving a domain with many nameservers that share overlapping
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IP addresses (e.g., 10 NS records all pointing at the same set of
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addresses), BIND could previously waste time querying duplicate
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addresses and build up excessively large server lists. Deduplicate
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addresses in the resolver's server list so that each unique IP is only
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queried once per resolution attempt, regardless of how many NS records
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point to it and cap the number of addresses stored per nameserver name
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to 6 (combined A and AAAA), preventing memory and CPU overhead from
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domains with unusually large NS/glue sets. :gl:`#5641`
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- [CVE-2026-3039] Fix GSS-API resource leak.
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Fixed a memory leak where each GSS-API TKEY negotiation leaked a
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security context inside the GSS library. An unauthenticated attacker
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could exhaust server memory by sending repeated TKEY queries to a
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server with tkey-gssapi-keytab configured. The leaked memory was
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allocated by the GSS library, bypassing BIND's memory accounting.
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Multi-round GSS-API negotiation (GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) is now
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rejected, as BIND never supported it correctly and Kerberos/SPNEGO
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completes in a single round.
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Also implemented missing RFC 3645 requirement: the client now verifies
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that mutual authentication and integrity flags are granted by the
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GSS-API mechanism (Section 3.1.1). :gl:`#5752`
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- [CVE-2026-5950] Avoid unbounded recursion loop.
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A bug during bad server handling could cause the resolver to enter an
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infinite loop, continuously sending queries to an upstream server with
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no exit condition, until the resolver query timeout was hit. This has
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been fixed.
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ISC would like to thank Billy Baraja (BielraX) for bringing this issue
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to our attention. :gl:`#5804`
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- [CVE-2026-3593] Add system test for HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame flood.
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A use-after-free vulnerability in the DNS-over-HTTPS implementation
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could cause named to crash when a client sends a flood of HTTP/2
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SETTINGS frames while a DoH response is being written. This affects
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servers with DoH (DNS-over-HTTPS) enabled.
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ISC would like to thank Naresh Kandula Parmar (Nottiboy) for reporting
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this.
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For: #5755
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- [CVE-2026-5946] Disable recursion, UPDATE, and NOTIFY for non-IN
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views.
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Recursion, dynamic updates (UPDATE), and zone change notifications
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(NOTIFY) are now disabled for views with a class other than IN (such
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as CHAOS or HESIOD); authoritative service for non-IN zones (e.g.
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version.bind in class CHAOS) continues to work as before. Servers
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configured with recursion yes in a non-IN view will log a warning at
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startup, and named-checkconf flags the same condition. UPDATE and
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NOTIFY messages that specify the meta-classes ANY or NONE in the
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question section are now rejected with FORMERR.
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This addresses a set of closely related security issues collectively
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identified as CVE-2026-5946. ISC would like to thank Mcsky23 for
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bringing these issues to our attention.
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Feature Changes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- Fix CPU spikes and slow queries when cache approaches memory limit.
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When the cache grew close to the configured max-cache-size, every
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subsequent entry triggered all worker threads to run cache cleanup at
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once, causing CPU spikes and a drop in query throughput. Cleanup is
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now spread probabilistically across inserts as memory approaches the
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limit, so the work is distributed evenly instead of piling up at the
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threshold.
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Bug Fixes
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~~~~~~~~~
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- Use the zone file's basename as origin in DNSSEC tools.
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In `dnssec-signzone` and `dnssec-verify`, when the zone origin is not
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specified using the `-o` parameter, the default behavior is to try to
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sign using the zone's file name as the origin. So, for example,
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`dnssec-signzone -S example.com` will work, so long as the file name
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matches the zone name.
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This now also works if the zone is in a different directory. For
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example, `dnssec-signzone -S zones/example.com` will set the origin
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value to `example.com`. :gl:`#5678`
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- Fix a possible race condition during zone transfers.
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The :iscman:`named` process could terminate unexpectedly when
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processing an IXFR message during a zone transfer. This has been
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fixed. :gl:`#5767`
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- Fix named crash when processing SIG records in dynamic updates.
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Previously, :iscman:`named` could abort if a client sent a dynamic
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update containing a SIG record (the legacy signature type) to a zone
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configured with an update-policy. The function `dns_db_findrdataset`
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had an incorrect requirements prerequisite that prevented SIG records
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being looked up, which was triggered as part of processing an UPDATE
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request and could be triggered remotely by any client permitted to
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send updates. This has been fixed by ensuring that SIG records are
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handled consistently with RRSIG records during update processing.
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:gl:`#5818`
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- Fix zone verification of NSEC3 signed zones.
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Previously, when computing the compressed bitmap during verification
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of an NSEC3-signed zone, an undersized buffer was used that resulted
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in an out-of-bounds write if there were too many active windows in the
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bitmap. This impacted mirror zones which are NSEC3-signed,
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`dnssec-signzone` and `dnssec-verifyzone`. This has been fixed.
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:gl:`#5834`
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- Prevent a crash when using both dns64 and filter-aaaa.
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An assertion failure could be triggered if both `dns64` and the
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`filter-aaaa` plugin were in use simultaneously. This happened if the
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plugin triggered a second recursion process, which then attempted to
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store DNS64 state information in a pointer that had already been set
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by the original recursion process. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5854`
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- Remove unnecessary dns_name_free call.
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When processing a catalog zone member's primaries definition and there
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is a TXT record containing an invalid name TSIG key name,
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dns_name_free was incorrectly called triggering an assertion. This has
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been fixed. :gl:`#5858`
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- Prevent malicious DNSSEC zones from exhausting validator CPU.
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A DNSSEC-signed zone could publish a DNSKEY with an unusually large
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RSA public exponent and force any validator resolving names in that
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zone to spend disproportionate CPU verifying signatures. The
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validator now rejects such DNSKEYs, matching the limit already applied
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to keys read from files or HSMs. :gl:`#5881`
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- Fix rndc-confgen aborting on HMAC-SHA-384/512 keys above 512 bits.
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`rndc-confgen -A hmac-sha384` and `-A hmac-sha512` documented a `-b`
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range of 1..1024, but any value above 512 aborted on hardened builds
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instead of producing a key. The full advertised range now works.
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:gl:`#5903`
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- Prevent crafted queries from degrading RRL performance.
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With response rate limiting enabled, an attacker sending queries from
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many spoofed source addresses could steer entries into the same slot
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of the internal rate-limit table and slow down query processing on the
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affected server. The table now uses a per-process keyed hash so the
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placement of entries cannot be predicted or influenced from the
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network. :gl:`#5906`
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- Prevent rare named crash when notifies are cancelled.
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Under heavy load, named could occasionally crash when a queued
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outbound notify or zone refresh was cancelled at the moment it was
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being sent — for example, while a zone was being reloaded or removed.
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The race that caused the crash is now prevented. :gl:`#5915`
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- Stop delv from aborting on a malformed query name.
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delv aborts with SIGABRT instead of exiting cleanly when given a query
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name that fails wire-format conversion (e.g. a label longer than 63
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octets). After this change delv prints the parse error and exits with
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a normal failure code. :gl:`#5916`
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- Fix a crash when reconfiguring while an NTA is being rechecked.
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When named was reconfigured or shut down while a negative trust anchor
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was being rechecked against authoritative servers, the in-flight
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recheck could outlive the view that owned it and cause `named` to
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crash. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5938`
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- Fix a bug in allow-query/allow-transfer catalog zone custom
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properties.
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The :iscman:`named` process could terminate unexpectedly when
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processing a catalog zone with an invalid ``allow-query`` or
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``allow-transfer`` custom property (i.e. having a non-APL type)
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coexisting with the valid property. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5941`
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- Fix a memory leak issue in the catalog zones.
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The :iscman:`named` process could leak small amounts of memory when
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processing a catalog zone entry which had defined custom primary
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servers with TSIG keys using both the regular ``primaries`` custom
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property syntax and the legacy alternative syntax (``masters``) at the
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same time. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5943`
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- Fix suppressed missing-glue check in named-checkzone.
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named-checkzone and named-checkconf -z silently skipped the
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missing-glue check for any NS name that had already triggered an
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extra-AAAA-glue warning, so zones missing required A glue could pass
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validation and be deployed with broken delegations.
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- Implement seamless outgoing TCP connection reuse.
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The resolver can and will reuse outgoing TCP connections to the same
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host, as recommended by RFC 7766. This prevents a whole class of
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attacks that abuse the fact that establishing a TCP connection is
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expensive and it is fairly easy to deplete the outgoing TCP ports by
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putting them into TIME_WAIT state.
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The number of pipelined queries per connection is capped at 256 to
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limit the impact of a connection drop.
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- Reject record sets too large to serve in DNS.
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When BIND was asked to store a record set whose total size exceeds
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what fits in a DNS message, it would allocate memory and build the
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structure, then fail later at response time. Such oversized record
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sets are now rejected at the time of storage with an error, avoiding
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wasted work on data that can never be served.
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