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Test ZSK and KSK rollover
Add tests for ZSK Pre-Publication and KSK Double-KSK rollover. Includes tests for next key event is scheduled at the right time.
This commit is contained in:
Matthijs Mekking
parent
c9f1ec8380
commit
36c72bf3c3
4 changed files with 889 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ controls {
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};
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include "policies/kasp.conf";
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include "policies/autosign.conf";
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/* Zones that are getting initially signed */
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@ -120,3 +121,115 @@ zone "ecdsa384.kasp" {
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file "ecdsa384.kasp.db";
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dnssec-policy "ecdsa384";
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};
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/*
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* Zones in different signing states.
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*/
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/*
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* Zone that has expired signatures.
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*/
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zone "expired-sigs.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "expired-sigs.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "autosign";
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};
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/*
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* Zone that has valid, fresh signatures.
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*/
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zone "fresh-sigs.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "fresh-sigs.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "autosign";
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};
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/*
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* Zone that has unfresh signatures.
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*/
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zone "unfresh-sigs.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "unfresh-sigs.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "autosign";
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};
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/*
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* Zone that has missing private ZSK.
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*/
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zone "zsk-missing.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "zsk-missing.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "autosign";
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};
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/*
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* Zone that has inactive ZSK.
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*/
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zone "zsk-retired.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "zsk-retired.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "autosign";
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};
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/*
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* Zones for testing ZSK Pre-Publication steps.
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*/
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zone "step1.zsk-prepub.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step1.zsk-prepub.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub";
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};
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zone "step2.zsk-prepub.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step2.zsk-prepub.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub";
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};
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zone "step3.zsk-prepub.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step3.zsk-prepub.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub";
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};
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zone "step4.zsk-prepub.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step4.zsk-prepub.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub";
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};
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zone "step5.zsk-prepub.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step5.zsk-prepub.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub";
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};
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/*
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* Zones for testing KSK Double-KSK steps.
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*/
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zone "step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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zone "step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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zone "step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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zone "step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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zone "step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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zone "step6.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" {
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type master;
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file "step6.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.db";
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk";
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};
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66
bin/tests/system/kasp/ns3/policies/autosign.conf
Normal file
66
bin/tests/system/kasp/ns3/policies/autosign.conf
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
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*
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* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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*
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* See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
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* information regarding copyright ownership.
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*/
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dnssec-policy "autosign" {
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signatures-refresh P1W;
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signatures-validity P2W;
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signatures-validity-dnskey P2W;
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dnskey-ttl 300;
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keys {
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ksk key-directory P2Y 13;
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zsk key-directory P1Y 13;
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};
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};
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dnssec-policy "zsk-prepub" {
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signatures-refresh P1W;
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signatures-validity P2W;
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signatures-validity-dnskey P2W;
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dnskey-ttl 3600;
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publish-safety P1D;
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retire-safety P2D;
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keys {
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ksk key-directory P2Y 13;
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zsk key-directory P30D 13;
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};
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zone-propagation-delay PT1H;
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zone-max-ttl 1d;
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};
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dnssec-policy "ksk-doubleksk" {
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signatures-refresh P1W;
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signatures-validity P2W;
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signatures-validity-dnskey P2W;
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dnskey-ttl 2h;
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publish-safety P1D;
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retire-safety P2D;
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keys {
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ksk key-directory P60D 13;
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zsk key-directory P1Y 13;
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};
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zone-propagation-delay PT1H;
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zone-max-ttl 1d;
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parent-ds-ttl 3600;
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parent-registration-delay P1D;
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parent-propagation-delay PT1H;
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};
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@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ setup() {
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echo $zone >> zones
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}
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private_type_record() {
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_zone=$1
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_algorithm=$2
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_keyfile=$3
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_id=$(keyfile_to_key_id "$_keyfile")
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printf "%s. 0 IN TYPE65534 \# 5 %02x%04x0000\n" $_zone $_algorithm $_id
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}
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# Make lines shorter by storing key states in environment variables.
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H="HIDDEN"
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R="RUMOURED"
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O="OMNIPRESENT"
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U="UNRETENTIVE"
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#
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# Set up zones that will be initially signed.
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#
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@ -48,3 +65,294 @@ zone="pregenerated.kasp"
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$KEYGEN -k rsasha1 -l policies/kasp.conf $zone > keygen.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$KEYGEN -k rsasha1 -l policies/kasp.conf $zone > keygen.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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#
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# Set up zones that are already signed.
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#
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# These signatures are set to expire long in the past, update immediately.
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setup expired-sigs.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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T="now-6mo"
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -d $O $T -k $O $T -r $O $T $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -k $O $T -z $O $T $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -PS -x -s now-2mo -e now-1mo -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# These signatures are still good, and can be reused.
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setup fresh-sigs.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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T="now-6mo"
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -d $O $T -k $O $T -r $O $T $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -k $O $T -z $O $T $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# These signatures are still good, but not fresh enough, update immediately.
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setup unfresh-sigs.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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T="now-6mo"
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -d $O $T -k $O $T -r $O $T $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -k $O $T -z $O $T $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1w -e now+1w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# These signatures are already expired, and the private ZSK is missing.
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setup zsk-missing.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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T="now-6mo"
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -d $O $T -k $O $T -r $O $T $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -k $O $T -z $O $T $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -PS -x -s now-2w -e now-1mi -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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rm -f ${ZSK}.private
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# These signatures are already expired, and the private ZSK is retired.
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setup zsk-retired.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 300 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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T="now-6mo"
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -d $O $T -k $O $T -r $O $T $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $T -A $T -g $O -k $O $T -z $O $T $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -PS -x -s now-2w -e now-1mi -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -I now -g HIDDEN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
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#
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# The zones at zsk-prepub.autosign represent the various steps of a ZSK
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# Pre-Publication rollover.
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#
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# Step 1:
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# Introduce the first key. This will immediately be active.
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setup step1.zsk-prepub.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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TactN="now"
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# Step 2:
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# It is time to pre-publish the successor ZSK.
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setup step2.zsk-prepub.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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# According to RFC 7583: Tpub(N+1) <= Tact(N) + Lzsk - Ipub
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# Also: Ipub = Dprp + TTLkey (+publish-safety)
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# so: Tact(N) = Tpub(N+1) + Ipub - Lzsk = now + (1d2h) - 30d =
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# now + 26h - 30d = now − 694h
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TactN="now-694h"
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# Step 3:
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# After the publication interval has passed the DNSKEY of the successor ZSK
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# is OMNIPRESENT and the zone can thus be signed with the successor ZSK.
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setup step3.zsk-prepub.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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ZSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
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# According to RFC 7583: Tpub(N+1) <= Tact(N) + Lzsk - Ipub
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# Also: Tret(N) = Tact(N+1) = Tact(N) + Lzsk
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# so: Tact(N) = Tact(N+1) - Lzsk = now - 30d
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# and: Tpub(N+1) = Tact(N+1) - Ipub = now - 26h
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# and: Tret(N+1) = Tact(N+1) + Lzsk
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TactN="now-30d"
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TpubN1="now-26h"
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TretN1="now+30d"
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I now -g $H -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK1 > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -S $ZSK1 -i 0 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
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$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A now -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $R $TpubN1 -z $H $TpubN1 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.4 2>&1
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cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK1}.key" "${ZSK2}.key" > "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK1 >> "$infile"
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private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK2 >> "$infile"
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$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
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# Step 4:
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# After the retire interval has passed the predecessor DNSKEY can be
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# removed from the zone.
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setup step4.zsk-prepub.autosign
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KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
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ZSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
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ZSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
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# According to RFC 7583: Tret(N) = Tact(N) + Lzsk
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# Also: Tdea(N) = Tret(N) + Iret
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# Also: Iret = Dsgn + Dprp + TTLsig (+retire-safety)
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# so: Tact(N) = Tdea(N) - Iret - Lzsk = now - (1w1h1d2d) - 30d =
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# now - (10d1h) - 30d = now - 961h
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# and: Tret(N) = Tdea(N) - Iret = now - (10d1h) = now - 241h
|
||||
# and: Tpub(N+1) = Tdea(N) - Iret - Ipub = now - (10d1h) - 26h =
|
||||
# now - 267h
|
||||
# and: Tact(N+1) = Tdea(N) - Iret = Tret(N)
|
||||
# and: Tret(N+1) = Tdea(N) - Iret + Lzsk = now - (10d1h) + 30d =
|
||||
# now + 479h
|
||||
TactN="now-961h"
|
||||
TretN="now-241h"
|
||||
TpubN1="now-267h"
|
||||
TactN1="${TretN}"
|
||||
TretN1="now+479h"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I $TretN -g $H -k $O $TactN -z $U $TretN $ZSK1 > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -S $ZSK1 -i 0 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A $TactN1 -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $O $TactN1 -z $R $TactN1 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.4 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK1}.key" "${ZSK2}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -PS -x -s now-2w -e now-1mi -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 5:
|
||||
# The predecessor DNSKEY is removed long enough that is has become HIDDEN.
|
||||
setup step5.zsk-prepub.autosign
|
||||
KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
ZSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
ZSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 3600 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
|
||||
# Substract DNSKEY TTL from all the times (1h).
|
||||
TactN="now-962h"
|
||||
TretN="now-242h"
|
||||
TpubN1="now-268h"
|
||||
TactN1="${TretN}"
|
||||
TretN1="now+478h"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I $TretN -D now -g $H -k $U $TretN -z $U $TretN $ZSK1 > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -S $ZSK1 -i 0 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A $TactN1 -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $O $TactN1 -z $R $TactN1 $ZSK2 > settime.out.$zone.4 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK1}.key" "${ZSK2}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK1 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK2 >> "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The zones at ksk-doubleksk.autosign represent the various steps of a KSK
|
||||
# Double-KSK rollover.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 1:
|
||||
# Introduce the first key. This will immediately be active.
|
||||
setup step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign
|
||||
KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
TactN="now"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 2:
|
||||
# It is time to submit the introduce the new KSK.
|
||||
setup step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign
|
||||
KSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
# According to RFC 7583: Tpub(N+1) <= Tact(N) + Lksk - Dreg - IpubC
|
||||
# Also: IpubC = DprpC + TTLkey (+publish-safety)
|
||||
# so: Tact(N) = Tpub(N+1) - Lksk + Dreg + IpubC = now - 60d + (1d3h)
|
||||
# now - 1440h + 27h = now - 1413h
|
||||
TactN="now-1413h"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 3:
|
||||
# It is time to submit the DS.
|
||||
setup step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign
|
||||
KSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
KSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
|
||||
# According to RFC 7583: Tsbm(N+1) >= Trdy(N+1)
|
||||
# Also: Tact(N+1) = Tsbm(N+1) + Dreg
|
||||
# so: Tact(N) = Tsbm(N+1) + Dreg - Lksk = now + 1d - 60d = now - 59d
|
||||
# and: Tret(N) = Tsbm(N+1) + Dreg = now + 1d
|
||||
# and: Tpub(N+1) <= Tsbm(N+1) - IpubC = now + 27h
|
||||
# and: Tret(N+1) = Tsbm(N+1) + Dreg + Lksk = 1d + 60d
|
||||
TactN="now-59d"
|
||||
TretN="now+1d"
|
||||
TpubN1="now-27h"
|
||||
TretN1="now+61d"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I $TretN -g $H -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $O $TactN $KSK1 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -S $KSK1 -i 0 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A $TretN -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $R $TpubN1 -r $R $TpubN1 -d $H $TpubN1 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK1}.key" "${KSK2}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK1 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK2 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 4:
|
||||
# The DS should be swapped now.
|
||||
setup step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign
|
||||
KSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
KSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
|
||||
# According to RFC 7583: Tdea(N) = Tret(N) + Iret
|
||||
# Also: Tret(N) = Tsbm(N+1) + Dreg
|
||||
# Also: Tact(N+1) = Tret(N)
|
||||
# Also: Iret = DprpP + TTLds (+retire-safety)
|
||||
# so: Tact(N) = Tdea(N) - Lksk - Iret = now - 60d - 2d2h = now - 1490h
|
||||
# and: Tret(N) = Tdea(N) - Iret = now - 2d2h = 50h
|
||||
# and: Tpub(N+1) = Tdea(N) - Iret - Dreg - IpubC = now - 50h - 1d - 1d3h = now - 101h
|
||||
# and: Tsbm(N+1) = Tdea(N) - Iret - Dreg = now - 50h - 1d = now - 74h
|
||||
# and: Tact(N+1) = Tret(N)
|
||||
# and: Tret(N+1) = Tdea(N) + Lksk - Iret = now + 60d - 2d2h = now + 1390h
|
||||
TactN="now-1490h"
|
||||
TretN="now-50h"
|
||||
TpubN1="now-101h"
|
||||
TsbmN1="now-74h"
|
||||
TactN1="${TretN}"
|
||||
TretN1="now+1390h"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I $TretN -g $H -k $O $TactN -r $O $TactN -d $U $TsbmN1 $KSK1 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -S $KSK1 -i 0 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A $TactN1 -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $O $TsbmN1 -r $O $TsbmN1 -d $R $TsbmN1 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK1}.key" "${KSK2}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK1 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK2 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 5:
|
||||
# The predecessor DNSKEY is removed long enough that is has become HIDDEN.
|
||||
setup step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign
|
||||
KSK1=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.1`
|
||||
KSK2=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -f KSK -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.2`
|
||||
ZSK=`$KEYGEN -a ECDSAP256SHA256 -L 7200 $zone 2> keygen.out.$zone.3`
|
||||
# Substract DNSKEY TTL from all the times (2h).
|
||||
TactN="now-1492h"
|
||||
TretN="now-52h"
|
||||
TpubN1="now-102h"
|
||||
TsbmN1="now-75h"
|
||||
TactN1="${TretN}"
|
||||
TretN1="now+1388h"
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -I $TretN -g $H -k $U $TretN -r $U $TretN -d $H $TretN $KSK1 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -S $KSK1 -i 0 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.3 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TpubN1 -A $TactN1 -I $TretN1 -g $O -k $O $TactN1 -r $O $TactN1 -d $O $TactN1 $KSK2 > settime.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
$SETTIME -s -P $TactN -A $TactN -g $O -k $O $TactN -z $O $TactN $ZSK > settime.out.$zone.2 2>&1
|
||||
cat template.db.in "${KSK1}.key" "${KSK2}.key" "${ZSK}.key" > "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK1 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $KSK2 >> "$infile"
|
||||
private_type_record $zone 13 $ZSK >> "$infile"
|
||||
$SIGNER -S -x -s now-1h -e now+2w -o $zone -O full -f $zonefile $infile > signer.out.$zone.1 2>&1
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1080,5 +1080,407 @@ dnssec_verify
|
|||
|
||||
# TODO: ED25519 and ED448.
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: expired-sigs.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "expired-sigs.autosign" "autosign" "300" "2"
|
||||
# Both KSK and ZSK stay OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY1" "ksk" "63072000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY1" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "omnipresent"
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "31536000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY2" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
# Expect only two keys.
|
||||
key_clear "KEY3"
|
||||
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify all signatures have been refreshed.
|
||||
check_rrsig_refresh() {
|
||||
# Apex.
|
||||
_qtypes="DNSKEY SOA NS NSEC"
|
||||
for _qtype in $_qtypes
|
||||
do
|
||||
n=$((n+1))
|
||||
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
dig_with_opts $ZONE @10.53.0.3 $_qtype > dig.out.$DIR.test$n || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
|
||||
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
|
||||
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
|
||||
# If this exact RRSIG is also in the zone file it is not refreshed.
|
||||
_rrsig=`cat rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype`
|
||||
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}"
|
||||
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
|
||||
status=$((status+ret))
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Below apex.
|
||||
_labels="a b c ns3"
|
||||
for _label in $_labels;
|
||||
do
|
||||
_qtypes="A NSEC"
|
||||
for _qtype in $_qtypes
|
||||
do
|
||||
n=$((n+1))
|
||||
echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" @10.53.0.3 $_qtype > dig.out.$DIR.test$n || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
|
||||
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
|
||||
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
|
||||
_rrsig=`cat rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype`
|
||||
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}"
|
||||
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
|
||||
status=$((status+ret))
|
||||
done
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_rrsig_refresh
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: fresh-sigs.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "fresh-sigs.autosign" "autosign" "300" "2"
|
||||
# key_properties, key_timings and key_states same as above.
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify signature reuse.
|
||||
check_rrsig_reuse() {
|
||||
# Apex.
|
||||
_qtypes="NS NSEC"
|
||||
for _qtype in $_qtypes
|
||||
do
|
||||
n=$((n+1))
|
||||
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
dig_with_opts $ZONE @10.53.0.3 $_qtype > dig.out.$DIR.test$n || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
|
||||
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
|
||||
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
|
||||
# If this exact RRSIG is also in the zone file it is not refreshed.
|
||||
_rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype)
|
||||
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}"
|
||||
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
|
||||
status=$((status+ret))
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Below apex.
|
||||
_labels="a b c ns3"
|
||||
for _label in $_labels;
|
||||
do
|
||||
_qtypes="A NSEC"
|
||||
for _qtype in $_qtypes
|
||||
do
|
||||
n=$((n+1))
|
||||
echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" @10.53.0.3 $_qtype > dig.out.$DIR.test$n || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
|
||||
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
|
||||
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" dig.out.$DIR.test$n > rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
|
||||
_rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype)
|
||||
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}"
|
||||
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
|
||||
status=$((status+ret))
|
||||
done
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_rrsig_reuse
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: unfresh-sigs.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "unfresh-sigs.autosign" "autosign" "300" "2"
|
||||
# key_properties, key_timings and key_states same as above.
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
check_rrsig_refresh
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: zsk-missing.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "zsk-missing.autosign" "autosign" "300" "2"
|
||||
# KSK stays OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY1" "ksk" "63072000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY1" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "omnipresent"
|
||||
# key_properties, key_timings and key_states same as above.
|
||||
# TODO
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: zsk-retired.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "zsk-retired.autosign" "autosign" "300" "3"
|
||||
# KSK properties, timings and states same as above.
|
||||
# The ZSK goal is set to HIDDEN but records stay OMNIPRESENT until the new ZSK
|
||||
# is active.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "31536000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY2" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "hidden" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "none"
|
||||
# A new ZSK should be introduced, so expect a key with goal OMNIPRESENT,
|
||||
# the DNSKEY introduced (RUMOURED) and the signatures HIDDEN.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "zsk" "31536000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY3" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "rumoured" "hidden" "none" "none"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Testing ZSK Pre-Publication rollover.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step1.zsk-prepub.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step1.zsk-prepub.autosign" "zsk-prepub" "3600" "2"
|
||||
# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY1" "ksk" "63072000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY1" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "omnipresent"
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY2" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
# Initially only two keys.
|
||||
key_clear "KEY3"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
check_next_key_event() {
|
||||
_expect=$1
|
||||
|
||||
n=$((n+1))
|
||||
echo_i "check next key event for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
|
||||
ret=0
|
||||
grep "zone ${ZONE}.*: next key event in .* seconds" "${DIR}/named.run" > keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n || log_error "no next key event for zone ${ZONE}"
|
||||
|
||||
_time=$(awk '{print $10}' < keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n)
|
||||
|
||||
# The next key event time must within 10 seconds of the
|
||||
# expected time.
|
||||
_expectmin=$((_expect-10))
|
||||
_expectmax=$((_expect+10))
|
||||
|
||||
test $_expectmin -le $_time || log_error "bad next key event time ${_time} for zone ${ZONE} (expect ${_expect})"
|
||||
test $_expectmax -ge $_time || log_error "bad next key event time ${_time} for zone ${ZONE} (expect ${_expect})"
|
||||
|
||||
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
|
||||
status=$((status+ret))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the successor ZSK needs to be published. That is
|
||||
# the ZSK lifetime - prepublication time. The prepublication time is DNSKEY
|
||||
# TTL plus publish safety plus the zone propagation delay. For the
|
||||
# zsk-prepub policy that means: 30d - 3600s + 1d + 1h = 2498400 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 2498400
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step2.zsk-prepub.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step2.zsk-prepub.autosign" "zsk-prepub" "3600" "3"
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) doesn't change.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) remains active, no change in properties/timings/states.
|
||||
# New ZSK (KEY3) is prepublished.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "rumoured" "hidden" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY3" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the successor ZSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
|
||||
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
|
||||
# the zsk-prepub policy, this means: 3600s + 1h + 1d = 93600 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 93600
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step3.zsk-prepub.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step3.zsk-prepub.autosign" "zsk-prepub" "3600" "3"
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) doesn't change.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) properties and timing metadata same as above.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) no longer is actively signing, RRSIG state in UNRETENTIVE.
|
||||
# New ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "hidden" "omnipresent" "unretentive" "none" "none"
|
||||
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "rumoured" "none" "none"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
# Subdomain still has good signatures of ZSK (KEY2)
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when all the RRSIG records have been replaced with
|
||||
# signatures of the new ZSK, in other words when ZRRSIG becomes OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
# That is Dsgn plus the maximum zone TTL plus the zone propagation delay plus
|
||||
# retire-safety. For the zsk-prepub policy that means: 1w (because 2w validity
|
||||
# and refresh within a week) + 1d + 1h + 2d = 10d1h = 867600 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 867600
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step4.zsk-prepub.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step4.zsk-prepub.autosign" "zsk-prepub" "3600" "3"
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) doesn't change.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) properties and timing metadata same as above.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is no longer needed.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "hidden" "unretentive" "hidden" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "zsk" "2592000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "none"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
|
||||
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the zsk-prepub policy this is:
|
||||
# 3600s + 1h = 7200s
|
||||
check_next_key_event 7200
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step5.zsk-prepub.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step5.zsk-prepub.autosign" "zsk-prepub" "3600" "3"
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) doesn't change.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) properties and timing metadata same as above.
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY3) DNSKEY is now completely HIDDEN and removed.
|
||||
key_timings "KEY2" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "removed"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "hidden" "hidden" "hidden" "none" "none"
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY3) remains actively signing, staying in OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the
|
||||
# ZSK lifetime minus Iret minus Ipub minus DNSKEY TTL. For the zsk-prepub
|
||||
# policy this is: 30d - 867600s - 93600s - 3600s = 1627200 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 1627200
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Testing KSK Double-KSK rollover.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" "ksk-doubleksk" "7200" "2"
|
||||
# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY1" "ksk" "5184000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY1" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "omnipresent"
|
||||
key_properties "KEY2" "zsk" "31536000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY2" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
key_states "KEY2" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "none"
|
||||
# Initially only two keys.
|
||||
key_clear "KEY3"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the successor KSK needs to be published. That is
|
||||
# the KSK lifetime - prepublication time - DS registration delay. The
|
||||
# prepublication time is DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus the zone
|
||||
# propagation delay. For the ksk-doubleksk policy that means:
|
||||
# 60d - (1d3h) - (1d) = 5000400 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 5000400
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" "ksk-doubleksk" "7200" "3"
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) doesn't change.
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) remains active, no change in properties/timings/states.
|
||||
# New KSK (KEY3) is prepublished (and signs DNSKEY RRset).
|
||||
key_properties "KEY3" "ksk" "5184000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "yes"
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "rumoured" "none" "rumoured" "hidden"
|
||||
key_timings "KEY3" "published" "active" "retired" "none" "none"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the successor KSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
|
||||
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
|
||||
# the ksk-doubleksk policy, this means: 7200s + 1h + 1d = 97200 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 97200
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" "ksk-doubleksk" "7200" "3"
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) doesn't change.
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) DS will be removed, so it is UNRETENTIVE.
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "hidden" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "unretentive"
|
||||
# New KSK (KEY3) has its DS submitted.
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "rumoured"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the
|
||||
# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that
|
||||
# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the
|
||||
# registration delay plus the retire interval, which is the parent
|
||||
# propagation delay plus the DS TTL plus the retire-safety. For the
|
||||
# ksk-double-ksk policy this means: 1d + 1h + 3600s + 2d = 3d2h =
|
||||
# 266400 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 266400
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" "ksk-doubleksk" "7200" "3"
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) doesn't change.
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY can be removed.
|
||||
key_properties "KEY1" "ksk" "5184000" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256" "no"
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "hidden" "unretentive" "none" "unretentive" "hidden"
|
||||
# New KSK (KEY3) DS is now OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
key_states "KEY3" "omnipresent" "omnipresent" "none" "omnipresent" "omnipresent"
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
|
||||
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the ksk-doubleksk policy this is:
|
||||
# 7200s + 1h = 10800s
|
||||
check_next_key_event 10800
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Zone: step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
|
||||
#
|
||||
zone_properties "ns3" "step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign" "ksk-doubleksk" "7200" "3"
|
||||
# ZSK (KEY2) doesn't change.
|
||||
# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY is now HIDDEN.
|
||||
key_states "KEY1" "hidden" "hidden" "none" "hidden" "hidden"
|
||||
# New KSK (KEY3) stays OMNIPRESENT.
|
||||
check_keys
|
||||
check_apex
|
||||
check_subdomain
|
||||
dnssec_verify
|
||||
|
||||
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the
|
||||
# KSK lifetime minus Ipub minus Dreg minus Iret minus DNSKEY TTL. For the
|
||||
# ksk-doubleksk this is: 60d - 1d3h - 1d - 2d2h - 2h =
|
||||
# 5184000 - 97200 - 86400 - 180000 - 7200 = 4813200 seconds.
|
||||
check_next_key_event 4813200
|
||||
|
||||
echo_i "exit status: $status"
|
||||
[ $status -eq 0 ] || exit 1
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue