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doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-04.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-05.txt
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DNS Extensions O. Kolkman
Internet-Draft RIPE NCC
Expires: June 3, 2003 J. Schlyter
Carlstedt Research &
Technology
December 3, 2002
KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag
draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-04
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 3, 2003.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
With the DS record [5] the concept of key-signing and zone-signing
keys has been introduced. Key-signing keys are the keys that sign
the keyset only. In general, key-signing keys are the keys that are
pointed to by DS records and are the first keys to be used when
following a chain of trust into the zone. The key-signing keys only
sign the KEY RRset at the apex of a zone, zone- signing keys sign all
other data in a zone. We propose a flag to distinguish the key-
signing key from other keys in the KEY RR set during DNSSEC
operations.
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
The key words "MAY","MAY NOT", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"RECOMMENDED", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC2119.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Document Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.1 draft version 00 -> 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.2 draft version 01 -> 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.3 draft version 02 -> 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.4 draft version 03 -> 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
1. Introduction
"All keys are equal but some keys are more equal than others" [6]
With the DS record [5] the concept of key-signing and zone-signing
keys has been introduced into DNSSEC[3]. In general these are the
keys that are pointed to by DS records and are the first keys to be
used when following the chain of trust into a zone ( secure entry
points of the zone). These key-signing keys may also be configured
in resolver systems that use zones as a trusted root[4] for a secure
island.
Early deployment tests have shown that during the key-exchange
between the parent and the child it is useful to highlight which keys
are to be used as the secure entry point to a zone. We introduce the
Key-Signing Key flag to indicate this special 'administrative' status
of the key. The availability of the flag allows the key exchange to
be automated where, without the flag, some additional out-of-band
communication is needed.
2. The Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags |K| protocol | algorithm |
| |S| | |
| |K| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEY RR Format
The KSK bit (TBD) in the flags field is assigned to be the key-
signing flag. If set the key is intended to be used as key-signing
key. No special meaning should be assigned to the bit not being set.
The draft proposes using the current 15'th bit [1] as the KSK bit.
This way operators can recognize the key-signing by the parity of the
decimal representation of the flag field.
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes
The use of the KSK flag does not change the DNS resolution and
resolution protocol. The KSK flag is only used to provide a hint
about the different administrative properties and MUST NOT be used
during the resolving process.
4. Operational Guidelines
By setting the KSK flag on a particular key, zone administrators
indicate that that key SHOULD be used as the secure entry point for
their zone. Therefore zone administrators SHOULD set the bit only
for zone keys that are used to sign the KEY RRset and are intended to
act as the first link in the chain of trust for their zone.
Parent zone administrators and resolver administrators that want to
configure a key-signing key as their 'trusted key' MAY choose to
ignore the flag.
Using the flag a key roll over can be automated. The parent can use
an existing trust relation to verify keysets in which a new key with
the KSK flag appears.
If the bit is modified during the lifetime of the key then this would
have impact on the keytag in the SIG RRs and on the hash data in the
DS RRs intending to point to this key. The bit SHOULD NOT be
modified once the key has been put into use.
5. Security Considerations
The flag MUST NOT be used in the resolution protocol or to determine
the security status of a key. The flag is to be used for
administrative purposes only.
No trust in a key should be inferred from this flag - trust must be
inferred from an existing chain of trust or an out-of-band exchange.
Since this flag might be used for automating key exchanges, we think
the following consideration is in place.
Automated mechanisms for roll over of the DS RR might be vulnerable
to a class of replay attacks. This might happen after a key exchange
where a keyset, containing two keys with the KSK flag set, is sent to
the parent. The parent verifies the keyset with the existing trust
relation and creates the new DS RR from the key that the current DS
is not pointing to. This key exchange might be replayed. Parents
are encouraged to implement a replay defence. A simple defence can
be based on a registry of keys that have been used to generate DS RRs
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
during the most recent roll over.
6. IANA Considerations
draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec [1] eliminates all flags
field except for the zone key flag in the KEY RR. We propose to use
the 15'th bit as the KSK bit; the decimal representation of the
flagfield will then be odd for key-signing keys.
7. Internationalization Considerations
There are no internationalization considerations
8. Document Changes
8.1 draft version 00 -> 01
Clean up of references and correction of typos;
modified Abstract text a little;
Added explicit warning for replay attacks to the security section;
Removed the text that hinted on a distinction between a key-
signing key configured in resolvers and in parent zones.
8.2 draft version 01 -> 02
Added IANA and Internationalization section.
Split references into informational and normative.
Spelling and style corrections.
8.3 draft version 02 -> 03
Changed the name from KS to KSK, this to prevent confusion with
NS, DS and other acronyms in DNS.
In the security section: Rewrote the section so that it does not
suggest to use a particular type of registry and that it is clear
that a key registry is only one of the defences possible.
Spelling and style corrections
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
8.4 draft version 03 -> 04
Text has been made consistent with the statement: ' No special
meaning should be assigned to the bit not being set.'
Made explicit that the keytag changes in SIG RR.
9. Acknowledgements
The ideas documented in this draft are inspired by communications we
had with numerous people and ideas published by other folk. Among
others Olafur Gudmundsson, Daniel Karrenberg, Ed Lewis, Dan Massey,
Marcos Sanz and Sam Weiler have contributed ideas and provided
feedback.
This document saw the light during a workshop on DNSSEC operations
hosted by USC/ISI.
Normative References
[1] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
Record out", draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-04 (work
in progress), September 2002.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[4] Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone
Status", RFC 3090, March 2001.
Informative References
[5] Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer Resource Record", draft-
ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-09 (work in progress), September
2002.
[6] Orwell, G. and R. Steadman (illustrator), "Animal Farm; a Fairy
Story"", ISBN 0151002177 (50th anniversery edition), April 1996.
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
Authors' Addresses
Olaf M. Kolkman
RIPE NCC
Singel 256
Amsterdam 1016 AB
NL
Phone: +31 20 535 4444
EMail: olaf@ripe.net
URI: http://www.ripe.net/
Jakob Schlyter
Carlstedt Research & Technology
Stora Badhusgatan 18-20
Goteborg SE-411 21
Sweden
EMail: jakob@crt.se
URI: http://www.crt.se/~jakob/
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag December 2002
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Kolkman & Schlyter Expires June 3, 2003 [Page 8]
DNS Extensions O. Kolkman
Internet-Draft RIPE NCC
Expires: July 4, 2003 J. Schlyter
Carlstedt Research &
Technology
E. Lewis
ARIN
January 3, 2003
KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag
draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-05
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2003.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
With the DS resource record the concept of key-signing and zone-
signing keys has been introduced. During key-exchanges with the
parent there is a need to differentiate between these zone- and key-
signing keys. We propose a flag to indicate which key is used as
key-signing key.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Document Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1 draft version 00 -> 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2 draft version 01 -> 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.3 draft version 02 -> 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.4 draft version 03 -> 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.5 draft version 04 -> 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
1. Introduction
"All keys are equal but some keys are more equal than others" [6]
With the definition of the DS Resource Record [5] the concept of a
key being either a key-signing key (KSK) or zone-signing key(ZSK) has
been introduced into DNSSEC[3]. A KSK is one that signs the zone's
KEY RR set, and is a key that is either used to generate a DS RR or
is distributed to resolvers that use the key as the root of a trusted
subtree[4].
In early deployment tests, the use of two keys has been prevalent,
one key for exchange with delegating zone and the other key to sign
the zone. These dual roles were defined to allow a zone to more
rapidly change the ZSK without a high volume of traffic needed to
make new DS RRs. Because of this, participants have had to manage
two keys at all times, one acting as a KSK and the other ZSK (per
cryptographic algorithm). In practice, participants used a longer
key for the KSK or resorted to writing the footprints on paper.
There is a need to differentiate between a KSK and a ZSK by the zone
administrator. This need is driven by knowing which keys are to be
sent for DS RRs, which keys are to be distributed to resolvers, and
which keys are fed to the signer application at the appropriate time.
While addressing this need it is important that the distinction is
made in a way compatible with single key zone, those whose KSK and
ZSK is one in the same. The best way to address this is to define a
bit setting in the KEY RR flags field that is ignored in the
resolver. This allows for both dual key and single key management to
be workable.
The key words "MAY","MAY NOT", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"RECOMMENDED", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC2119.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
2. The Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags |K| protocol | algorithm |
| |S| | |
| |K| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEY RR Format
The KSK bit (TBD) in the flags field is assigned to be the key-
signing key flag. If the the bit is set to 1 the key is intended to
be used as key-signing key. No special meaning should be assigned to
the bit is set to 0. The draft proposes using the current 15th bit
[1] as the KSK bit. This way operators can recognize the key-signing
by the even or odd-ness of the decimal representation of the flag
field.
3. DNSSEC Protocol Changes
The use of the KSK flag does not change the DNS resolution and
resolution protocol. The KSK flag is only used to provide a hint
about the different administrative properties and MUST NOT be used
during the resolving and verification process.
4. Operational Guidelines
The KSK bit is used to indicate that the key represented in the KEY
RR is intended to sign the KEY RR set of the zone. As the KSK bit is
within the data that is used to compute a KEY RR's footprint,
changing the KSK bit will change the identity of the key within DNS.
When a key pair is created, the operator needs to indicate whether
the KSK bit is to be set in the KEY RR. The KSK bit is recommended
whenever the public key of the key pair will be distributed to the
parent zone to build the authentication chain or if the public key is
to be distributed for static configuration in verifiers.
When signing a zone, it is intended that a key with the KSK bit set
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
be used to sign the KEY RR set of the zone. The same key can be used
to sign the rest of the zone data too. It is conceivable that not
all keys with a KSK bit set will sign the KEY RR set, such keys might
be pending retirement or not yet in use.
When verifying an RR set, the KSK bit is not intended to play a role.
How the key is used by the verifier is not intended to be a
consideration at key creation time.
Although the KSK flag provides a hint on which key to be used as
trusted root, administrators can choose to ignore the flag when
configuring a trusted root for their resolvers.
Using the flag a key roll over can be automated. The parent can use
an existing trust relation to verify key sets in which a new key with
the KSK flag appears.
5. Security Considerations
As stated in Section 3 the flag is not to used in the resolution
protocol or to determine the security status of a key. The flag is
to be used for administrative purposes only.
No trust in a key should be inferred from this flag - trust must be
inferred from an existing chain of trust or an out-of-band exchange.
Since this flag might be used for automating key exchanges, we think
the following consideration is in place.
Automated mechanisms for roll over of the DS RR might be vulnerable
to a class of replay attacks. This might happen after a key exchange
where a key set, containing two keys with the KSK flag set, is sent
to the parent. The parent verifies the key set with the existing
trust relation and creates the new DS RR from the key that the
current DS is not pointing to. This key exchange might be replayed.
Parents are encouraged to implement a replay defence. A simple
defence can be based on a registry of keys that have been used to
generate DS RRs during the most recent roll over.
6. IANA Considerations
draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec [1] eliminates all flags
field except for the zone key flag in the KEY RR. We propose to use
the 15'th bit as the KSK bit; the decimal representation of the
flagfield will then be odd for key-signing keys.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
7. Internationalization Considerations
There are no internationalization considerations
8. Document Changes
8.1 draft version 00 -> 01
Clean up of references and correction of typos;
modified Abstract text a little;
Added explicit warning for replay attacks to the security section;
Removed the text that hinted on a distinction between a key-
signing key configured in resolvers and in parent zones.
8.2 draft version 01 -> 02
Added IANA and Internationalization section.
Split references into informational and normative.
Spelling and style corrections.
8.3 draft version 02 -> 03
Changed the name from KS to KSK, this to prevent confusion with
NS, DS and other acronyms in DNS.
In the security section: Rewrote the section so that it does not
suggest to use a particular type of registry and that it is clear
that a key registry is only one of the defences possible.
Spelling and style corrections
8.4 draft version 03 -> 04
Text has been made consistent with the statement: ' No special
meaning should be assigned to the bit not being set.'
Made explicit that the keytag changes in SIG RR.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
8.5 draft version 04 -> 05
References and acronyms where stripped from the Abstract. the
Introduction and the the Operational Guideline section were
rewritten in such a way that the draft does not suggest any use of
the bit in the verification process and that the draft does not
enforce, but suggests, the use of a key- and zone-signing key.
Added 'and verification' in the sentence "MUST NOT be used during
the resolving and verification process" (protocol changes
section).
9. Acknowledgements
The ideas documented in this draft are inspired by communications we
had with numerous people and ideas published by other folk. Among
others Mark Andrews, Olafur Gudmundsson, Daniel Karrenberg, Dan
Massey, Marcos Sanz and Sam Weiler have contributed ideas and
provided feedback.
This document saw the light during a workshop on DNSSEC operations
hosted by USC/ISI.
Normative References
[1] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
Record out", draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-04 (work
in progress), September 2002.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[4] Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone
Status", RFC 3090, March 2001.
Informative References
[5] Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer Resource Record", draft-
ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-12 (work in progress), December
2002.
[6] Orwell, G. and R. Steadman (illustrator), "Animal Farm; a Fairy
Story"", ISBN 0151002177 (50th anniversery edition), April 1996.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
Authors' Addresses
Olaf M. Kolkman
RIPE NCC
Singel 256
Amsterdam 1016 AB
NL
Phone: +31 20 535 4444
EMail: olaf@ripe.net
URI: http://www.ripe.net/
Jakob Schlyter
Carlstedt Research & Technology
Stora Badhusgatan 18-20
Goteborg SE-411 21
Sweden
EMail: jakob@crt.se
URI: http://www.crt.se/~jakob/
Edward P. Lewis
ARIN
3635 Concorde Parkway Suite 200
Chantilly, VA 20151
US
Phone: +1 703 227 9854
EMail: edlewis@arin.net
URI: http://www.arin.net/
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft KEY RR Key-Signing Key (KSK) Flag January 2003
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Kolkman, et al. Expires July 4, 2003 [Page 9]