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Document SIG(0) verification removal
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5 changed files with 9 additions and 23 deletions
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@ -391,10 +391,8 @@ Notes
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.. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a
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feature.
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.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is
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only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local
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authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to
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retrieve unknown keys.
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.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
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as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975.
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.. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only.
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A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`.
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ or ports come preconfigured with local (loopback address) security preconfigured
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If ``rndc`` is being invoked from a remote host, further configuration is required.
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The ``nsupdate`` tool uses **Dynamic DNS (DDNS)** features and allows users to dynamically
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change the contents of the zone file(s). ``nsupdate`` access and security may be controlled
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using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or using TSIG or SIG(0) cryptographic methods <dynamic_update_security>`.
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using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or via the TSIG cryptographic method <dynamic_update_security>`.
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Clearly, if the remote hosts used for either ``rndc`` or DDNS lie within a network entirely
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under the user's control, the security threat may be regarded as non-existent. Any implementation requirements,
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therefore, depend on the site's security policy.
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@ -7450,7 +7450,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled.
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updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule
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either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to
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be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key
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that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most
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that signed the update request, using TSIG. In most
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cases, :any:`update-policy` rules only apply to key-based identities. There
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is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address.
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@ -7507,7 +7507,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled.
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field. Details for each rule type are described below.
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The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In
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most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that
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most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that
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must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a
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wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may
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apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to
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@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent
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spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server.
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ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The
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client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the
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client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the
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request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS
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Client-Subnet option, if any.
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@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``.
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In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against
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the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key``
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elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key.
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elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key.
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When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for
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geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL
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@ -12,17 +12,5 @@
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SIG(0)
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------
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BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as
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specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to
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authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with
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TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based
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on the key name.
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When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if
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the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt
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to recursively fetch or validate the key.
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SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
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The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages
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is :iscman:`nsupdate`.
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Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures has been removed.
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This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.
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