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68
doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-07.txt
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@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Expires: June 2005 December 2004
Expires: January 2006 July 2005
Elliptic Curve KEYs in the DNS
-------- ----- ---- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt>
<draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-07.txt>
Richard C. Schroeppel
Donald Eastlake 3rd
@ -15,10 +14,10 @@ Expires: June 2005 December 2004
Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
This draft is intended to be become a Proposed Standard RFC.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ Abstract
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
@ -124,8 +123,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
other information. The DNS has been extended to include digital
signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC intro,
protocol, records].
signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [RFC 4033, 4034,
4035].
This document describes how to store elliptic curve cryptographic
(ECC) keys and signatures in the DNS so they can be used for a
@ -141,8 +140,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
2. Elliptic Curve Data in Resource Records
Elliptic curve public keys are stored in the DNS within the RDATA
portions of key RRs, such as RRKEY and KEY [RFC records] RRs, with
the structure shown below.
portions of key RRs, such as RRKEY and KEY [RFC 4034] RRs, with the
structure shown below.
The research world continues to work on the issue of which is the
best elliptic curve system, which finite field to use, and how to
@ -624,7 +623,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Generate random [RFC 1750] K such that 0 < K < Q. (Never sign two
Generate random [RFC 4086] K such that 0 < K < Q. (Never sign two
different messages with the same K. K should be chosen from a
very large space: If an opponent learns a K value for a single
signature, the user's signing key is compromised, and a forger
@ -759,8 +758,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2004. This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
@ -823,20 +822,21 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
[RFC 1035] - P. Mockapetris, "Domain names - implementation and
specification", 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1750] - D. Eastlake, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", 12/29/1994.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[RFC 2671] - P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
August 1999.
[RFC 4033] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
[RFC 4035] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC 4086] - Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June
2005.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons
@ -856,10 +856,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
[RFC 2434] - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", October 1998.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
[RFC 4034] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC
4034, March 2005.
@ -880,7 +879,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Woodland Hills, UT 84653 USA
Telephone: +1-505-844-9079(w)
+1-801-423-7998(h)
Email: rschroe@sandia.gov
@ -890,16 +888,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1 508-786-7554 (w)
+1 508-634-2066 (h)
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in June 2004.
This draft expires in January 2006.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-07.txt.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-ecc-key-06.txt.
@ -927,4 +926,3 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT ECC Keys in the DNS
R. Schroeppel, et al [Page 16]

68
doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-05.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-06.txt
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@ -1,23 +1,22 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
OBSOLETES: RFC 2536 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
Expires: September 2005 March 2005
Expires: January 2006 July 2005
DSA Keying and Signature Information in the DNS
--- ------ --- --------- ----------- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-05.txt>
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-06.txt>
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the DNS extensions working group mailing list
@ -79,6 +78,7 @@ Table of Contents
Normative References.......................................7
Informative References.....................................7
Authors Address............................................8
Expiration and File Name...................................8
@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ Table of Contents
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2]
@ -125,9 +124,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
other information [RFC 1034, 1035]. The DNS has been extended to
include digital signatures and cryptographic keys as described in
[RFC intro, proto, records] and additional work is underway which
would require the storage of keying and signature information in the
DNS.
[RFC 4033, 4034, 4035] and additional work is underway which would
require the storage of keying and signature information in the DNS.
This document describes how to encode US Government Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) keys and signatures in the DNS. Familiarity with the
@ -171,6 +169,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed as
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 3]
@ -206,7 +205,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
S = ( K**(-1) * (hash + X*R) ) mod Q
For information on the SHA-1 hash function see [FIPS 180-1] and [RFC
For information on the SHA-1 hash function see [FIPS 180-2] and [RFC
3174].
Since Q is 160 bits long, R and S can not be larger than 20 octets,
@ -282,8 +281,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and except
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except
as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
@ -353,38 +352,23 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Normative References
[FIPS 180-1] - U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard: Secure
Hash Standard, April 1995.
[FIPS 186-2] - U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard: Digital
Signature Standard, 27 January 2000.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
[RFC 4034] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005.
Informative References
[random] - "Randomness Recommendations for Security", D. Eastlake, S.
Crocker, J. Schiller, work in progress, draft-eastlake-
randomness2-*.txt currently in RFC Editor's queue.
[RFC 1034] - "Domain names - concepts and facilities", P.
Mockapetris, 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1035] - "Domain names - implementation and specification", P.
Mockapetris, 11/01/1987.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in progress,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[RFC 2671] - "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", P. Vixie, August
1999.
@ -394,6 +378,17 @@ Informative References
[RFC 3174] - "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", D. Eastlake, P.
Jones, September 2001.
[RFC 4033] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, March
2005.
[RFC 4035] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC
4035, March 2005.
[RFC 4086] - Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[Schneier] - "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols,
algorithms, and source code in C" (second edition), Bruce Schneier,
1996, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-471-11709-9.
@ -403,6 +398,10 @@ Informative References
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]
@ -423,9 +422,9 @@ Authors Address
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in September 2005.
This draft expires in January 2006.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-05.txt.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-06.txt.
@ -463,4 +462,3 @@ Expiration and File Name
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8]

79
doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-05.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-06.txt
View file

@ -2,23 +2,23 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
OBSOLETES: RFC 2539 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
Expires: September 2005 March 2005
Expires: January 2006 July 2005
Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keying Information in the DNS
------- -- -------------- ------ ----------- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-05.txt>
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-06.txt>
Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the DNS extensions working group mailing list
@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ Table of Contents
Normative References.......................................7
Informative Refences.......................................7
Author Address.............................................7
Author Address.............................................8
Expiration and File Name...................................8
Appendix A: Well known prime/generator pairs...............9
@ -111,7 +112,6 @@ Table of Contents
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2]
@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
similar information [RFC 1034, 1035]. The DNS has been extended to
include digital signatures and cryptographic keys as described in
[RFC intro, proto, records] and additonal work is underway which
would use the storage of keying information in the DNS.
[RFC 4033, 4034, 4035] and additonal work is underway which would use
the storage of keying information in the DNS.
@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and except
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except
as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ Normative References
[RFC 2434] - "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section
in RFCs", T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, October 1998.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
[RFC 4034] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005.
@ -378,13 +378,13 @@ Informative Refences
[RFC 2671] - "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", P. Vixie, August
1999.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in progress,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC 4033] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, March
2005.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[RFC 4035] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC
4035, March 2005.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C" (Second Edition), 1996, John Wiley
@ -392,6 +392,22 @@ Informative Refences
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
Author Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
@ -400,31 +416,15 @@ Author Address
Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1-508-786-7554
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in September 2005.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-05.txt.
This draft expires in January 2006.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-06.txt.
@ -578,4 +578,3 @@ A.3. Well-Known Group 3: A 1536 bit prime
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 10]

559
doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-bad-dns-res-03.txt → doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-bad-dns-res-04.txt
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@ -3,26 +3,24 @@
DNS Operations M. Larson
Internet-Draft P. Barber
Expires: April 27, 2005 VeriSign
October 27, 2004
Expires: January 18, 2006 VeriSign
July 17, 2005
Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior
draft-ietf-dnsop-bad-dns-res-03
draft-ietf-dnsop-bad-dns-res-04
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
@ -35,32 +33,30 @@ Status of this Memo
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2005.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2006.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This memo describes DNS name server and resolver behavior that
results in a significant query volume sent to the root and top-level
domain (TLD) name servers. In some cases we recommend minor
additions to the DNS protocol specification and corresponding changes
in iterative resolver implementations to alleviate these unnecessary
queries. The recommendations made in this document are a direct
byproduct of observation and analysis of abnormal query traffic
This memo describes DNS iterative resolver behavior that results in a
significant query volume sent to the root and top-level domain (TLD)
name servers. We offer implementation advice to iterative resolver
developers to alleviate these unnecessary queries. The
recommendations made in this document are a direct byproduct of
observation and analysis of abnormal query traffic patterns seen at
two of the thirteen root name servers and all thirteen com/net TLD
name servers.
Larson & Barber Expires April 27, 2005 [Page 1]
Larson & Barber Expires January 18, 2006 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior July 2005
patterns seen at two of the thirteen root name servers and all
thirteen com/net TLD name servers.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
@ -72,32 +68,32 @@ Table of Contents
2. Observed iterative resolver misbehavior . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Aggressive requerying for delegation information . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Repeated queries to lame servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Repeated queries to lame servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Inability to follow multiple levels of out-of-zone glue . 7
2.3.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Aggressive retransmission when fetching glue . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Aggressive retransmission behind firewalls . . . . . . . . 9
2.5.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6 Misconfigured NS records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.7 Name server records with zero TTL . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.7.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.8 Unnecessary dynamic update messages . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.8.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.9 Queries for domain names resembling IP addresses . . . . . 13
2.9.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.10 Misdirected recursive queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.10.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.11 Suboptimal name server selection algorithm . . . . . . . 14
2.11.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Internationalization considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Inability to follow multiple levels of indirection . . . . 8
2.3.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Aggressive retransmission when fetching glue . . . . . . . 9
2.4.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Aggressive retransmission behind firewalls . . . . . . . . 10
2.5.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6 Misconfigured NS records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7 Name server records with zero TTL . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.8 Unnecessary dynamic update messages . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.8.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9 Queries for domain names resembling IPv4 addresses . . . . 14
2.9.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.10 Misdirected recursive queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.11 Suboptimal name server selection algorithm . . . . . . . 15
2.11.1 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Internationalization considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 21
@ -109,9 +105,12 @@ Table of Contents
Larson & Barber Expires April 27, 2005 [Page 2]
Larson & Barber Expires January 18, 2006 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior July 2005
1. Introduction
@ -119,7 +118,7 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
Observation of query traffic received by two root name servers and
the thirteen com/net TLD name servers has revealed that a large
proportion of the total traffic often consists of "requeries". A
requery is the same question (<qname, qtype, qclass>) asked
requery is the same question (<QNAME, QTYPE, QCLASS>) asked
repeatedly at an unexpectedly high rate. We have observed requeries
from both a single IP address and multiple IP addresses (i.e., the
same query received simultaneously from multiple IP addresses).
@ -130,7 +129,7 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
operational anomaly. The implementation deficiencies we have
identified to date include well-intentioned recovery attempts gone
awry, insufficient caching of failures, early abort when multiple
levels of glue records must be followed, and aggressive retry by stub
levels of indirection must be followed, and aggressive retry by stub
resolvers or applications. Anomalies that we have seen trigger
requery events include lame delegations, unusual glue records, and
anything that makes all authoritative name servers for a zone
@ -139,9 +138,9 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
In the following sections, we provide a detailed explanation of the
observed behavior and recommend changes that will reduce the requery
rate. Some of the changes recommended affect the core DNS protocol
specification, described principally in RFC 1034 [2], RFC 1035 [3]
and RFC 2181 [4].
rate. None of the changes recommended affects the core DNS protocol
specification; instead, this document consists of guidelines to
implementors of iterative resolvers.
1.1 A note about terminology in this memo
@ -154,30 +153,32 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
problematic. An example is the entity that accepts recursive
queries, issues iterative queries as necessary to resolve the initial
recursive query, caches responses it receives, and which is also able
answer questions about certain zones authoritatively. Often called a
"recursive name server" or a "caching name server", it is in fact an
iterative resolver combined with an authoritative name server.
to answer questions about certain zones authoritatively. This entity
is an iterative resolver combined with an authoritative name server
and is often called a "recursive name server" or a "caching name
server".
This memo is concerned principally with the behavior of iterative
resolvers, which are typically found as part of a recursive name
server. This memo uses the more precise term "iterative resolver",
because the focus is usually on that component. In instances where
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because the focus is usually on that component. In instances where
the name server role of this entity requires mentioning, this memo
uses the term "recursive name server". For example, the name server
component of a recursive name server receives DNS queries and the
iterative resolver component sends queries.
uses the term "recursive name server". As an example of the
difference, the name server component of a recursive name server
receives DNS queries and the iterative resolver component sends
queries.
The advent of IPv6 requires mentioning AAAA records as well as A
records when discussing glue. To avoid continuous repetition and
qualification, this memo uses the general term "address records" to
qualification, this memo uses the general term "address record" to
encompass both A and AAAA records when a particular situation is
relevant to both types.
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2. Observed iterative resolver misbehavior
@ -240,7 +239,11 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
We have observed a recursive name server implementation whose
iterative resolver then verifies the zone's NS RRset in its cache by
querying for the zone's delegation information: it sends a query for
the zone's NS RRset to one of the parent zone's name servers.
the zone's NS RRset to one of the parent zone's name servers. (Note
that queries with QTYPE=NS are not required by the standard
resolution algorithm described in section 4.3.2 of RFC 1034 [2].
These NS queries represent this implementation's addition to that
algorithm.)
For example, suppose that "example.com" has the following NS RRset:
@ -268,23 +271,23 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
list of name servers in the referral from the target zone's parent.
If on its first attempt to search the target zone, none of the name
servers in the referral is reachable, a verification query to the
parent is pointless: this query to the parent would come so quickly
on the heels of the referral that it would be almost certain to
contain the same list of name servers. The chance of discovering any
new information is slim.
parent would be pointless: this query to the parent would come so
quickly on the heels of the referral that it would be almost certain
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to contain the same list of name servers. The chance of discovering
any new information is slim.
The other possibility is that the iterative resolver successfully
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contacts one of the target zone's name servers and then caches the NS
RRset from the authority section of a response, the proper behavior
according to section 5.4.1 of RFC 2181 [4], because the NS RRset from
according to section 5.4.1 of RFC 2181 [3], because the NS RRset from
the target zone is more trustworthy than delegation information from
the parent zone. If, while processing a subsequent recursive query,
the iterative resolver discovers that none of the name servers
@ -304,16 +307,46 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
possible. The scenarios that we can envision that would benefit from
the parent requery behavior do not outweigh its damaging effects.
This section should not be understood to claim that all queries to a
zone's parent are bad. In some cases, such queries are not only
reasonable but required. Consider the situation when required
information, such as the address of a name server (i.e., the address
record corresponding to the RDATA of an NS record), has timed out of
an iterative resolver's cache before the corresponding NS record. If
the name of the name server is below the apex of the zone, then the
name server's address record is only available as glue in the parent
zone. For example, consider this NS record:
example.com. IN NS ns.example.com.
If a cache has this NS record but not the address record for
"ns.example.com", it is unable to contact the "example.com" zone
directly and must query the "com" zone to obtain the address record.
Note, however, that such a query would not have QTYPE=NS according to
the standard resolution algorithm.
2.1.1 Recommendation
An iterative resolver MUST NOT send a query for the NS RRset of a
non-responsive zone to any of the name servers for that zone's parent
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zone. For the purposes of this injunction, a non-responsive zone is
defined as a zone for which every name server listed in the zone's NS
RRset:
1. is not authoritative for the zone (i.e., lame), or,
2. returns a server failure response (RCODE=2), or,
3. is dead or unreachable according to section 7.2 of RFC 2308 [5].
3. is dead or unreachable according to section 7.2 of RFC 2308 [4].
2.2 Repeated queries to lame servers
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intervention and can be reasonably expected to be temporary.
Other symptoms clearly indicate a condition requiring human
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intervention, such as lame server: if a name server is misconfigured
and not authoritative for a zone delegated to it, it is reasonable to
assume that this condition has potential to last longer than
@ -347,22 +372,52 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
to maintain a list of known lame servers and avoid querying them
repeatedly in a short interval.
It should also be noted, however, that some authoritative name server
implementations appear to be lame only for queries of certain types
as described in RFC 4074 [5]. In this case, it makes sense to retry
the "lame" servers for other types of queries, particularly when all
known authoritative name servers appear to be "lame".
2.2.1 Recommendation
Iterative resolvers SHOULD cache name servers that they discover are
not authoritative for zones delegated to them (i.e. lame servers).
Lame servers MUST be cached against the specific query tuple <zone
name, class, server IP address>. Zone name can be derived from the
owner name of the NS record that was referenced to query the name
server that was discovered to be lame. Implementations that perform
lame server caching MUST refrain from sending queries to known lame
servers based on a time interval from when the server is discovered
to be lame. A minimum interval of thirty minutes is RECOMMENDED.
not authoritative for zones delegated to them (i.e. lame servers).
If this caching is performed, lame servers MUST be cached against the
specific query tuple <zone name, class, server IP address>. Zone
name can be derived from the owner name of the NS record that was
2.3 Inability to follow multiple levels of out-of-zone glue
Some iterative resolver implementations are unable to follow more
than one level of out-of-zone glue. For example, consider the
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referenced to query the name server that was discovered to be lame.
Implementations that perform lame server caching MUST refrain from
sending queries to known lame servers based on a time interval from
when the server is discovered to be lame. A minimum interval of
thirty minutes is RECOMMENDED.
An exception to this recommendation occurs if all name servers for a
zone are marked lame. In that case, the iterative resolver SHOULD
temporarily ignore the servers' lameness status and query one or more
servers. This behavior is a workaround for the type-specific
lameness issue described in the previous section.
Implementors should take care not to make lame server avoidance logic
overly broad: note that a name server could be lame for a parent zone
but not a child zone, e.g., lame for "example.com" but properly
authoritative for "sub.example.com". Therefore a name server should
not be automatically considered lame for subzones. In the case
above, even if a name server is known to be lame for "example.com",
it should be queried for QNAMEs at or below "sub.example.com" if an
NS record indicates it should be authoritative for that zone.
2.3 Inability to follow multiple levels of indirection
Some iterative resolver implementations are unable to follow
sufficient levels of indirection. For example, consider the
following delegations:
foo.example. IN NS ns1.example.com.
@ -382,29 +437,33 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
"www.foo.example". While this situation may appear contrived, we
have seen multiple similar occurrences and expect more as new generic
top-level domains (gTLDs) become active. We anticipate many zones in
new gTLDs will use name servers in other gTLDs, increasing the amount
of inter-zone glue.
new gTLDs will use name servers in existing gTLDs, increasing the
number of delegations using out-of-zone name servers.
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2.3.1 Recommendation
Clearly constructing a delegation that relies on multiple levels of
out-of-zone glue is not a good administrative practice. This issue
could be mitigated with an operational injunction in an RFC to
refrain from construction of such delegations. In our opinion the
practice is widespread enough to merit clarifications to the DNS
protocol specification to permit it on a limited basis.
indirection is not a good administrative practice. However, the
practice is widespread enough to require that iterative resolvers be
able to cope with it. Iterative resolvers SHOULD be able to handle
arbitrary levels of indirection resulting from out-of-zone name
servers. Iterative resolvers SHOULD implement a level-of-effort
counter to avoid loops or otherwise performing too much work in
resolving pathological cases.
Iterative resolvers SHOULD be able to handle at least three levels of
indirection resulting from out-of-zone glue.
A best practice that avoids this entire issue of indirection is to
name one or more of a zone's name servers in the zone itself. For
example, if the zone is named "example.com", consider naming some of
the name servers "ns{1,2,...}.example.com" (or similar).
2.4 Aggressive retransmission when fetching glue
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Problems with glue fetching can arise in the context of
"authoritative-only" name servers, which only serve authoritative
data and ignore requests for recursion. Such an entity will not
normally generate any queries of its own. Instead it answers
non-recursive queries from iterative resolvers looking for
information in zones it serves. With glue fetching enabled, however,
an authoritative server invokes an iterative resolver to look up an
normally generate any queries of its own. Instead it answers non-
recursive queries from iterative resolvers looking for information in
zones it serves. With glue fetching enabled, however, an
authoritative server invokes an iterative resolver to look up an
unknown address record to complete the additional section of a
response.
We have observed situations where the iterative resolver of a
glue-fetching name server can send queries that reach other name
servers, but is apparently prevented from receiving the responses.
For example, perhaps the name server is authoritative-only and
therefore its administrators expect it to receive only queries and
not responses. Perhaps unaware of glue fetching and presuming that
the name server's iterative resolver will generate no queries, its
We have observed situations where the iterative resolver of a glue-
fetching name server can send queries that reach other name servers,
but is apparently prevented from receiving the responses. For
example, perhaps the name server is authoritative-only and therefore
its administrators expect it to receive only queries and not
responses. Perhaps unaware of glue fetching and presuming that the
name server's iterative resolver will generate no queries, its
administrators place the name server behind a network device that
prevents it from receiving responses. If this is the case, all
glue-fetching queries will go answered.
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prevents it from receiving responses. If this is the case, all glue-
fetching queries will go answered.
We have observed name server implementations whose iterative
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resolvers retry excessively when glue-fetching queries are
unanswered. A single com/net name server has received hundreds of
queries per second from a single such source. Judging from the
@ -494,18 +553,17 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
underlying problem might not be recognized or corrected. A popular
stub resolver implementation has a very aggressive retransmission
schedule, including simultaneous queries to multiple recursive name
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servers, which could explain how such a situation could persist
without being detected.
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2.5.1 Recommendation
The most obvious recommendation is that administrators SHOULD take
@ -545,23 +603,23 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
"www.example.com" address record in the answer section and,
typically, the "example.com" NS records in the authority section and,
if space in the message remains, glue address records in the
additional section. According to Section 5.4 of RFC 2181 [4], NS
additional section. According to Section 5.4 of RFC 2181 [3], NS
records in the authority section of an authoritative answer are more
trustworthy than NS records from the authority section of a
non-authoritative answer. Thus the "example.com" NS RRset just
received from the "example.com" authoritative server overrides the
trustworthy than NS records from the authority section of a non-
authoritative answer. Thus the "example.com" NS RRset just received
from the "example.com" authoritative server overrides the
"example.com" NS RRset received moments ago from the "com"
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authoritative server.
But the "example.com" zone contains the erroneous NS RRset as shown
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in the example above. Subsequent queries for names in "example.com"
will cause the iterative resolver to attempt to use the incorrect NS
records and so it will try to resolve the nonexistent names
@ -579,16 +637,15 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
An authoritative server can detect this situation. A trailing dot
missing from an NS record's RDATA always results by definition in a
name server name that exists somewhere under the SOA of the zone the
name server name that exists somewhere under the apex of the zone the
NS record appears in. Note that further levels of delegation are
possible, so a missing trailing dot could inadvertently create a name
server name that actually exists in a subzone. But in any case, the
address record must still be present in this zone, either as
authoritative data or glue.
server name that actually exists in a subzone.
An authoritative name server SHOULD report an error when one of a
zone's NS records references a name server below the zone's SOA when
a corresponding address record does not exist in the zone.
An authoritative name server SHOULD issue a warning when one of a
zone's NS records references a name server below the zone's apex when
a corresponding address record does not exist in the zone AND there
are no delegated subzones where the address record could exist.
2.7 Name server records with zero TTL
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A zero TTL on an RRset expected to change frequently is extreme but
permissible. A zone's NS RRset is a special case, however, because
changes to it must be coordinated with the zone's parent. In most
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zone parent/child relationships we are aware of, there is typically
some delay involved in effecting changes. Further, changes to the
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set of a zone's authoritative name servers (and therefore to the
zone's NS RRset) are typically relatively rare: providing reliable
authoritative service requires a reasonably stable set of servers.
@ -632,7 +689,7 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
Because of the additional load placed on a zone's parent's
authoritative servers resulting from a zero TTL on a zone's NS RRset,
under such circumstances authoritative name servers SHOULD issue a
warning when loading a zone or refuse to load the zone altogether.
warning when loading a zone.
2.8 Unnecessary dynamic update messages
@ -663,17 +720,18 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
servers. A valid question is why the algorithm proceeds to send
updates all the way to TLD and root name servers. This behavior is
not entirely unreasonable: in enterprise DNS architectures with an
"internal root" design, there could conceivably be private,
non-public TLD or root zones that would be the appropriate targets
for a dynamic update.
"internal root" design, there could conceivably be private, non-
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public TLD or root zones that would be the appropriate targets for a
dynamic update.
A significant deficiency with this algorithm is that knowledge of a
given UPDATE message's failure is not helpful in directing future
UPDATE messages to the appropriate servers. A better algorithm would
@ -691,18 +749,18 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
2.8.1 Recommendation
Dynamic update agents SHOULD send SOA or NS queries to progressively
higher-level zones to find the closest enclosing zone for a given
higher-level names to find the closest enclosing zone for a given
name to update. Only after the appropriate zone is found should the
client send an UPDATE message to one of the zone's authoritative
servers. Update clients SHOULD NOT "probe" using UPDATE messages by
walking up the tree to progressively higher-level zones.
2.9 Queries for domain names resembling IP addresses
2.9 Queries for domain names resembling IPv4 addresses
The root name servers receive a significant number of A record
queries where the qname is an IP address. The source of these
queries is unknown. It could be attributed to situations where a
user believes an application will accept either a domain name or an
queries where the QNAME looks like an IPv4 address. The source of
these queries is unknown. It could be attributed to situations where
a user believes an application will accept either a domain name or an
IP address in a given configuration option. The user enters an IP
address, but the application assumes any input is a domain name and
attempts to resolve it, resulting in an A record lookup. There could
@ -719,30 +777,22 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
It would be desirable for the root name servers not to have to answer
these queries: they unnecessarily consume CPU resources and network
bandwidth. One possibility is for iterative resolver implementations
to produce the Name Error response directly. We suggest that
implementors consider the option of synthesizing Name Error responses
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at the iterative resolver. The server could claim authority for
synthesized TLD zones corresponding to the first octet of every
possible IP address, e.g. 1., 2., through 255. This behavior could
be configurable in the (probably unlikely) event that numeric TLDs
are ever put into use.
Another option is to delegate these numeric TLDs from the root zone
to a separate set of servers to absorb the traffic. The "black hole
servers" used by the the AS 112
Project [8], which are currently
delegated the in-addr.arpa zones corresponding to RFC 1918 [7]
private use address space, would be a possible choice to receive
these delegations.
bandwidth. A possible solution is to delegate these numeric TLDs
from the root zone to a separate set of servers to absorb the
traffic. The "black hole servers" used by the AS 112 Project [8],
which are currently delegated the in-addr.arpa zones corresponding to
RFC 1918 [7] private use address space, would be a possible choice to
receive these delegations. Of course, the proper and usual root zone
change procedures would have to be followed to make such a change to
the root zone.
2.10 Misdirected recursive queries
@ -754,10 +804,10 @@ Project [8], which are currently
these queries result from users configuring stub resolvers to query a
root server. (This situation is not hypothetical: we have received
complaints from users when this configuration does not work as
hoped.) Of course, users should not direct stub resolvers to use name
servers that do not offer recursion, but we are not aware of any stub
resolver implementation that offers any feedback to the user when so
configured, aside from simply "not working".
hoped.) Of course, users should not direct stub resolvers to use
name servers that do not offer recursion, but we are not aware of any
stub resolver implementation that offers any feedback to the user
when so configured, aside from simply "not working".
2.10.1 Recommendation
@ -779,19 +829,18 @@ Project [8], which are currently
An entire document could be devoted to the topic of problems with
different implementations of the recursive resolution algorithm. The
entire process of recursion is woefully under specified, requiring
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each implementor to design an algorithm. Sometimes implementors make
poor design choices that could be avoided if a suggested algorithm
and best practices were documented, but that is a topic for another
document.
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Some deficiencies cause significant operational impact and are
therefore worth mentioning here. One of these is name server
selection by an iterative resolver. When an iterative resolver wants
@ -807,19 +856,23 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
produce the most impact in terms of reducing disproportionate query
load among a zone's authoritative servers. I.e., these changes would
help spread the query load evenly.
o Do not make assumptions based on NS RRset order: all NS RRs SHOULD
be treated equally. (In the case of the "com" zone, for example,
most of the root servers return the NS record for
"a.gtld-servers.net" first in the authority section of referrals.
most of the root servers return the NS record for "a.gtld-
servers.net" first in the authority section of referrals.
Apparently as a result, this server receives disproportionately
more traffic than the other 12 authoritative servers for "com".)
o Use all NS records in an RRset. (For example, we are aware of
implementations that hard-coded information for a subset of the
root servers.)
o Maintain state and favor the best-performing of a zone's
authoritative servers. A good definition of performance is
response time. Non-responsive servers can be penalized with an
extremely high response time.
o Do not lock onto the best-performing of a zone's name servers. An
iterative resolver SHOULD periodically check the performance of
all of a zone's name servers to adjust its determination of the
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3. IANA considerations
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4. Security considerations
Name server and resolver misbehaviors identical or similar to those
discussed in this document expose the root and TLD name servers to
increased risk of both intentional and unintentional denial of
service.
The iterative resolver misbehavior discussed in this document exposes
the root and TLD name servers to increased risk of both intentional
and unintentional denial of service attacks.
We believe that implementation of the recommendations offered in this
document will reduce the amount of unnecessary traffic seen at root
@ -950,41 +1003,41 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
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5. Internationalization considerations
We do not believe this document introduces any new
internationalization considerations to the DNS protocol
specification.
There are no new internationalization considerations introduced by
this memo.
6 Normative References
6. Informative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[4] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS Specification",
[3] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS Specification",
RFC 2181, July 1997.
[5] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)", RFC
2308, March 1998.
[4] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)",
RFC 2308, March 1998.
[6] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136, April
1997.
[5] Morishita, Y. and T. Jinmei, "Common Misbehavior Against DNS
Queries for IPv6 Addresses", RFC 4074, May 2005.
[7] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G. and E.
Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC
1918, February 1996.
[6] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136,
April 1997.
[7] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and E.
Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5,
RFC 1918, February 1996.
[8] <http://www.as112.net>
@ -997,7 +1050,7 @@ Authors' Addresses
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
USA
EMail: mlarson@verisign.com
Email: mlarson@verisign.com
@ -1006,9 +1059,10 @@ Authors' Addresses
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Piet Barber
@ -1017,7 +1071,7 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
USA
EMail: pbarber@verisign.com
Email: pbarber@verisign.com
@ -1062,9 +1116,9 @@ Internet-Draft Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior October 2004
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Intellectual Property Statement
@ -1105,7 +1159,7 @@ Disclaimer of Validity
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
@ -1118,6 +1172,5 @@ Acknowledgment
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